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gustav Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > Between the Indeterminate and the Determined-- > from the Viewpoints of Dignaga and Kant. > Also an Attempt to Reconcile Epistemoligists and > Metaphysicians > > As Dan Arnold in his “Is Svasamvitti > Transcendental?”[1] has captured, there seems to > always exist a tension between epistemological > approach and metaphysical approach towards the > most urgent yet lasting question – what's going > on with our very own existence and how we can > better it. In the early middle age India there > were Dignaga's epistemology and the following > debate between Madhyamika opponents and Dignaga's > advocates regarding the issue self-awareness > (svasamvitti); in the eighteenth to the early > nineteenth century Europe, there were Kant's > epistemology and the following debate on the same > issue between the anti-epistemic German-idealist > reconstructors and the epistemologist-Kant's > sympathisers. With presenting the parallel, as > well as with entangling these two lines so that > the both ends on the one line reflects upon their > comrades on the other, Dan Arnold tries to > demonstrate how a transcendental reconstruction of > Dignaga's epistemology in Kant's fashion (Dan > Arnold's interpretation of Santaraksita's comment > on Dignaga) could help out the middle age Indian > epistemologists from the attacks of Madhyamika > thinkers and thus suggests a positive answer to > the proposed question: Dignaga's svasamvitti as > reconstructed by Santaraksita is indeed > transcendental. In this article, as a supplement, > I attempt to argue that with Dignaga's own > teachings alone in the Pramanasamuccaya, Dignaga's > pramanavada agrees with Kant's transcendental > idealism. And then, after the transcendental > nature of both epistemologies get assured, I will > focus on the relation between Dignaga's perception > and inference and the relation between Kant's > intuition and concept; on the one hand, I will try > to clarify their systematical difference, and on > the other, I will try to reconcile the two systems > with a “schematic” reconstruction in terms of > the swing between the indeterminate and the > determined. Hopefully the effort here could also > resolve the antinomy that epistemology such as > Kant's and Dignaga's is a righteous course and > that metaphysics such as Madhyamika's is a > righteous course, too, regarding the most urgent > and lasting question. > > > Kant distinguishes “transcendent” and > “transcendental” as “not interchangeable > terms” in the beginning of his “Transcendental > Dialectic” in Critique of Pure Reason, CPR, > where he entitles the principles “whose > application is confined entirely within the limits > of possible experience, immanent,” i.e., > transcendental, while the principles “which > profess to pass beyond these limits, > transcendent.” (CPR A 296/B 352) Also, the > transcendental is distinguished from the empirical > that the latter must be obtained via the > employment of sensibility and thus must be a > posteriori, while the former must come a priori, > i.e., must be required so that the employment of > sensibility is possible; the knowledge a > posteriori must be the result of our apperception, > via which our consciousness arises, while the > knowledge a priori is the condition of our > apperception and thus known to us in our > consciousness yet as form or as transcendental > ideas. Clearly we can see that the division > between the transcendental and empirical is a > division of the origin of knowledge and/or > awareness and the effect of that origin; due to > such a division, our knowledge and awareness are > thus allowed to be characterized with two aspects: > form and matter. In his Critique of Judgment, CJ, > where the employment of our cognitive power is > further characterized as an ability about > “determination.” This development, I believe, > is a further exploration of the primordial status > of apperception and judgment, namely, his > so-called “transcendental reflection” in CPR, > the form of judgment prior to all judgments, one > which makes possible the reference of a concept to > an intuition. It is in this part of his > transcendental task the notion of transcendental > is put in a brighter light. > > In Kant's theory of threefold synthesis in CPR, > the notion of transcendental is presented in a > mechanical fashion: via the synthesis of > apperception, the inner determination of our > mind[2] is accomplished, that is, our mind becomes > conscious of the object of the determination which > is always accompanied by self-awareness, a > thought[3], too. The synthesis is then taken as > the condition of our consciousness and thus of our > all possible experiences. It is said in the > deductions (the first edition mainly) of CPR that > in order for experience to be possible at all, the > apprehension of intuition, the reproduction in > imagination and the recognition in concept must > already be united in a schema; this is the > condition of all possible experience. To put in a > fashion more critical, we have our experience as > such must be resulted from a system in > coordination as such a priori which causes, i.e., > conditions and makes possible, the experience as > such, or