MEPO Forum - 佛教知識論 http://mepopedia.com/forum/list.php?143 Wed, 29 Apr 2026 15:00:57 +0800 Phorum 5.2.7 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,93688,93688#msg-93688 藕益大師《愣嚴文句》解眾生關於「二種根本」的顛倒知見 (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,93688,93688#msg-93688
前已總明一切眾生生死相續。皆由不知常 住真心性淨明體。用諸妄想。此想不真。故有輪轉。然猶未曾分明說此真心妄想總無二體。如麻之與蛇。不離一繩。今更申明二本不離一心。使人不遺真以逐妄。須 了妄以歸真也。一切眾生。泛指迷真逐 妄之流。廣如下文七趣所列。諸修行人。別指厭妄求真之士。廣如下文陰魔所明。惡叉。西域果名。此方所無。聚者。三必同生。共成一聚。以喻惑業苦三。始終不 相離也。不成無上菩提。指權教菩薩。別成聲聞緣覺。指藏通二乘。餘皆可知。此之二流。雖復一是任迷。一是趨悟。賢愚迥然不同。而未達真妄源頭。無有始覺真 智。則一而已。故總責云。皆由不知二種根本也。沙。喻依他性上所起徧計執性。饌。喻依他性上所具圓成實性。不捨徧計。那獲圓成。塵劫勤修。總為唐喪。可不 慎哉。攀者。能緣之心。卽八種識各有見分。緣者。所攀之境。卽八種識各有相分。依八種識之自證分。起此見相二分。是名依他起性。不了此之心境。惟是八識自 證所現。橫起我法二執。是名用攀緣心為自性者。卽所謂妄認四大為自身相。妄認六塵緣影為自心相等是也。以此為無始生死根本者。由不達心境悉無自性。卽是常 住真心性淨明體。所以凡夫起於貪著。攀三界六塵之緣。則為分段生死根本。二乘起於厭惡。別攀真諦涅槃之緣。菩薩雙捨二邊。別攀但中理性之緣。則為變易生死 根本也。菩提者。四種智 德之果。涅槃者。三種斷德之果。元清淨體者。性本清淨。不待修證而後淨也。識精。通指八識各自精了。所謂自證分也。元明。總指八識所依一心。所謂證自證分 也。然非分剖一心以為八箇證自證分。亦非八識共只一箇證自證分。良由心體離過絕非。不可思議。只此元明之體。徧在八識。八識各得其全。以為證自證分。如八 人同觀一輪圓月。行向八方。各有全月隨八人去。亦非分為八分。亦非共看一月。思之。思之。能生諸緣。謂依此自證及證自證。能成見相二分也。見分具於四緣。 謂親因緣。等無間緣。所緣緣。增上緣。相分具於二緣。謂親因緣。增上緣也。緣所遺者。謂此自證證自證分。旣舉體幻成見相二分。則自體便成隱沒。如舉麻之全 體成繩。則人但見其為繩。不復以為麻矣。然旣舉自證而為見相。則見相無非自證。如舉麻為繩。繩卽是麻。今正指此卽見相之自證以為菩提涅槃元清淨體。故曰緣 所遺者。而下文云。此見及緣。元是菩提妙淨明體。亦與此處同也。指第八識。卽大圓鏡智菩提元清淨體。指第七識。卽平等性智菩提元清淨體。指第六識。卽妙觀 察智菩提元清淨體。 指前五識。卽成所作智菩提元清淨體。此則四智菩提。亦是本具。不同相宗權說。謂是生因所生也。指徧計本空。我法自性了不可得。如繩上本無蛇性。卽圓淨涅槃 元清淨體。指依他如幻。十界假名無量差別。如麻可為繩。卽方便淨涅槃元清淨體。指圓成本具。法法全真。如繩卽是麻。卽性淨涅槃元清淨體。所以二種根本。不 離一心。悟見相惟自證。譬如了繩卽麻。則是菩提涅槃。迷見相為我法。譬如於繩見蛇。則成生死根本。故曰遺此本明。雖終日行而不自覺。枉入諸趣。此一經最要 之關。佛祖傳心之訣也。舊解以攀緣心偏指六識。必欲破除六識令盡。則果中將何以為妙觀察智。成所作智之體。一可痛也。以識精偏指第八。必欲專用之以為體。 則是無量劫來生死本。癡人認作本來人。二可痛也。況今文義。本自彰灼。而紛紛妄解。誣罔經宗。何為者乎。


Source:
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Reference:
http://tripitaka.cbeta.org/X13n0285_001]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Sun, 10 Jul 2022 21:42:39 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,92529,92529#msg-92529 因上努力，果中隨緣 (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,92529,92529#msg-92529 gustav 佛教知識論 Tue, 11 May 2021 08:04:38 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,91774,91774#msg-91774 反省於在世與出世 - 當佛教遇到歐陸哲學工作坊：第一場「出世與在世」與談稿 (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,91774,91774#msg-91774 當佛教遇到歐陸哲學工作坊：第一場「出世與在世」與談稿

時間：2021年1月8日
地點：國立中山大學哲學研究所
主持人：林鎮國教授
引言人：游淙祺院長、耿晴教授
同場與談人：越建東教授
與談稿撰文：汪純瑩
有勞林恕安博士代為宣讀


