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gustav Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > Chun-Ying WANG: Between the Given and the Thought: > Introducing the Introduction of Dan > Arnold's《Brains, Buddhas, and Believing》 > > (In progress, please do not cite any part of the > short essay) > > Questions in focus: > ◎ Can Buddhism be naturalized? Can the > “experience” in the regard of some > transcendent point of view be explained and > examined by science? Mind is after all > empirical-only or there is something rational (or > logical, transcendental, conceptual, or > linguistic) about it? > ◎ Is the idea of selfless in Buddhism compatible > with contemporary physicalists, that all metal > events or states is only under (natural) causal > laws and then reducible to activities in the > physical world? With the theory of rebirth, > Buddhism is than never totally agree with > physcialism? However, can the claim that only > those entering some causal relations can be > counted as something real, which commonly > admitted by Dharmakīrti and one physicalist > represetative Fodor, survive the challenge raised > by some like Sellars who urges for “logical > space of reason,”or by Mimansakas and > Madhyamakas who urge for the independence of the > linguistic-related mental elements that cannot be > reduced to causal laws? Dharmakīrti's own theory > of “intentional level of description” and > “the necessary first-person point of view” can > help here? > ◎ The referentiality of intention, as a mental > activity, (the relation between the mental > aboutness and the directed of the aboutness) is > after all simply causal – as physicalists and > Dharmakīrti wants it, or is constitutive? > ◎I believe that... How to treat “belief”? > The attitude of intentionality is different from > its content, and this is about the question of > ontology: is everything only normative, as > Dharmakīrti wants it, that something is true > because I or we believe it to be true? When I > believe that it is raining, is it true that it is > raining outside, given I believe it or not? When I > believe that nothing has self-nature, is it true > that nothing has self-nature, given I believe it > or not? Perhaps language has its own external, > even individual objectivity (Mimansakas)? Not only > intention, but also intension. > > > I. Between the given and the thought – the birth > place of all puzzles > > Dignāga says at the very beginning of his > 《Pramānasamuccaya》 that because there are the > particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the universal > (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), we establish two (and only > two) pramānas, namely, perception (pratyakṣa) > and inference (anumāna). The seeming simple lines > stirs up exactly all the puzzles we will discuss > in this field. Kant as well addresses at the > beginning of his 《First Critique》 that: “In > whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of > knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that > through which it is in immediate relation to them, > and to which all thought as a means is directed. > But intuition takes place only in so far as the > object is given to us. This again is only > possible, to man at least, in so far as the mind > is affected in a certain way. The capacity > (receptivity) for receiving representations > through the mode in which we are affected by > objects , is entitled sensibility. Objects are > given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone > yields us intuitions; they are thought through the > understanding, and from the understanding arise > concepts. But all thought must, directly or > indirectly, by way of certain characters (marks, > Merkmale; transcendental categories I would say), > relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, > with us, to sensibility, because in not other way > can an object be given to us”(A19/B33; Kemp > Smith's English translation). > > > II. Kantian in the North America and analystic > philosophy: Sellars's “logical space of > reason1”and McDowell's following-up > > Sellars, Wilfrid(1912-1989)believes that > thought is “inner speech”and he tries to avoid > his so-called “the mythical given”(the given > knowledge does not demand for a correspondent, > reasonable cognitive capacity). He claims that all > of the intentional activities of human beings take > place only in a “logical space of reason,” > which is the source verifying and being able to > verify one's discourse of inference, and any known > “attributions” only has their states in the > space, including those in cognitive activities, > speech acts, and the truth in the sense of this > circumstance (such as we can agree with the > authority possessed by some experts with regard to > their description about the observation of the > world). With this, Selalrs fights against any kind > of “foundationalism” that bases cognition and > theories of cognition in some mythical given > (footnote 1). In other words, Sellars's opinion is > similar with Kant's claim that human being's > rational response to sensible experience is not a > response of judgment; on the contrary, reason has > to be operative directly in the experience and > becomes part of the condition of experience. > > McDowell once gives an example2:suppose A sees a > cardinal, but A never learns about the cardinal, > and A may be even in no possession of a concept of > it, nor any related understandings. At the same > occasion, B also sees the cardinal, and B > recognizes that this is a cardinal. If we only > think about the visual experience, the awareness > of A and B in that occasion may not be different, > but B's experience allows or inclines him to say > “this is a cardinal”, while A's does not. The > examples tries to indicate that: (1) the > specification or attributions people address to a > described object are somehow *really and > *non-inferentially accepted as (part of) their > knowledge, but (2) these specified attributions > does not belong to the real, non-inferential > experience, while (3) these specifiable and > expressible contents indeed belongs to the > capacity of cognition. The element of the capacity > of cognition that does not yield direct experience > but allows for specification and description > dwells in “the logical space of reason” of > Sellars in McDowell's understanding. These points > means ot us here that: (1) the content that is to > be described does not have its state in the direct > experience, or otherwise it would not be > impossible for A to address “this is a > cardinal” in his experience; furthermore, (2) > direct experience cannot be propositional, but the > other kind; hence, (3) we have to accept two > different kinds or sources of knowledge. And if we > are with Sellars with regard to the persistence of > correspondent, reasonable capacities, and both > direct and indirect experience are possible only > through cognitive capacity, then some kind of > internalism that urges for the rejection of any > form or states of “the thing in itself” no > matter with direct experience or indirect > experience. To reterm this in Buddhism, both the > direct and the indirect experience do not have any > kind of self-nature independent of the cognition, > and no direct experience is not involved with > prapanca (language). In this sense, Buddhism is > not mythical. > > > III. The plan of the book > In Arnold's article “Is Svasamvitti > Transcendental?” published in《Asian > Philosophy》, 2005 , he puts two lines of > history of philosophy together: (1) Kant – > German idealism – north American Kant Studies > and (2) Dignāga – Dharmakīrti – Madhaymika. > He thinks, the post-Kantian development in German > idealism is in favor of a more individualism that > prefers simple idealism, while a more realistic > feedback in the North America seems to summon up a > “constitutive” understanding of Kant's > transcendental theory that is believed by him to > be more Kantian. On the other side, the > post-Dignāga Dharmakīrti accepts Dignāga's > theory of self-awareness as something like a > perceptual subject or inner psychological focus, > while Candarkīrti (Madhaymaka)'s critics (the > endless regress of self-awareness) accelerates the > later development in Santaraksita's correction of > Dignāga theory of self-awareness with the idea of > “condition” rather than “perception.” > > In his article “Self-awareness and Subjectivity > in Buddhist Philosophy”published in 《Indian > Philosophy》, 2010, Arnold tries to decide > Dignāga's theory of self-awareness between Paul > Williams' perceptual model and constitutive model. > By reviewing the development of the tradition, he > suggest that there is a direction from the > perceptual model reading going to the constitutive > model reading. By ruling out perceptual model, > Arnold places Dharmakīrti's “necessity of the > first-person perspective”under the constitutive > model and by introducing a Shaivis, > Rāmakaṇṭa, as well as the intensity between > phenomenology and Kant, he deepens the discussion > about the constitutive reading of self-awareness. > > In the present book, Arnold focuses on > Dharmakīrti, and group him with contemporary > physicalist such as Fodor when mentioning that > they both claim “only things entering some > causal relations can be counted as real” on the > one hand, and group him with rational cognitivist > like Sellars when mentioning that they both urge > for the rational part of intentionality. His > strategy shows the complexity in both Dharmakīrti > and in the questions related. We do not have to > take these classification of Dharmakīrti > seriously, or how he positions some of the > philosophical systems mentioned. By integrating > the accounts and questions, he just put