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gustav Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > Averting The Arguments > > > (Vigrahavyavartani by Nargarjuna) > > > > Part 1 > > The Arguments of the Opponents > > 1. > If self-existence (svabhava) does not exist > anywhere in any existing thing, > Your statement, itself being without > self-existence, is not able to discard > self-existence. > > 2. > But if that statement has its own self-existence, > then your initial proposition is refuted; > There is a logical inconsistency in this, and you > ought to explain the grounds of the difference > between the principle of validity in your > statement and others. > > 3. > Should your opinion be that your statement is like > "Do not make a sound," this is not possible; > For in this case by a present sound there will be > a future prevention of that sound. > > 4. > If your statement were that: "This is a denial of > a denial," that is not true; > Thus your thesis, as to a defining mark > (laksanata) - not mine - is in error. > > 5. > If you deny existing things while being seen by > direct perception, > Then that direct perception, by which things are > seen, also does not exist. > > 6. > By denying direct perception inference is denied, > as also Scripture and analogy. > As well as the points to be proved by inference > and Scripture and those points to be proved by a > similar instance (drstanta). > > 7. > The people who know the modes of the dharmas know > there is a good self-existence of good dharmas. > As to the others, the application is the same. > > 8. > There is a self-existence of liberation in those > dharmas mentioned as liberative modes of dharmas. > Likewise, there is that which is non-liberative, > etc. > > 9. > And, if there would be no self-existence of > dharmas, then that would be "non-self existence"; > In that case the name (nama) would not exist, for > certainly there is nothing without substance to > which it refers. > > 10. > If one asserts: That which is self-existent > exists, but the self-existence of the dharmas does > not exist, > One should give the explanation concerning that of > which there is self-existence without dharmas. > > 11. > As there must be a denial of something that > exists, as in in the statement: "There is not a > pot in the house," > That denial of yours which is seen must be a > denial of self-existence that exists. > > 12. > Or if that self-existence does not exist, what do > you deny by that statement? > Certainly, the denial of what does not exist is > proved without a word! > > 13. > Just as children erroneously apprehend that there > is "non-water" in a mirage, > So you would erroneously apprehend a non-existing > thing as deniable. > > 14. > If this is so, then there is the apprehensions > "what is apprehended" and the one who apprehends, > Also the denial, "what is denied" and the one who > denies-- six-all together. > > 15. > However, if the apprehension, "what is > apprehended" and the one who apprehends do not > exist. > Then is it not true that denial, "what is denied," > and the one who denies do not exist? > > 16. > If denial, "what is denied," ant the one who > denies do not exist, > Then all existing things as well as the > self-existence of them are proved since you have > eliminated their denial. > > 17. > Because of non-self-existence there is no proof of > any grounds of knowledge; whence are your > grounds? > There is no proof of a "point" possible for you if > it has no grounds. > > 18. > If the proof of your denial of a self-existent > thing is not a result of grounds of knowledge, > Then my affirmation of the existence of a > self-existent thing is proved without grounds. > > 19. > Or if you maintain: "The real existence of grounds > is such that it is a non-self-existent thing > (asvabhava) this is not justified; > Because no thing whatever in the world exists > lacking it own nature (nishvabhava). > > 20. > When it is mid: The denial precedes "what is > denied," this is not justified. > Denial is not justified either later or > simultaneously. Therefore self-existence is real. > > > > Part II > > Nargarjuna's Reply to the Arguments of the > Opponents > > 21. > If any thesis does not bear on the totality of > causes and conditions, or on them separately, > Is not emptiness proved because of the fact that > there is no self-existence in existing things > (1)? > > 22. > The "being dependent nature" of existing things: > that is called "emptiness." > That which has a nature of "being dependent"--of > that there is a non-self-existent nature. > > 23. > Just as a magically formed phantom could deny a > phantom created by its own magic, > Just so would be that negation. > > 24. > This statement regarding emptiness is not "that > which is self-existent"; therefore, there is no > refutation of my assertion. > There is no inconsistency and thus the grounds for > the difference need not be explained. > > 25. > Regarding "Do not make a sound"--this example > introduced by you is not pertinent, > Since there is a negation of sound by sound. That > is not like my denial of self -existence . > > 26. > For, if there is prevention of that which lacks > self-existence by that which lacks > self-existence, > Then that which lacks self-existence would cease, > and self-existence would be proved. > > 27. > Or, as a phantom could destroy the erroneous > apprehension concerning a phantom woman that: > "There is a woman," just so this is true in our > case. > > 28. > Or else the grounds of proof are that which is to > be proved; certainly sound does not exist as > real. > For we do not speak without accepting, for > practical purposes, the work-a-day world. > > 29. > If I would make any proposition whatever, then by > that I would have a logical error; > But I do not make a proposition; therefore I am > not in error. > > 30. > If there is something, while being seen by means > of the objects of direct perceptions, etc., > It is affirmed or denied. That denial of mine is a > non-apprehension of non-things. > > 31. > And if, for you, there is a source of knowledge of > each every object of proof, > Then tell how, in turn, for you there is proof of > those sources. > > 32. > If by other sources of knowledge there would be > the proof of a source -- that would be an > "infinite regress"; > In that case neither a beginning, middle, nor an > end is proved. > > 33. > Or if there is proof of those objects without > sources, your argument is refuted. > There is a logical inconsistency in this, and you > ought to explain the cause of the difference > between the principles of validity in your > statement and others. > > 34. > That reconciliation of difficulty is not realized > in the claim: "Fire illumines itself." > Certainly it is not like the non-manifest > appearance of a pot in the dark. > > 35. > And if, according to your statement, fire > illumines