林老師、游院長、耿老師與越老師：晚輩要以尚未成熟的哲學工作來就教於各位學者前輩，十分心虛，敬請諸位老師與與會先進多多指教。

0.
在進入討論脈絡前，想要先分享一則故事，點出我與談的主軸：「人之將死其言也善」時的心境，就是出世的心境，完全不假包裝，才能親見真相。年輕氣盛貢高我慢時，反省能力不彰，只能用意識形態行事，難免無力回天時後悔莫及。早日有此覺悟，時時都能以將死之心，行走世間。趁還有力氣時，就儘量減少包裝才好。境無好壞，貪嗔痴就是在世的角度，而戒定慧就是出世的角度。

林凱信醫師是亞洲地區首例成功骨髓移植案例的主治醫師，而照片中賴玲玫女士是他返台後頭幾例骨髓移植成功的海洋性貧血案例（以前稱作地中海型貧血，後因基因定序確認型態不同而更名）。請各位看照片中出自賴爸爸賴德忠先生的謝辭。





(故事分享已獲林凱信醫師、賴德忠先生同意。)

當時是民國73年，勇敢的姊姊韋如捐贈骨髓救了妹妹玲玫一命。賴家是在雲林古坑種植雞蛋柳丁的農家。除了姊妹外，哥哥與弟弟也都是海洋性貧血病友，弟弟已經先離世了，ㄧ週前玲玫也走了。我有幸得以代表林凱信醫師探望家屬時，從賴爸爸口中聽得這個故事：當時家貧，醫藥費負擔很重，幸得學術補助得以紓緩，一次，當時衛生機關官員到醫院訪視時，問了賴先生一句話：「你女兒在這裡接受醫療，花了政府一百萬，你有沒有很開心？」當時賴先生直接回說：「不開心，你們這些官員都被xx醫院的醫師騙了不知道。」現場包含林醫師在內的群醫面面相覷，不知是怎麼一回事。賴先生才悠悠道來。原來，就醫以來，每一筆醫療開銷賴先生都記錄得十分詳實，他說：「前前後後xx醫院已經花了兩百多萬，你怎麼說一百萬？」後來，玲玫的case獲得上面全額的補助。也由於這個新聞一鬧開，各界善款湧至，賴爸爸說：「我們窮，但是有些錢就是不該拿。」既然醫藥費全由學術名義負擔了，這些善款就成了今日的xxxx基金會的基金。當時，我在賴家的果園中，真的感受到什麼叫做「人之將死，其言也善」，也從故事中感受到什麼叫做包裝。我想，從這個故事開始今天的與談，可以提供扎實的情境。 (機關名稱姑且保留）

1.
游院長從胡賽爾現象學與超越後之還原來探討「在世」與「出世」之間的關係，我想這是在歐陸哲學中再適合不過的切入點了，不只出於胡賽爾在康德與海德格之間在此問題上承啟而在歐陸哲學中佔得地利之便，更在於懸擱的無法完全，也就同游院長所說，有別於超越論現象學，現象心理學還原凸顯「純粹心靈（超越論之研究對象）與世界生活（作為世界之子的現象學主體之活動）之間的相即又相離的弔詭關係」，讓我們有了切入點來探究主體在認知中「面臨」純粹性與經驗性之分裂危機之中有否自我和解之契機。

針對這個部分，我能貢獻的補充，就是往前延伸到康德主體置於自然世界（自然因果關係）與自由世界（自由因果關係）之間的不自然關係的脈絡。主體在自然世界中，在範疇之引導下，想像綜合出整全意識，在這樣的必然的「判斷」之中，主體與自然世界合而為一地在時間與空間中、合理且跨主體地發展。循著先驗方法，抽離走經驗內容之後，於理論理性之範圍（認識論）中，純粹心靈的認知能力及其原則，也就是知性的範疇，以及想像力的時間空間型式，得以在方法上被確定，同時也確認在自然世界中知性經驗與感性經驗於現象當中完全一致，且各種合理關係必為客觀實在（在時空經驗之中必然有效）。以上為康德《純粹理性批判》之工作。在《實踐理性批判》中，康德將主體面對道德情境時仍然必須為一自然世界之主角，但同時又必須為一自由世界之主角，以致於能夠完整地經驗仍為自然世界的道德處境，又同時得以以自由人的身分認知到「良知（自我立法的絕對命令）」，並在自然人的自私傾向與自由人的良知之間取捨。誠如康德自己在《判斷力批判》前言中所言，認知的理性與實踐的理性之間的斷裂，終將在「判斷力批判」中獲得橋接，透過判斷力批判，以我們美與崇高的經驗作為證據，證明我們的「反省能力（Refelxion）」，也就是知性與想像力之自在和諧關係為真，這個部分我們隨後再開展更為細緻的論述。前述的「抽離」這個康德所謂先驗方法，即是我們作為自然人考察純粹靈魂的途徑，亦即胡賽爾「懸擱」方法之靈感。而人既同時有感性認知之觀點與純粹理性認知之觀點，且純理之理在兩者之間同一而共通，故作為整全意識自然世界的現象我（現象心理學之對象）與直接通達純理的超越我（超越現象學之對象）便處在一個「不自然」的關係當中合而為一；不自然，是因為自然為純理展現在時間與空間之中之表象，而純理之中介於自然與自由中並不被展現在時間與空間之中，故稱之為「不自然」。

