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Thank you for your reply. As I point out in the later part of the article, the two concepts/technical terms "appearance" and "intuition" are distinct from each other quite fuzzily. And at this part exactly shows the systematical discrepancy between Kant's and Dignaga's epistemology (Dignaga holds that the ultimate truth falls in appearance, i.e., to Dignaga appearance is the true perception, and the reproduced intuition is not true perception; while Kant holds that the truth is the proper relation between intuition and concept which has some a priori basis, and at best we can relate ourselves with appearance in our very way of experience/awareness only in beauty). The two terms are basically divided sharply by appearance being indeterminate while intuition being either indeterminate or determined. The division in Kant is not kept in consistency as well. But there is some reason for the inclarity, and of course for the division of "particular/perception" into "appearance" and "intuition".

In the paragraph you were mentioning, I write "Fifth, the particulars in our experience is fuzzy that they are both manifold and singular" which has hints as well abou the above inclarity. To put more precisely, the particular object, or aspect of object, in our awareness in Kant has been characterized as manifold and singular. Appearance is the idealized aspect of the origin of the manifoldness in our experience; intuition is the idealized aspect of origin of the particularity which does not loose the manifoldness.

Thank you for your reply. As I point out in the later part of the article, the two concepts/technical terms "appearance" and "intuition" are distinct from each other quite fuzzily. And at this part exactly shows the systematical discrepancy between Kant's and Dignaga's epistemology (Dignaga holds that the ultimate truth falls in appearance, i.e., to Dignaga appearance is the true perception-- true intution in dialogue with Kant, , and the reproduced intuition is not true perception; while Kant holds that the truth is the proper relation between intuition and concept which has some a priori basis, and at best we can relate ourselves with appearance in our very way of experience/awareness only in beauty). The two terms are basically divided sharply by appearance being indeterminate while intuition being either indeterminate or determined. The division in Kant is not kept in consistency as well. But there is some reason for the inclarity, and of course for the division of "particular/perception" into "appearance" and "intuition".

Thank you for your reply. As I point out in the later part of the article, the two concepts/technical terms "appearance" and "intuition" are distinct from each other quite fuzzily. And at this part exactly shows the systematical discrepancy between Kant's and Dignaga's epistemology (Dignaga holds that the ultimate truth falls in appearance, i.e., to Dignaga appearance is the true perception-- true intution in dialogue with Kant, and the reproduced intuition is not true perception; while Kant holds that the truth is the proper relation between intuition and concept which has some a priori basis, and at best we can relate ourselves with appearance in our very way of experience/awareness in beauty). The two terms are basically divided sharply by appearance being indeterminate while intuition being either indeterminate or determined. The division in Kant is not kept in consistency as well. But there is some reason for the inclarity., and of course for the division of "particular/perception" into "appearance" and "intuition".

Thank you for your reply. As I point out in the later part of the article, the two concepts/technical terms "appearance" and "intuition" are distinct from each other quite fuzzily. And at this part exactly shows the systematical discrepancy between Kant's and Dignaga's epistemology (Dignaga holds that the ultimate truth falls in appearance, i.e., to Dignaga appearance is the true perception-- true intution in dialogue with Kant, and the reproduced intuition is not true perception; while Kant holds that the truth is the proper relation between intuition and concept which has some a priori basis, and at best we can relate ourselves with appearance in our very way of experience/awareness in beauty). The two terms are basically divided sharply by appearance being indeterminate while intuition being either indeterminate or determined. The division in Kant is not kept in consistency as well. But there is some reason for the inclarity.