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gustav Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > > > This chapter on svabhva is quite worrying, for > the topic itself and the traditions (in India > alone) involved with it are too tremendously > complicated for us to conveniently buy these > paragraphs, which nevertheless has done a good job > to throw us in the midst of the pool where the > fine lines dividing things, essence and knowledge > are indeterminately blurred again. Westerhoff > attempts to reconstruct the Mdhyamika > (Nrgrjuna and Candrak蘋rti's mainly) position > thereof as one that right understanding > (j簽na) is the genuine realization of the > absence of substance-svabhva, i.e., the > penetration into the falsity of the ontological > commitment to our conventional realization of > objectness, and such an understanding constitutes > a shift of cognition which brings about the > cessation of all suffering (Interpretations of > svabhva 47). If this were not the haunting of > the author's own philosophical stand, such a > Mdhyamika shift is certainly echoed with Kant's > therapeutical Copernican turn. When time and space > become the mere forms of our awareness, and > relations that look externally set actually > require, perhaps sufficiently, the valid inner > determination of our mind, ontology is only > commitalbe in so far as it is restricted to the > reuslt of our cognition for we lose the necessary > links within and among objects that we used to > take for granted. On the one side, it seems the > realm of sensible world is assured; on the other > side, ontology turns out to be set upon one > tilting assumption. The penetration into the > unnecessity of the objectness we used to realize > frees us from the web of rules, the way by which > we used to conceive, the result of which is that > things become appreciable and in turn the destined > become dare to determine. The shift makes the > conventional empirical world solid and at once > limits its validity as well, yielding the space of > appreciation and reflection to us. Moreover, > appreciating and reflecting, the determining feels > the feeling of life which is different from any > kind of sensible experience via cognition > (determination). > > An epistemologist's deduction of the above stand > is to focus on the means of cognition and to > persuade the sufferer of the means' conditioning > and making possible all possible experiences as > such and of the identification of the means and > the result (cognition as well as experience). The > critical point is that means of cognition include > perception (intuitive component) and inference > (conceptual component) so that cognition > necessarily consists of the aspect of perception > and the aspect of inference. Via the act of > cognition, all at once, objectness is given for > perception and inference cooperate as providing > manifold sensible elements (via perception) > determined/determinable as such (via inference), > and, on the other side, the independence of the > links are to be realized as untrue for the links > are actually originated from the > correspondence/unity of perception and inference. > That is to say, putting into the Indian > traditional debates on svabhva, svabhva comes > in the unity of both perception and inference; > hence, svabhva as essence is somehow acceptable > in experience for the origination of our cognition > gives valid ground for recognizing objects as > objects with objectness, but svabhva as > substance, as something independently of our > cognition, becomes improbable, for the assumption > of our own that the way our cognition rises > indicates the status of the things the cognition > is about, is itself too overstepping and hence > improbable. Afterwards, the external causality > from the hypothetical thing-in-itself to our > sensibility becomes something we come to commit to > or against. To, the conventional experience is > solid; against, glimpse of life glitters, so that > we gradually gain finer and finer position in the > conventional experience. > > And how Madhyamika's deduction be, or better, how > Madhyamika's position regarding the issue be, is > quite inviting!