otherwise, the aspects of our experience > (appearance, intuition, and concept) cannot > co-occur in our experience as in unity. > > In CJ, judgment is divided into determined and > reflective (indeterminate); in the former, the > association of imagination is based on the rules > of a concept which the object of the association > is to be known about, while in the latter, the > association of imagination gives a basis for > understanding to apply various concepts to. To put > in less Kantian technical vocabulary, judgment is > an ability of locating a particular as, i.e., in > imagination, contained under a universal; when the > universal is given and the judgment subsumes a > particular under it, this is determined; when only > the particular is given and the universal has to > be found for it, the judgment is reflective. Kant > describes our judgments as the interactions > between the faculty of rules, understanding, and > the faculty of association, imagination. In a > determined judgment, understanding offers a set of > rules which is implied by a concept while > imagination associates in accordance with the > rules. To characterize this with the model in CPR, > imagination relates the synthesized manifold > intuition α as well as the appearance X, i.e., > manifold of sense through the synopsis of the > manifold a priori, in accordance with the > conceptual unity 'α' of this synthesis through > transcendental apperception. Once the condition is > satisfied, the judgment that the particular X/α > is subsumed under the universal 'α' is made, from > which arises the consciousness of an α which is > known as a case of the governing concept 'α' as > well. In an indeterminate judgment, imagination > creates an object X which understanding keeps > trying to find a concept for. To characterize this > with the model in CPR again, the particular X is > given (in nature) or created (in art) first > through imagination, and various universals such > as 'α', 'β', 'γ', 'δ' etc. are tried to be > found to grasp the manifold X when imagination at > the same time reproduces intuitions α, β, γ, δ > etc. Here Kant has actually presented to us a > further exploration of the transcendental. > > First, we have experience without exception in > such coordination, and hence we gain the reason to > idealize a system coordinated as such. Second, the > idealized system must be the origin and cause of > our experience for we so idealize it. Third, the > necessary coordination in our experience is that > in every instance of consciousness there must be a > relation between a particular and a universal, so > we idealize a system with two faculties as the > epistemic origins of the particulars and the > universals respectively. Fourth, in order to > approve the ontological commitment so that our > daily life, our interactions with the world, the > interpersonal activities and morality can make > sense at all, we must take it for granted that the > particulars have external cause. But to our > experience, our consciousness must come after the > employment of sense, imagination and apperception, > and hence we have no idea at all about the > external cause except for such a causal > commitment. Fifth, the particulars in our > experience is fuzzy that they are both manifold > and singular. This is schemed in CPR and explained > in CJ. In the former, the manifold of the > particulars have their origin in the sense, > perhaps with a relation to the conceptualization, > that we are given the form of sense as manifold, > and they can be reproduced in imagination and > cognized in concept. In the latter, when > imagination becomes an ability that not only > produces and reproduces intuitions with the ways > of association originated from understanding, but > can create as well something indeterminable (the > appreciation of nature or the artistic object in > imagination are created), something as manifold as > the manifold of sense through the synopsis of the > manifold a priori and yet welcome to a lot of, > even all possible conceptions. We can see the > critical role imagination plays in our > idealization here; it links the three modes of > synthesis in the idealized coordination system. > The so-far so-called idealization distinguishes > itself for its self-referential nature, i.e., on > the one hand the idealized system is directly > inferred from the necessity in experience while > the necessity in experience is deduced from the > idealization; on the other, it is so idealized > that the idealized system is the cause of > experience as its function and that because of our > experience has such forms we can have good reason > supporting such an idealization. This kind of > idealism is thus distinguished from what he calls > “empirical idealism” (including dogmatic > idealism such as Berkeley's and sceptic idealism > such as Descartes's) which in general is potential > to lead to the conclusion of mistrust of the > particulars; in dogmatic idealism the objects of > sensation, i.e., the objects in space, is merely > imagined, while in sceptic idealism the objects of > sensation cannot be established, and only the > inner objects, the objects in time, can be > indubitable. And the ground for such a premature > conclusion is that the idealization is made in > experience