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> An Essay Establishing Critical Epistemology –
> Following Dignāga and Kant 
> 
> Chun-Ying WANG
> 
> 
> Abstract
> 
> 	This essay as a philosophical enquiry tries to
> establish Critical Epistemology (CE) by reporting
> the observations in the conduct of critical
> epistemology itself along with accepting
> Dignāga's and Kant's methods and observations.
> “Critical” indicates the reflective and
> circulative nature of this specific type of
> epistemology, namely, letting cognition cognize
> itself and producing self-knowledge upon which all
> cognitions as *results are explained and
> justified. “Epistemology” indicates the status
> suspending any ontological premiss. The general
> attitude is: to accept the direct facts, and to be
> sceptic about the hidden assumptions, contrary to
> the relatively more popular approach: to question
> about the direct facts with tacit strong
> assumptions. The report is put in this format in
> order to get itself engaged in the philosophical
> forum with the two traditions while to avoid
> playing any agency roles for them. 
> 
> 	One major result obtained through the conduct is
> the immediate relation between the faculty for the
> immediate knowledge and the faculty for the
> mediate knowledge, with which we can find that the
> both CE conductors have agreed. Such an immediacy
> is supplied from the direct, necessary accompany
> of the faculty for the apperception (manas,
> urteilskraft) with the five external sensational
> senses. Then, a non-representational model, though
> it is accepted that all that we know is
> representations, directly follows, i.e., the
> cognizing gets the activity itself  directly
> engaged in reality while the world is never the
> cause – except in postulation, but the result of
> cognition. With the awareness of such an
> immediacy, the world as appeared outside, the
> world as appeared inside and the subject as
> appeared to “know the world in which the subject
> itself occur” are altogether sharply accepted as
> one unity of the conditioned representations.
> Consequently, on the one hand, the “validity”
> or “effectiveness” of the empirical knowledge
> and its generalization, especially with regard to
> vyāpti (universal pervasion) and the basic
> function of apoha (exclusion) finds its ground,
> for the conceptualization “imposes” the
> effectiveness without exception in appearance on
> the one hand and make the sensory results appear
> as extending in space and succeeding in time on
> the other. On the other hand, such a cosmological
> view puts the cosmological conflicts between close
> universe and open universe in a dialectical
> observation by unfolding the conditioning process
> through which the conflicts occur. If (a) the
> universe is close and (b) the universe is open are
> in a way found congruent, a spiritual development
> from the constrained to liberty can then happen as
> a dynamical process, in a sense that, in stead of
> the development as one-way from the constrained to
> liberty, the dialectics between the constrained
> and the liberty self-sustainingly continue to
> happen in parallel and get entangled with each
> other. It then follows that on the one hand, the
> validity of empirical sciences and the values of
> morality in our experience find their effective
> supporting ground, and, on the other hand, the
> spiritual development and freedom find theirs as
> well.  
> 
> 
> Key tags: manas 意（識）, apperception 統覺,
> Dignāga 陳那,  Jinendrabuddhi
> 勝主智（勝主慧）, Kant 康德,
> transcendental idealism 先驗理想論, critical
> philosophy 批判哲學, antinomy (rational
> conflict) 二律背反（理性先驗矛盾）,
> epistemology 知識論, soteriology 救度學, 
> 
> Related Website:
> http://buddhica.nccu.edu.tw/ ｜ Event 20110507
> http://iabs2011.ddbc.edu.tw/iabs2011//paper/view/3
> 55
> IABS Brief English ｜ Chinese 
> 
> 
> 
> An Essay Establishing Critical Epistemology –
> Following Dignāga and Kant
> 
> Chun-Ying WANG
> 
> 
> This essay tries to establish Critical
> Epistemology (CE) by reporting the observations in
> the conduct of critical epistemology itself along
> with accepting Dignāga[1]'s and Kant[2]'s methods
> and observations. “Critical” indicates the
> reflective and circulative nature of this specific
> type of epistemology, namely, letting cognition
> cognize itself and producing self-knowledge upon
> which all cognitions as results are explained and
> justified. “Epistemology” indicates the status
> suspending any ontological premiss. The general
> attitude, as following Dignāga's and Kant's
> methods, is :to accept the facts, and to be
> sceptic about the hidden assumptions, contrary to
> the relatively more popular approach: to question
> about the direct facts with tacit strong
> assumptions..
> 
> To speak before in a non-precise fashion, reasons
> for putting Dignāga and Kant together should be
> given. Both fit the description of critical
> epistemology above. Both try to establish a middle
> position against idealists (who question the
> particular aspect of experience) and realists (who
> either question or have problems with the
> universal aspect of experience). Both try to
> *idealize a system consisting of faculties
> according to the fact that in experience there are
> only two aspects, namely, of the particular and of
> the universal. Both emphasize the immediate
> experience by beginning with its faculty first in
> their representative masterpieces, and both insist
> the immediate relation between the immediate
> experience and the concepts, claiming that in
> order for cognition to arise, five senses must be
> accompanied by the apperception. Both hold firmly
> that all one can grasp in cognition is but
> representation, while both accept and try to prove
> the distinction between the valid and the invalid
> cognition. From both, the conclusion that self is
> empty, as well as the conclusion that the logic
> and causality are perfectly effective in the world
> cognized, while freedom is nonetheless possible
> for the beings of cognition, can be obtained; to
> infer further, both conclusions allow for morality
> and the possibility for spiritual development in
> the world-cognized. With these reasons, especially
> with the first one beginning with “Both fit..”
> and the last possibility of inference for morality
> and spiritual development, our putting them
> together is acceptable.        