its own self, > Then is this not like a fire which would illumine > its own self and something else? > > 36. > If, according to your statement, fire would > illumine both its "own self" and an "other self," > Then also darkness, like fire, would darken itself > and an "other self." > > 37. > Darkness does not exist in the glow of a fire; and > where the glow remains in an "other individual > self," > How could it produce light? Indeed light is the > death of darkness. > > 38. > If you say: "Fire illumines when it is being > produced," this statement is not true; > For, when being produced, fire certainly does not > touch (prapnoti) darkness. > > 39. > Now if that glow can destroy the darkness again > and again without touching it, > Then that glow which is located here would destroy > the darkness in "every corner" of the world. > > 40. > If your sources of knowledge are proved by their > own strength (svatas), then, for you, the sources > are proved without respect to "that which is to be > proved"; > Then you have a proof of a source, but no sources > are proved without relation to something else. > > 41. > If, according to you, the sources of knowledge are > proved without being related to the objects of > "that which is to be proved," > Then these sources will not prove anything. > > 42. > Or if you say: What error is there in thinking, > "The relationship of these sources of knowledge to > their objects is already proved"? > The answer is: This would be the proving of what > is proved. Indeed "that which is not proved" is > not related to something else. > > 43. > Or if the sources of knowledge in every case are > proved in relation to "what is to be proved," > Then "what is to be proved" is proved without > relation to the sources > > 44. > And if "what is to be proved" is proved without > relation to to the sources of knowledge, > What purpose is the proof of the sources for > you--since that for the purpose of which those > sources exist is already proved! > > 45. > Or if, for you, the sources of knowledge are > proved in relation to "what is to be proved," > Then, for you, there exists an interchange between > the sources and "what is to be proved." > > 46. > Or if, for you, there are the sources of knowledge > being proved when there is proof of "what is to be > proved," and if "what is to be proved" exist when > The source is proved, then, for you, the proof of > them both does not exist. > > 47. > If those things which are to be proved are proved > by those sources of knowledge, and those things > which are proved > By "what is to be proved," how will they prove > anything? > > 48. > And if those sources of knowledge are proved by > what is to be proved, and those things which are > proved > By the sources, how will they prove anything? > > 49. > If a son is produced by a father, and if that > father is produced by that very son when he is > born, > Then tell me, in this case, who produces whom? > > 50. > You tell me! Which of the two becomes the father, > and which the son- > Since they both carry characteristics of "father" > and "son"? In that case there is doubt. > > 51. > The proof of the sources of knowledge is not > established by itself, not by each other, or not > by other sources; > It does not exist by that which is to be proved > and not from noting at all. > > 52. > If those who know the modes of the dharmas say > that there is good self-existence of good > dharmas, > That self-existence must be stated in > contradistinction to something else. > > 53. > If a good self-existence were produced in relation > to something else, > Then that self-existence of the good dharmas is an > "other existence." How then, does self-existence > exist? > > 54. > Or if there is that self-existence of good > dharmas, while not being related to something > else, > There would be no state of a spiritual way of > life. > > 55. > There would be neither vice nor virtue, and > worldly practical activities would not be > possible; > Self-existent things would be eternal because that > without a cause would be eternal. > > 56. > Regarding your view of bad, "liberative," and > undefined dharmas, there is an error; > Therefore, all composite products (samskrta) exist > as non-composite elements (asamskrta). > > 57. > He who would impute a really existing name to a > really existing thing > Could be refuted by you; but we do not assert a > name. > > 58. > And that assertion: "The name is unreal"--would > that relate to a real or a non-real thing? > If it were a real thing, or if it were a non-real > thing--in both cases your entire proposition is > refuted. > > 59. > The emptiness of all existing things has been > demonstrated previously; > Therefore, this attack is against that which is > not my thesis. > > 60. > Or if it is said: "Self-existence exists, but that > self-existence of dharmas does not exist"-- > That is questionable; but that which was said by > me is not questionable. > > 61. > If the denial concerns something real, then is not > emptiness proved? > Then you would deny the non-self-existence of > things. > > 62. > Or if you deny emptiness, and there is no > emptiness, > Then is not your assertion: "The denial concerns > something real" refuted? > > 63. > Since anything being denied does not exist, I do > not deny anything; > Therefore, the statement: "You deny"--which was > made by you--is a false accusation. > > 64. > Regarding what was said concerning what does not > exist: "The statement of denial is proved without > a word," > In that case the statement expresses: "That object > does not exist"; the words do not destroy that > object. > > 65. > Regarding the great censure formerly made by you > through the instance of the mirage-- > Now hear the ascertainment whereby that instance > is logically possible. > > 66. > If that apprehension of the mirage is "something > which is self-existent," it would not have > originated presupposing other things; > But that apprehension which exists presupposing > other things--is that not emptiness? > > 67. > If that apprehension is "something which is > self-existent," with what could the apprehension > be negated? > This understanding applies in the remaining five > factors: > "what is apprehended," > the one who apprehends, > the denial, > "what is denied," > and the one who denies; > therefore that is an invalid censure. > > 68. > By this argument the absence of a cause for > denying self-existence is refuted--on the basis of > the similarity with the foregoing: > Namely, that which was already said regarding the > exclusion of the instance of the mirage. > > 69. > That which is the cause for the three times is > refuted from what is similar to that given > before; > Negation of cause for the three times affirms > emptiness. > > 70. > All things prevail for him for whom emptiness > prevails; > Nothing whatever prevails for him for whom > emptiness prevails.