耿老師很巧妙地分別以（1）龍樹《中論》的中觀視角點出大乘佛教共許之二諦觀：世俗與勝義為一，呼應胡賽爾這種主體內部自我分裂的危機終究必須得和解於這個並未分裂為現象的與智的單一的世界；且以（2）唯識論中共許的識智轉換之方法「無分別智」來對比胡賽爾「還原」中所帶有的「言說性質」，懷疑同樣作為超越論的言說方法，在佛教傳統中開放出更多自然世界之積極意義，在胡賽爾傳統中恐需「追問」，現象學心理學「何以總是站在正確的一方來批判自然態度？」也就是為何純粹靈魂總優越於自然世界。

既已提出「山頂上的」純粹心靈在「下山」之後必須面對與自然之子的和解，歐陸傳統下自然世界與理性之不可分割或許不需太多費力辯解，只需澄清理性仍舊透過意識必然地展現於我們對自然世界的體驗，而體驗自然的自我與超越的自我仍舊是同一個自我。而對於自然世界的批判以及對於感性內容之懷疑，若非帶著傳統理性主義（尤其是笛卡爾與伯克利之懷疑論）對於感性知識之不信任的偏見，該批判不過就是一個單純於「認知層次」的考察方法，不應（如胡賽爾隱隱焦慮中的）過度到本體論，更不建構自由世界那個屬於「實踐」的範圍—實踐仍然發生於自然之中。至於在唯識傳統中部分的見解依循中觀應承傳統對語言純世俗化的看法，認為具有超越性的勝義本身非為言說所能表述且與言說不相關（世俗為言說構成；勝義與言說無關），進而主張勝義中的主體為無分別智，也就是後來對於陳那離分別的「現量」理論之神秘化詮釋（覺者為純現量）。其實，另一部分依循初期中觀與中觀自續傳統的主張，認為言說可延伸至超越，所謂「無分別的分別」，也就是陳那自身堅稱的現量比量之間共轉的問題，特別是其於意現量與自證的處理。這特別呼應今日國際舞台上相當熱門的是否「存在」「非概念感知」這個問題之上：前者將樂意於非概念感知狀態「存在」之可能，後者則樂意於無此可能，所有感知都在與概念關聯之中而發生。

2.
從認識論的角度來說，「世間」即是經驗（認識）主體之經驗（認識）結果，而「出世」則是經驗主體對經驗之條件之自我認證；離開世間，自我認證無法完成；透過經驗中必然之形式（純理之知性型式與時間、空間等感性型式），我們「假言施設」地推設「出世」而貫通一切（世間）經驗的認識能力，又既然其意義只不過是經驗中必然的型式，「出世」並非離開「世間」且於「世間」無關的彼岸，而是必然展現於世間之開展的經驗條件。這一方面呼應上面所述康德純理批判的先驗方法，一方面也解釋著陳那在「自證理論」中「量即所量即量果」的「譬喻式」關係（法尊法師《集量論略解》第一品第十誦陳那自解之長行：「此三一體，非有別異。約義不同，安立為三。」）。

特別，意現量作為現量之一特性（面向），正是該些純理之理必然開展於時間與空間感性型式中之必然型式，故能通於分別之結果，即共相之內理結構（範疇），故陳那云：「意亦義貪等，自證無分別...分別亦現量」，長行「分別心亦是自證現量。然非於義是現量，以於義是分別故。對於義是分別，不妨對自體是自證現量。自證現量亦不妨對境義是分別也。」表示，「共相」由於為「自相」之內理結構，其自身不以時間空間相顯於自相中，故不被認為「實」，既不被認為實，也不妨害現量境之為唯一世界，不致因其自身仍舊「內理於」義，而引伸於識外另立他境（超越世界）之疑慮；也不妨害當共相之於第六意識之對象時仍為現量(pratyakṣa)—仍為依於（prati-）根（akṣa，在此即意根）之直接認識。換言之，當我們經驗這個世界時，由於這個世界的感性相即是適合我們用共相加以指涉的，由於我們以具時間空間相的感性相為實，以不具時間空間相而被認識的共相為虛，世界於此中被經驗，進而可被共相指涉與分析，且不肇生共相另存於識外之境的疑慮。

以此觀之，不只在陳那處，對於自然世界具有超越並賦予型式的「正理」不僅僅是「無分別的」，還必須是「無分別的分別」，也正因為我們的意識本身具有將自然世界認識為在時間與空間之中，並且還內含可以被分別的條件，故分別的作用以及言語活動才得以成立。不僅如此，也因為如此，正確的言語活動與錯誤的言語活動才得以被合理地在型式上（合乎現、比二量之條件）分開來，而減去錯誤的言語活動以確保量的適當使用，才成為大乘佛教在進入龍樹中道共識（一切法空：否認極微為實之無條件觀念論立場）還能夠提出的具體積極實踐方案：成量（pramāṇabhuta）。積極地在世間，合理地運用現量比量，在科學（與道德）之上將錯誤與正確的分別開來，於迷因迷果的顛倒中，找出正因正果，從正因下手行出正果，即為開悟之意。