> 
> 
> 1. The method 
> 
> To carry out the essay, an apparatus has to be
> brought forth first. Since the critical
> epistemology has a reflective and circulative
> nature, namely, to observe the cognition with
> cognition itself, the result of the observation
> can be the basis for a specific form of
> idealization: the idealized system is postulated
> via the self-observation of cognition while the
> result of such an observation-postulation is
> deduced and supported solely because of the
> specific form itself. Hence, CE can accept
> Dignāga's establishment of the only two
> means/systematic faculties: pratyakṣa
> (perception) and anumāna (inference) upon the
> ground that there are only two aspects of cognized
> object, the immediate svalakṣaṇa (the form of
> the particular) and the mediate
> sāmānyalakṣaṇa (the form of the universal)
> (PS 1.2[3]). As well, CE can accept Kant's
> distinction between the immediate Anschauung (the
> knowledge-mode of intuition) and the mediate
> Begriff (the knowledge-mode of concept), as much
> as between Sinnlichkeit (sensibility) and Verstand
> (understanding) (KrV A19/B33[4]).
> 
> Besides, CE can accept Kant's clue of
> investigation, namely, to request the condition of
> all possibilities of experience, which means the
> condition through which every possible cognition
> becomes possible, and Kant's framework of
> transcendental method, i.e., to entitle the
> postulated system “transcendental” while to
> entitle the result of the postulated system
> “empirical,” whereas CE has to keep in mind
> that the postulated and the produced result are
> one and the same due to the specific nature of the
> idealization. On this account, CE can similarly
> accept Dignāga's idea that the three factors of
> cognition, namely, prameya (the object of
> cognition), pramāna (the means of cognition) and
> phala (the result of cognition), “are not
> separate from one another” (PS 1.10).
> Jinendrabuddhi[5]'s interpretation is also
> acceptable here: there is indeed no process of
> production or resulting, just like the light, for
> example – the statement that the light
> illuminates itself is only valid metaphorically,
> while, in *reality, the light's illuminating
> itself solely because the illuminating of the
> light itself has the form of the light itself, and
> there is no process of the light's illuminating
> itself (PSV 70,11[6]). These two acceptances
> accord with CE's position that there is only one
> *reality, which is, on the one hand, the support
> upon which CE's idealization is postulated, and
> which is, on the other hand, the result of the
> operation of the postulated system. 
> 
> Hence, CE concludes that because the object of
> cognition has necessarily only two aspects,
> namely, the aspect of the particular and the
> aspect of the universal, CE can postulate the
> immediate faculty and the mediate faculty through
> which the *real object's necessary possession of
> two aspects (of the particular and of the
> universal) becomes possible. At meanwhile, CE
> holds that the postulated system of the immediate
> faculty and the mediate faculty cannot be
> separated from both the observed *real object and
> the result of the system. 
> 
> 
> 2 Between the immediate experience and the mediate
> experience
> 
> CE holds that the immediate experience has to
> connect with the effect of five senses, for all
> the experience of the five senses has the
> immediate form of the particular aspect, on the
> one hand, and for the relation between the
> immediate experience from the five senses and the
> mediate experience in thinking is immediate, as
> well, on the other.  
> 
> 2-a. Five senses and the immediate experience
> 
> Following the above position, CE can accept
> Dignāga's own etymological explanation in
> Nmukh[7], that pratyakṣa is so entitled because
> it is in close connection with (prati) each sense
> faculty (akṣa)[8], and his systematical
> explanation, with his reference to Vasubandhu and
> his textual explanation thereupon, namely, “it
> is named after the sense-organs (faculties better)
> because they are its specific cause
> (asādhāraṇahetu)”, in PS (PS 1.4ab)[9].
> Remarkably, in Dignāga's mind, there should be
> more than five senses; the sense of mind (manas)
> is also a sense-faculty (indriya). 
> 
> CE can also accept Kant's claim that the empirical
> intuition has to take place only in so far as the
> mind is affected (affiziert werden) in a way of
> *receiving matters with senses. Also remarkably,
> in Kant's mind, beside of the outer sense (der
> äußere Sinn), which lets us represent to
> ourselves objects as outside us, the inner sense
> (der innere Sinn) via which the mind intuits
> itself or its inner state (KrV A22/B37), is also a
> necessary part of the way of receiving matters –
> although no matters from the latter alone is ever
> possible.
> 
> 2-b. What's going on with the sixth sense and the
> mediate faculty
> 
> CE can accept Kant's treaties of postulating outer
> sense and inner sense and his observation that via
> the former the form of intuition “space” is
> given to experience (i.e., the way to receive the
> object of cognition as outside us is to represent
> it in (the form of) space) while via the latter
> the form of intuition “time” is given to
> experience (i.e., the way to receive to
> self-cognition of the object of cognition or the
> inner state of mind, is to represent the object of
> cognition or the inner state in (the form of)
> time); space and time as forms of intuition are in
> immediate relation, too, because, from the
> perspective of CE, all experience of space is
> necessarily observed in time, and, from Kant's
> perspective, in the cooperation of the mediate
> faculty, namely, understanding (Verstand), in
> connection with the immediate faculty, namely,
> sensibility, the manifold (Manigfalltigkeit) of
> the intuition apprehended from sensibility is
> necessarily united and recognized in the
> conceptualization so that cognition or experience
> becomes possible at all (the issue to deduce in
> the two editions of the Deduction in KrV)[10].  
