http://mepopedia.com/forum/list.php?58 Wed, 29 Apr 2026 15:45:53 +0800 Phorum 5.2.7 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,45468,45468#msg-45468 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,45468,45468#msg-45468
而上面這種評述，不論是針對康德、或者針對佛家知識論來說，都依循著一種「混淆了本體論與知識論」的詮釋傾向，換句話說，是一種夾帶有形上學與本體論預設的立場來看待知識論，進而再以這樣的混淆看待了這兩個知識論體系。而這種詮釋，在註釋傳統的發展中並非從來不被質疑。不論在佛家知識論的詮釋發展中，或者在康德哲學的詮釋發展中，在主流的本體論詮釋風潮之下，都出現了「讓知識論回歸單純知識論」的呼籲，而我們也可在原始文獻以及在經典註釋歷史上，發現了支持後一立場的材料，特別是在佛家哲學方面，因為相對而言，本體論詮釋路線的不適切，在康德哲學這邊，是淺而易見的，基本上，是康德自己所明確反對的，問題是在於康德的詮釋者無法理解為何康德可以如此反對。另外，單純在哲學思辨上面，我們也應主張帶有本體論預設的知識論是無法成立的。

此外，在佛家哲學方面，「智」對於「本體」的效力，各家立場不一，這也導致了「知識論」作為一種義理辨決與修證方法，一直以來還「妾身未明」。堅持空性原則的一群（中觀），主張這個「效力」違背了空性的立場；另一群（唯識），雖認為知識論才能更明確地指引人們真正地體悟空性，但是對於認識效力與空性原則的矛盾，尚未有令人滿意的回應出現。我主張這兩方的歧見，以及唯識的薄弱回應，皆源自於佛家知識論的「批判性」（不帶本體論預設的特性）尚未明白彰顯，這特別反應在月稱（中觀應承）與法稱（佛家知識論之宗）對陳那（佛家知識論之祖），特別是其自證理論的本體論式的理解與其於印、藏的蓬勃發展。

我主張知識論不應該帶有任何形上學與本體論的預設，而該讓知識論單純作為知識論，姑且稱之為「批判知識論」。更進一步限定，批判知識論主張：一、認識不是一種實際的動作；二、認識依循的因果關係並非經驗的因果關係，而是另外一種形式的（只具形式作用）、自由的（沒有前因、自主肇因）的因果關係，稱之為「自由的因果」；三、認識的因果並不因為不依循經驗的因果關係，而在效力上不能為「積極的 positive」，只是，積極效力不必然意謂著任何特殊的存有狀態。依循著這個觀念，我支持兩個傳統中的「非主流觀點」，並且願意在文本上（康德「Third Antinomy」，陳那「自證理論」）以及哲學思辨上提供辯駁。就此觀點，不只許多因為本體論詮釋而衍生的歧異可以獲得調解，而且知識論與二者的實踐計畫也將因此觀點而獲得更明確的「正位」。

簡言之，「認識能力」、「自由」與「物自身」作為一種預設，並非一種本體的預設、並不依循著自然的因果律，因此它們並不會成為一種認識的對象與結果，對於經驗世界沒有實質地影響，因此這種預設並不會對空性原則造成困難，它們並不需要超越的實在性。但是，若缺乏這種預設，而經驗世界在哲學考量上將無法成立。不同於 Allison 將這種預設看作是一種「單純理論性的」、「系統需求而被迫虛設」的「理性要求」，我主張這個預設的形式效力與實際因果關係的存有效力是同等的（同樣積極的 positive），只是兩者性質上完全「不同」：認識成為事實之時，就是認識的條件被完滿之時，而兩種因果關係同等地都是該認識條件的要求項目。接受經驗實在性，就必須同時接受先驗觀念性--誠如康德一向的主張，同時，我們也應該如此來理解佛家的二諦論，以及龍樹的名句「以有空義故一切法得成」。

統整一下，我所主張的路線，既不認為康德需要接受「智的直覺」，也不以為佛家真的可以主張「智的直覺」（唯識不必然與中觀有究竟的教義分歧），然而，我們也不因此而認同「物自身等不可以有任何 positive account」。換言之，在兩個傳統中，「追求一種超越的認識，可以去認識對象本然的本體」這樣的目的並不適當，物自身、認識的因果關係、認識主體三者，都不需要是種超越的、本體的抑或是實際的存有。「智的直覺」將造成經驗世界在哲學考量上的困難（中觀對唯識的非難多半是朝著這個部份而來），但是「自由」與「物自身」等作為一種先驗觀念，既不是一種先驗幻想（與認識條件相悖的單純概念堆疊的產物），也不是一種消極的預設。先驗觀念，是絕對的肇因，既無前因，也無後果，但是是認識結果的必要前在條件之一，無需要任何形上的或本體的基礎，但認識條件的完滿需要先驗觀念的參與。那麼，「本體論」，就只能是一種「作為認識結果」的本體論，不會是「因」或者「條件」上的研究工作，而「本體」只是一種經驗與理念的雜揉的產物，既沒有超越的狀態，也因為感性條件的限制，不會以「整體」的型態呈現在我們的經驗範圍之中，但是其整體性與必然性，只因為經驗與理性的必然雜揉而在「經驗範圍」中「完全合理」，但也僅止於「合理」，具有「可證性」但不具有「實證性」。


相關連結：
自證（svasamvitti）～絕對的主動覺察

附檔：
Transcendental Logic and Spiritual Development – Following Dignāga's and Kant's Critical Epistemology (PhD. Diss. Proposal, 2014 May): PDF download

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Over the past years, the scholars who tried to converge Kant's philosophy and Buddhist philosophy (including Stcherbatsky, K. C. Bhattacharyya, MOU Zongshan and perhaps some Japanese monk-philosophers UI Hakuju and WATSUJI Tetsurō) coincidently criticized Kant from the perspective of Buddhist thinkers that Kant should not reject intellectual intuition. They, with their oriental resources, suggested that in some extraordinary situation, intellectual intuition can directly know things in themselves and that the cognitive capacity can remain effective even beyond the scope of appearance while the idea of the thing in itself as much as the idea of freedom is indeed more than what Kant had claimed to be without any positive account in cognition.