3.
針對意現量，智藏（Jñānagarbha）即將法稱認識論中的意現量理論當作是現量與比量兩者之中介結構（Stcherbatsky 1958 (1932): 315），吳汝鈞（2009: 94-5）甚至說有點雷同於康德「判斷」（Urteil）此一概念。當然我們知道法稱認識論中五根現量生取境之自相在前，而意現量生取境之自相於五根現量在後這種休謨式的認識模型，判斷便成一種兩個獨立運作的認識機能之間的中介程序成為一個不得不的詮釋，這我們在康德學於北美中分裂為Strawson-Paul Guyer等一路傾向於超越實在論立場（切除先驗觀念論）的康德詮釋，以及Allison（2004 (1983)）呼籲回歸Strawson之前、站在忠於康德自身的先驗觀念論立場的詮釋，認為知性與感性的區別並非存有上的區別，而是同一認識能力的兩個不同特質（或面向），進而將Straswson-Guyer路線上不得不提出現象與智之間構成斷裂需要彌補這樣的結論批評為多此一舉，如出一徹。

既然康德自己在《純理批判》中特別澄清其自身並非超越實在論者（承認認識對象超越於認識而存在）故非理性主義中的懷疑論者（如笛卡爾和伯克利）那樣不承認感性之確實，而將自己限縮為有條件的（經驗）實在論者以及無條件的（先驗）觀念論者。Allison的「defense」合情合理。又康德自己說《判斷》是理論理性（認識）與實踐理性之間的橋樑，我們轉而看向《判斷》。

「美作為道德的象徵」在Allison（2001: 195-270）從審美之先天原則的觀點，即從「反省」（知性與想像之自由關係，即先天合目的性）審視下，自然到自由，感性到智性的過渡得以顯現。就連Guyer（1998: 338-55）也認為美的分析展現的自我立法能力為《第一批判》中所指積極自由，而崇高的分析展現的是人能從自然中掙脫的同上出處所指相對的消極自由，在《判斷》中自由之理論得以完整，故能承理論理性批判之結論（自由既合於知性型式且不違反感性型式）而發動實踐理性批判之實證（Proof; Faktum der Vernunft）。此處不進入細緻討論，先引出兩個觀點：其一，反省能力，在美學中因為美感作為先天情感因其必然性而證明了其先天原則為真，即知性與感性的匹配方式除了在認知中的固定模式與在實踐中的命令模式之外，不固定的匹配模式為實，而這展現於審美經驗中，每個人得以跳脫自然人的因果、利害關係脈絡，從自由人，也就是設想人之為人站在此一個別審美判斷情境前的必然判斷型式：自由聯想（任何人只要處在同一情境中必然作此同一判斷）；在道德情境中，這反省能力正是我們賴以能以自由人之角色聽見良知命令，而不是只有從自然人角度固定地朝向因果與利害之牽引，所謂「普遍性方法」。是以，康德（KU 42: 298-99）會說能夠在自然或者藝術當中發現美的人，必然有著良善（道德）的稟賦（guter moralisher Charakter）；人在自然當中對美的直接興趣是「智性的」且總伴隨著「直觀與反省」（ibid.）。當我們在享受自然中夜鶯的歌聲時，那種鼓舞中「含著一種自然賦予我們的語言，卻具有更高的意義」（ibid.: 302）。康德強調，那種良善的稟賦就是道德氣質（moralishe Gesinnung）的稟賦（ibid.: 300-1）。那麼，若非將判斷能力所涉之知性與感性設想為相互獨立而非三種關係範疇中任一者的關係，我們該怎麼設想？或者說，如何看作知性與感性實際上是同一認識能力的兩個不同性質（面向）？

其二，由於美感之中，感性是滿足的（愉悅），故要證明美感之所源（認知能力的智性運用，即自由聯想）較難以釐清，因為美感同樣是滿足的（愉悅）。在崇高中，感性是不滿足的（痛苦），因為所感受之對象或在量上（空間大小上）或在質上（強度大小上）超越感性能力所能處理，而在那當下，我們的判斷仍然以「崇高」的愉悅型式被我們經驗，這更方便於凸顯出審美能力的先天與超越性，也就是說我們確有一種先天情感不是出自於認識能力之經驗性的生產，判斷能力本質上的智性乃為先天，於崇高感中得證。是以康德會說，在崇高中，要說我們是對認知能力所不及的對象產生敬畏感，毋寧說是我們的理性仍然得以要求判斷力對該超越我們認識能力之對象仍加以智性地完整認知，並在這種崇高感中產生自信（自我敬畏）。再細細思索，在美之中，不論感官上我們滿足與否、不論在目的上（包含科技與道德目的）我們滿足與否，只要我們的想像能力超越知性範疇的理解，也就是只要當下（特定時間空間中）具體的感性對象可以被任何置換的知性對象比附，我們就能對該對象產生先天的智性情感。同樣地，在崇高中，感官上的自卑卻仍不阻撓我們對該對象的完整賞析，我們不會如同電腦一樣，一旦因為運算負荷過重而導致運算能力直接當機失去意識，我們仍舊振奮（put it together）並且體會到對方遠較於自我偉大。在這之中我們體會到了我們自身的尊嚴，超出認知負荷的同時，我仍然意識完整，這個世界仍未崩塌；我同時知道我的認識是有限的且同時知道我並這個世界是無限的。這在在顯示，在認知應用之外，更基本的是判斷之本質，康德所稱「認知一般」（Erkenntnis Überhaupt），在想像依據知性之範疇內理結構的特定組合方式產生感性經驗之外，更基本的是感性本身就與範疇內理結構一致。這正是判斷力的合目的性，是判斷的本質，我們賴以於意識中「自我省察」。一旦我們賦予合目的性目的，我們便能行科技實踐（假言命令）與道德實踐（絕對命令），這是，《判斷力批判》後半目的論的主題；而前半部的主題，則是確定未帶目的的合目的性，為判斷（也就是認知能力本身）的先天型式與原則，正所謂「認知一般」的意義。