> 
> Similarly, we can accept Dignāga's theory about
> the two-fold appearance, namely, the appearance
> via which the object is represented as outside and
> the appearance via which the cognition is
> represented as inner (PS 1.11) and observation
> that there is no *real separation between the
> mental perception and the perception of the five
> senses. We can find and accept the textual
> supports for this observation in the following
> materials: (1) “Here our distinguishing various
> kinds of perception is in response to the view of
> others. However, all kinds of perception are
> indeed  free from conceptual construction”
> (Dignāga's self-interpretation to PS 1.5,
> emphasis made by me) – the treatises of separate
> perceptions are “in response to the view of
> others”, and to the own thesis, there is only
> one perception, namely, that which is devoid of
> conceptualization. (2) “There is also mental
> perception, which is of two kinds: awareness of an
> external object and self-awareness of such
> subordinate mental activities such as desire and
> the like” (PS 1.6ab) and “The mental
> perception which, taking a thing of color, etc.,
> for its object, occurs in the form of immediate
> experience (anubhava) is also free from conceptual
> construction. The self-awareness (sva-saṃvedana)
> of desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, etc.,
> is also recognized as mental perception because it
> is not dependent on any sense-organ (faculty)”
> (self-interpretation to PS 1.6ab). It's also
> greatly obliged to Steinkellner's reconstruction
> of the Sanskrit text of Jinendrabuddhi's PSV and
> Junjie Chu's translation and introduction of that
> into German that we find valuable side support:
> Jinendrabuddhi gave us a perspective closer to
> Dignāga than our modern understanding by pointing
> out that in the Indian tradition, it is the
> conformity between the form of the object-cognized
> and the form of self-cognition (the conformity
> between the akara of the visya, i.e., artharūpa,
> in visyajñāna and the akara of “tatjñāna”,
> i.e., the jñāna of that jñāna, in anubhava,
> anubhavarūpa) that is to be argued for, not the
> proposition that every cognition of the object has
> to be accompanied by a cognition of the cognition
> which is commonly agreed at that time (PSV 77,6;
> PSV 79,6; PSV 82,10); owing to such conformity,
> Jinendrabuddhi holds that the “distance”
> between anubhava in mānasaṃ and the pratyakṣa
> are too close to be regarded as distinguishable,
> refusing Dharmakīrti's idea to separate the phase
> of indriyajñāna from the phase of  mānasaṃ.
> We can agree with Junjie Chu that as well as Kuiji
> 窺基 must have his textual source in Dignāga
> when claiming that the experience of five senses
> must be accompanied with the experience of the
> mind (manas), namely, 五俱意識,
> Jinendrabuddhi's information gives us supportive
> ground as well. Jinendrabuddhi read plenty of
> Dignāga's original texts in Nālandā Temple
> (which has the most complete collection of
> Dignāga), by which he can argue against the
> mainstream interpretation of Dharmarkīrti on
> Dignāga, while Kuiji's master Xuanzang does not
> receive any influence of Dharmarkīrti school;
> hence, both's interpretation on Dignāga about the
> immediate relation between the sense-organ
> perception and the mental perception is highly
> precious.
> 
> However, CE cannot be satisfied with the argument
> of Jinendrabuddhi that the distance is “too
> close to be regarded as distinguishable.” If we
> appreciate enough Dignāga's own words, we may
> find better argument: “there is no need for
> admitting another separate means of cognition for
> cognizing the combination of the two
> above-mentioned aspects of the object (the
> svalakṣaṇa and the sāmānyalakṣaṇa)”
> (PS 1.2cd) and “In the case of the cognition
> which cognizes a thing of color, etc., as
> noneternal, firstly, one cognizes the
> inexpressible particularity and the universal,
> color-ness. Then, by means of the operation of the
> mind (manas), one relates the color-ness to the
> universal, noneternity, and expresses the
> resulting cognition in the judgment 'the thing of
> color, or the like, is noneternal” (his
> self-interpretation to PS 1.2cd). In order to make
> such a judgment, the ground upon which the
> judgment can be made, namely, the relation between
> the universal the color-ness and the universal
> noneternity can be determined, must be obtained
> first; the ground is exactly “the thing of color
> and the like”, viz., “the combination of the
> particular and the universal.” Only under the
> circumstance that the relation between the
> particular and the universal must be united as the
> necessary condition for cognition and experience,
> such a ground for all empirical judgment can ever
> be obtained. 
> 
> CE can then accept Jinendrabuddhi's “conformity
> of artharūpa in indriyajñāna and anubhavarūpa
> in mānasaṃ” by interpreting it with
> Dignāga's “combination of the particular and
> the universal” and with Kant's “synthesis.”
> That is, with the idea that the condition for all
> possible cognition as well as for all possible
> experience is the a priori unity of the particular
> and the universal. That is, with the very basic
> observation of CE in Section 1 of this essay.
> 
> Hence, CE concludes that, although the immediate
> experience and the mediate experience are sharply
> distinguished with our method, the a priori
> combination of the postulated faculties for them
> is the necessary condition for all possible
> cognition and empirical existence – the
> immediate-mediate difference is only of aspects,
> not of *realty.
> 
> CE also holds that the ground, for example, the
> thing of color and the like, which is the result
> of the combination of the particular and the
> universal, is the reality. This view holds, that
> is to say, that the ontical state out of which any
> ontological studies can only make sense, has to be
> the result of cognition, never as the cause,
> except for restricted in an idealization as ours. 
> 
> 
> 
> 3. Perfect causal net in *reality, reciprocally
> supported by the immediate relation between the
> immediate and the mediate faculty
> 
> CE holds that logic is necessarily effective in
> *reality, since the relation between our immediate
> experience and mediate experience is direct.
> Without the conceptualization in the mediate
> experience, the immediate experience is never
> cognized, and without the reception in space and
> time, the mediate experience is never cognized,
> either. Because the later recollection and
> thinking about the immediate experience before
> indeed has truth-value, namely, our empirical
> judgment can either fit or not fit the *reality,
> we can idealize that, among all possible logical
> connections, there are some necessary, some
> actual, and some mere possible – yet to make a
> remark, the three sets are not in a relation of
> logical implication (viz., svābhāva-hetu), for
> the difference of the three sets does not belong
> to the scope of the result of its own employment,
> to which logical implication is effective; rather,
> it belongs to the difference of the various
> operative modes of mind. It is the logical modes,
> or functions, of the mind being a part of the
> necessary condition of our experience, that can on
> the one hand make the “objective valid
> relations” in *reality possible and effective,
> and, on the other hand, receive/represent the
> “object” in space and time.  