Such comment, no matter in terms of Kant or Buddhism, actually confused epistemology with ontology in the background. In other words, the commentators understood epistemology with metaphysical and ontological assumption, and then understood both Kantian epistemology and Buddhist epistemology with the confusion. The confused understanding, however, has actually been the mainstream one in both sides, but it is not the case that this understanding has never been questioned in each commentary history. Also, in both fields, the urge exclaiming let epistemology be simple epistemology can be observed in their recent development (Henry Allison in Kant; Dan Arnold, Yao Zhihua, Chu Junjie in Buddhism). In my research, I have indicated materials in the original texts and the classical commentaries supporting the coming-up challenge. This has to be especially for the Buddhist side, because, on the other side, Kant is obviously in favor of the non-mainstream understanding. Kant directly rejected the epistemology with the metaphysical and ontological assumption of “transcendental realism,” and the mainstream commentators actually did not agree, or had problems with such a position of Kant. Besides, I think pure philosophical consideration would suggest any epistemology with ontological assumption cannot hold, either.

Further on, the Buddhist thinkers held various opinions on the efficacy of the intellect (prajñā) on the thing in itself. This has led to the predicament that the role of epistemology in understanding and practicing Buddha's teachings remains indeterminable for a long time. Those who held on the principle of emptiness (Mādhyamaka) thought the transcendent efficacy would undermine the position that rejects any transcendent reality. The others (Yogācāra) thought epistemology was more appropriate to unfold the “meaning” of emptiness but failed to propose any satisfying answer to the challenge about the contradiction between the cognitive efficacy and the principle of emptiness. I think the reason of the discrepancy between the two sides and the weak response of Yogācāra rests at the impotent notice and development of the “critical nature” of Buddhist epistemology (“critical” means to suspend any ontological assumption). The ontological interpretation of Dignāga's epistemology, especially his theory of self-awareness (svasaṃvitti), in Candrakīrti's Mādhyamaka influential response and Dharmakīrti's inside influential response, I think, has to be responsible for the lack of this development.

I hold epistemology should be critical without any metaphysical and ontological assumption, and epistemology should remain simple epistemology. I call it “critical epistemology.” To specify, critical epistemology holds following three points. (1) Cognition is not real action. (2) Cognition does not follow empirical causality but is in another kind of causal relation which is formal (yielding forms, not matters) and free (spontaneous and autonomous). I call it “causality of freedom” comparing to “causality of nature.” (3) It is not because cognition does not follow natural causal laws that we can hold that its efficacy cannot be “positive”; nonetheless, its positivity does not necessarily imply any particular status of existence. With this idea, I will argue for the “non-mainstream” interpretation in both traditions, textually (“third antinomy” in Kant and “theory of self-awareness” in Dignāga) and philosophically. Hopefully, with the idea, the discrepancies caused by the ontological interpretation could be reconciled and the role of epistemology in the practical projects of both sides could be finally determined.

In short, cognitive capacities, freedom and the thing in itself as presumptions are not ontological presumptions – they are simply about cognition itself (the condition of cognition). They do not follow natural causal laws. They cannot be the objects and the results of cognition and they do not really affect the empirical world. Then they would not cause any difficulty for the principle of emptiness. However, they are needed. Without the presumptions, the philosophical consideration to the empirical world cannot hold. Besides, unlike Allison's opinion to understand these presumptions as simply theoretical demands of reason forced by system, I think the formal efficacy is as much effective (positive) as real efficacy. But they are different in kind. Both as required items in the condition of cognition, when cognition is realized, i.e., when the condition of cognition is satisfied, they both have to be effective. If we have to accept empirical reality, we have to accept transcendental ideality, too – as Kant always claimed. Also, I suggest we should try to understand Nāgārjuna's “if you make sense of emptiness, everything makes sense 以有空義故一切法得成.”

Let me be clear, I hold Kant needn't accept intellectual intuition, and Buddhism does not really hold intellectual intuition, either (i.e., there should be no original discrepancy between Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka). However, it is not followed that the thing in itself, etc. do not bear any positive account in cognition. In other words, pursuing some kind of transcendent cognition of the transcendent objects in themselves is not appropriate at all in both traditions, and the thing in itself, the causal relation of cognition and the subject of cognition needn't be any transcendent, ontological or real existences. Intellectual intuition is rejected because it causes problems in the philosophical consideration of the empirical world (this is exactly the target of Mādhyamaka's attacks on Yogācāra). However, freedom and the thing in itself, as transcendental ideas, are not transcendental illusions (simple conceptual constructions which do not fit the condition of cognition). They are not negative, theoretical presumptions, either. Transcendental ideas are the absolute cause. Without any pre-condition and without any real result, they are in the condition which makes the result of cognition possible by holding the parts of the condition in a unity. There need not any metaphysical or ontological basis for them, but the satisfaction of the condition of cognition needs transcendental ideas. Following the above, ontology can best be the ontology merely about the results of cognition, not about the cause or the condition of cognition. “Ontology” (or the Chinese concept Ben-ti 本體) is after all just the product of the mixture of experience and ideas. There's no transcendent status of it, and because of the limit of our sensibility, there's no real status of it in totality. But because of the necessary “participation” of reason in experience, the idea(ontology)'s totality and necessity in experience is totally reasonable – and at best only reasonable: the idea can be proved in the study of the condition of experience but not evidenced with any sensational proofs.]]> gustav 先驗理想主義 Wed, 23 Apr 2014 11:00:30 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,43951,43951#msg-43951 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,43951,43951#msg-43951 李明輝（中研院中國文哲研究所研究/聯合報
在台灣翻譯世界‧在今天想像未來──科技部經典譯注講座
形上學有未來嗎？－－康德的《一切能作為學問而出現的未來形上學之序論》
[聯副 Issue 4588/2014-03-18]
引用連結：http://paper.udn.com/udnpaper/PIC0004/255065/web/



想要了解康德哲學的讀者若是從此書入手，或許就不會像王國維初讀《批判》時那樣，感到茫然不可解。相信形上學在未來仍有可能重建的讀者更不可錯過此書……

在西方，形上學是哲學家的夢：既是夢想，也是夢魘。20世紀以來西方哲學的基調是反形上學的。德國哲學家康德（Immanuel Kant）出生於1724年，逝世於1804年，基本上屬於18世紀。在他的時代，充斥著各式各樣的形上學系統，但形上學家之間眾說紛紜，並無共識。他於1783年出版的《一切能作為學問而出現的未來形上學之序論》（以下簡稱《序論》）一書便是對這種情勢的檢討與回應。但是要了解康德撰寫此書的動機，就得先談到他在兩年前出版的《純粹理性批判》（以下簡稱《批判》）。

《批判》一書已成為近代西方哲學的經典，其影響力之大實難以估計。康德於1770年升任教授之後，就開始構思並準備撰寫此書。但直到十年之後，他才在年歲日增的壓力下，於短短四、五個月的時間內倉卒完稿。在這十年之間，他僅發表了兩篇小論文。如果他在目前台灣的大學任教，恐怕通不過教師評鑑。這部著作的篇幅有八百多頁，它所探討的問題極其複雜，而且康德在書中還使用了不少新的名詞與表述方式。但更重要的是，根據康德自己在《序論》中的說法，《批判》是「一部離開了所有常走的道路、而走上一條我們無法立刻熟悉的新道路之著作」。