so that the idealized are regarded as > empirically reachable entities, either as > something we are totally live in though it is only > imaginary, or as something we can directly cognize > and completely indubitable and veiling up the > particular making it mediate. From here, the > transcendental is shown as the nature of such a > distinguished idealization that the idealized is > put into the position of the systematical cause of > the systematical function (experience) and as the > condition which gives forms to the function, and > via the conditioning the idealization can be > reasonable at all. Consequentially, we do not give > up any of the particular and the universal; > moreover, we preserve the manifold and immediate > nature of the particular and the determined and > mediate nature of the universal in well > explanation, as how we indeed experience. To > concretely define the scope of the transcendental > nature, the relation between the particular and > the universal has to be regarded in the position > of an idealized cause only whose result enables > any of us to know things. If it is the particular > alone or the universal alone that is idealized, > the idealization is made solely in our knowledge, > that is, the relation between the particular and > the universal is linked empirically, either as an > empirical induction from the direct particular to > the indirect universal or as an empirical > inference from the direct universal to the > indirect particular. > > > Stick to the above characterization of Kant's > transcendental idealism, we can find that > Dignaga's epistemology meets the spirit of it in > terms of the following two points. On the one > hand, Dignaga holds that there's a causal > relation, which yet makes no distinction, between > means of cognition and cognition as result and > there's correspondence between the forms of the > result and the original means. On the other, he > holds that the sharply divided two means of > cognition are divided in the origin, rejecting > valid reachable independent universals (such as > Descartes's the indubitable), recognizing > conceptualization to be part of valid cognition, > i.e., rejecting the independent particular as mere > imaginary. Both points can be conveniently shown > in Masaaki Hattori's comments (Note 1.9.) in his > translation of Pramanasamuccaya[4]: “Dignaga's > theory is unique on each of these four points: (1) > He recognizes perception (pratyaksa) and inference > (anumana) as the only two means of cognition, and > does not admit verbal testimony (sabda), > identification (upamana,), etc. as independent > means of cognition... (2) He characterizes > perception as “being free from conceptual > construction” (kalpanapodha), and does not > recognize determinate perception > (savikalpala-pratyaksa) as a kind of perception... > (3) He sharply distinguishes the particular > (svalaksana) and the universal (samanya-laksana), > which are respectively the objects of perception > and inference. He denies the reality either of the > universal as an independent entity or of the > particular as qualified by the universal... (4) > Rejecting the realist's distinction between the > means and the result of cognition, he establishes > the theory of non-distinction between the two” > – Dignaga writes “we do not admit, as the > realists do, that the resulting cognition > (pramanaphala) differs from the means of cognition > (pramana). The resulting cognition arises bearing > in itself the forms of the cognized object and > thus is understood to include the act of cognizing > (savyapara)” (k. 7cd-8ab.) and “it can be > maintained that the self-cognition or the > cognition cognizing itself (svasamvitti) is here > the result of the act of cognizing” (k. 9a.) … > “because the determination of the object > (artha-niscaya) conforms with it, viz., with the > self-cognition” (k. 9b.). > > Before I mixed the two epistemologies from the > viewpoint of determination versus indeterminacy, I > have to point out the systematical discrepancy > between the two and also clarify the issue of > Kant's I-think as a thought while Dignaga's > svasamvitti, self-awareness, as an intuition, > which is also noticed by Dan Arnold. > > Although both rejects the reality of independent > universal (mere conceptual construction without a > proper particular for it), Kant and Dignaga holds > different views of truth: Kant tempts to take as > truth the proper reference between the particular > and the universal, whereas Dignaga groups the > particular as qualified by universal, i.e., > determined perception, with the untrue cases, > embracing the particular which can never be > generalized or conceptualized as truth. Moreover, > the distinction between intuition and concept in > Kant and the distinction between perception and > inference in Dignaga are not well-paralleled. To > Kant it is not sharply divided between appearance > (manifold of sense through the synopsis of the > manifold a priori) and intuition, both being the > object and product of imagination, while to > Dignaga the determined particular is not true > perception, only the indeterminate perception is > perception. Due to the discrepancy, there occurs > the chance for the issue whether Dignaga and Kant > disagree with each other on the nature