> 
> Hence, CE can accept Kant's project of
> “Transzendentale Logik” whose “ultimate
> purpose” is to determine the scope and limits of
> itself (KrV A154/B193)[11]. In conformity with the
> internal, systematic coordination of the operation
> of understanding (die logischen Funktion des
> Verstandes in Urteilen, the logical function of
> understanding in judgments) (KrV A70/B95), the
> transcendental object (the object-ness we can find
> in every empirical object) has the conceptual
> structure (consisting of die Kategorien, the
> categories) (KrV A76/B102). Since all possible
> cognition has the “conformity” as its
> necessary condition, the object-ness can be found
> in all empirical objects. We can accept Kant's
> effort to schematize the categories (demonstrating
> how the concepts, the coordinated pure concepts of
> the categories, are applied to/in intuition) and
> accordingly to draw the system of all principles
> of pure understanding in the second Book of the
> “Transzendentale Logik”: with the mode of
> quantity, the unit-ness of the object-ness is
> offered while the matter united in the unit-ness
> is received/represented in the extension (of
> space); with the mode of quality, the degree-ness
> of the object-ness is offered while the matter
> produced as the sense effects is
> received/represented in the intensity (of
> space[12]); with the mode of relation, the units
> obtained in previous moment (das vorige
> Moment[13]) are objectively determined as
> subject/substance-predicates/properties,
> cause-effect and reciprocal relations while the
> matter is received as duration, succession and
> co-existence (with such a mode, time has its
> transcendental source in the idealized system, in
> another words, so time becomes possible
> experience); with the mode of modality, the
> determination of relations obtained in the
> previous moment, are subjectively determined as
> possible (when the condition of the necessary
> unity of the particular and the universal is
> satisfied), actual (when the material condition,
> namely, with sensation, is satisfied) and
> necessary (when the universal condition, namely,
> with the modes of the mind themselves, is
> satisfied) while the determination itself here is
> sole formal modification of what has been
> received/represented in space and time. 
> 
> Following the above, CE can understand and accept
> Dignāga's observation of twofold appearance (PS
> 11ab) and in a backhand fashion explain how to
> relate the “combination” (PS 2cd) and his
> theory of anumāna, as well as Kant's theory of
> valid cognition. Since the mind has the function
> to form a grasping conceptual structure as an
> object-ness holder (in anumāna) on the one hand
> and to receive/represent anything in possession of
> such object-ness in space and time (will explain
> more together with the second half of the two-fold
> appearance theory in the next section) in the
> direct form of experience, namely, in pratyakṣa,
> on the other, anything in reality, namely,
> anything cognized in space and time as an object,
> must appear as objective and outside (which
> however in our idealization is actually mere
> representation, ākāra). Thus we can understand
> the function of manas and how to make the relation
> between the particular and the universal mediate
> through it while at the same time make kalpanā
> (formation of appearance) possible. Based on this,
> we understand Dignāga's “even conceptual
> construction, when it is brought to internal
> awareness, is admitted as a type of perception.
> However, with regard to the external object, the
> conceptual construction is not admissible as
> perception, because it conceptualizes the
> object” (PS 7ab) as: in the discourse about
> conceptual construction's being brought to the
> internal awareness, manas is a faculty reaching
> down to (“bis herunter zu” in note 10) the
> reception of matters in space and time, as
> indicated in the previous paragraph; in the
> discourse about conceptual constructions' being
> with regard to the external objects, manas is a
> faculty to produce the object-ness holder for
> empirical objects of cognition.    Besides, owing
> to the nature of logical function, on the one
> side, all possible units made by manas are put in
> a systematic network of connections in the realm
> of possibilities; on the other side, all possible
> objects cognized must go through the operation of
> such logical function of manas. Hence, the world,
> namely, the world-post-cognition, must be in a
> perfect order which is necessarily understandable
> to the logic[14]. 
> 
> Following the above, CE can interpret Kant's
> holding that the scope of possibility is no larger
> than the scope of actuality in his
> “Postulate”: the difference between these two
> scopes are not in a logical implication one may
> hold, namely, the possibility contains the
> actuality; rather, Kant would hold that the scopes
> cover all possible objects, while the difference
> comes from whether the formal condition of
> experience is supplied by perception or not.
> Similarly, CE can also accept Kant's claiming that
> “unity of nature in time and space, and unity of
> the experience possible for us, are one and the
> same[15]” (Section 4 of the first-edition
> Introduction to Kritik der Urteilskraft). Further,
> CE can understand Kant's mysterious notion of the
> conformity between the manifold of a priori
> sensibility (the synopsis contained in the sense,
> as the synopsis for the synthetic unity of the
> transcendental apperception[16], KrV A97) and the
> manifold in determined intuition[17]: the former
> refers to the realm of possibilities, while the
> latter refers to the realm of actuality. Since the
> difference between the realms depends on the
> subjective modification whether the senses have
> been effected and have offered materials,
> objectively speaking, the world to be cognized and
> the world cognized are one and the same – the
> world is the world, given one is cognizing it or
> not. Hence, we can also accept Jinendrabuddhi's
> explanation about Digāga's idea of identity of
> pramāna, pramaeya and phala: the object of
> cognition as means and the object of the result of
> cognition is one and the same[18] (PSV73,3).
> 
> Then, with the conformity or non-conformity
> between the conceptual construction as the
> condition of cognition which is immediately
> represented in space and time and the conceptual
> construction associated in the action of judgment,
> there is the value of truth and non-truth.