康德在《批判》第一版〈前言〉中悲嘆：形上學曾是「一切學問的女王」，如今卻成了棄婦。他將形上學的發展史比擬為專制帝國與遊牧民族的鬥爭史，亦即獨斷論與懷疑論的鬥爭史。在《批判》第二版〈前言〉中，康德回溯在人類理性的發展中有哪些學科步上了「學問之途」。首先步上學問之途的是邏輯，其次是數學。到了近代，自然科學也步上了學問之途。但直到康德的時代，形上學家依然爭論不休，始終無法取得共識，形上學無異於一個「戰場」。康德在《序論》中如此形容過去的形上學家之思考活動：「形上學就這樣漂浮在表面，像泡沫一樣，而一旦人們所掬取的泡沫破滅了，立刻便有另一個泡沫出現在表層。有些人始終熱切地採集泡沫，而另一些人則不去深入探究這種現象之原因，卻嘲笑前一種人白費力氣，而自以為聰明。」這種現象正顯示形上學尚未步上學問之途。

儘管「作為學問的形上學」尚未成立，但是康德提出了另一種意義的形上學：「作為自然稟賦的形上學」。因為形上學涉及人類理性最關切的問題，如意志自由、靈魂不朽、上帝存在，故人類理性絕不會放棄形上學的探求。因此，康德說：「我們不可期望人類的精神終將完全放棄形上學的探討，正如我們不可期望我們為了不要老是吸入不純淨的空氣，而寧願終將完全停止呼吸。」《批判》一書便是要通過對人類理性的「批判」，將「作為自然稟賦的形上學」提升為「作為學問的形上學」。康德所謂的「批判」，並非意指一般意義的「批評」，而是特指對人類理性的原則、界限與可能性之考察。

《批判》一書出版之初，德國哲學界的反應極為冷淡。1782年1月19日在《哥廷根學報》刊出了一篇對於《批判》的匿名書評。這篇書評的原作者是加爾維（Christian Garve），後經該學報編輯費德爾（J.G.H. Feder）的大幅刪節與小幅修改。加爾維曾擔任萊比錫大學哲學教授，是18世紀德國「通俗哲學」的代表人物之一。他的評論完全誤解了《批判》的要旨，並且將其系統與英國經驗論哲學家柏克萊（George Berkeley）的「獨斷觀念論」混為一談。

在《批判》出版之後，康德原本就計畫為艱澀的此書撰寫一個通俗版，即《序論》一書。加爾維的書評使康德改變了原先的計畫，而在這部計畫撰寫的新書中針對加爾維的書評加入一些釐清與辯解的文字。在《序論》的〈附篇〉中有一節題為〈在探討《批判》之前就對它作評斷的樣例〉，即是針對加爾維的書評。

康德並無意以《序論》來取代《批判》一書。對他而言，《序論》具有《批判》所欠缺的通俗性，是幫助讀者理解《批判》的入門之階。他希望讀者因閱讀《序論》而進一步研究《批判》一書。他還將《序論》與《批判》的關係比擬為建築藍圖與建築物的關係，只不過這個建築藍圖是在建築物完成後才擬訂的。《序論》以較為通俗的方式重述《批判》的主題：形上學要如何才能步上學問之途？

以本文的有限篇幅，筆者自然不可能概述《序論》的內容，不過可以舉出此書中的若干名言。例如，康德在書中表白英國懷疑論哲學家休謨（David Hume）對他的深刻影響：「我坦白承認：正是大衛‧休謨之提醒在多年前首度打斷了我獨斷的瞌睡，並且為我在思辨哲學底領域中的探討提供了一個完全不同的方向。」又如他以一句話說明了其「先驗觀念論」的獨特立場：「知性並非從自然取得其（先天的）法則，而是為自然制定法則，這乍聽之下固然奇怪，但仍然是確實的。」這些都是在西方哲學史中常被引述的名句。想要了解康德哲學的讀者若是從此書入手，或許就不會像王國維初讀《批判》時那樣，感到茫然不可解。相信形上學在未來仍有可能重建的讀者更不可錯過此書。]]> gustav 先驗理想主義 Thu, 20 Mar 2014 08:25:04 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,28940,28940#msg-28940 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,28940,28940#msg-28940

Chunying Wang 站在康德的立場來說，不能了知物自身，是感性的侷限，不是理性的問題。反而是理性，讓這個侷限有了擴張的機會，這是這一段話要表達的意義。但是這裡的擴張，並不必然是個好事，而將經驗限制于可能經驗的範圍內，也不是個shame。更甚，就算不管康德的計畫，只就一般來說，「超越的」物自身是個假對象，想要了那樣的知物自身的執著，不能怪罪於理性，應該要慢慢去取消它才是，慢慢把「自我」從那裏解脫掉才是。
December 4 at 10:48pm · Edited · Like · 2

Chunying Wang 理性讓人碰觸到無限，但理性在人這裡總只展現於有限的經驗當中，這當然就造成了有限的視角當中不可避免的背反（antinomy），並不奇怪。
類似於，假如我們只限制我們的視角於世俗或者勝義之一，而去看待任何涉及二諦關係的議題，總是會碰到矛盾一樣，例如，對於只有世俗單一的視角來說、或者對於只有勝義單一的視角來說，八不中道豈不也很矛盾？
December 5 at 1:30pm · Like · 1

Chunying Wang
一、理性不單單是人類所獨有的。
二、理性不等於思維。
三、背反的矛盾，是一種錯誤的認識，不需避開，只要回復「正見」即可，猶如夢中的病不需要診治，從夢中醒來就好。



（More discussion on Facebook）]]> gustav 先驗理想主義 Sun, 30 Dec 2012 18:13:18 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,24564,24564#msg-24564 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,24564,24564#msg-24564
Henry Allison此次來台講演，重新闡述他著名的London Talk，他藉由比對康德的先驗理想主義（Transcendental Idealism）以及康德所對立的先驗現實主義（Transcendental Realism）一則明示我們何謂先驗理想論，再則提示我們康德的先驗理想主義如何具有將我們自對於事物的實在（matter-of-facts）的執著中醒悟（disabuse）而得逍遙的治癒功能(therapeutical functions)。在此，我先為各位提供一簡明的介紹，讓您瞭解Allison如何闡述康德的「先驗倒轉」（transcendental turn）；之後，再嘗試將Allison所提示的治療意義談論出來，論述康德先驗理想主義作為治癒的步數，使我們從對於「物/事實」的執著中醒悟過來，從而體證自由的可能。