of > self-awareness being a perception or a thought. > > The issue can be conveniently get passed by > bringing Dignaga's words: “even conceptual > construction, when it is brought to internal > awareness, is admitted as a type of perception. > However, with regard to the external object, the > conceptual construction is not admissible as > perception, because it conceptualizes the > object.” (k. 7ab) To Kant, the unity of > apperception must be a thought, I-think, that > unites the manifold of sense and the manifold of > intuition; the thought here is not an empirical > thought, but a transcendental thought which > conditions and makes possible the self-awareness > in cognition. Actually we can observe here that > Kant's self-awareness and Dignaga's self-awareness > do not equate each other: first, Kant presents the > notion in transcendental vocabulary, while Dignaga > presents the notion not in such a strong > distinction between a priori and a postiriori; > moreover, Kant's talking about self-awareness is > confined mostly within the scope of being the > unity of apperception while Dignaga tends to > include the inner feelings, which to Kant would > also be intuition yet merely as empirical one and > hence not included in the talking. Nonetheless we > can explain as well that Dignaga takes the > conceptualization unity as part of perception, > too, with his own explanation that such a > conceptualization is not one over an object, but a > mental activity which is brought into internal > awareness. But, there's much more to talk about > in this issue. Because Kant emphasizes more on the > reference between the particular and the > universal, stowing away the fuzzy relation between > indeterminate particular and the determined > particular by assigning both tasks under > imagination's shoulder, his major goal is > naturally set at explaining how such a reference > can be possible, as consequence of which the > uniting side of the transcendental unity pops out > as the core nature of self-awareness. However, in > CJ, we can find Kant moves his attention on the > united side of the transcendental unity --indeed, > in CPR, Kant already holds that the intuition has > to be ready for conceptualization; however, in CJ, > he reaches the principle of purposivessness which > works in the relation between imagination and > understanding and in the relation of the object of > imagination and the object of understanding, and > he gets closer to the standpoint that the > indeterminate judgement is prior to determined > judgment. On the contrary, to Dignaga what is > important is the manifoldness of perception, the > independent particularity. Unlike Kant's holding > the firm ground of how the particular is > determined so that the indeterminacy becomes the > pursue, Dignaga embraces the indeterminacy in the > outset so that it becomes an issue needing > explained that in a valid cognition, how the > conceptual construction can be admitted as > perception, i.e., self-awareness. But the > significance of the above-mentioned meeting of the > two directions (from uniting side to the united > side and the reverse) lies at one common goal of > both projects: there must be two transcendental > origins/means so that its result, the cognition, > is possible as such – as with two aspects: the > particular and the universal; there must be a > transcendental unity of the two means as the cause > and origin of our cognition as such, so that we > can experience as such – as with the reference > between the particular and the universal; the > transcendental unity must be the idealized origin > of what we attribute with “I” and hence it > must be a combination of the uniting and the > united. It is at this very point that Kant and > Dignaga departs away from each other: Kant grasps > firmly the combination so that the empirical > reality is committed, while Dignaga leaves the > combination and embraces the united, or better, > the to-be-united, in order to get close to which > an epistemology as such (making clear with strict > and careful critique and excluding step by step > the uniting conceptions, then the particular as > qualified by the uniting conceptions, helps reach > the to-be-united) must be made. > > Dignaga's refusing the determined particular to > be the untruth corresponds to Madhyamika's > distinction between the ultimate truth and the > conventional truth (二諦), whereas his admitting > perception and inference can be altogether > transcendentally idealized may upset the > Madhyamika thinkers for in consequence this > admitting could blur the sharp distinction between > the ultimate and the conventional. The worry can > be eased by arguing that, not forgetting the > distinction of perception and inference lies in > idealization and hence as mere forms or aspects of > reality so that we should not simply identify > perception with the ultimate truth and identify > inference with the conventional truth, the sharp > distinction between ultimate truth and the > conventional truth is safe because the distinction > is actually a distinction between the > transcendental and the empirical: before > determined and cognized, perception is > indeterminate, the apperceptive result of which, > viz., pramanaphala, however must be always > determinedly known – both perception and > inference being transcendental means makes no harm > to the distinction of their being transcendental > ideas and their being forms/aspects of cognition. > What is ultimately true is the indeterminable > perception with manifoldness, which is thus > ineffable unless in symbolism, but in order to > assure a workable and moreover valuable > conventional reality, it is significant to insist > the inference must be properly related with > perception, inference here including at once the > conventional languages and especially the > symbolisms targeting the true perception, such as > theologies, metaphysics etc. – significant as > Dignaga's doing pramanavada that expresses the two > aspects of cognition are originated from two means > of cognition and yet resulting in single cognition > with two aspects, the particular and the > universal, as well as Kant's idealizing those > conceptual constructions for which no intuitions > can be found and admitting the rest as physically > true with the firm groundwork a priori expressed > in CPR that the appearance (manifold sensible > awareness a priori), intuition (sensible awareness > a posteriori) and concept of an empirical object > are transcendentally united. Only after assuring > the valid inference and physical reality and its > relation to the pre-cognitive state, our views of > the conventional truth and the ultimate truth can > both at once be well explained and well > re-oriented (oriented in accordance with what is > given to us) so that paralogical symbolisms > targeting the ultimate which greatly enhance > people's confusion can be avoided. > > Kant's final effort in his critical philosophy > sketches the swing between the determined and the > indeterminable. What is cognized is what is > determined; and determination is made through > imagination's following understanding's rules in > association producing intuition. But the > pre-cognized intuition, viz., appearance, which is > part of the apperception in its origin but loses > the indeterminacy in its result, gives to > cognition nonetheless the characteristic of the > manifoldness as openness to all possibilities of > conception and readiness for all possible > conceptualization. With such a basis a priori we > are able to obtain a united, determined awareness > so that we know and know about (in analysis) > something, and with the same basis we are able to > produce various intuitions (particularly > determined awareness) in relating to the intuition > itself (pre-cognitive perception with a manifold > synopsis) in “free-play” to “appreciate” > something when various concepts to match the > indeterminable intuition can keep occurring and > along holding up various correspondent particular > intuitive awareness of it; because of such > purposiveness of the employment of understanding > and the employment of intuition, that intuition > and concept are necessarily (such a necessity is > assured for the unity's being transcendental) > referable, first, the indeterminable can be known > determined, and second, with the determined the > indeterminable is witnessed. The significance of > the above is, as Hattori comments on Dignaga: > “rejecting the realist's distinction between the > means and the result of cognition, he establishes > the theory of non-distinction between the two” > (Note 1.9.), first, although the known is always > determined, since the known must have the aspect > of indeterminacy, for there is the > conceptual-unity-based crossover between the > manifold a priori and the manifold a posteriori, > the pre-cognitive indeterminable, i.e., the > manifold of sense through the synopsis of the > manifold a priori, must agree in form with the > indeterminate witnessed with the determined, i.e., > the openness to all possible conceptions and the > readiness for all possible conceptualizations; and > then, the intuition which is accompanied with a > proper reference to its counterpart concept, i.e., > Dignaga's “determined perception” is identical > with the indeterminable perception, for if we > exhaust all possible ways of presenting the > intuition, i.e., if we apply all possible concepts > to the intuition so that the intuition's all > possible aspects are shown in unity – in the > intuition itself alone, i.e., if we appreciate > freely the object, the known object is directly > the true perception, the indeterminable a priori. > This is evidenced in the fact that we only > experience one world, that we experience the > sensible world and the intellectual world as one > identical world, as well as in Dignaga's insisting > on rejecting realists' distinction between the > idealized means and the reality of cognition and > in Kant's refuting empirical idealism. Both the > realists Dignaga rejects and the idealists Kant > refutes are empirically separating the world into > reality and ideas. They both take the means of > cognition as objects known, namely, empirical > objects, though they entitle them with > “ideas”, and take the transcendental > idealization as cognizable causal relation; that > is to say, they mistakenly realize the > transcendental ideas. Consequentially, they think > they should try to make themselves go beyond the > phenomena and get true knowledge of the > “transcendent” ideas, and thus