> Besides, only then, Dignāga can establish his
> theory of proper inference. From the observation
> of the smoke rising in the mountain, we can infer
> that there is fire, together with the previous
> instances such as the fire in the kitchen is
> connected with smoke and with the previous
> instances such as the lake is not connected with
> smoke. Now the real experience is the observation
> of smoke in the mountain; with the knowledge
> induced from past experience (namely, the world,
> given cognized or to be cognized,) we know that
> smoke can be caused by fire and nothing else so
> far, i.e., the smoke and the fire are two units
> whose relation is causally determined in our
> experiencing. Hence, the inference can be a proper
> one. Yet, we have to make a remark here: the
> significance of such theory of inference is not to
> assure the absolute truth value of this particular
> inference “there is fire in the mountain.”
> What is necessary is not the fire's being the
> cause of the existence of smoke; rather that all
> that can take place in the world must take place
> in causal networks is necessary. That is to say,
> the inference, though it is proper with the
> support we have so far, can be a mistake, as long
> as we find another stronger, more immediate
> support, for instance, a fairy's magic is making
> that happen to our own eyes and we can check that
> in our public community. The point is, there must
> be a truth, although all that exist are but
> representations.     
> 
> 
> CE thus concludes that reality as in space and
> time is exactly the world to be cognized as well
> as the world cognized, with two aspects. Every
> thing in space and time is thus mere
> representation and a result, but as a valid
> representation, not as the image-representation
> which is the copy or imitation of any a priori
> external entities. Hence, there must be a
> distinction between valid cognition and invalid
> cognition, as well as a distinction between true
> judgment and false judgment. Besides, CE can thus
> accept the sutra's verse
> 應無所住而生其心–any thing received in
> space and time as well as apperceived in mind is
> exactly the mind itself, or, we can say, the world
> is exactly the mind. 
> 
> 
> 4. The empty *self
> 
> CE's special idealism is distinguished from other
> idealism with regard to its persistence in the
> immediacy between the outer experience and the
> intuitiveness of the self-knowledge (the immediacy
> of self-awareness in the awareness of an object)
> beside of the conceptualization in pure
> apperception. From such persistence we can
> demonstrate to us the mistrust in the outer
> experience held in problematic or dogmatic
> idealism indeed leads to the inapplicability of
> the knowledge of inner experience and consequently
> shows that such knowledge itself is actually as
> mistrustful as the outer experience so held. It is
> the persistence in the intuitiveness of the self
> knowledge beside of the pure apperception that
> grants the experience and the knowledge of it
> trustworthy, at the meanwhile properly settling
> ourselves with a position to accept the facts that
> on the one hand the world and the self must be
> known through our consciousness while on the other
> hand the consciousness is not of an idea but of
> the world in real space and time – the reality
> is both objectively in the mind and subjectively
> accessible by the mind. Besides, self is but the
> way perceiving the world. 
> 
> Hence, CE can accept Dignāga's theory of
> svasaṃvitti (self-awareness). Dignāga holds
> that the cognition itself is primarily the result
> in a way of the formal conformity, not in a way as
> his opponents do, i.e., to admit that means and
> result are different via the process of production
> (PS 1.8cd); he emphasizes, there is no real
> vyāpāra (activity, function)[19]. We can also
> accept Jinendrabuddhi's explanation that the means
> and the result should not be mediated with a third
> for, on the one side, the formal conformity should
> be sufficient while the verbal separation is only
> metaphorical, and, on the other side, if it is the
> case that there is a third, then we would have the
> problem of anavasthā (infinite regression) (PSV
> 65,11). To this step, Dignāga has established the
> self-appearance nature of cognition, a
> characteristic to appear the object of cognition
> as cognized by a self. 
> 
> CE can accept Dignāga's twofold appearance idea
> that “Every cognition is [*]produced with a
> twofold appearance, namely, that of itself as
> subject (svâbhāsa) and that of the objet
> (viṣayâbhāsa)” (self-interpretation to PS
> 1.9a); and because the arthaniścaya
> (determination of the object) and the
> self-cognition (the cognition of the cognition)
> are in formal conformity (which we have explained
> in detail with Kant's help in the previous
> section), CE can happily accept Dignāga's
> entitling the cognition's possession of twofold
> appearance and the svasaṃvitti are both “the
> result” (self-interpretation to PS 1.9a; PS
> 1.9b). Jinendrabuddhi's explanation is also
> valuable especially with regard to the problem of
> the identity of pramāna, pramaeya and phala, when
> he points out that with the verse “it is known
> only through this, viz., through cognition's
> having the form of it [, namely, the object]”
> (PS 1.9d2), Dignāga shows that the object has to
> be determined through the power of cognition (in
> manas) so that we can admit the power is a
> pramāna (PSV 72,10); yet, this is not our main
> concern here, while this is also dealt with when
> we point out the devoid of vyāpāra in previous
> paragraph (as Dignāga does in the end of his
> self-intepretation to PS 1.9d2 by pointing out
> that all elements of existence, sarvadharma, are
> devoid of function, nirvyāpāra), so we do not go
> into further detail. We want to point out here
> that, in Dignāga, cognition as means and result
> has the nature that on the one hand the object of
> cognition has the aspect of immediate particular
> and the aspect of mediate universal, and on the
> other hand the cognition has twofold appearance:
> the appearance of the object and the appearance of
> itself as subject. 
