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        <title>MEPOPEDIA - Critique of Judgment</title>
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        <link>http://mepopedia.com/forum/list.php?492</link>
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            <guid>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,10741,10741#msg-10741</guid>
            <title>§1 A Judgment of Taste Is Aesthetic / Kant's Critique of Judgment (1 reply)</title>
            <link>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,10741,10741#msg-10741</link>
            <description><![CDATA[<div>If we wish to decide whether something is beautiful or not, we do not use understanding to refer the presentation<sup>4</sup> to the object so as to give rise to cognition;<sup>5</sup> rather, we use imagination (perhaps in connection with understanding) to refer the presentation to the subject and his feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Hence a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment and so is not a logical judgment but an aesthetic one, by which we mean a judgment whose determining basis cannot be other than subjective. But any reference of presentations, even of sensations, can be objective (in which case it signifies what is real [rather than formal] in an empirical presentation); excepted is a reference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasurethis reference designates nothing whatsoever in the object, but here the subject feels himself, [namely] how he is affected by the presentation.</div><br /><div>To apprehend a regular, purposive building with one's cognitive power<sup>6</sup> (whether the presentation is distinct or confused) is very different from being conscious of this presentation with a sensation of liking. Here the presentation is referred only to the subject, namely, to his feeling of life, under the name feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and this forms the basis of a very special power of discriminating and judging.<sup>7</sup></div><br /><div>This power does not contribute anything to cognition, but merely compares the given presentation in the subject with the entire presentational power, of which the mind becomes conscious when it feels its own state. The presentations given in a judgment may be empirical (and hence aesthetic<sup>8</sup>), but if we refer them to the object, the judgment we make by means of them is logical. On the other hand, even if the given presentations were rational, they would still be aesthetic if, and to the extent that, the subject referred them, in his judgment, solely to himself (to his feeling).</div><br /><br /><div>4[ Vorstellung, traditionally rendered as `representation: (See above, Ak. 175 br. n. 17.) `Presentation' is a generic term referring to such objects of our direct awareness as sensations, intuitions, perceptions, concepts, cognitions, ideas, and schemata. Cf. the Critique of Pure Reason, A 320 = B 376-77 and A 140 = B 179.1</div><div>5[Erkenntnis. Cf. above, Ak. 167 br. n. 2.]</div><div>6[ For my use of 'power,' rather than `faculty,' see above, Ak. 167 br. n. 3.1</div><div>7[Beurteilung. On Kant's attempt to make a terminological distinction between 'beurteilen' and 'urteilen,'see above, Ak. 169 br. n. 9.1</div><div>8[ From Greek aisthesthai`to sense']</div>]]></description>
            <dc:creator>Hsinping</dc:creator>
            <category>Critique of Judgment</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 May 2011 21:42:00 +0800</pubDate>
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            <guid>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,7178,7178#msg-7178</guid>
            <title>Why &quot;a judgment of taste cannot be based on a subjective purpose?&quot; (2 replies)</title>
            <link>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,7178,7178#msg-7178</link>
            <description><![CDATA[In section 11, Kant wrote in the beginning:<br />
<br />
<i>Whenever a purpose is regarded as the basis of a liking, it always carries with it an interest, as the basis that determines the judgment about the object of the pleasure. Hence a judgment of taste cannot be based on a subjective purpose.</i><br />
<br />
I don't quite understand why the the statement of the second sentence is true, and I don't see the connection between the first and the second sentences.<br />
<br />
And, I also  noticed  something interesting in the last sentence (§11):<br />
<br />
<i>Therefore the liking that, without a concept, ...... , can be nothing but the <b>subjective purposiveness in the presentation of an object</b>, without any purpose (whether objective or subjective), and hence the mere form of purposiveness, insofar as we are conscious of it, in the presentation by which an object is <u>given</u> us</i>.]]></description>
            <dc:creator>HP</dc:creator>
            <category>Critique of Judgment</category>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Aug 2010 06:44:47 +0800</pubDate>
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            <guid>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,5764,5764#msg-5764</guid>
            <title>What is THIS? &quot;This&quot; forms the basis of a very special power of discriminating and judging. (1 reply)</title>
            <link>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,5764,5764#msg-5764</link>
            <description><![CDATA[In section 1, Kant wrote:<br />
<br />
Here the presentation is referred only to the subject, namely, to his feeling of life, under the name feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and <b>this forms the basis of a very special power of discriminating and judging</b>.<br />
<br />
I am wondering: what specifically "this" refers to?<br />
<br />
Also, I am wondering is that Kant really use "under the name" of pleasure and displeasure. It seems he uses "the name" on purpose.]]></description>
            <dc:creator>HP</dc:creator>
            <category>Critique of Judgment</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 Apr 2010 11:09:50 +0800</pubDate>
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