4.
生成對抗網路（GANs, generative adversarial networks）是目前主流AI專家認為最具潛力的非監督式機器學習理論，卷積網路（CNNs, convolutional neural networks）之父Yann LeCun於2016年的一場公開研討會中稱讚這是機器學習發展二十年來最酷的創意。該理論與實作由Ian J. Goodfellow等（2014）提出，原先用於利用機器學習創作藝術作品的應用中，參考知性與想像力對陣的「鑒賞能力」想像，以一組生成網路構想創新的時空表現形相，再同時以一組判別網路解讀、依照某原則（可以為既有原則如某藝術風格，也可以為機器學習生成原則）批評生成網路構想出的形象，在拮抗中產生有別於以往的機器學習無法符合圖靈測試的窘境，我們參考一下維基百科上的說明：「生成對抗網絡由一個生成網絡與一個判別網絡組成。生成網絡從潛在空間（latent space）中隨機取樣作為輸入，其輸出結果需要盡量模仿訓練集中的真實樣本。判別網絡的輸入則為真實樣本或生成網絡的輸出，其目的是將生成網絡的輸出從真實樣本中盡可能分辨出來。而生成網絡則要盡可能地欺騙判別網絡。兩個網絡相互對抗、不斷調整參數，最終目的是使判別網絡無法判斷生成網絡的輸出結果是否真實。」NVIDIA公司在「A Style-Based Generator Architecture for Generative Adversarial Networks」, https://youtu.be/kSLJriaOumA, cited 2020.12.28）中，以既有人臉圖像創生出新的同一人人臉圖像而能不被機器或者真人判斷為是機器創作的，或者同公司擅長以特殊音樂風格改編同一旋律而不被機器或者真人判斷為機器創作，抑或是依據某獨特風格畫家創作風格創作出新的畫作而不被機器或者真人判斷為機器創作。倘若我們能描繪出何以判斷不是由兩組獨立的networks在時間中對抗，而是在想像產生之中的不自然關係裡，同一network的同時多層次功能，或許對於當今機器學習的瓶頸—反省能力以及我們意識的自主自律--的突破，能夠有所貢獻。

Scott Phoenix 在紀錄片《AI, Your New Brain》（Tao Favre, 2017）中提及，當前的機器學習技術如同尚未發展到新腦前的舊腦，沒有哺乳類新腦中前額葉新皮質（cortex）部分掌管反省的功能，只是很基本、深度的刺激反應，在長時間中的制約形成狀似遵從規則的行為樣態；而新腦中反省能力彰顯在於我們在反省中依據因果等關係的推理以及心理模擬（想像），讓哺乳動物在單純物理原則（即自然因果關係）之外發展出基於物理原則但卻看似自由的行為模式（跳脫處境並預估發展，以及對脈絡之合理性之感受），這正是GAN的目標。

5.
回到在世與出世，在世的（廣義）腦與出世的（廣義）腦是同一（廣義）腦；在世的我與出世的我是同一我；在世的世界與出世的世界還是同一個世界。只是，除了以上理論性的分析之外，我們還能怎樣談論？《論語．泰伯》中曾子曰：「人之將死，其言也善」一語成為古諺。為何人之將死，其言也善呢？反省既為我們意識之中不可分割的一部分，不論是未知生死的我還是人之將死的我，自由狀態中的反省總是常態。不過，在我們年輕氣盛，貢高我慢的時候，我們將生命的力量集中在特定的意識形態之中，對於某些於感官的抑或是於目的的滿足著迷，故而欲求某些特定規則（假言命令），在這些意識形態的包裝中，認識的結果就是我們全部的世界，既脫離自然世界的現實，也脫離智性的理想，而這些包裝，正是中觀所謂的世俗言說活動，或者唯識的染污識，或者康德所稱的「先驗妄想」（Transzendentalen Paralogismen）與「惡的傾向」（Neigung），作為特定認識結果之認知被我們所意識並在慾望中採用其假言規則，執著為如同世界本身一般實在，並欲求之。當人在將死之際，已經沒有力氣去執著與包裝的時候，不得不讓真正的反省現前，我們才在純粹的反省中見識到超越認識能力的世界與純粹靈魂自身，以及那些因為包裝被拆穿之後依舊常在的良心的譴責，還有時不我與無力回天的遺憾。反觀，倘若我們能在尚有力氣包裝時就揚棄自然人認識活動中的包裝，以自由人的正知正見去令自然人隨緣消業，在任何當下不論結果令人滿意或不滿意，發心即功德圓滿，有如將死之人一般，則我們早已了然於心的真相（世界本身）與良知（純粹靈魂）或可穿透認知的包裝顯現在純粹的反省之中，讓我們及早避免後悔卻來不及的遺憾。



Bibliography:

吳汝鈞（2009）。〈陳那的知識論研究〉。《正觀雜誌》第49期，第55-135頁。

法尊法師（1980s）。《陳那集量論略解》。See https://cbetaonline.dila.edu.tw/zh/B0040_001
(cited 2020.12.28).