一旦您體認到我們的所知以及我們所要去知道的對象之間存有差距並且不願放棄其中一項，例如您有一個「世界」的知識，也知道這知識是不完全的，而您既不是只願意僅僅擁抱您的知識（如柏克萊以為除了我們所有的知識之外，其他的一切都不存在）也不是只願意相信這世界實體而以為您的一切知識都不具有客觀確定意義（任何科學家都有這樣的傾向），您的思想體系便應落入先驗的範疇。康德將他以前的先驗思想體系都歸入先驗現實主義加以駁斥，Allison以為康德主要的論述都基礎在：世界（所謂物自身things in themselves，即被我們以為造成我們的感知卻永遠不被我們感知的知識對象本身）不具時間性以及空間性，時間與空間僅是我們感知的先天形式，先驗現實主義者們錯把時間與空間歸屬於世界了；而Allison認為我們應當把這一個倒轉詮釋為介於不同認知模型間（由本體論的到認知論的）的轉變～亦即一種後設哲學的（metaphilosophical）轉變，而非在單一認知模型，即本體論內部的相異的認識本體的方法之間的轉變～這是後設物理學（即形上學metaphysical）的論述轉變。讓我們循著Allison的路數，由他的觀點來看我們是如何先驗地倒轉，並由駁斥這些先驗現實主義者們來介紹先驗理想主義。

傳統以為，時間與空間的存在有三種可能的形式：第一、作為實體（substances），例如當我們說：「時間很長」、「空間很寬」，我們把時間與空間當作一個實體存在著，就像天、地或者一棵樹、一個杯子一樣，我們說「天高」、「地遠」、「這棵樹是植物」、「這個杯子很實用」；第二、作為屬性（accidents），例如我們說：「這箱子容量有多少立方公分」或者「一趟車程有半小時久」，好比我們把光亮當作太陽的屬性，把液態當作水的屬性一般，我們把空間（多少立方公分）與時間（半小時）當作事物（箱子、車程）的屬性；第三、作為物與物之間的關係，持此觀點者既覺時空當作本體不妥又覺當作屬性不妥，便放棄對時空進行本體狀態的定義，而單純認為時空乃為物體與物體間的關係。這三種論點都把時間與空間當作存在物來談論，屬於存有論(Ontology)的範疇，基本上都以時空乃獨立於我們的認知之外的存在為基礎。康德則提出第四種可能，他以為時間與空間是我們感知能力的先天形式，我們任何的感知經驗必定被呈現為時間的與空間的。康德提出這樣的時空觀，有如哥白尼將宇宙由天動轉為地動一般，把世界中心移到其恰當位置：誠如Allison的說法，康德把神本的（theocentric）世界轉為人本的(anthropocentric)世界。Allison以為這個倒轉應被詮釋為：哲思焦點由談論世界本體存在的實際性轉向到談論我們認知的條件以及知識的疆域，也就是由一種由神的全能觀點所成全的認知模型改為一種由人的侷限觀點所建構的認知模型；不應該被解讀為侷限於舊有的神本的世界觀底下談論兩種認知本體的方法：倒轉前，我們談論事物猶如存在於時空底下，倒轉後，我們談論事物猶如被感知為是時空的一種存有，但無論倒轉與否，我們所談論的，都是「存在」。簡言之，康德的先驗倒轉，倒置的必然結果是：本體論（Ontology）應該被放棄。

康德在《純粹理性批判》的〈辯證論〉裡論述純粹理性的二律背反：倘若我們假設一種時空的世界實在，即我們以為我們感知對象的總集合為世界，而這世界是時空的，則必然導致時空的延展既是有限的、又是無限的這樣的矛盾。康德診斷這樣的妄想，首先，我們錯以為感知對象一旦部分被經驗我們就能假定其一切都能被經驗（這是因為於知性的處理裡邊，例如我們能把「杯子」的概念應用到我目前這個杯子，我便能把這組規則應用到一切杯子之上來認知它們，進而我們認為我們能經驗一切杯子，殊不知這樣的假定只是妄想～從來我們就只有經驗眼下這個杯子，沒有經驗過「一切杯子」。），再則，對我們目前的任務更重要的，康德說我們囿於先驗現實主義的陋習，而把不相關的時空的有限性與時空的無限性混在一起談了：時空是有限的，因為每個當下我們經驗的對象總是被我們的認知所限制了；然而時空是無限的，此乃因為它們是我們認知的先天形式，其自身便在展延中具有無限性，這就是說，時空的有限性乃存於認知的有限之中，它們實際上是有限地被實際經驗著，然而它們卻是先驗理想地無限著。假若我們不能體悟時空的先驗理想性，即不能體認時空實際上僅僅是我們感受的必要先天形式，而錯以為時空具有現實性（把它們當作實際存有來看待，或者把一切存有物自身當作具有時空性），則必定困惑於此二律背反之中。於此，康德便間接證明了我們必須採信先驗理想主義的立場，亦即，我們必須把時間與空間侷限於我們經驗裡邊，而不能假設外在世界自身具有時空性。我們更應跳出存有論的神本窠臼，謹守人本謙遜的哲學觀，我們不應假裝我們知道一切，我們應該以經驗現實主義取代先驗現實主義，應該以為我們所知的一切只針對可被經驗的可能對象：我們可以把杯子這樣的普遍概念應用到每一個可能的杯子上，但不應該以為我們就此有可能經驗到所謂的一切杯子。一切杯子不是一個可能的經驗對象，誠如一個現象總和而成的世界也不是一個可能的對象，那樣的世界不實在。另外，我們應當提醒我們自己，先驗理想主義不是被拿來替換任何我們既有的意識型態的另一個意識型態，而是意識型態的置換本身，而其功能便是置換的動力來源，此即所謂批判活動的動力來源，是這樣的動力，使我們選擇放棄先驗現實主義，限制我們自己於經驗的現實主義。

更進一步，Allison試圖但謹慎地說，我們對物自身之實存性的執著（先驗現實主義的慣性殘留），實際上是一種錯誤（他還不好意思直接稱之為病），唯有透過先驗理想主義的治癒功能才能根除，我們也才能醒悟、看見自由的可能。而這療程便是讓我們醒悟，就物自身（及外在世界）而言，我們該採取的態度是把物自身這東西當作是我們所既有的認知模式之下必然的一種結果，不要去執著它，只要謹記我們對於知識必須謙遜，我們並不完全知道；另外，藉此我們分清楚我們可以講究「事實」的範疇為何，而哪些不是可以講究「事實」的範疇。被治癒的，我認為，是誤以為我們可以了然那些我們不可能的經驗的狂妄被教訓了、而那康德稱作「純粹理性的安樂死（euthanasia of pure reason）」那樣肆無忌憚懷疑一切知識之有效的自卑被解脫、對於不該執著的物自身之實存性的觀念被修正了，而被養成的、被鼓舞的反動力量幫助我們去游移、鎖定、推翻、貞定正確的理念來面對真正的現實！