the > traditions on similar issues at different time and > space into a single forum. Besides, we should also > notice that the main role of the book is > Dharmakīrti, and we have to keep an awareness of > the difference between Dharmakīrti and Dignāga. > > Dharmakīrti is a epistemic idealist in Yogacara > school. He thinks everything we get aware of has > not ontological value. To him, they are all mental > events, and they are mentally real, sothing > causally effective at the level of cognition > (p.11, middle paragraph). > > The problem is, how the universal gets its > relation to the particular? Dharmakīrti develops > his apoha (exclusion) theory that the meaning of > cognition becomes clearer and more certain when > the more specific concept is obtained by excluding > the others from a broader concept. For this, > Dharmakīrti claims that the meaning of the > universals must sourced from the particular in > sensibility; more importantly, only the clear and > certain meaning of cognition is “real” > (p.10). > > Fodor's intentional realism: in《Propositional > Attitudes》 (1978), Fodor urges that mental > states are just mental, individual > representations. In 《A Theory of Content and > Other Essays》 (1990), he criticizes standard > realism, such as Dianiel Dennett, who claims that > we can admit the realty fo mental state without > having to admit the reality of mental > representations. Fordor urges that we must accept > the reality of the perceptual, linguistic as well > thinking operations codified in the brain, as we > accept the reality of the mind and brain. Similar > to Searle's idea: thinking as the real function of > brain is as real as the digestion of the digestion > organs. Arnold is aware that Dharmakīrti would > not agree that cognition is just the function of > brain, but he thinks both Dharmakīrti and Fordor > are looking for the source of reality inside the > mind, in the causal relations between the > particular (perceptual mental pieces) and treating > it as the basis explaining the abstract. > > Arnold claims, the project in front of both > Dharmakīrti and Fordor is a project to > non-intentionalize the intentionality (p.11, last > paragraph). When what is real is no longer the > object of intention but is the intention itself, > first, intention does not obtain meaning because > of the object (it is then the case that intention > itself is intelligible, i.e., meaning is in > intention – self-awareness), and, second, > intention is no longer about something else, but > yielding intelligence, and cognition, by itself. > Arnold also thinks the realization of > intentionality conforms to some fundamental > principles or objectives of the contemporary > “naturalization of intentionality.” Such > attitude puts cognition to be a kind of > subjective, psychological and empirical states, > which by excluding some abstract elements and > further specifying, to some degree, certain and > causally effective mental states, from which real > meaning is yielded. > > But, if it is the case that the meaning origins > from such “real” mental states or events, then > where does the universal which by its nature does > not belong to the particular mental states or > events, come from? As questioned by his opponents, > that which can be directly known via the apoha > (exlusion) is only in reference to the universals, > and no particular is involved (p.12, top > paragraph), while the story that we are capable of > ascertain some specific concept by exclusion with > the help of the basis of some particular mental > events, cannot explain all about the intention > (last paragraph, p.12). It seems reasonable to > claim, as Mimansakas wants to urge, that language > cannot be reduced to empirical psychology, and a > separate condition for this is necessary-- not > touching yet whether that condition is the Vedas > or something else. Neither the concept that > “causes” a moral practice in Kant's practical > reason, nor the logical space of reason raised by > Sellars and McDowell seem to be able to be reduced > to a particular basis. > > Besides, the separation of ultimate truth and > conventional truth made by Madhyamakas, and their > believing the world to be, after all, an > “irreducible conventional”are read by Arnold > as an urge similar to Mimansakas that persists in > the necessity of a individual condition of mind > for linguistic mental elements. They both, to > Arnold, reject naturalizing intentionality. > Besides, Dharmakīrti spends pages on “the > necessity of the first-person perspective” and > the “intentional level of description,” using > a strategy like Kant's in 《Second Critique》 to > deal with the issue from the perspective of > morality (one universal as the cause and its > result in real action). This is the topic of the > sixth chapter of the book. > > > (In progress, please do not cite any part of the > short essay)