Allison, Henry E. (2004 (1983)). Kant's Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Favre, Tao (2017). AI, Your New Brain. AB Productions. See https://youtu.be/cJUf-0J-o8I?t=2697 (cited 2020.12.28).

Goodfellow, Ian J.; Pouget-Abadie, Jean; Mirza, Mehdi; Xu, Bing; Warde-Farley, David; Ozair, Sherjil; Courville, Aaron; Bengio, Yoshua (2014). “Generative Adversarial Networks”. https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.2661 (cited 2020.12.28). Also see Goodfellow, Ian J. (2016). “Introduction to GANs, NIPS 2016 | Ian Goodfellow, OpenAI” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9JpdAg6uMXs (cited 2020.12.28).

Guyer, Paul (1998). “The Symbols of Freedom in Kant's Aesthetics” in Kant's Aesthetics. L'Esthétique de Kant. Ed. by Herman Parret. Berlin & New York: de Gruyter.

Hattori, Masaaki (1968). Dignāga, on Perception. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University.

Kant, Immanuel (1962 (1790)). Kritik der Urteilskraft in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, reprinted by Walter de Gruyter in 1902.

LeCun ,Yann (2016). “RI Seminar: Yann LeCun : The Next Frontier in AI: Unsupervised Learning.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IbjF5VjniVE (cited 2020.12.28).

Stcherbatsky, TH. (1958 (1932)). Buddhist Logic. Netherlands: Mouton & Co.,-Printers, the Hague.]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Thu, 31 Dec 2020 00:37:30 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,29234,29234#msg-29234 吾入定觀察，欲釋深經，心期正覺，非願無學果也 ...《大唐西域記卷十》 (1 reply) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,29234,29234#msg-29234
《大唐西域記卷十》三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯，大總持寺沙門辯機撰（CBETA全文）

T51n2087_p0930b05(00)║瓶耆羅城側不遠有大伽藍，重閣層臺，
T51n2087_p0930b06(02)║製窮剞劂，佛像聖容，麗極工思。
T51n2087_p0930b07(06)║伽藍前有石窣堵波，高數百尺，
T51n2087_p0930b08(15)║並阿折羅(唐言所行)阿羅漢之所建也。
T51n2087_p0930b09(00)║所行羅漢伽藍西南不遠有窣堵波，
T51n2087_p0930b10(03)║無憂王之所建也，如來在昔於此說法，現大神通，
T51n2087_p0930b11(00)║度無量眾。
T51n2087_p0930b12(00)║所行羅漢伽藍西南行二十餘里，至孤山，
T51n2087_p0930b13(01)║山嶺有石窣堵波，陳那(唐言授)菩薩於此作
T51n2087_p0930b14(02)║《因明論》。　陳那菩薩者，佛去世後，承風染衣。
T51n2087_p0930b15(01)║智願廣大，慧力深固，愍世無依，思弘聖教。
T51n2087_p0930b16(01)║以為因明之論，言深理廣，學者虛功，
T51n2087_p0930b17(03)║難以成業，乃匿跡幽巖，[打-丁+西]神寂定，
T51n2087_p0930b18(05)║觀述作之利害，審文義之繁約。是時崖谷震響，
T51n2087_p0930b19(03)║煙雲變釆，山神捧菩薩高數百尺，唱如是言：
T51n2087_p0930b20(02)║「昔佛世尊善權導物，以慈悲心，說《因明論》，
T51n2087_p0930b21(01)║綜括妙理，深究微言。如來寂滅，大義泯絕。今者，
T51n2087_p0930b22(00)║陳那菩薩福智悠遠，深達聖旨，因明之論，
T51n2087_p0930b23(01)║重弘茲日。」菩薩乃放大光明，照燭幽昧。
T51n2087_p0930b24(02)║時此國王深生尊敬，見此光明相，疑入金剛定，
T51n2087_p0930b25(00)║因請菩薩證無生果。陳那曰：「吾入定觀察，
T51n2087_p0930b26(00)║欲釋深經，心期正覺，非願無生果也。」
T51n2087_p0930b27(01)║王曰：「無生之果，眾聖欣仰，斷三界欲，
T51n2087_p0930b28(03)║洞三明智，斯盛事也，願疾證之。」
T51n2087_p0930b29(07)║陳那是時心悅王請，方欲證受無學聖果。
T51n2087_p0930c01(07)║時妙吉祥菩薩知而惜焉，欲相警誡，乃彈指悟之，而告曰：
T51n2087_p0930c02(02)║「惜哉！如何捨廣大心，為狹劣志，從獨善之懷，
T51n2087_p0930c03(00)║棄兼濟之願？欲為善利，
T51n2087_p0930c04(07)║當廣傳說慈氏菩薩所製《瑜伽師地論》，導誘後學，為利甚大。」
T51n2087_p0930c05(00)║陳那菩薩敬受指誨，奉以周旋。
T51n2087_p0930c06(03)║於是覃思沈研，廣因明論。
T51n2087_p0930c07(09)║猶恐學者懼其文微辭約也，乃舉其大義，綜其微言，作《因門論》，
T51n2087_p0930c08(01)║以導後進。自茲已後，宣暢瑜伽，盛業門人，
T51n2087_p0930c09(00)║有知當世。]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Wed, 16 Jan 2013 11:12:30 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,24800,24800#msg-24800 Chun-Ying WANG: Between the Given and the Thought: Introducing the Introduction of Dan Arnold's《Brains, Buddhas, and Believing》 (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,24800,24800#msg-24800
(In progress, please do not cite any part of the short essay)

