<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
    <channel>
        <title>MEPOPEDIA - Critique of Judgment</title>
        <description></description>
        <link>http://mepopedia.com/forum/list.php?492</link>
        <lastBuildDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 07:20:52 +0800</lastBuildDate>
        <generator>Phorum 5.2.7</generator>
        <item>
            <guid>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,10741,12870#msg-12870</guid>
            <title>Re: §1 A Judgment of Taste Is Aesthetic / Kant's Critique of Judgment</title>
            <link>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,10741,12870#msg-12870</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Very interesting discussion. Thank you for your effort to put this in the web. I am wondering about if you have any chance to talk about Kant’s Critique of Judgment in terms of morality and religion. To my understanding, the third critique was the heart amongst the 3 critiques (my own opinion), specially the reflective judgment, and “as-if” metaphor. To use “as-if”, Kant made a leap by employing an amazing way of to discribe something so hard to explain–”something is not there, but so often it appears to be there.” Kant explained asethetics not for the sake of it, but as a door to explain moral and the final end, for that matter, to explain what is human.<br />
<br />
May I discuss Kant's "as-if"?  There are limited resources about "as-if" discussion on the web.<br />
<br />
What is your opinion on Heisenberg's indeterminacy (uncertainty principle) relating to Kant's noumenon?]]></description>
            <dc:creator>boris</dc:creator>
            <category>Critique of Judgment</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 May 2011 21:42:00 +0800</pubDate>
        </item>
        <item>
            <guid>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,10741,10741#msg-10741</guid>
            <title>§1 A Judgment of Taste Is Aesthetic / Kant's Critique of Judgment</title>
            <link>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,10741,10741#msg-10741</link>
            <description><![CDATA[<div>If we wish to decide whether something is beautiful or not, we do not use understanding to refer the presentation<sup>4</sup> to the object so as to give rise to cognition;<sup>5</sup> rather, we use imagination (perhaps in connection with understanding) to refer the presentation to the subject and his feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Hence a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment and so is not a logical judgment but an aesthetic one, by which we mean a judgment whose determining basis cannot be other than subjective. But any reference of presentations, even of sensations, can be objective (in which case it signifies what is real [rather than formal] in an empirical presentation); excepted is a reference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasurethis reference designates nothing whatsoever in the object, but here the subject feels himself, [namely] how he is affected by the presentation.</div><br /><div>To apprehend a regular, purposive building with one's cognitive power<sup>6</sup> (whether the presentation is distinct or confused) is very different from being conscious of this presentation with a sensation of liking. Here the presentation is referred only to the subject, namely, to his feeling of life, under the name feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and this forms the basis of a very special power of discriminating and judging.<sup>7</sup></div><br /><div>This power does not contribute anything to cognition, but merely compares the given presentation in the subject with the entire presentational power, of which the mind becomes conscious when it feels its own state. The presentations given in a judgment may be empirical (and hence aesthetic<sup>8</sup>), but if we refer them to the object, the judgment we make by means of them is logical. On the other hand, even if the given presentations were rational, they would still be aesthetic if, and to the extent that, the subject referred them, in his judgment, solely to himself (to his feeling).</div><br /><br /><div>4[ Vorstellung, traditionally rendered as `representation: (See above, Ak. 175 br. n. 17.) `Presentation' is a generic term referring to such objects of our direct awareness as sensations, intuitions, perceptions, concepts, cognitions, ideas, and schemata. Cf. the Critique of Pure Reason, A 320 = B 376-77 and A 140 = B 179.1</div><div>5[Erkenntnis. Cf. above, Ak. 167 br. n. 2.]</div><div>6[ For my use of 'power,' rather than `faculty,' see above, Ak. 167 br. n. 3.1</div><div>7[Beurteilung. On Kant's attempt to make a terminological distinction between 'beurteilen' and 'urteilen,'see above, Ak. 169 br. n. 9.1</div><div>8[ From Greek aisthesthai`to sense']</div>]]></description>
            <dc:creator>Hsinping</dc:creator>
            <category>Critique of Judgment</category>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 Feb 2011 19:42:18 +0800</pubDate>
        </item>
        <item>
            <guid>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,7178,7204#msg-7204</guid>
            <title>Re: Why &quot;a judgment of taste cannot be based on a subjective purpose?&quot;</title>
            <link>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,7178,7204#msg-7204</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Ya. I have thought about it after posting the question and somehow got the point. It's like a stupid question...]]></description>
            <dc:creator>HP</dc:creator>
            <category>Critique of Judgment</category>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Aug 2010 06:44:47 +0800</pubDate>
        </item>
        <item>
