Transcendental Logic and Spiritual Development – Following Dignāga's and Kant's Critical Epistemology 2016/12/12
Transcendental Logic and Spiritual Development – Following Dignāga's and Kant's Critical Epistemology 2016/12/12
1. Inference vs. dialectics/ prasaṅga
A proposition whose subject is not presently cognized can be established via two kinds of employment of logic. When the subject is cognizable, we infer; when the subject is not cognizable, we use dialectics, viz., reductio ad absurdum (in Buddhism, prasaṅga).
Inference:
E.g.: There is fire in the mountain, because smoke is observed, just like [there is fire in] a stove.
The mountain that there is fire in, is cognizable, while the fire is not presently cognized. What is cognized is smoke.
Smoke is produced from fire; this is a causal relation that we can obtain via cognition. For example, the fire in a stove (we cognized before) produces smoke. Besides, as long as we walk to the fire in the mountain where the smoke is produced, we can see the fire from which the smoke is produced.
(Details: Any cognition invoves with the unity of “perception/intuition” and “inference (anumāna)/concept”; the unity is not a posteriori, and they are not united in any causal relation in time. The causality of cognition (causality of freedom or formal causality) is different from the causal relation between cognized objects (causality of nature). Once a cognition of any particular object appears, it appears with a determined way of thinking itself with certain possible associations of universals, giving criteria by means of which our empirical (a posteriori) inferences and judgments about the particular object could be either true, not true or irrelevant, in contrast to the free reflection of the cognition itself.）
Dialectics (Kantian)/ reductio ad absurdum:
When the subject of the proposition is impossible to cognize (not cognizable in sensible forms, i.e., in space and time), like “freedom,” “self-awareness” or “emptiness”.
The form of reductio ad absurdum: First we exhaust all logical possibilities of the proposition, like thesis and anti-thesis in Kant, four-corner argument in Buddhism (MMK by Nagārjūna; A by Dignāga), and then we indicate that every consequence of the logical possibility is contradictory to the experience. That means, the proposition cannot be established.
That is, when a rational concept is not supported by experience, the concept must be false.
On the contrary, when a rational concept is supported by experience, the concept must be true. Being supported by experience here does not mean having sensible ground, but means being not contradictory to the condition of cognition, especially to the condition of sensibility. That is, the rational concept that is empty of any empirical content is “allowed” to be thinkable by “perception/intuition”. Because, first, when a concept itself is logically problematic, it is automatically false. Second, it is exactly via the sensible condition of cognition that reality (in space and time) is first experienced. This is an obvious methodology in Kant. In Buddhism (N by Dignāga), “現、教力勝 ”i.e., perception and master's teachings, ultimately decide the indeterminable propositions between doctrines. Master's teachings are rooted in perception, too; master's teachings are the reports of real perception.
2. Orthogonality between free causality and phenomenal causality
The causality of freedom only necessitates the cause of cognition and its relation to all cognitions, while the causality of nature is only effective in the results of cognition, never on the cause. Reality is the system of the results of cognition which must be appearing and thinkable in certain ways.
3. Spiritual development:
Logic is identical, but has different employments. In cognition, since perception/intuition and inference/concept are united a priori, experience and reality are necessarily conditioned by phenomenal causality, which is the product of a crucial component of the function of logic. Regarding morality, this means the determination of desire (will) is subject to the object of cognition (the desired object) in phenomenal causal relation. On the other hand, the orthogonality of free causality and natural causality and ineffectiveness of the latter over the former ascertain the fact of free state. In cognition, although the subject of cognition becomes possible only insofar as both the cognizer and the cognized are established in cognition, the subject is not thus necessitated by the cognized. Meanwhile, there comes the possibility of valid and invalid judgment. In practice, will can be free from the determination of the sensible objects. From being situated in the simple conditioning of natural causality to being autonomous and spontaneous in the phenomenal causal exhaustion is a rational spiritual development.