> 
> CE refuses to accept the idea some people may hold
> that pramāna= svâbhāsa;
> pramaeya=viṣayâbhāsa; phala=svasaṃvitti. Not
> only we can bring up Dignāga's own saying:
> cognition's possession of twofold appearance and
> the svasaṃvitti are both the result
> (self-interpretation to PS 1.9a); we can also show
> the idea's oversimplification with CE's
> accomplishment. Pramāna, pramaeya and phala are
> mere apparatuses of idealization (devoid of
> function, nirvyāpāra) in identity, while
> svâbhāsa, viṣayâbhāsa and svasaṃvitti are
> not in that kind of relation – the former two
> are features or forms of the appearance while the
> appearance and the third together are the features
> of cognition. In section 3, CE has shown the
> twofold function of manas, which, on the one hand,
> makes everything take place in immediate form of
> space and time, and, on the other, makes
> everything take place in a perfect network of
> logical connection. It is also shown that the
> relation between the result of the former function
> and the result of the latter function is
> immediate. The result of cognition would appear as
> an object because on the one hand it is determined
> through manas with the objectness and at the same
> time the objectness makes the object
> received/represented in the immediate form of
> space and time where the web of logical
> connections are embedded. On the other side, since
> the object is immediate in nature, it is possessed
> by the subject, too, for it is “to the
> subject” that the term “immediate” stands
> for. Owing to such twofold function and the direct
> relation between our immediate experience and our
> mediate experience, we can represent object as an
> object outside in space and time
> (viṣayâbhāsa), while also as an object of the
> subject (svâbhāsa). Pramāna, pramaeya and phala
> are one and the same – it is on the one hand the
> cognition, and on the other hand the world
> cognized and to be cognized. Svâbhāsa,
> viṣayâbhāsa and svasaṃvitti are forms of
> cognition and the *real mental status. The former
> distinction can be said in transcendental
> language, while the latter distinction is only
> with regard to the result. Otherwise, if it is the
> case that the latter distinction is also a
> transcendental distinction, the false conclusions
> that (1) there might be the world in itself; (2)
> that there might be an absolute self prior to
> cognition and conducting the activity of
> cognition; and (3) that there must be an superior
> power which connect the world in itself and the
> subject, would be drawn, and these must contradict
> not only CE, but also Dignāga's and Kant's
> epistemology. 
> 
> 
> CE can also accept Dignāga's using
> “recollection” and “motion cognition from
> one object to another” to support the self as an
> empty modifier. Dignāga argues, the immediacy of
> the modifier –the immediacy to the world in
> space and time, the immediacy to conceptual
> constructions and the immediacy as belong to the
> modifier itself – is established for the
> cognition must have two forms (svâbhāsa and
> viṣayâbhāsa), or otherwise recollection cannot
> take place (PS 1.11cd and its
> self-interpretation). Since recollection must have
> certain relation to previous cognition (PS 1.11d),
> “if the cognition had only one form, either that
> of the object or of itself, then the object which
> was cognized by a preceding cognition could not
> appear in a succeeding cognition;” because
> “that object  of the preceding cognition does
> not exist when the succeeding cognition arises and
> could not be the object of the latter”
> (self-interpretation to PS 1.11b). Jinendrabuddhi
> explains, it is first agreed that the cognition
> must belong to the the cognition itself, and it is
> through the formal conformity of the object in
> previous cognition and in succeeding recollection
> that such identity of the object of previous
> cognition and that of the succeeding memories can
> make sense (PSV 77,6 – 81,13). CE holds
> similarly, since all that can take place in the
> world must have been through cognition and the
> determination of manas, then: (1) in the previous
> cognition, there must be the formal conformity
> between the particular in space and time and the
> conceptual construction; (2) in the previous
> cognition, there must be the formal conformity
> between the object of cognition (namely, the
> object-ness perceiving/reprenting the object in
> space and time as well as grasping the object in
> the object-ness) and the cognition itself (the
> immediacy as being perceived/represented in space
> and time); (3) owing to the network of logical
> connections which also grants the spatial and
> temporal sequence via the necessary role of manas,
> the object cognized before would not vary without
> any logically identifiable development, while, on
> the other side, owing to the same reason, the
> modifier itself that can only exist only as
> appearing in the determining of manas, will remain
> permanently identical. Hence, (4) in recognition
> or recollection, the universals by which one
> recognizes or reproduces the object previously
> experienced in its re-appearance or in its absence
> is still immediate to the immediacy of the former
> cognition. 
> 
> Dignāga also argues: to avoid anavasthā, we
> should admit the self-referential nature of
> cognition and not allow a third cognition making
> the previous cognition an object of the
> recollection-cognition (self-intepretation to PS
> 1.12b); and he continues, if it is the case, then
> “there could be no motion of cognition from one
> object to another” (PS 1.12cd). To this point,
> Dharmakīrti explains: if the cognition requires
> another cognition to cognize itself, then the
> series of cognition would be broken at some point
> – the last in the series would have no next
> cognition to cognize itself; since the movement of
> the cognition from one to another is admissible,
> we should not accept the requirement of another
> cognition but accept the self-referential nature
> (PV, III, 539-540; Hattori note 80). With Kant, CE
> holds that the synopsis of the a priori
> sensibility, namely, all possible experience which
> meet the formal condition of cognition, is the
> ground for the empirical, actual succession of
> cognitions in a series (note 17). Because the
> formal condition of cognition assures the
> objective identity as well as the modifier's
> subjective identity, that is to say, the world
> extending in space and succeeding in time as well
> as the modifier receiving/representing the world
> in space and time with its apperceptive
> object-ness always remains one and the same (the
> mediacy between the immediate and the mediate
> experience), the affinity of all possible
> combinations of the particulars and the
> universals, namely, the affinity of all possible
> conceptualization of the world in space and time
> (the only particular)  is identical to the
> affinity of the succeeding actual cognitions,
> namely, the cognitions with certain concepts
> combined with the same particular. If the modifier
> itself is also perceived/represented in space and
> time, as the opponents to Dignāga hold that let
> another cognition cognizes the cognition, the
> immediacy between the immediate experience and the
> mediate experience will be destroyed while the
> identity of the world to be cognized and the world
> cognized will be destroyed, too. Hence, CE cannot
> accept the non-empty modifier, neither can
> Dignāga and Kant. Further, it is the persistence
> in the refusal against the immediacy between the
> outer experience and the intuitiveness of the
> self-knowledge which is also in immediate relation
> to the conceptualization in pure apperception that
> leads the opinion-holder to have problems with the
> connection between knowledge and reality the
> knowledge is about.