            <guid>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,7178,7197#msg-7197</guid>
            <title>Re: Why &quot;a judgment of taste cannot be based on a subjective purpose?&quot;</title>
            <link>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,7178,7197#msg-7197</link>
            <description><![CDATA["Whenever a purpose is regarded as the basis of a liking" means if an object is liked under the condition that it can lead to some result (which is the target of the liking). Such a liking is hence a liking based upon and determined by an interest. Since the liking for the beautiful has been divided from the other two in the previous treatise, and since the disinterestedness nature of a judgment of taste has been assured first, with the same reason supporting the two "since"s, Kant writes "Hence a judgment of taste cannot be based on a subjective purpose. He does not mention objective purpose because it is too distant to be a question.]]></description>
            <dc:creator>gustav</dc:creator>
            <category>Critique of Judgment</category>
            <pubDate>Sat, 31 Jul 2010 18:45:20 +0800</pubDate>
        </item>
        <item>
            <guid>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,7178,7178#msg-7178</guid>
            <title>Why &quot;a judgment of taste cannot be based on a subjective purpose?&quot;</title>
            <link>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,7178,7178#msg-7178</link>
            <description><![CDATA[In section 11, Kant wrote in the beginning:<br />
<br />
<i>Whenever a purpose is regarded as the basis of a liking, it always carries with it an interest, as the basis that determines the judgment about the object of the pleasure. Hence a judgment of taste cannot be based on a subjective purpose.</i><br />
<br />
I don't quite understand why the the statement of the second sentence is true, and I don't see the connection between the first and the second sentences.<br />
<br />
And, I also  noticed  something interesting in the last sentence (§11):<br />
<br />
<i>Therefore the liking that, without a concept, ...... , can be nothing but the <b>subjective purposiveness in the presentation of an object</b>, without any purpose (whether objective or subjective), and hence the mere form of purposiveness, insofar as we are conscious of it, in the presentation by which an object is <u>given</u> us</i>.]]></description>
            <dc:creator>HP</dc:creator>
            <category>Critique of Judgment</category>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Jul 2010 21:42:08 +0800</pubDate>
        </item>
        <item>
            <guid>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,5764,5767#msg-5767</guid>
            <title>Re: What is THIS? &quot;This&quot; forms the basis of a very special power of discriminating and judging.</title>
            <link>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,5764,5767#msg-5767</link>
            <description><![CDATA[German original: Hier wird die Vorstellung gänzlich auf das Subjekt, und zwar auf das Lebensgefühl desselben, unter dem Namen des Gefühls der Lust oder Unlust, bezogen: welches ein ganz besonderes Unterscheidungs - und Beurteilungsvermögen gründet, das ...<br />
<br />
Pluhar's English translation: Here the presentation is referred only to the subject, namely, to his feeling of life, under the name feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and <b>this</b> forms the basis of a very special power of discriminating and judging.<br />
<br />
<br />
1. Pluhar's "this" refers to the subject, as well as, more specifically, the feeling of life. According to the German original, "this" is the translation of the neutral relational pronoun "welches" which can be taken to refer to the antecedent neural noun(s) "das Subjekt", "das Lebensgefühl" or "des Gefühls." Since these neutral nouns are appositives and share the same gender, they all could be taken to be the referent of "whecles". To understand the sentence, we can think as the following: <br />
It is the subject, namely, the <b>feeling</b> of life (in the subject) which is better specified under the name of the <b>feeling</b> of pleasure and displeasure, that forms the basis of the very special power of discriminating and judging.<br />
<br />
2. "Name" is not an emphasis here; it is "the feeling of pleasure and displeasure" that matters here. Kant tries to indicate that the "feeling of life" is better understood with, or further specified by, the name of "feeling of pleasure and displeasure" here.]]></description>
            <dc:creator>gustav</dc:creator>
            <category>Critique of Judgment</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 Apr 2010 11:09:50 +0800</pubDate>
        </item>
        <item>
            <guid>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,5764,5764#msg-5764</guid>
            <title>What is THIS? &quot;This&quot; forms the basis of a very special power of discriminating and judging.</title>
            <link>http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?492,5764,5764#msg-5764</link>
            <description><![CDATA[In section 1, Kant wrote:<br />
<br />
Here the presentation is referred only to the subject, namely, to his feeling of life, under the name feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and <b>this forms the basis of a very special power of discriminating and judging</b>.<br />
<br />
I am wondering: what specifically "this" refers to?<br />
<br />
Also, I am wondering is that Kant really use "under the name" of pleasure and displeasure. It seems he uses "the name" on purpose.]]></description>
            <dc:creator>HP</dc:creator>
            <category>Critique of Judgment</category>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 Apr 2010 02:55:11 +0800</pubDate>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>