先驗邏輯與精神發展 -- 從陳那與康德的批判知識論談起 2016/12/12
1. 推論（inference）與辯證（dialectics）/歸謬論證（prasanga）
針對一個未被現證的命題，我們只能透過兩種方式去確定該命題是否成立。當命題的主題（subject）是一個可被認知的對象或狀態時，我們採取「推論」；當命題的主題是一個不可能被認知的對象或狀態時，我們採取辯證，或者歸謬論證，的方式，來確認命題是否成立。
推論：
如：彼山有火，以有煙故，如灶。
山裡面的火，是一個可以被認知但是命題設定的時候未被認知。
被認知到的，是煙。
煙由火生，這是一個可以被認知到的因果關聯，例如灶裡的火可以生煙；且我們若真的走到山裡彼煙生處，我們是可以看到是有火的，且由火生煙。
（細節：任何的認知，都必然牽涉到「現量/直觀」與「比量/概念」的統合。而現量與概念的統合並非後天的，並非關聯於時間之內的因果關係，認知的因果（自由因果、形式因果），不同於被認識的對象之間的因果關係（自然因果）。而是任何現量「出現（appear）」時，其必隱含著其一切可被思及並已確定（determined）的「正當性（allowability）」。Once a cognition of any particular object appears, it appears with a determined way of thinking itself with certain possible associations of universals, giving criteria by means of which our empirical (a posteriori) inferences and judgments about the particular object could be either true, not true or irrelevant, in contrast to the free reflection of the cognition itself.）
辯證/歸謬論證：
當命題的主題不可能被認知（不可通過感性形式，即時間與空間，被認知），例如「自由」、「自證」或「空性」。
歸謬的形式：窮舉該命題的所有邏輯可能，如正反（康德），如四句（龍樹中論、陳那觀論），並且指出每一列舉出的邏輯可能，都導致與「經驗」相衝突的結果（「實則不然」）。這表示，該命題不可能成立。
例如：龍樹中論第一品觀因緣不成。例如：康德任一paralogism。
也就是說，當一個理性概念，不受經驗支持時，該概念必不為真。
相對地，當一個理性概念，受經驗支持時，其概念為必然地真。這裡所謂受經驗支持，並不是指該概念有認知基礎，而是指不與任何認知條件相違背，特別是「現量/直觀」這個條件，換句話說，是當這個沒有感性經驗內涵的理性概念，可被現量（經驗本身）允許為可思的。兩個原因，其一，當一個概念本身含有邏輯錯誤時，其本身便不成立，故立破關鍵在於直觀條件。其二，正是透過感性條件，（在時間與空間之中的）現實 才真正被經驗。這在康德是十分明顯的方法論，在陳那，因論「現、教力勝」是決斷不可能被認知的命題的原則，其中，「教（現證者的報告）」的根源仍是「現」。
2. 自由的因果與現象的因果之正交關係：
自由因果只有限定認知條件與所有一切可能認知之間的關係，而自然因果只在認知的結果之間有效，不涉及認知條件。（The causality of freedom only necessitates the cause of cognition and its relation to all cognitions, while the causality of nature is only effective in the results of cognition, never on the cause. ）現實，就是作為認識的結果的體系，必然是出現的（appearing）且可合理思及的。
3. 精神發展：
邏輯是同一邏輯，一方面因為任何的認知，都牽涉到「現量/直觀」與「比量/概念」的先天統合，經驗與現實一定是受限於現象的因果制約。於道德面來說，便是欲望（意志）順服於認知對象（欲望對象）而決定。然而，自由的因果與現象的因果之正交關係，以及後者對前者的無效，確保的是自由狀態的事實。於認知，認識主體雖因認知而令認知者與被認知者同時成立，但不被被認知者綁定，也有判斷正確與否的可能。於實踐，便是意志可以自由不為感性對象決定。由單純在自然因果制約中生活，提升到能自主處在自然因果脈絡之中，則是一合理的精神發展。