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試問怎麼讀《判斷力批判》?

Posted by gustav 
試問怎麼讀《判斷力批判》?

分類標籤: 康德判斷力批判
《判斷力批判》分作兩部份外加一個Appendix:
第一部分:美感判斷力批判(Kritik der Ästhetischen Urteilskraft/Critique of Aesthetic Judgment);
第二部份:目的論判斷力批判 (Kritik der Teleologischen Urteilskraft/ Critique of Teleological Judgment)
Appendix:方法論

當然第一部分的主題是「審美判斷」,第二部份的主題是「目的判斷」;第一部分的本源(princip)是主觀合目的性原理,第二部份是客觀合目的性原理。那,我們就該只把第一部分當作「美學」,而第二部份就當作「目的論」嗎?著名的「康德美學」大家所意指的就是「判斷力批判」的第一部分,更尤甚者有人會說判斷力批判就是美學。似乎說「美感判斷力批判」就是「美學」也不為過。可是,這個批判的名稱是「判斷力批判」,主題是「判斷/判斷力」,那我們是不是應該在隨著康德思索審美判斷與目的判斷的同時,多去關注「判斷」自身,或者至少要帶著這樣的關注去思索這兩種特別的判斷。

另外,《判斷力批判》還帶著一個任務要把第一批判《純粹理性批判》(理論性/認知判斷--科學)以及第二批判《實踐理性批判》(道德判斷--道德)兩個系統(感性世界/ sinnliche Welt/ sensible world的先驗條件與智性世界/intellektuele Welt/ intellectual world的先驗條件)統整起來,就這考量來說,對「判斷」關注更是不能被忽略。因為判斷是形成確定意識的前要條件,而「我們得透過確定意識去認識才有經驗(康德第一批判的第一原理)」。

此外,如果我們的哲學活動不是以「概念釐清」為目的而已,也不只滿足於「文字的琢磨」,我們更不應該只把《判斷力批判》當作美學與目的論而已,因為我們得實際以「判斷批判判斷」,逃不了判斷的,當我們這麼做的時候,我們會發現美學不只是美學,而目的論不只是目的論,而「判斷」會變成理論哲學(第一批判)與實踐哲學(第二批判)的「形上之思」(META-philosophy)--當然這裡的「形上」是先驗意義的形上,不是傳統形上學的意義下的形上。


[名詞解釋] (credit & responsibility: gustav)
批判:在先驗哲學的架構下,以某認識活動對該認識活動自身的認識,藉以確定該認識活動的確為一必要的、根源的認識活動,進而在整個整體的活動當中找到、確定該活動的位置(與系統的官能)並且看清楚該活動的界域。

先驗:凡先驗的,就是先於經驗但使經驗成為可能並給予經驗必然形式的,而在經驗中於是可稱呼它作即於經驗的。先驗關係是一種特殊的因果關係,是因果同時的關係,有別於認識(認知)當中的異時因果關係。

判斷:經由判斷活動,心智的內在確定性形成,而形成意識(這是種特殊的因果關係,切不可解讀為一般的因果關係)。是心智在未定狀態與確定狀態之間的過渡。



Edited 5 time(s). Last edit at 06/27/2009 08:02AM by gustav.
(編輯記錄)

Purposiveness (purposefulness) as well as Kant's "as-if" metaphor is the key. What is the inference of "intuitive, imaginary" purposiveness onto phenomenon and noumenon? Without "as-if" purposefulness (deternimating judgment), science cannot be possible, and without "as-if" purposefulness (reflective judgment), morality cannot be possible.

"Purposiveness" sounds like an object of cognition in your question, which is quite worrying.

Basically speaking, the purposiveness or as-if principle (look as if there WERE a rule for a determination in a judgment) is about certain extra causality required for human aware experience other than the natural causality. On the one hand, such an extra causality makes experience in space and time possible for it "offers" formal conformity so that (a) appearance must be so perceived in space and time under logic and (b) thus phenomena must be thinkable. Therefore, such a principle in our awareness yields the ground for science. On the other hand, such an extra causality (a) makes it possible that certain act of a "person" belongs to this "person" ( similar to the formal conformity between an object cognized and the object in one's cognition/self-awareness, the act which is the effect of certain concept of a person (reason/purpose/motive etc.), is formally determined to belong to that person); (b) the pure intelligent being that human being can access or involve in human's pure awareness (namely, person in "freedom"), is the only thing intelligent (among other pure ideas, or "transcendental paralogisms/illusions in the First Critique, such as God, soul etc. ) left via the most radical self-critique of awareness itself, which is also provided as the proof for the possible "practical" employment of pure reason; (a) and (b) altogether give a solid account and a finer understanding of morality, and the humanity.

