MEPO Forum :: 佛教現象學

gustav Wrote:
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> Wang, Chun-Ying 
> 97154502
> Buddhist Phenomenology 
> Professor Chen Kuo Lin
> 
> Week05:  
> 1. How Husserl and Kant approach differently to
> the “of”?
> 2. How to “regard” the reflection?
> 
> 1.
> Husserl's shift of focus from the objects of
> consciousness onto the consciousness of objects
> share the same end with Kant's idea of
> “Critique”-- they both focus on the “of”
> of “the consciousness of something,” but they
> approach to the end by different ways. Husserl
> tries to abstract “ideal meaning” through
> which something becomes conscious. (And Smith
> claims such an approach is “transcenendental”
> (pp. 261), which is very distasteful to me.) Kant
> tries to abstract the inevitable forms in
> consciousness. The former approach leads Husserl
> to his method of brackets (attitude of suspending
> the object) and quotations (ascending our 
> awareness from experience to reflection). The
> latter approach leads Kant to his discovery of the
> transcendental plan of our mind.  
> 
> 2.
> Reflection means to think about the acts of
> consciousness in Husserl, according to Smith. And
> the way to get phenemenoligical description of our
> acts of consciousness is first to bracket the
> object of consciousness and then to asend, by
> series of quoting, from the experience to the way
> the conscious experience becomes possible.
> Accordingly, Husserl thinks “the way” has to
> do with “relations of entailment among
> propositions and the sematic correlations of
> meanings with object in the world” (237). Such a
> process is, on the one hand one is suspending the
> object of consciousness and on the other one is
> describing how the object begins to make sense to
> the experiencing subject. 
> 
> Reflection means to Kant the way (i) how our
> capacities of mind work together as a mingled web,
> (ii)  how each capacity comes to “function”
> spontaneously with its own proper domain, so it is
> (iii) the principle the mind disciplines itself
> and thus (iv) as a pre-condition of rationality.
> To “grasp” reflection, one has to “feel”
> how the mind works (properly). This means, one
> should focus on “the consciousness of
> something” while being aware of how every
> capacity is contributing its “function” in the
> “proper way.” I think in Kant there are two
> occasions one has direct access to reflection: in
> the substitution of concepts for the same object
> (i.e., in free play, in the judgment of the
> beautiful), or in the “cognition in general,”
> i.e., when one is very culticated in judging,
> i.e., very acquainted with his own power, one
> cognizes his own power.