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gustav Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > Week02: Self-Positioning > > Personal problem: I am familiar with Kant and find > great correspondence regarding the philosophical > methods between Kant and the later > phenomenologists (like Heidegger, Husserl, even up > to Searle) who always claim, or are claimed, that > they hold different philosophical views from Kant, > to which I always have to honestly dissent. I on > the other hand dare not call myself a Kantian, for > being familiar with equals not being professional > about. Now I am here facing the subject > “Buddhist Phenomenology,” reading Mr. Smith's > introduction to Husserl's theory of intenionality > and feeling his interpretative inclination toward > “targeting” rather than a balance with > “immediateness” on the Husserlian > “directedness,” I have a lot of troubles. One > one out is to get Kant, Husserl and so on clear, > which happens to be too much effort to me for the > time being. I think I better stick to the problem, > learn from their methods and observations, and try > to figure myself out. That's my present > self-positioning. > > Transcendental Idealism: I think Transcendental > Idealism is the only suitable ideology for > phenomenology. “Transcendental” is the spirit > to turn the manner of study from one that intends > to see the world as an ontological object and then > to investigate how we are or are becoming in it, > to one that intends to investigate first how we > experience everything and then to clarify the very > target of the investigation itself. > “Transcendental Idealism” is an ideology to > regard the conditions, which on the one hand > constrain and on the other hand make possible all > possible experiences, as ideal rather than real; > the conditions include forms such as “time,” > “space,” “categories” etc. and their > corresponding powers. As long as you buy that the > conditions are real, you accept that your power to > communicate with (perceive, understand, act with > etc.) “the world” can grasp “the world” in > real. To a great extend I think that our power can > grasp “the world” in real, is contradictory to > phenomenology. But frankly I am still arguing for > this thought. However, for a practical reason, the > Transcendental Idealism as an ideololgy enables us > to break our ultimate morbid persistence which is > the source of various kinds of sorrow. If to be > happy is what we want, maybe for this reason we > have to consider to replace Transcendental > Realistism with Transcendental Idealism. > > A suggestion: The starting point to do > Transcendental Idealism, I think, is to accept the > methodolgical frame: substance-substratum > relation. If substance is all that which is ever > conscios, and if all that which is conscious is > transcendentally conditioned, we have to ideally > assume that there's a substratum substrating and > making possible the substance. Based on Kant's > critique, we can ideally assume that the > substratum is systematic, and the substance is > functional. Whenever the system operates, > functions are given. If the system allows the > function to be self-aware, spacio-temporal, and to > have meaningful, logical intrenet of expereinces > and its counterrevolution (that is, freedom; > nevertheless, something as a counterrevolution > does not necessarily imply to be the consequence), > i.e., if the function has to be given as such, > i.e., if we in our very experience can only > expereicne as such and not otherwise, we should > take the system and especially its internal > structure for granted ideally (I think to Husserl, > Heidegger, Frege, Searle, it's been taken for > granted really). The investigation can only take > place in substance, so the systematical substratum > is only a necessary ideal assumption. > > Self-Positioning: Transcendental Idealism allows > for Empirical Realism; when we ideally take the > transcendental conditions for granted, we accept > that our experience is real and scientifically > investgatable; if we take the conditions for > granted as real, we extend reality beyond our > conscious experience. When our experience is real > and scientifically investgatable, the observation > such as consciouness has the features of retention > and pretention in time, or extension in space etc. > makes sense only then. On the contrary, if we take > the observed features as real structural elements > of the conditions, then we are not > phenomelologists any more, rather we become more > like rationalists.