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gustav Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > 1. > I think, when the categories of causality in > understanding is employed, the purposive causality > is something objective while the object of such > purposive/causal relation is in space & time. Yet, > the purposiveness in the as-if regularity of > something no rule of understanding can be employed > at all, is something a priori. If we are talking > about natural causality, yes! it is true that the > formal conformity between the awareness and the > object of that awareness has nothing to do with > causality. Based on this ground, Kant would have > such as phrase that the "relation" in a judgment > of taste is "purposiveness without a purpose" for > a purpose is exactly the "concept" of > understanding which is to be employed and > contribute natural causality. > > As for the case of morality, free will is the > cause of a phenomenal act, and it is at this point > Kant needs another kind of causality, because > will, metaphorically speaking, links something > pure/intelligent with something phenomenal. Such a > causal relation itself must thus not be empirical. > > > However, Kant thinks that the content of a free > will must be conceptual so that universal > practical laws could be possible and so that the > pure intelligent can be thinkable without any need > of sensible expression, which we can also agree, > and then, it is not obscure to mention about > "causality" in the practical employment of reason. > > > As for the subjective purposiveness (the one > without a concept/purpose), it refers to the > relation between faculties. A typical case is the > free play between understanding and imagination. > Since the free play is the a priori ground for the > pure pleasure, the play itself is something not in > space and time; if the faculties have to have > "effect" upon each other -- actually, this is a > question to all faculties in all employment of > reason, then how should we put such a causality. > Doesn't "purposiveness without a purpose" means > "causality without a concept"? How far can "such > causality without a concept" and the causality of > freedom different -- namely, what is the symbolic > structure between beauty and morality? These are > the questions we have to continue, I believe. > > > 2. > We can agree with Kant in the Critique of > Practical Reason that there is no deduction for > practical reason because morality does not appear > -- only recognized intelligibly, but that the > universal communicability of practical laws can be > taken as the proof for the practical employment of > pure reason ("preface").