"Purposiveness" sounds like an object of cognition in your question, which is quite worrying.
re: Confusing enough. According to Kant (3rd Critique, not 1st theoretical and 2nd practical), with my interpretation, Purposiveness is an a priori principle of judgment (or may called a priori legislating principle. It legislates the principle for itself). It is subjective, yet arguably, Kant tried to prove its universality/communicability/suitability. And Kant left necessity clause to possibility/contingency. Therefore, the infamous "as-if" was invented and used in philosophical language ever since. Purposiveness with its subjectivity nature accompanying with pseudo objectivity tendency, Kant arguably imposed it to cognized objects (nature), and imposed it to thing-in-itself (freedom, morality, god, and so forth.) In the final, Kant still reminded us, after all it "is" AS-IF (in order to be consistent with his noumenon unknownability claim.)

Speaking causality, 3rd Critique, to my knowledge, Kant only concerned causality with regard to Nature/Science, i.e. theoretical judgments. I will think it through for another reply to you.

Basically speaking, the purposiveness or as-if principle (look as if there WERE a rule for a determination in a judgment) is about certain extra causality required for human aware experience other than the natural causality.
re: Kant defined purposiveness as the causality of a concept with regard to its object. Is this the "certain extra causality" you mentioned? My read: the conceptual causality (as some calls it) was explained when purposiveness employs concept with one of its category: causality. This is purposiveness used in nature - the territory of the theoretical philosophy. To me, this "causality" has nothing to do with the inception of purposiveness, which is an a priori of the faculty of judgment.

On the one hand, such an extra causality makes experience in space and time possible for it "offers" formal conformity so that (a) appearance must be so perceived in space and time under logic and (b) thus phenomena must be thinkable. Therefore, such a principle in our awareness yields the ground for science.
re: In addition to borrow the a priori of the faculty of pure reason (the form: space and time, and the categories), the reflecting judgment does the job (i.e. to deduct a particular to universal, to transform complexity to simplicity, to conform parts to whole, and to understand the unthinkable) under the dynamics of purposiveness. Your description is close enough.

On the other hand, such an extra causality (a) makes it possible that certain act of a "person" belongs to this "person" ( similar to the formal conformity between an object cognized and the object in one's cognition/self-awareness, the act which is the effect of certain concept of a person (reason/purpose/motive etc.), is formally determined to belong to that person); (b) the pure intelligent being that human being can access or involve in human's pure awareness (namely, person in "freedom"), is the only thing intelligent (among other pure ideas, or "transcendental paralogisms/illusions in the First Critique, such as God, soul etc. )
re: The reflecting judgment does the job for the realm of practical reason; in analogous to that for the realm of pure reason. However, both employment of reflecting judgment are regulative, not constitutive.

left via the most radical self-critique of awareness itself, which is also provided as the proof for the possible "practical" employment of pure reason; (a) and (b) altogether give a solid account and a finer understanding of morality, and the humanity.
re: Under the notion of "regulative" and the notion of free will, the "understanding" aspect of morality is unattainable other than to practice/legislate it. To me, Kant's "proof", strictly speaking, is a transcendental deduction substantiated by providing "obvious" pseudo-empirical evidence.

1.
I think, when the categories of causality in understanding is employed, the purposive causality is something objective while the object of such purposive/causal relation is in space & time. Yet, the purposiveness in the as-if regularity of something no rule of understanding can be employed at all, is something a priori. If we are talking about natural causality, yes! it is true that the formal conformity between the awareness and the object of that awareness has nothing to do with causality. Based on this ground, Kant would have such as phrase that the "relation" in a judgment of taste is "purposiveness without a purpose" for a purpose is exactly the "concept" of understanding which is to be employed and contribute natural causality.

As for the case of morality, free will is the cause of a phenomenal act, and it is at this point Kant needs another kind of causality, because will, metaphorically speaking, links something pure/intelligent with something phenomenal. Such a causal relation itself must thus not be empirical.

However, Kant thinks that the content of a free will must be conceptual so that universal practical laws could be possible and so that the pure intelligent can be thinkable without any need of sensible expression, which we can also agree, and then, it is not obscure to mention about "causality" in the practical employment of reason.

As for the subjective purposiveness (the one without a concept/purpose), it refers to the relation between faculties. A typical case is the free play between understanding and imagination. Since the free play is the a priori ground for the pure pleasure, the play itself is something not in space and time; if the faculties have to have "effect" upon each other -- actually, this is a question to all faculties in all employment of reason, then how should we put such a causality. Doesn't "purposiveness without a purpose" means "causality without a concept"? How far can "such causality without a concept" and the causality of freedom different -- namely, what is the symbolic structure between beauty and morality? These are the questions we have to continue, I believe.

2.
We can agree with Kant in the Critique of Practical Reason that there is no deduction for practical reason because morality does not appear -- only recognized intelligibly, but that the universal communicability of practical laws can be taken as the proof for the practical employment of pure reason ("preface").

Very clear explanation. So I learned, thanks for your professionalism. This tells apart academia from amateur.

On the notion of "what is the symbolic structure between beauty and morality?" I am interested to know your view (and/or current status) regarding the connection between Kant's aesthetics and teleology deduction? An onging research topic I believe.

-- A close look at the term causality is needed when it is used . We, as well as Kant use causal relationship so readily. The possible "recursion" constitutes Kant's concern and hardship - to explain judgment by using judgment.

Thanks for the discussion!
I look forward to further discussion with you.