這給我們的進一步啟示是，回到自由這個理念，我們常自問「我們真的是自由的嗎？」這個真的嗎便預設了提問者的一個錯誤態度，一個等待被先驗理想主義治癒的態度：自由被誤以為是有關乎事實的，他們把自由歸於可能對象的範疇，並嘗試去論斷其實存與否。透過先驗理想主義的治癒，我們體悟了，「我們真的自由嗎？」根本不是一個問題，會有這種問題是源自於我們妄想：我們妄想我們自己為實在，然後我們妄想我們自己的實在到底具不具有自由的屬性。而先驗理想主義排除這樣的荒謬問題，告訴我們，自由無關乎實不實在，那不是我們可能的認知對象，而自此被指出的自由應當由其他方式被證成（必須在理性之實踐當中被預設），這為康德的實踐理性批判成就了發展空間。

II

至此，我想提出的問題是，康德的先驗倒轉所給予的治療，到底對於我們的生活有什麼幫助呢？我想要把話題轉移到啟蒙的意義。我嘗試把先驗倒轉的工作，置放於反省能力的鍛鍊中，並且把它等同於啟蒙的工作。

針對理性的一般應用來說，康德在〈何謂理性〉提到妨礙我們啟蒙的根本人性弱點為懶惰與怯懦；而在道德的層面來說，康德在《單純理性限度內的宗教》說我們驅惡的傾向基本上為脆弱（傾向在遵循自己的道德準則上意志不堅）、不純正（傾向把善、惡的動機混為一談）與惡劣（傾向故意違反自己的道德準則而行）。因為這些妨礙，雖然我們與生具有理性，我們卻放任我們的理性留存於蒙昧中。

我把先驗現實主義以及先驗理想主義當作兩種態度，前者試圖把我們的知識執著於事物自身，後者強調將我們的知識限制於我們的經驗範圍裡邊。前者因對於事物自身的執著導致我們把一切生活中的對象都納入我們的理解範圍裡面，進而執著於一些理智的妄想不自知；後者要求我們在面對每一件事物的當下努力貼近現實、經由游移、鎖定、推翻、貞定的反省過程，確定我們與對象事物之間正確的關係。於知識層面，前者狂妄、後者謙卑；於行為方面，前者導致我們養成非主動的制約行為，後者導致我們時時刻刻必須主動、為自己負責地三思而後行。

而我們應當採取的態度，不是那個令我們安逸地由經驗累積習慣與成規，令我們習於以經驗的歸納以及成規來看世界以及作為行事準則。我們應當採取一種時時刻刻為當下負責、貼近當下現實的反省態度，去省思明辨、去主動行事。由前項態度轉變為後項態度，正是所謂的先驗倒轉，也所謂的啟蒙，而先驗倒轉的治癒意義，其實就是理性的力量。

譬如道德議題，當我們採取先驗現實主義態度時，我們執著於道德性、道德價值以及道德行為當事人的責任與義務等等都是可被認知的對象，於是我們喜於判斷誰誰誰是不是道德的，我們喜於帶著對他者的道德判斷來看待他者，我們以為我們能為他者的價值作審判，反過來，我們也習於把一些既定的習俗規範拿來當作道德的客觀標準，用來當作自己判斷的基礎。然而，當我們採取了先驗理想主義的態度時，我們知道把這些非認知對象誤作為認知對象是一種理智的妄想與執著，我們必須放棄道德的存有論，道德無關乎我們的認知與評判，反過來，我們的理性早在我們行為之前給了我們標準，當我們捨棄眾多成見、利益，我們明心見性，在我們的真誠反省中，我們一定聽得見我們的理性正在耳提面命，提醒著我們面對何等的現實我們應當何等的行為，而非得等我們遵從了我們理性的命令之後、付諸行動，道德價值才被創造出來（遑論我們的行動成功與否）！例如，當您知道您的一位朋友遭逢其父自幼長期的性騷擾與虐待，您要選擇社會標榜的「天下無不是的父母」這樣的德行來建議這位朋友忍耐並想辦法與其父溝通，或者是選擇建議這位朋友：「請勇敢地貼近現實，想想你應該怎麼作？」很顯然的，道德性不存於世間有如一棵樹、一個杯子一般可以被既有的理智經驗法則衡量與歸類，當這位朋友聽從您的建議，真誠、勇敢地理性反思並產生判斷並基於此而實踐，「道德」就此被創造。 在此理解之中，我們也可知當我們批評他人（甚至是自己）道不道德時，或者我們問著「我們果真是道德的？」這些問題有多荒謬。

而採取了先驗理想主義的態度，不僅僅我們懂得了反思與自由，我們還認得了通往幸福的通道。因為一方面，我們謙遜面對世界，一方面我們讓我們朝向善的正確方向前進、實踐，我們還鍛鍊了我們的理性，鍛鍊了反省的能力，而反省的能力帶給我們的是源源不絕的幸福感與意義，這不像我們在先驗現實主義裡邊追尋的感官的滿足、目的的滿足所帶來的快感與意義，這種滿足所充實的在在都是認知中的那個「我」。反省的幸福感與意義充實的是一個完滿無缺的「空」，沒有條件也沒有所著。試試看，您就知道您會喜歡哪一個。體驗到這，所謂先驗倒轉的治癒意義在哪兒，或者道家追尋的逍遙、佛家講求的空性，可見一斑。

(2007.03.12)]]> gustav 先驗理想主義 Thu, 23 Aug 2012 11:20:40 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,15771,15771#msg-15771 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,15771,15771#msg-15771 Kantian Ethics (2007)

Chun-Ying WANG

In this chapter, Allen Wood centers on the difficulty of “the identity of a self that is free with one that is admittedly unfree” (157). He thinks it is not possible that a single acceptance of Kant's theory of freedom “can be squared with all the texts” of Kant's (156). Sidgwik, quoted by Wood, points out that Kant in Groundwork holds that the self giving laws is purely “noumenal”, while the self obeying laws is “empirical”, added to which is that the acting self subjects to natural necessitation. At another situation, Kant in Religion holds moral agents act from an inclination only by incorporating (Allison) the inclination into a freely adopted maxim. Wood seems to suggest a difficulty that the stances of the former Kant, who persists in sharp separation between transcendental self and empirical self, and the latter Kant, who demands the the inclination (belonging to empirical self) must be incorporated with a maxim (empirically realized) which can be transformed in the free will into universal practical law (altered to the same direction as reason demands), cannot be well fused.