Questions in focus:
◎ Can Buddhism be naturalized? Can the “experience” in the regard of some transcendent point of view be explained and examined by science? Mind is after all empirical-only or there is something rational (or logical, transcendental, conceptual, or linguistic) about it?
◎ Is the idea of selfless in Buddhism compatible with contemporary physicalists, that all metal events or states is only under (natural) causal laws and then reducible to activities in the physical world? With the theory of rebirth, Buddhism is than never totally agree with physcialism? However, can the claim that only those entering some causal relations can be counted as something real, which commonly admitted by Dharmakīrti and one physicalist represetative Fodor, survive the challenge raised by some like Sellars who urges for “logical space of reason,”or by Mimansakas and Madhyamakas who urge for the independence of the linguistic-related mental elements that cannot be reduced to causal laws? Dharmakīrti's own theory of “intentional level of description” and “the necessary first-person point of view” can help here?
◎ The referentiality of intention, as a mental activity, (the relation between the mental aboutness and the directed of the aboutness) is after all simply causal – as physicalists and Dharmakīrti wants it, or is constitutive?
◎I believe that... How to treat “belief”? The attitude of intentionality is different from its content, and this is about the question of ontology: is everything only normative, as Dharmakīrti wants it, that something is true because I or we believe it to be true? When I believe that it is raining, is it true that it is raining outside, given I believe it or not? When I believe that nothing has self-nature, is it true that nothing has self-nature, given I believe it or not? Perhaps language has its own external, even individual objectivity (Mimansakas)? Not only intention, but also intension.


I. Between the given and the thought – the birth place of all puzzles

Dignāga says at the very beginning of his 《Pramānasamuccaya》 that because there are the particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), we establish two (and only two) pramānas, namely, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). The seeming simple lines stirs up exactly all the puzzles we will discuss in this field. Kant as well addresses at the beginning of his 《First Critique》 that: “In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us. This again is only possible, to man at least, in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects , is entitled sensibility. Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts. But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain characters (marks, Merkmale; transcendental categories I would say), relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in not other way can an object be given to us”(A19/B33; Kemp Smith's English translation).


II. Kantian in the North America and analystic philosophy: Sellars's “logical space of reason1”and McDowell's following-up

Sellars, Wilfrid（1912-1989）believes that thought is “inner speech”and he tries to avoid his so-called “the mythical given”(the given knowledge does not demand for a correspondent, reasonable cognitive capacity). He claims that all of the intentional activities of human beings take place only in a “logical space of reason,” which is the source verifying and being able to verify one's discourse of inference, and any known “attributions” only has their states in the space, including those in cognitive activities, speech acts, and the truth in the sense of this circumstance (such as we can agree with the authority possessed by some experts with regard to their description about the observation of the world). With this, Selalrs fights against any kind of “foundationalism” that bases cognition and theories of cognition in some mythical given (footnote 1). In other words, Sellars's opinion is similar with Kant's claim that human being's rational response to sensible experience is not a response of judgment; on the contrary, reason has to be operative directly in the experience and becomes part of the condition of experience.

McDowell once gives an example2：suppose A sees a cardinal, but A never learns about the cardinal, and A may be even in no possession of a concept of it, nor any related understandings. At the same occasion, B also sees the cardinal, and B recognizes that this is a cardinal. If we only think about the visual experience, the awareness of A and B in that occasion may not be different, but B's experience allows or inclines him to say “this is a cardinal”, while A's does not. The examples tries to indicate that: (1) the specification or attributions people address to a described object are somehow *really and *non-inferentially accepted as (part of) their knowledge, but (2) these specified attributions does not belong to the real, non-inferential experience, while (3) these specifiable and expressible contents indeed belongs to the capacity of cognition. The element of the capacity of cognition that does not yield direct experience but allows for specification and description dwells in “the logical space of reason” of Sellars in McDowell's understanding. These points means ot us here that: (1) the content that is to be described does not have its state in the direct experience, or otherwise it would not be impossible for A to address “this is a cardinal” in his experience; furthermore, (2) direct experience cannot be propositional, but the other kind; hence, (3) we have to accept two different kinds or sources of knowledge. And if we are with Sellars with regard to the persistence of correspondent, reasonable capacities, and both direct and indirect experience are possible only through cognitive capacity, then some kind of internalism that urges for the rejection of any form or states of “the thing in itself” no matter with direct experience or indirect experience. To reterm this in Buddhism, both the direct and the indirect experience do not have any kind of self-nature independent of the cognition, and no direct experience is not involved with prapanca (language). In this sense, Buddhism is not mythical.


