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gustav Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > Following the understanding of 同品 and 異品 > in the light of the understanding of 義 (as > 起論端義 and 簡別義) presented last week, > we are now to examine Dignāga's theory of > 九句因. > > First, the cognitive model will be described; > second, the logical function as distributing cases > with its rules will be described; then, we will > come back to 九句因. > > Non-representational model. With the immediacy > between (the operation of) the five senses and > (the operation of) manas, the cognition arises in > a form as: the world as appeared outside, the > world as appeared inside and the subject as > appeared to “know the world in which the subject > itself occurs” are altogether sharply given as > one unity of the conditioned representations, > namely, the real. > > It then follows that the logical functions we can > observe in our own reflection dwell (operate) > directly in the world, neither the case that > “the sensational impressions are taken in, > processed with the logos and produced to be > knowledge” nor the case that “the res cogitans > in time (as developing concepts) relate to the res > extensas in space in a harmonious > correspondence”. With the operation of the > living logic in the “first cause” that turns > out, post-critically, to dwell (operate) in every > instance of cognition and directly in reality, the > object of cognition (一切義) is twofold: the > object to be specified (起論端義, 宗法(義)) > and the object as specified (簡別義). (Although > twofold, there's no real distinction between the > folds, since the first cause only comes into > effect “formally”. Such a causality is the > supporting source for Jinendrabuddhi's term > “formal conformity between the object of > cognition and the cognition of that cognition”.) > > > The object to be specified is in possession of > manifold specific ways determining itself, but it > comes into reality only in a unity once a time. > The realized specific way determining the object > makes the object itself the one as specified. > E.g., “(the cup as) the cup”, “(the cup as) > my cup”, “(the cup as) white object”... are > one and the same object. This is what Dignāga's > internal process in which an object is inferred, > namely, the inference-for-oneself > (svarthāanumāna), may refer to. With such an > operation of the direct logic, the inferential > measures for others in the parārthanumāna > (inference-for-others) such as the dharmin-dharma > (subject-predicate) relations, similar instances > and dissimilar instances, falling near or far > (與所立法鄰近均等) in the distribution of > cases, etc., come into effect, too. And thus this > is the light in demand to shed on understanding > these inferential measures. > > Formally speaking (in a sense as the conditioning > of the logical functions), since the direct logic > contributes unity, which forms the definite scope > of a dharmin, all the possible objects to be > specified are empty, neutral cases (something like > the infinite neutral nodes in the information > topology). When the material specification comes > in, namely, when experience through cognition > comes in, namely, when things appear, all the > possible ways of self-determination of each case > are determined (prior to the taking-place of any > specific cognition action, and non-effected by the > free determination of the cognizer) – this is > the material distribution. > > Since all the possible cases that can appear have > their own manifold ways of self-determination, > while the ways themselves are the objects as > specified again (a mini-critical circle in a > single conscious structure), the distribution > process (as formal activity in reflection, namely, > in svarthāanumāna) by means of the ways of > specification has its ground to perform. I.e., > since every empty case can be so-specified (P) or > non-so-specified (-P) with certain specification > (“P”), all the cases must be able to be > distributed as a group of P and its exclusive > group -P. (一切義皆名品故) > > Now, as into the concern of the verbal inference > (parārthanumāna), the object to be specified is > indirect and needs the help of another object as > specified among the object's possible ways of > self-determination. Then, the determined relation > between these two ways of self-determination of > the object must be obtained as valid first. E.g., > the mountain as having smokes is to be specified > as one having fire, when the having-fire-ness as a > way any dharmin can appear to a cognizer must > co-occur with the having-fire-ness as a way any > dharmin so can. The two distribution systems of > the same web of neutral information nodes applying > dharma A (e.g., specifiable with having-fire-ness) > and applying dharma B (e.g., specifiable with > having-smoke-ness) must be identical: all that can > be specified with A are all that can be specified > with B, while the exclusive scope of A is the one > of B equally. > > Therefore, in Dignāga's analysis of the reasons > and pseudo-reasons (九句因), only the way of > self-determination presented as the inferential > reason which can successfully makes the contrast > (against the way of self-determination presented > as the inferential target宗法) of the two > distribution systems resultful, i.e., makes the > two distribution systems identical (同品有, > 異品無), the reason is legitimately effective. > > > > > Beside of the perfect situation, there is only one > kind of legitimate reason left, namely, > 同品有無俱, 異品無. All that cannot appear > as specified with the thesis-dharma is identical > with all that cannot appear as specified with the > reason-dharma; some that can appear as specified > with the thesis-dharma can fall in the group as > appearing as specified with the reason-dharma, > while the left of that which can appear as > specified with the thesis-dharma, cannot appear as > specified with the reason-dharma. E.g., voice is > non-eternal, because it is produced by human > effort, like the pots or lightening, and unlike > śūnyatā (emptiness). This distribution systems > in contrast are identical as well, for the > equation does not be harmed with the cases which > is non-specifiable with the thesis-dharma -- the > distribution of the cases specified with the > thesis-dharma falls within the distribution of the > cases specified with the reason-dharma, while the > distribution of the later cases does not fall > without the distribution of the former cases. > > > > The other seven kinds of reasons will be discussed > later.