> 
> 
> Hence, CE concludes that self is an empty modifier
> which grants the immediacy between the outer
> experience and the intuitiveness of the
> self-knowledge which is also in immediate relation
> to the conceptualization in pure apperception.
> 
> 
> 5. Liberation and the directions of further
> development
> 
> Following the above section, CE holds that the
> motion cognition from one object to another
> (*āśraya-paravṛtti) is acceptable. This
> indicates the fact, as we have shown in the
> previous section, that, the affinity of all
> possible cognition, namely, the world to be
> cognized, and the affinity of all the actual
> cognition, namely, the world cognized, are
> identical, exactly because both affinity must be
> made in the determining of manas with its formal
> condition of experience. Besides, since the formal
> condition grands the distinction between the world
> outside and the internal awareness, as well as the
> permanence of the world-identity and the
> self-identity, with the a priori synopsis that
> entails all possibilities, the motion of cognition
> from one actual cognition to another signifies the
> fact that our cognition is not direct response to
> the stimuli outside, or otherwise, we would not
> have the experience of the aspect-difference
> between the world and our cognizing the world and
> the experience of the motion cognition. We do not
> receive the world as the affinity of all possible
> or all actual cognitions, we have the world there
> but we appreciate it in a series of motion
> cognition. Hence, we can conclude that the being
> of such cognition is free, in a sense that
> although all that exist to us is representations
> through the determining of manas, our cognition is
> different from the world cognized. By this, CE
> refuses the opinion that the cognition is possible
> for the self is effected by the world a priori. 
> 
> Although the determined mediate representation and
> the indeterminate immediate representation are
> contradictory with each other, but in *reality
> they are mutually dependent. Determined
> representation is obtained through the grasping of
> manas, while the indeterminate representation
> grasps nothing and grasp all. If the indeterminate
> representation is to be understood as not-yet
> grasping, then it would never become an
> experience. However, the motion cognition is
> acceptable. Hence we admit that the indeterminate
> representation is not not-yet grasping. This keeps
> CE away from nihilism. On the contrary, if the
> indeterminate representation is to be understood
> as grasping, we would have problem explaining the
> indeterminate representation can ever be
> immediate, for all the grasped are grasped with
> concepts. With CE's observation of the operation
> of manas, we know the detail in the determining
> and can accept that indeterminate to be a special
> grasping, as self-grasping of the formal condition
> of experience. At this point, we are liberated
> from the determined representation. 
> 
> For instance, if I cognize a cup, I cognize its
> color first, and its touch, its weight etc. in a
> series. In the succeeding cognitions, I determine
> myself with the determined representations.
> However, if it is the case that, in the previous
> event, the motion cognition from one to another is
> nothing but the series of the cognition of the
> single form of its color, that of its touch, that
> of its weight etc. in a series, then there is no
> possibility for us to know that I am cognizing
> this, this and that. This is the proof for an
> empty modifier self which nonetheless can grasp
> everything – both via its immediate faculty gets
> itself engaged in the whole world (the world to be
> cognized), and via its manas gets itself always
> prepared to grasp all that could be possibly
> grasped. This we can also find a supporting ground
> in CE's specific idealization form: since we must
> cognize the cup in the world of space and time, we
> must postulate that the cup exists in the world.
> Similarly, since the cup must be endlessly
> analyzable within or outside of it, the cup must
> be in a complete network of connections which can
> be picked up by the logic. And since the cup must
> be in a complete network of connections for it
> must be so cognized, the empty modifier is
> supported while its freedom as the postulation
> according to the fact of motion cognition and its
> endless possibilities has a reasonable ground.
> 
> If the network of logical connections in the world
> of space and time and the freedom are both
> acceptable, there is room for morality. And CE can
> further investigate the direct result of the
> indeterminate representation to prove that the
> internal status in freedom is pleasure. But now we
> have to stop for the time being. (© gustav
> 2010/10/29)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Footnotes:
> [1] In this essay, I mainly rely on Hattori's
> translation of Chapter One of Pramānasamuccaya
> (1968). The annotated punctuation “ [ ] ” of
> Hatorri's are all removed by me in this essay,
> while my additional phrases are put in it.
> 
> [2] The standard edition of the original text is
> Kants Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Deutsche
> Akademie der Wissenschaften (Walter de Gruyter,
> 1902), viz., Akademie Aufgabe; there's another
> also widely used later edition by Wilhelm
> Weischedel, which is advantageous over the former
> for its being closer to the original and
> indicating the tacit changes made by the former. I
> used Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft's
> reprography of the Wilhelm Weischedel edition in
> 1998. For citations and terminological
> translation, I mainly use Kemp Smith's translation
> in 1965 for the Critique of Pure Reason, while,
> when necessary, I'll use Pluhar's translation in
> 1987 for the Critique of Judgment.
> 
> [3] “PS” stands for Pramānasamuccaya;
> “1.2” stands for chapter 1 and verse 2.  
> 
> [4] “KrV” stands for Kritik der reinen
> Verfunt, Critique of Pure Reason; “A19” stands
> for “Page 19 in the first edition in 1781”;
> “B33” stands for “Page 33 in the second
> edition in 1787.” The pagination follows the
> Akademie Aufgabe.
> 
> [5] In this essay, I rely on Junjie Chu's German
> translation (1999) and his lectures in NCCU Summer
> School, 2010. Besides, I also have a copy of
> 韓清鏡 Qingjing Han's manuscript at hand. The
> former are precious for they follow the Sanskrit
> originals of Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī
> Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (PSV) reconstructed by
> E. Steinkellner et al. in 2005. 
