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第二週心得報告

第二週心得報告

分類標籤: 佛教現象學
請大家把第二週的心得報告回應到這篇文章!

Re: 第二週心得報告

分類標籤: 佛教現象學
Week02: Self-Positioning

Personal problem: I am familiar with Kant and find great correspondence regarding the philosophical methods between Kant and the later phenomenologists (like Heidegger, Husserl, even up to Searle) who always claim, or are claimed, that they hold different philosophical views from Kant, to which I always have to honestly dissent. I on the other hand dare not call myself a Kantian, for being familiar with equals not being professional about. Now I am here facing the subject “Buddhist Phenomenology,” reading Mr. Smith's introduction to Husserl's theory of intenionality and feeling his interpretative inclination toward “targeting” rather than a balance with “immediateness” on the Husserlian “directedness,” I have a lot of troubles. One one out is to get Kant, Husserl and so on clear, which happens to be too much effort to me for the time being. I think I better stick to the problem, learn from their methods and observations, and try to figure myself out. That's my present self-positioning.

Transcendental Idealism: I think Transcendental Idealism is the only suitable ideology for phenomenology. “Transcendental” is the spirit to turn the manner of study from one that intends to see the world as an ontological object and then to investigate how we are or are becoming in it, to one that intends to investigate first how we experience everything and then to clarify the very target of the investigation itself. “Transcendental Idealism” is an ideology to regard the conditions, which on the one hand constrain and on the other hand make possible all possible experiences, as ideal rather than real; the conditions include forms such as “time,” “space,” “categories” etc. and their corresponding powers. As long as you buy that the conditions are real, you accept that your power to communicate with (perceive, understand, act with etc.) “the world” can grasp “the world” in real. To a great extend I think that our power can grasp “the world” in real, is contradictory to phenomenology. But frankly I am still arguing for this thought. However, for a practical reason, the Transcendental Idealism as an ideololgy enables us to break our ultimate morbid persistence which is the source of various kinds of sorrow. If to be happy is what we want, maybe for this reason we have to consider to replace Transcendental Realistism with Transcendental Idealism.

A suggestion: The starting point to do Transcendental Idealism, I think, is to accept the methodolgical frame: substance-substratum relation. If substance is all that which is ever conscios, and if all that which is conscious is transcendentally conditioned, we have to ideally assume that there's a substratum substrating and making possible the substance. Based on Kant's critique, we can ideally assume that the substratum is systematic, and the substance is functional. Whenever the system operates, functions are given. If the system allows the function to be self-aware, spacio-temporal, and to have meaningful, logical intrenet of expereinces and its counterrevolution (that is, freedom; nevertheless, something as a counterrevolution does not necessarily imply to be the consequence), i.e., if the function has to be given as such, i.e., if we in our very experience can only expereicne as such and not otherwise, we should take the system and especially its internal structure for granted ideally (I think to Husserl, Heidegger, Frege, Searle, it's been taken for granted really). The investigation can only take place in substance, so the systematical substratum is only a necessary ideal assumption.

Self-Positioning: Transcendental Idealism allows for Empirical Realism; when we ideally take the transcendental conditions for granted, we accept that our experience is real and scientifically investgatable; if we take the conditions for granted as real, we extend reality beyond our conscious experience. When our experience is real and scientifically investgatable, the observation such as consciouness has the features of retention and pretention in time, or extension in space etc. makes sense only then. On the contrary, if we take the observed features as real structural elements of the conditions, then we are not phenomelologists any more, rather we become more like rationalists.