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HP Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > Section 5 of Critique of Judgment by Immanuel > Kant, translated by Werner Pluhar > > Both the agreeable and the good refer to our power > of desire and hence carry a liking with them, the > agreeable a liking that is conditioned > pathologically by stimuli (stimuli), the good a > pure practical liking that is determined not just > by the presentation of the object but also by the > presentation of the subject's connection with the > existence of the object; i.e., what we like is not > just the object but its existence as well. A > judgment of taste, on the other hand, is merely > contemplative, i.e., it is a judgment that is > indifferent to the existence of the object: it > the character of the object only by holding it up > to our feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Nor is > this contemplation, as such, directed to concepts, > for a judgment of taste is not a cognitive > judgment (whether theoretical or practical) and > hence is neither based on concepts, nor directed > to them as purposes. > > Hence the agreeable, the beautiful, and the good > designate three different relations that > presentations have to the feeling of pleasure and > displeasure, the feeling by reference to which we > distinguish between objects or between ways of > presenting them. The terms of approbation which > are appropriate to each of these three are also > different. We call agreeable what GRATIFIES us, > beautiful what we just LIKE, good what we ESTEEM, > or endorse , i.e., that to which we attribute an > objective value. Agreeableness holds for > nonrational animals too; beauty only for human > beings, i.e., beings who are animal and yet > rational, though it is not enough that they be > rational (e.g., spirits) but they must be animal > as well; the good, however, holds for every > rational being as such, though I cannot fully > justify and explain this proposition until later. > We may say that, of all these three kinds of > liking, only the liking involved in taste for the > beautiful is disinterested and free, since we are > not compelled to give our approval by any > interest, whether of sense or of reason. So we > might say that liking, in the three cases > mentioned, refers to inclination, or to favor, or > to respect. For FAVOR is the only free liking. > Neither an object of inclination, nor one that a > law of reason enjoins on us as an object of > desire, leaves us the freedom to make an object of > pleasure for ourselves out of something or other. > All interest either presupposes a need or gives > rise to one; and, because interest is the basis > that determines approval, it makes the judgment > about the object unfree. > > Consider, first, the interest of inclination, > with the agreeable. Here everyone says: Hunger is > the best sauce; and to people with a healthy > appetite anything is tasty provided it is edible. > Hence if people have a liking of this sort, that > does not prove that they are selecting by taste. > Only when their need has been satisfied can we > tell who in a multitude of people has taste and > who does not. In the same way, second, one can > find manners (conduite) without virtue, politeness > without benevolence, propriety without integrity, > and so on. For where the moral law speaks we are > objectively no longer free to select what we must > do; and to show taste in our conduct (or in > judging other people's conduct) is very different > from expressing our moral way of thinking. For > this contains a command and gives rise to a need, > whereas moral taste only plays with the objects of > liking without committing itself to any of them.