MEPO Forum :: 康德判斷力批判

HP Wrote:
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> Section 5 of Critique of Judgment by Immanuel
> Kant, translated by Werner Pluhar
> 
> Both the agreeable and the good refer to our power
> of desire and hence carry a liking with them, the
> agreeable a liking that is conditioned
> pathologically by stimuli (stimuli), the good a
> pure practical liking that is determined not just
> by the presentation of the object but also by the
> presentation of the subject's connection with the
> existence of the object; i.e., what we like is not
> just the object but its existence as well. A
> judgment of taste, on the other hand, is merely
> contemplative, i.e., it is a judgment that is
> indifferent to the existence of the object: it 
> the character of the object only by holding it up
> to our feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Nor is
> this contemplation, as such, directed to concepts,
> for a judgment of taste is not a cognitive
> judgment (whether theoretical or practical) and
> hence is neither based on concepts, nor directed
> to them as purposes.
> 
> Hence the agreeable, the beautiful, and the good
> designate three different relations that
> presentations have to the feeling of pleasure and
> displeasure, the feeling by reference to which we
> distinguish between objects or between ways of
> presenting them. The terms of approbation which
> are appropriate to each of these three are also
> different. We call agreeable what GRATIFIES us,
> beautiful what we just LIKE, good what we ESTEEM,
> or endorse , i.e., that to which we attribute  an
> objective value. Agreeableness holds for
> nonrational animals too; beauty only for human
> beings, i.e., beings who are animal and yet
> rational, though it is not enough that they be
> rational (e.g., spirits) but they must be animal
> as well; the good, however, holds for every
> rational being as such, though I cannot fully
> justify and explain this proposition until later.
> We may say that, of all these three kinds of
> liking, only the liking involved in taste for the
> beautiful is disinterested and free, since we are
> not compelled to give our approval by any
> interest, whether of sense or of reason. So we
> might say that  liking, in the three cases
> mentioned, refers to inclination, or to favor, or
> to respect. For FAVOR is the only free liking.
> Neither an object of inclination, nor one that a
> law of reason enjoins on us as an object of
> desire, leaves us the freedom to make an object of
> pleasure for ourselves out of something or other.
> All interest either presupposes a need or gives
> rise to one; and, because interest is the basis
> that determines approval, it makes the judgment
> about the object unfree.
> 
> Consider, first, the interest of inclination, 
> with the agreeable. Here everyone says: Hunger is
> the best sauce; and to people with a healthy
> appetite anything is tasty provided it is edible.
> Hence if people have a liking of this sort, that
> does not prove that they are selecting  by taste.
> Only when their need has been satisfied can we
> tell who in a multitude of people has taste and
> who does not. In the same way, second, one can
> find manners (conduite) without virtue, politeness
> without benevolence, propriety without integrity,
> and so on. For where the moral law speaks we are
> objectively no longer free to select what we must
> do; and to show taste in our conduct (or in
> judging other people's conduct) is very different
> from expressing our moral way of thinking. For
> this contains a command and gives rise to a need,
> whereas moral taste only plays with the objects of
> liking without committing itself to any of them.