> 
> [6] “PSV” stands for Jinendrabuddhi's
> Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā
> (PSV) reconstructed by E. Steinkellner et al. in
> 2005. “70,11” stands for “the paragraph
> beginning at the 11th line on page 70 of the
> reconstructed text.
> 
> [7] “Nmukh” stands for Nyāyamukha; in this
> essay I can only rely on Xuanzang 玄奘's Chinese
> translation after the Sanskrit and Tucci's
> translation after Chinese and Tibetan materials in
> 1978 for checking. However, we also have Hattori's
> findings in the footnotes of his translation of
> PS. 
> 
> [8] Hattori's note 11 to PS 1.2ab has accumulated
> plenty of contextual materials before and after
> Dignāga regarding the term “pratyakṣa.”
> 
> [9] Hattori's note 32 to PS 1.5 has precious
> contextual information.
> 
> [10] “Auf ihnen [,i.e., Kategorien,] gründet
> sich also alle formale Einheit in der Synthesis
> der Eibildungskraft, und vermittelst dieser auch
> alles empirischen Gebrauchs derselben (in der
> Rekognition, Reproduktion, Assoziation,
> Apprehension) bis herunter zu den Erscheinungen,
> weil diese, nur vermittelst jener Elemente der
> Erkenntnis und überhaupt unserum Bebußtsein,
> mithin uns selbst angehören können” (KrV A125,
> emphasis made by me).
> 
> [11] “Denn, nach Vollendung dessselben, kann sie
> (die transzendentale Logik) ihrem Zweck, nämlich
> den Umfang und die Grenzen des reinen Verstandes
> zu bestimmen, vollkommen ein Gnüge tun.”
> 
> [12] Although the sense effects, the qualia, are
> represented as internal, because the effects are
> represented as being caused externally, the
> reception of them is in form of space, as well.
> For instance, on a heating morning, we can feel
> that the temperature is rising, i.e., the degree
> of the sense effect is getting more intensive. But
> the heating is represented as the changes of the
> status of the air, not of the sense itself, so we
> say the quality is received in form of space, not
> time. Kant would agree with this as well, for he
> wants to preserve the time to the last two sets of
> the categories, namely, relation and modality.
>  
> [13] In German, there are two words: der Moment
> (masculine) and das Moment (neutral). The former
> has a temporal sense, while the latter has a
> dynamical sense. Since the discourses about the
> transcendental elements are all idealized,
> postulated conditions, there should be no temporal
> relation among the moments here, since time only
> is *real in resulted cognition.
> 
> [14] The discourse does not imply that logic has
> its transcendental employment so that we would
> have any specific a priori rules beside of the
> necessary ones logic discovers in itself in the
> endeavour of the transcendental investigation. If
> it is the case, then any empirical proposition of
> a determined relation, namely, any specific
> “actual” relation would become necessary. 
> 
> [15] “Denn Einheit der Natur in Zeit und Raum
> und Einheit der uns möglichen Erfahrung ist
> einerlei...”
> 
> [16] “Wenn eine jede einzelne Vorstellung der
> andern ganz fremd, gleichsam isoliert, und von
> dieser getrennt wäre, so würde niemals so etwas,
> als Erkenntnis ist, entspringen, welche ein Ganzes
> verglichener und verknüpfter Vorstellungen ist.
> Wenn ich also dem Sinne deswegen, weil er in seine
> Anschauung Mannigfaltigkeit enthält, eine Synopsi
> beilege, so korrespondiert dieser jederzeit eine
> Synthesis und die Rezeptivität kann nur mit
> Spontaneität verbunden Erkenntnisse möglich
> machen.” (Emphasis by me.)
> 
> [17]   In Kritik der Urteilskraft, judgment is
> divided into determined and reflective
> (indeterminate); in the former, the association of
> imagination is based on the rules of a concept
> which the object of the association is to be known
> about, while in the latter, the association of
> imagination gives a basis for understanding to
> apply various concepts to. To put in less Kantian
> technical vocabulary, judgment is an ability of
> locating a particular as, i.e., in imagination,
> contained under a universal; when the universal is
> given and the judgment subsumes a particular under
> it, this is determined; when only the particular
> is given and the universal has to be found for it,
> the judgment is reflective. Kant describes our
> judgments as the interactions between the faculty
> of rules, understanding, and the faculty of
> association, imagination. In a determined
> judgment, understanding offers a set of rules
> which is implied by a concept while imagination
> associates in accordance with the rules. To
> characterize this with the model in KrV,
> imagination relates the synthesized manifold
> intuition α as well as the appearance X, i.e.,
> manifold of sense through the synopsis of the
> manifold a priori, in accordance with the
> conceptual unity 'α' of this synthesis through
> transcendental apperception. Once the condition is
> satisfied, the judgment that the particular X/α
> is subsumed under the universal 'α' is made, from
> which arises the consciousness of an α which is
> known as a case of the governing concept 'α' as
> well. In an indeterminate judgment, imagination
> creates an object X with manifold which
> understanding keeps trying to find a concept for.
> To characterize this with the model in KrV again,
> the particular X  is given (in nature) or created
> (in art) first through imagination, and various
> universals such as 'α', 'β', 'γ', 'δ' etc. are
> tried to be found to grasp the manifold X when
> imagination at the same time reproduces intuitions
> α, β, γ, δ etc. 
> 
> [18] “pramāṇaphalayor viṣayabhedo na
> bhavati.”
> 
> [19] This emphasis conforms with CE's position of
> “idealization” and the nature of the
> “functions” of the postulated faculties. As
> Dignāga himself says, “it is metaphorically
> called means” but “ultimately speaking devoid
> of activity (self-interpretation to PS 8cd).