Logic and the Non-perceivable (II) [Dignāga's Nyāyamukha]

T32n1628_p0001c22(00)║　說因宗所隨　　宗無因不有
T32n1628_p0001c23(00)║　依第五顯喻　　由合故知因

1.
鄭偉宏（2007）：五支作法：
我常（宗）I am permanent (thesis)
不為根所覺者（因）not perceived by the senses (proof)
如虛空（喻）like emptyness (instances)
我是不為根所覺者（合）I am not perceived by the senses (combination)
我常（結）I am permanent (conclusion)

2.
第五顯喻：lna-bahi mthah-candpe（第五顯喻集量作有第五轉聲之喻，〈因明正理門論本證文〉）
《因明入正理論疏》（窺基）：「第五轉聲。由者因由。第三轉攝。因由敵證。」
T44n1840_p0133b20(17)║似同法喻有其五種一能立法不成二所立法不成。三俱不成四無合五倒合。　述曰。
T44n1840_p0133b21(01)║下依生正釋有二。初標列。後別解。標列有二。
T44n1840_p0133b22(01)║初標列同。後標列異。此初也。因名能立。
T44n1840_p0133b23(03)║宗法名所立。同喻之法。必須具此二。因貫宗喻。
T44n1840_p0133b24(02)║喻必有能立。令宗義方成。喻必有所立。
T44n1840_p0133b25(04)║令因義方顯。今偏或雙。於喻非有。故有初三。
T44n1840_p0133b26(03)║喻以顯宗。令義見其邊極。不相連合。所立宗義不明。
T44n1840_p0133b27(00)║照智不生。故有第四。初標能以所逐。
T44n1840_p0133b28(03)║有因宗必定隨逐。初宗以後因。乃有宗以因其逐。
T44n1840_p0133b29(00)║返覆能所。令心顛倒。共許不成。他智翻生。
T44n1840_p0133c01(01)║故有第五。依增勝過但立此五。
T44n1840_p0133c02(06)║故無無結及倒結等。以似翻真故亦無合結。

An instance (no matter similar or dissimilar) can be analyzed/checked with the following five elements: (1) proof-predicate, (2) thesis-predicate, (3) the residence of the former two in the instance (?), (4) the relation between the instance and the thesis-predicate (?) and the (5) co-occurrence of the proof-predicate and the thesis-predicate assured through the similar instances and the dissimilar instances (?)

初標：能以所逐，有因、宗必定隨逐；初宗以後因，乃有宗以因其逐，反覆能所、令心顛倒、共許不成，他智翻生。

3.
TRANSLATION
說因宗所隨，　　宗無因不有；
依第五顯喻，　　由合故知因。
The proof-predicate and the thesis-subject must co-occur in the thesis-subject; the proof-predicate does not reside alone in the thesis-subject without the thesis-predicate. Owing to the fifth fold of determination in the instances, the proof is perceived from the combination-part of the five-part inference.

*The fifth fold of determination in the instances: consulting with Kuiji's Shuji, the fifth moment/fold in the formation of proper similar and dissimilar instances assures, i.e., make perceived, the necessary co-occurrence of the proof-predicate and the thesis-predicate. For instance, “where there is fire, there is smoke, while where there is no fire, there is no smoke” makes the rule “fire and smoke must co-occur” perceived.

*Combination-part: in the pre-Dignāga five-part inference, the combination-part makes perceived the determination between the thesis-subject and the proof-predicate. The making-perceived of the determination occurs when the necessity of the co-occurrence of the proof-predicate and the thesis-predicate is perceived through the instances.

4.
In Dignāga's epistemology, the objective form and the subjective form which belong to the same item, for they share a mutual formal conformity, appear as outside and inside. Thus, the mind appears to exist as well. In a Critical Epistemological reflection of the idea stated above, the formal conformity has to do with the logical function of the judgment/cognition, which makes possible the logic on the one side and the appearances on the other side.

Yet, the appearance of an object is manifold, e.g., the real cup appears to me can be grasped with the idea “this cup is white”, “this cup is extensive”, “this cup is on the desk”.... All the grasping activities are the “application of conceptual constructions to the appearance”, which means the “affinity” of all possible conceptual constructions makes the logical space of analysis of the corresponding object. Since all the conceptual constructions can be applied to the appearance, no matter supported by the senses or not, the “affinity” itself equates the appearance of the object. This supplies for the assumption in the NM (Nyāyamukha) inference that the thesis-predicate and proof-predicate can reside in the same thesis-subject.

Among all possible conceptual constructions, three relational types can be divided. As predicate to subject, the relation can only be accidentally real but can be assured with the present support of the senses, e.g., the mountain has smoke, the mountain is green. As cause and effect, the relation must be necessary, i.e., anything happens must has its cause in the previous stage in which it must have been through. As reciprocal relation, something whose causal relation to another object is never interfered by a third object, must stand with the third simultaneously. From the three, the temporal form in which objects appear (as duration, succession and co-existence) become possible. The temporal logical functions supply for the assumption in the NM inference that any object must stand with some objects as “similar group” and “dissimilar group”, for (a) as an object, i.e., an affinity, several onto-predicates must reside in it, (b) among the onto-predicates, the causes or effects reside in the subject in an irreversible fashion, (c) from (a) and (b) the rules of co-occurrence in succession order could be established in experience, and the groups become possible (either as having the same specific observable onto-predicate, or as having the same specific non-observable onto-predicate which can be proved via another rule of co-occurrence via causality).

The sharp distinction between the perceivable and the non-perceivable (empirical reality v.s. transcendental ideality): that which can be perceived can be classified with the rules we induced from the accumulation of the past cases, for the past cases are so perceived; that which can never be perceived can nonetheless be classified with the pure rules of the logical functions of judgment, for we can not do otherwise, e.g., that which is not perceivable is different (from what we can ever know). This supplies for the assumptions in the NM inference: (empirically) once we perceive that sound is perceivable, we can know that sound and all the perceivable belong to the same group; (empirically) we induce the rule about the group that all that is perceivable is not permanent; (logically) we create a group of the non-perceivable for we know that all the perceivable belong to the same group; (logically) we assume that that which does not belong to this group does not have the most general onto-predicate shared by all the cases of the group, so we assume that all that is not perceivable is not impermanent, for all that is permanent must be perceivable. However, the non-perceivable and the permanent are not onto-predicates; the best, they are the Jiaming 假名 which does not have any substance and could be a possible verbal predicate whose sensible support can not be found but whose ideal support can be found in the logical functions of judgment itself.



(編輯記錄)