However, it is my difficulty understanding Wood's criticism; do the two stances not explain the same thing, pointing out the same difficulty how come transcendental condition is connected with experience and certain maxim can under that circumstance become practical law? If we regard the transcendental-methodological objects neither as objects graspable in space and time, e.g., to think that the noumenal-phenomenal distinction does not equal the distinction between America and China or the land and the air, nor as pre-critical metaphysical terms, e.g., to think it does not equal the distinction between heave and earth, or not to compare these objects with the naïvely assumed another kind of conscious state in the animals (161-164)^[1], and if we appreciate enough the effort in Kant's epistemology, especially his notion of the causality of freedom, before hasting in the advanced issue, the “squaring” problem would resolve while the “gap” might be filled up.

If one cannot answer to the difficulty how the transcendental-methodological faculties must be incorporated to satisfy the condition of experience and thus how the condition of experience is linked transcendentally-methodologically with the experience, one is not ready to answer to the difficulty raised by Wood here. Kant's epistemology refuses the representational model of cognition. It is not the case that the a priori existents' effecting our cognitive powers so that our cognition happens, but the case that the a priori conditions, namely, certain powers incorporable, are satisfied so that our cognition appears as such in that incorporation. With the understanding, we should not understand the self giving laws, the self obeying laws and the acting self to be isolated conditions. If they are incorporable transcendentally-methodologically, their analysis in a fashion of method does not imply their “existing status” be “separated”. With the awareness of the notion of causality of freedom, knowing that the conformity between object of cognition and the cognition of the object of that cognition is only formal, the maxim accepted empirically can be universalized not as in a happening process. A cognized rule can be universalized only because it itself is universalizable in the condition: since every cognized happening object must be cognized with an understanding of its causal connection, the causation cognized there must be true for it comes from the cognitive condition – neither our empirical act of cognition nor the real happening object itself has any impact on the law at all; on the other hand, an object created by my concept belongs to me only because it meets the practical condition, i.e., the object is cognized with an understanding of necessary causal connection to my ideas, not because in pre-cognition state, my idea ideally effects me and my moves so that I come to cognize the result of that process.

Moreover, as the aware being, we are free in the sense that cognition itself is never effected by natural causal laws; however, we are also never free, because every experience via cognition must be conditioned by natural laws – we can only know phenomenal objects. Yet, it is only because the awareness is only allowed to know nature, including the self in that nature, while it still keeps a non-empirical causal connection to the cognized object, the cognition as such is possible; and of the same course, freedom and morality is possible.

*        *        *

It is also owing to the lack of appreciation of Kant's effort in epistemology that Wood would use the randomness in other animal kinds' actions (choices) or in natural development and quantum physics to blame Kant for his old-fashioned narrow knowledge of nature (158-161), and to further blame Kant's theory of freedom as a theoretical need based upon that narrow knowledge and his extravagant demand for freedom (162).

As for the complaint about other animal kind's choices, we just cannot mix up the investigation of conditions of experience (transcendental philosophy) with the interpretation of phenomena (science). The relation between the former and the latter is not simple correspondence. The behavior of imputability from one option to another is totally a different issue than making a choice in (self-)awareness. One is a study of the result of cognition, and the other is a reflection of its own condition.

As for the uncertainty in nature, I think, one could infer that all the future development must have been completely determined by the past, from the principle that everything happens must have its cause in the past, only insofar as he holds the assumption that things develop by itself as much as time and space are “out there” by itself. The scenario is, I think, that when something has not happened, there's no ground for any certainty with regard to a specific development; the ground for the specific certainty is only provided together with the completion of the cognition of that specific event. In a word, we can say, natural necessitations are given only through our experiencing them. And this is also why what we can never experience is necessarily impossible (the negative necessitation). Even further, the empirical ingredients which we may want to grant to “things themselves”, are exactly the source of randomness and contingency. Considering the condition of experience, on the other hand, I think we can accept uncertainty in nature with no difficulty, while the natural necessitation is still expressed in a sense that every random outcome must have its specific cause in a specific causal chain.


Note:
[1] “If we go by a common sense interpretation of everyday experience …. Animals do sometimes apparently hesitate between real possibilities and then make choices between them.” (159)]]> gustav 先驗理想主義 Wed, 21 Sep 2011 10:38:05 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,10875,10875#msg-10875 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,10875,10875#msg-10875 © gustav


Allen Wood nicely presents Kant's idea (in Religion with the Boundaries of Mere Reason) that to be moral or evil requires the intermediate combination of simple sensibility and simple rationality (such an influence we can also find easily in Goethe), for to the beings in both there's no place of free choice – the former is taken to be lack of the ability while the latter is taken to be lack of the possibility of misuse of reason. This idea perfectly accords with Kant's another relevant stance (in 1st Critique) that free moral agent must come to its exercise in the combination of as in phenomenal world and in noumenal world at once.

To start with an external explanation, if certain being cannot choose, for it does not have the ability to get aware of objects and states of affairs as human does (namely, to get aware of objects as options, of rules and natural development, of the formal conformity and then responsibility between an act together with its consequences, and the cause of the act itself), the behaviors of such being can the best be taken to be physical accidents. On the other hand, a simple rational being without any sensible ingredients cannot have any intra-contradiction, for a simple rational being to have any irrational ingredients or to make any irrational conducts is not reasonably acceptable. However, a being which is necessarily restricted in sensible awareness and at meanwhile accessible to the pure rational system, can have restriction (to know the objects/options) and liberation (to know objects/options – to alter the directedness of the awareness among options) at once, and then can choose.

To go further, in his enquiry to the epistemological condition of human experience (1st Critique), the necessary, immediate combination/relation between sensibility and intelligibility is grounded upon the fact that space and time are necessary to any human real awareness while any thing occurring in space and time can be thought with logical understanding. Consequently, (1) owing to the immediacy between sensibility and intelligibility as well as the formal conformity between the transcendental condition and its result, the validity of taking an act as an act of one's own is provided. (2) Since the rules and the developments of states of affairs ground their matter in sensibility and their forms in intelligibility, i.e., that is developed is always sensible, while the development always follows intelligible rules (so recognized and so developed in causality), the theoretical reason enables human to identify sensibly restricted objects and options with their certain possibilities of development. (3) The difference between the simple rational system and the synthesized empirical system of understanding's conceptualization (resting upon the independence and dependence from the sensibility – independence for the relation between sensibility and intelligibility is only formal and not material, dependence for the relation is epistemologically necessary in experience), creates the difference between the demand of pure reason and the needs in empirical self, only upon the ground of which morality first becomes a matter.