beside of the > world of cognition, another world of ideas is > diverged. It is exactly this point that bothers > Madhyamika thinkers. Candrakirti's criticism > against Dignaga's epistemology is basically with > the incentive to reject svasamvitti's being real, > as if there were indeed svasamvitti in an > empirically spiritual, ideal world. > > Candrakirti argues, according to Dan Arnold, that > Dignaga mistakenly creates something defining > svalaksana, which conventionally means the > property of the thing in itself and the reference > its name refers to, depriving the names of their > external, in-itself references on the one hand, > and castrating svalaksana's self-defining nature > on the other. Besides, the thing that Dignaga > believes to define svalaksana must be itself > svalaksana again and requires another created > thing to define it, inviting the endless > regression problem. The criticism above is made on > the misunderstanding of the means of cognition as > cognizable, empirical objects and on mistaking the > causal relation between means of cognition and > cognition to be cognizable, empirical causality, > which leads to Dignaga's object of refutation: the > empirical distinction between means of cognition > and cognition. But more significantly, what > bothers Candrakirti is that Dignaga seems to admit > that “self” indeed exists as any empirical > object, to which of course Dignaga directly > expresses his dissent in his Pramanasamuccaya. But > Candrakirti is not satisfied with the simple > dissent. The following argument might respond to > this attack. Though there is svasamvitti and > svasamvitti is perception in Dignaga, svasamvitti > is not empirical, for he won't call anything > empirical “perception” since true perception > does not include determined perception. Hence, > svasamvitti should be something which allows means > of cognition to operate like this so that its > result, cognition, is brought up to us as known > (known object and known to us), but not itself one > object of cognition. Since svasamvitti is true > perception and not itself one cognizable object, > it is impossible to equate Dignaga's svasamvitti > with the conventional, empirical self. And based > on this clarification, we can point out that the > conventional meaning of svalaksana leads to > something Candrakirti may dislike. Granted that > svalaksana is independent property that defines > itself and allows itself to be referred to by > names, then it becomes an issue how it is known to > self. The answer to the issue will be that either > we have the imaginary of everything and that's all > mere imaginary or we have intensions which > correspond to but never equate the extensions. > Both of the candidates needs an empirical I. I > think the Madhyamika thinkers, Dignaga and Kant > all won't be happy with it. > > On the contrary, Madhyamika's antinomy that the > ultimate truth and the conventional truth are > sharply distinct and yet the ultimate truth and > the conventional truth coexist so that we can live > our conventional life sincerely and yet are > possible to reach nirvana are in such an > epistemological project explained and expressed > with conventional words which are understandable > to conventional people. Hence the tension between > Madhyamika thinkers' as well as German Idealists' > metaphysical talk about emptiness (the > indeterminable)'s being the ultimate truth while > encouraging conventional practices, and Dignaga's > as well as Kant's epistemological project > establishing the means of valid cognition, should > be reconciled. (Dept. of Philosophy, NCCU) > > > Reference > > Arnold, Dan. “Is Svasamvitti Transcendental? A > Tentative Reconstruction Following Santaraksita” > in Asian Philosophy Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2005, > pp. 77-111. > Hattori, Masaaki trans. Dignaga, On Perception, > being the Pratyaksapariccheda of Dignaga's > Pramanasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and > the Tibetan versions. Cambridge & Massachusetts: > Harvard University Press, 1968. > Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. by > Norman Kemp Smith. Bedford, St. Martin's, Boston & > New York: Macmillan, 1929. > Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Trans. by > Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis & Cambridge: > Hackett Publishing Company, 1987. > > > > Endnotes: > [1] Arnold, Dan. “Is Svasamvitti Transcendental? > A Tentative Reconstruction Following > Santaraksita” in Asian Philosophy Vol. 15, No. > 1, March 2005, pp. 77-111. > [2] Representation, our awareness of an object, is > defined in CPR as “inner determination of our > mind in this or that relation of time” (CPR A > 197/B 242). > [3] “In the transcendental synthesis of the > manifold of representations in general, and > therefore in the synthetic original unity of > apperception, I am conscious of my self, not as I > appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only > that I am. This representation is a thought, not > an intuition” (CPR B 157). > [4] Hattori, Masaaki trans. and comment. Dignaga, > On Perception, being the Pratyaksapariccheda of > Dignaga's Premanasamuccaya from the Sanskrit > fragments and the Tibetean versions. Cambridge & > Massachusetts: Havrod University Press, 1968.