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先驗理想主義
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gustav Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > On “Freedom” in Allen Wood's Kantian Ethics > (2007) > > Chun-Ying WANG > > In this chapter, Allen Wood centers on the > difficulty of “the identity of a self that is > free with one that is admittedly unfree” (157). > He thinks it is not possible that a single > acceptance of Kant's theory of freedom “can be > squared with all the texts” of Kant's (156). > Sidgwik, quoted by Wood, points out that Kant in > Groundwork holds that the self giving laws is > purely “noumenal”, while the self obeying laws > is “empirical”, added to which is that the > acting self subjects to natural necessitation. At > another situation, Kant in Religion holds moral > agents act from an inclination only by > incorporating (Allison) the inclination into a > freely adopted maxim. Wood seems to suggest a > difficulty that the stances of the former Kant, > who persists in sharp separation between > transcendental self and empirical self, and the > latter Kant, who demands the the inclination > (belonging to empirical self) must be incorporated > with a maxim (empirically realized) which can be > transformed in the free will into universal > practical law (altered to the same direction as > reason demands), cannot be well fused. > > However, it is my difficulty understanding Wood's > criticism; do the two stances not explain the same > thing, pointing out the same difficulty how come > transcendental condition is connected with > experience and certain maxim can under that > circumstance become practical law? If we regard > the transcendental-methodological objects neither > as objects graspable in space and time, e.g., to > think that the noumenal-phenomenal distinction > does not equal the distinction between America and > China or the land and the air, nor as pre-critical > metaphysical terms, e.g., to think it does not > equal the distinction between heave and earth, or > not to compare these objects with the naïvely > assumed another kind of conscious state in the > animals (161-164)[1], and if we appreciate enough > the effort in Kant's epistemology, especially his > notion of the causality of freedom, before hasting > in the advanced issue, the “squaring” problem > would resolve while the “gap” might be filled > up. > > If one cannot answer to the difficulty how the > transcendental-methodological faculties must be > incorporated to satisfy the condition of > experience and thus how the condition of > experience is linked > transcendentally-methodologically with the > experience, one is not ready to answer to the > difficulty raised by Wood here. Kant's > epistemology refuses the representational model of > cognition. It is not the case that the a priori > existents' effecting our cognitive powers so that > our cognition happens, but the case that the a > priori conditions, namely, certain powers > incorporable, are satisfied so that our cognition > appears as such in that incorporation. With the > understanding, we should not understand the self > giving laws, the self obeying laws and the acting > self to be isolated conditions. If they are > incorporable transcendentally-methodologically, > their analysis in a fashion of method does not > imply their “existing status” be > “separated”. With the awareness of the notion > of causality of freedom, knowing that the > conformity between object of cognition and the > cognition of the object of that cognition is only > formal, the maxim accepted empirically can be > universalized not as in a happening process. A > cognized rule can be universalized only because it > itself is universalizable in the condition: since > every cognized happening object must be cognized > with an understanding of its causal connection, > the causation cognized there must be true for it > comes from the cognitive condition – neither our > empirical act of cognition nor the real happening > object itself has any impact on the law at all; on > the other hand, an object created by my concept > belongs to me only because it meets the practical > condition, i.e., the object is cognized with an > understanding of necessary causal connection to my > ideas, not because in pre-cognition state, my idea > ideally effects me and my moves so that I come to > cognize the result of that process. > > Moreover, as the aware being, we are free in the > sense that cognition itself is never effected by > natural causal laws; however, we are also never > free, because every experience via cognition must > be conditioned by natural laws – we can only > know phenomenal objects. Yet, it is only because > the awareness is only allowed to know nature, > including the self in that nature, while it still > keeps a non-empirical causal connection to the > cognized object, the cognition as such is > possible; and of the same course, freedom and > morality is possible. > > * * * > > It is also owing to the lack of appreciation of > Kant's effort in epistemology that Wood would use > the randomness in other animal kinds' actions > (choices) or in natural development and quantum > physics to blame Kant for his old-fashioned narrow > knowledge of nature (158-161), and to further > blame Kant's theory of freedom as a theoretical > need based upon that narrow knowledge and his > extravagant demand for freedom (162). > > As for the complaint about other animal kind's > choices, we just cannot mix up the investigation > of conditions of experience (transcendental > philosophy) with the interpretation of phenomena > (science). The relation between the former and the > latter is not simple correspondence. The behavior > of imputability from one option to another is > totally a different issue than making a choice in > (self-)awareness. One is a study of the result of > cognition, and the other is a reflection of its > own condition. > > As for the uncertainty in nature, I think, one > could infer that all the future development must > have been completely determined by the past, from > the principle that everything happens must have > its cause in the past, only insofar as he holds > the assumption that things develop by itself as > much as time and space are “out there” by > itself. The scenario is, I think, that when > something has not happened, there's no ground for > any certainty with regard to a specific > development; the ground for the specific certainty > is only provided together with the completion of > the cognition of that specific event. In a word, > we can say, natural necessitations are given only > through our experiencing them. And this is also > why what we can never experience is necessarily > impossible (the negative necessitation). Even > further, the empirical ingredients which we may > want to grant to “things themselves”, are > exactly the source of randomness and contingency. > Considering the condition of experience, on the > other hand, I think we can accept uncertainty in > nature with no difficulty, while the natural > necessitation is still expressed in a sense that > every random outcome must have its specific cause > in a specific causal chain. > > > Note: > [1] “If we go by a common sense interpretation > of everyday experience …. Animals do sometimes > apparently hesitate between real possibilities and > then make choices between them.” (159)