With the above understanding, some puzzles regarding Kant's morality may be explained. First, as Allen Wood also raises, evil must come after the social engagement, especially in comparison with others. Second, and relevantly, can the free moral being (in humanity) do anything evil? These puzzles must be explained first with the clarification of the formation of society in a Kantian sense. Society is a combination resulting from the combination of sensibility and intelligibility, too. Society is the genetic expression of humanity in all human conducts: humanity is the essence of all individual humans in a sense that every member of the group belongs to the same community only if they share the same theoretical and practical capacity (in Kant's terms, both subjective and objective universal communicability, and then society is recognized empirically so that it is subjected to the combination of sensibility and intelligibility, too.

Kant begins his Groundworks for the Metaphysics of Morals with the distinction between hypothetical and categorical good, explaining exactly the social, human complexity in the pursuit of ends. Technically separating, hypothetical relation is a synthesis, i.e., to take something to be something else; categorical relation is an analytics, something appears as itself. Hypothetical good is then something satisfying certain external purpose, namely, good for others, while categorical good is something satisfying for its own purpose, namely good in itself. In this context, Kant emphasizes, morally good is the only example of the categorical good. The reason may be the following: morally good is the only expression of pure rationality in humanity.

All the human possible awareness must be the result of cognition. Once cognized, the synthesis of sensibility and intelligibility is necessary. Attached with the value and pursuit of ends in humanity, the resulted awareness appears to be the need of empirical self. Any purpose in such a form must be an external one, for the purpose itself is first a synthesized object with the combination of intuition (satisfaction) and concept (empirical rules such as functions) which is then associated with another existing object (means) – e.g., because I think drinking coffee makes me excited or keeps me fresh (the concept of a purpose), I drink coffee (the another object) and feel satisfied accordingly (the intuition). Any social engagement and the comparison must come with such a notion of purpose; the social origin of evils is the result of the need of empirical self.

Regarding the demand of simple reason, thanks to its mere formal link to reality, the notion of purpose is different in kind to the notion of purpose in empirical need. Because pure rational system only consists of, and considers, pure rules (rule-ness, regulation) and the purposive relations ensuring the regularity itself, no contradiction is possible in it and hence no self-destructive demand is offered by it. The human agent can access the system intelligibly with the formal link, so, although there is no sensible expression of the pure intelligibility, human can “recognize” the intelligible forms in sensible states of affairs – including the conformity between the will (concept of purpose) and the actions (result of the concept of purpose), the moral meaning of human actions, the difference of hypothetical satisfaction and categorical satisfaction, etc. And since the pure rational system considers only homogeneous rules, the output value is the self-manifestation of the demand itself in the realization of the rules, similarly as the object-hood manifests itself in any object – not depending on another empirically associated objects. A free agent is free, I try to suggest, only in so far as the agent gets accessed to the demand of reason when the agent directs the directedness of the awareness from the known objects to “the knowing”, in which the formal conformity between sensibility and intelligibility, restriction and freedom, and the difference between the simple rational system and the synthesized empirical system, become possible at once. Following that, a moral agent that is not simply sensible nor simply rational, must be absolutely free (in a sense as also phenomenally restricted), and in such a condition, any corresponding action must be morally good – for in such a condition, the notion of “purpose” is altered from the relative, hypothetical mechanism to the absolute, self-supported mechanism. When the former notion is applied, the thinking subject is not free for the thinking is subjected to the cognitive synthesis; when the latter is applied, the thinking subject is free for the cognitive synthesis is subjected to the thinking.

Related Oriental Concepts:
「天地不仁」、「天道無親，常與善人」《老子》
「蓍之德，圓而神；卦之德，方以知；六爻之義，易以貢。聖人以此洗心，退藏於密，吉凶與民同患。神以知來，知以藏往，其孰能與此哉！」《易經繫辭傳》
「離分別」（General agreement in Buddhism）
「事法界、理法界、理事無礙法界、事事無礙法界」《大方廣佛華嚴經》、澄觀《華嚴法界玄鏡》、宗密《註法界觀門》
「見分、相分、自證分」陳那《因明正理門論》、《集量論》


© gustav (reference to this source page with hyperlink is required for full or partial citation)]]> gustav 先驗理想主義 Sat, 12 Mar 2011 04:33:22 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,493,493#msg-493 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,493,493#msg-493 http://www.philosophyol.com/pol/?action-viewnews-itemid-2239




An Introduction to Kant´s Transcendental Idealism

Thomas Pogge, Columbia University



This course will involve a close reading of selected parts from the B-edition of Kant´s Critique of Pure Reason, in the translation of Kemp Smith. Kant pursues there the questions: “What can we know?” and “How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible?” His engagement with these questions leads him to what he calls “transcendental idealism,” a view that, he says, brings about a “Copernican Revolution” in philosophy. Transcendental idealism offers a dramatically new account of how the human mind works and is also radically at odds with received conceptions of space, time, and causality.

1. Preface and Introduction (Bvii-30)

with passage on hypotheses (B803-810)

2. Space and Time (B33-73, 448-471, 513-555)

3. Intuitions, Concepts, Schemata; Categories; Judgments (B74-116, 169-193)

4. Transcendental Deduction Part 1 (B116-146)

5. Transcendental Deduction Part 2 (B144-169, 396-406)

6. Idealism One (B294-315, 331-336, 342-346, 518-525, xvi-xxii, xxvi-xxvii, 69-71)

7. Idealism Two (B274-279, xxxix ff. note, 288-294, 218-233)



8. Second and Third Analogies of Experience (B232-265)

Course book: Immanuel Kant: The Critique of Pure Reason, edited Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

B: second edition of The Critique of Pure Reason


Kant's Concept of Reason in the First Critique
Garrath Williams, Lancaster University



The Critique of Pure Reason (1781/7) is Kant’s most famous work and sets out his epistemology and metaphysics. The most-read part of the book is Kant’s account of how the structure of human knowledge is constituted – this will be covered in Thomas Pogge’s course on Kant’s transcendental idealism. However, Kant’s overall purpose – as the book’s title suggests – is to give an account of human reason. This course will focus on Kant’s account of the nature and limits of human reason, using some of Kant’s incidental essays (such as ‘What is Enlightenment?’), the introductory sections of the Critique, and its final sections. We will also briefly consider Kant’s moral theory: Kant is famous for insisting that practical reason can give us knowledge of morality and its supreme principle, the Categorical Imperative; one important question for us will be whether this principle offers a key to reason in all its guises.



1. ‘What is Enlightenment?’ and ‘What is orientation in thinking?’

