MEPO Forum :: 南海局勢

annie Wrote:
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> Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea: What
> Should Vietnam Do? 
> Le Hong Hiep
> May 15, 2014
> Link:
> http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinese-
> assertiveness-the-south-china-sea-what-should-1046
> 8
> 
> 
> (Source: The National Interest)
> 
> 
> Since 1 May, China has deployed the Haiyang Shiyou
> 981 floating oilrig off the central coast of
> Vietnam for an exploratory mission. Vietnam has
> been infuriated as the rig has been parked well
> within Vietnam’s lawful Exclusive Economic Zone
> (EEZ), just 120 nm from its maritime baseline. It
> has also caused widespread concerns across the
> region.
> 
> The incident is the latest development in what can
> be seen as a new wave of Chinese assertiveness in
> the South China Sea following its successful de
> facto seizure of the Scarborough Shoal from the
> Philippines in 2012. After a relatively calm year
> of 2013, this new wave started earlier this year
> with China’s siege of the Second Thomas Shoal in
> the Spratlys. There are also reports that China
> has been actively preparing for the construction
> of an airstrip on the Johnson South Reef, which it
> occupied after a naval skirmish with Vietnam in
> 1988.
> 
> 
> Deploying oilrigs in Vietnam’s EEZ isn’t a new
> tactic for China in its maritime disputes with
> Vietnam. In 1997, and in late 2004, China deployed
> the Kantan-3 floating oil platform to drill in
> Vietnam’s Block 113 off Thua Thien-Hue province.
> In both cases, China had to withdraw the platform
> after Vietnam issued diplomatic protests.
> 
> Nevertheless, the deployment of the Haiyang Shiyou
> 981 can still be seen as an escalation of Chinese
> assertiveness. Unlike the Kantan-3, the new rig is
> equipped with much more advanced technologies that
> make drilling more feasible in deep-water areas.
> Although it’s still unclear whether the rig has
> indeed undertaken drilling, the enhanced
> feasibility of the operation means that this time
> China is able to pose a more credible threat to
> Vietnam’s legitimate rights and interests.
> 
> Vietnamese authorities also report high levels of
> Chinese aggression at the scene. For example,
> China has dispatched up to 80 vessels from
> different forces, including seven naval warships,
> to the scene to protect the rig and to intimidate
> the Vietnamese vessels. Chinese vessels were
> reportedly using high-pressure water pumps to
> attack Vietnamese ships. Some also rammed
> Vietnamese vessels intentionally, causing major
> damage and endangering the lives of Vietnamese
> crew.
> 
> Against this backdrop, questions arise as to why
> China has targeted Vietnam rather than other
> claimant states in the South China Sea.
> 
> First, China might have considered Vietnam a more
> ‘convenient’ target than other ASEAN claimant
> states. Targeting Vietnam might not stir up as
> much concern and protest from other powers as
> targeting the Philippines, which has recently
> tightened its military cooperation with the US.
> 
> Second, the rig’s area of operation is close to
> the Paracels, which facilitates China’s
> protection of the rig. In that sense, it’s
> physically easier for China to coerce Vietnam than
> other claimants for simple reasons of geography.
> 
> Third, Vietnam is China’s biggest rival in the
> South China Sea so targeting it can provide
> Beijing with an opportunity to test Vietnam’s
> genuine capabilities and resolve. Vietnam has
> recently invested considerably in upgrading its
> navy as well as paramilitary forces, such as the
> Vietnam Coast Guard and the newly-established
> Vietnam Fisheries Resources Surveillance.
> 
> Fourth, Vietnam has recently made efforts to forge
> closer ties with the US so the deployment of the
> rig might serve as a timely reminder of the
> consequences of such actions.
> 
> Regardless of what China’s intentions might be,
> its deployment of the rig is undoubtedly a serious
> threat to Vietnam’s legitimate interests.
> Vietnam must therefore stand up to the Chinese
> challenge. Unfortunately, Vietnam seems to have
> only a limited range of options to deal with
> this.
> 
> It’s obvious that Vietnam isn’t willing to use
> force to evict the rig from its EEZ—it risks a
> major war with China, which is undesirable for
> Hanoi. Vietnam’s restraint in using force is
> therefore understandable, although it might raise
> doubts regarding Vietnam’s deterrence
> capabilities against China.
> 
> As a result, the most important thing Vietnam can
> do now is to name and shame China internationally
> and to enlist international diplomatic support in
> denouncing China’s actions. In addition to
> diplomatic protests, Vietnam will likely maintain
> the constant presence of its paramilitary vessels
> around the scene, at least as a form of protest
> against China’s actions, if not as a tactic to
> obstruct the deployment and operation of the rig.
> 
> The most likely outcome is that there’ll be a
> standoff between the two countries over the rig
> until August 15, the date China announced it would
> withdraw the rig. Still, it’s unclear as to
> whether China will do so, and if so, whether
> it’ll move the rig back to its waters or simply
> to another location unacceptable to Vietnam.
> 
> Le Hong Hiep is a PhD candidate in Politics at the
> University of New South Wales, Australian Defence
> Force Academy, Canberra, Australia. The following
> article was originally published by ASPI’s The
> Strategist here.
> 
> Image: Wikicommons.