2. Kant’s account of reason in ethics: the Categorical Imperative

2. Preface to the second (B) edition of the Critique Bvii-Bxli

3. The Ideal of Pure Reason A567=B595-A642=B670

4. Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic A642=B670-A704-B732

5. Doctrine of Method: Introduction and Chapter I, Sections I & II A707=B735-A769=B797

6. Doctrine of Method: Chapter I, Sections III & IV A769=B797-A794=B822

7. Doctrine of Method: Chapters II, III & IV A795=B823-A855-B883

Course book: Immanuel Kant: The Critique of Pure Reason, edited Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

A: first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason

B: second edition of The Critique of Pure Reason





Kant’s Ethics and Kantian Ethics

Onora O’Neill, Newnham College, Cambridge



These lectures will cover some of the central arguments of Kant’s moral philosophy, in particular those in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals [G] and The Critique of Practical Reason [CPrR]. The main focus of the course will be on Kant’s distinctive accounts of reason, freedom and autonomy, and some points of comparison and of contrast with contemporary deontological ethics.

Topics to be covered include: Kant’s theory of action; the role of principles in ethical life; good will and duty; some problems of Kant’s moral psychology; the Categorical Imperative and the supposed equivalence of its formulations; formalism and rigourism; Kantian conceptions of right and virtue; critique of reason and practical reason; the intelligible world and the two standpoints; the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason and their connection to Kant's Philosophy of Religion; Kant's extension of his practical philosophy to politics.



1 Introductory Remarks: What is Distinctive about Kant's Ethics?

2 Kant's Theory of Action

Begin reading Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason. As a first move aim to cover

G Part I and CPrR 5:15-5:29.

3 Practical Principles, Happiness and Duty

Continue CPrR up to 5:27

4 Imperatives and Universality

G II; CPrR up to 5:42

5 The Formulae, Autonomy and Heteronomy

As for 4

6 Freedom and Reason

G III, CPrR 5:43-109

7 The Highest Good, God and Immortality

CPrR 5:110-148

8 Politics

Course book: Kant. I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor & Kant, I.: Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary J. Gregor, in Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1999.





Kant's Aesthetics

Sebastian Gardner, University College London



The course aims to give students in the first place a reasonably detailed and comprehensive

understanding of Kant's aesthetic theory, based on close reading and discussion of the 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgement' which composes Part One of Kant's Critique of Judgement. The following elements will be covered:



· Kant's analysis of judgements of taste (with reference to the 'Analytic of the Beautiful').

· Kant's attempt to provide a justification of judgements of taste ('Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgements', §§30-42, and 'Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgement').

· Kant's theory of the sublime ('Analytic of the Sublime').

· Kant's theory of art ('Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgements', §§43-54).



In discussing these sections of Kant's text the course will draw attention to the following topics in particular: (1) the contrast of Kant's aesthetics with the aesthetic theories of his empiricist and rationalist predecessors; (2) the special exegetical difficulties surrounding certain of Kant's claims, and the competing interpretations of Kant offered by anglophone commentators (Henry Allison, Paul Guyer, and others); (3) the disputes among commentators concerning the relation of Kant's aesthetic theory to, on the one hand, his ethics, and on the other, his metaphysics of transcendental idealism; (4) historically important lines of criticism of Kant's aesthetics and the impetus given by Kant's aesthetics to the privileging of art in post-Kantian philosophy.



There will in addition be some discussion of the following further elements in the Critique of Judgement:



· Kant's theory of teleological judgement and his conception of its relation to aesthetic judgement (with reference to selected passages from the 'Critique of Teleological Judgement').

· Kant's moral theology ('Critique of Teleological Judgement', §§83-91).

· Kant's account of the purpose of the Critique of Judgement (selected passages from the Introduction and the First Introduction).



Here the emphasis will be on grasping and evaluating Kant's claims concerning the role of the Critique of Judgement in unifying and completing the Critical system.



Course book: Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, edited and trans. Paul Guyer and trans. Eric Matthews (Cambridge University Press, 2002).]]> gustav 先驗理想主義 Tue, 24 Mar 2009 02:17:57 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,303,303#msg-303 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,303,303#msg-303

§10
上面所說的足以求得哲學知識的概念式思維，既自詡為足以認識絕對對象[上帝、精神、自由]，則對它的這種認識方式的必然性何在，能力如何，必須加以考察和論證。但考察與論證這種思維的努力，已經屬於哲學認識本身的事情，所以只有在哲學範圍之內才能執行這種工作。如果只是加以初步的解釋，未免有失哲學的本色，結果所得恐不過只是一套無憑的假說，主觀的肯定，形式的推理，換言之，不過是些偶然的武斷而已。與此種片面的武斷相對立的反面，亦未嘗不可以同樣有理。

Remark
康德的批判哲學的主要觀點，即在於教人在進行探究上帝以及事物的本質等問題之前，先對於認識能力本身，作一番考察工夫，看人是否有達到此種知識的能力。他指出，人們在進行工作以前，必須對於用來工作的工具，先行認識，假如工具不完善，則一切工作，將歸徒勞。----康德這種思想看來異常可取，曾經引起很大的驚佩跟贊同。但結果使得認識活動將探討對象，把握對象的興趣，轉向其自身，轉向著認識的形式方面。如果不為文字所騙的話，那我們就不難看出，對於別的工具的工具，我們誠然能夠在別種方式下加以考察，加以批判，不必一定限於那個工具所適用的特殊工作內。但要想執行考察認識的工作，卻只有在認識的活動過程中才可進行。考察所謂認識的工具，與對認識加以認識，乃是一回事。但是想要認識於人們進行認識之前，其可笑無異於某學究的聰明辦法，在沒有學會游泳以前，切勿冒險下水[*]。
萊因哈特見到了哲學上這種開端的困難，特提出一種初步的 假說和試探式的哲學思考，以作為哲學的開端，藉以補救康德的困難。他以為這樣就可以循序漸進（其實誰也不知道如何進行），直至我們達到原始真理為止。仔細考察一下，他的方法並沒有超出普通的方法，即從分析經驗的基礎開始，或從分析一初步假定的概念的界說開始。不庸否認，就他把普通認識過程中前提和初步假定解釋作假設的或試探的步驟而言，其中確實包含有正確的見解。但是他這種正確看法，並未改變他的哲學方法的性質，而且適足以表明那種方法的不完善。


[*] K. L. Reinhold, 1758-1823。]]> gustav 先驗理想主義 Wed, 11 Feb 2009 11:51:52 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,262,262#msg-262 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?58,262,262#msg-262 2.為何被稱為利害且與對象實存結合的愉悅，不是欲求能力的規定就是與欲求能力的規定有關？
ps.第一次po錯地方> <]]> oculus 先驗理想主義 Wed, 04 Feb 2009 20:37:14 +0800