III. The plan of the book
In Arnold's article “Is Svasamvitti Transcendental?” published in《Asian Philosophy》, 2005 , he puts two lines of history of philosophy together: (1) Kant – German idealism – north American Kant Studies and (2) Dignāga – Dharmakīrti – Madhaymika. He thinks, the post-Kantian development in German idealism is in favor of a more individualism that prefers simple idealism, while a more realistic feedback in the North America seems to summon up a “constitutive” understanding of Kant's transcendental theory that is believed by him to be more Kantian. On the other side, the post-Dignāga Dharmakīrti accepts Dignāga's theory of self-awareness as something like a perceptual subject or inner psychological focus, while Candarkīrti (Madhaymaka)'s critics (the endless regress of self-awareness) accelerates the later development in Santaraksita's correction of Dignāga theory of self-awareness with the idea of “condition” rather than “perception.”

In his article “Self-awareness and Subjectivity in Buddhist Philosophy”published in 《Indian Philosophy》, 2010, Arnold tries to decide Dignāga's theory of self-awareness between Paul Williams' perceptual model and constitutive model. By reviewing the development of the tradition, he suggest that there is a direction from the perceptual model reading going to the constitutive model reading. By ruling out perceptual model, Arnold places Dharmakīrti's “necessity of the first-person perspective”under the constitutive model and by introducing a Shaivis, Rāmakaṇṭa, as well as the intensity between phenomenology and Kant, he deepens the discussion about the constitutive reading of self-awareness.

In the present book, Arnold focuses on Dharmakīrti, and group him with contemporary physicalist such as Fodor when mentioning that they both claim “only things entering some causal relations can be counted as real” on the one hand, and group him with rational cognitivist like Sellars when mentioning that they both urge for the rational part of intentionality. His strategy shows the complexity in both Dharmakīrti and in the questions related. We do not have to take these classification of Dharmakīrti seriously, or how he positions some of the philosophical systems mentioned. By integrating the accounts and questions, he just put the traditions on similar issues at different time and space into a single forum. Besides, we should also notice that the main role of the book is Dharmakīrti, and we have to keep an awareness of the difference between Dharmakīrti and Dignāga.

Dharmakīrti is a epistemic idealist in Yogacara school. He thinks everything we get aware of has not ontological value. To him, they are all mental events, and they are mentally real, sothing causally effective at the level of cognition (p.11, middle paragraph).

The problem is, how the universal gets its relation to the particular? Dharmakīrti develops his apoha (exclusion) theory that the meaning of cognition becomes clearer and more certain when the more specific concept is obtained by excluding the others from a broader concept. For this, Dharmakīrti claims that the meaning of the universals must sourced from the particular in sensibility; more importantly, only the clear and certain meaning of cognition is “real” (p.10).

Fodor's intentional realism: in《Propositional Attitudes》 (1978), Fodor urges that mental states are just mental, individual representations. In 《A Theory of Content and Other Essays》 (1990), he criticizes standard realism, such as Dianiel Dennett, who claims that we can admit the realty fo mental state without having to admit the reality of mental representations. Fordor urges that we must accept the reality of the perceptual, linguistic as well thinking operations codified in the brain, as we accept the reality of the mind and brain. Similar to Searle's idea: thinking as the real function of brain is as real as the digestion of the digestion organs. Arnold is aware that Dharmakīrti would not agree that cognition is just the function of brain, but he thinks both Dharmakīrti and Fordor are looking for the source of reality inside the mind, in the causal relations between the particular (perceptual mental pieces) and treating it as the basis explaining the abstract.

Arnold claims, the project in front of both Dharmakīrti and Fordor is a project to non-intentionalize the intentionality (p.11, last paragraph). When what is real is no longer the object of intention but is the intention itself, first, intention does not obtain meaning because of the object (it is then the case that intention itself is intelligible, i.e., meaning is in intention – self-awareness), and, second, intention is no longer about something else, but yielding intelligence, and cognition, by itself. Arnold also thinks the realization of intentionality conforms to some fundamental principles or objectives of the contemporary “naturalization of intentionality.” Such attitude puts cognition to be a kind of subjective, psychological and empirical states, which by excluding some abstract elements and further specifying, to some degree, certain and causally effective mental states, from which real meaning is yielded.

But, if it is the case that the meaning origins from such “real” mental states or events, then where does the universal which by its nature does not belong to the particular mental states or events, come from? As questioned by his opponents, that which can be directly known via the apoha (exlusion) is only in reference to the universals, and no particular is involved (p.12, top paragraph), while the story that we are capable of ascertain some specific concept by exclusion with the help of the basis of some particular mental events, cannot explain all about the intention (last paragraph, p.12). It seems reasonable to claim, as Mimansakas wants to urge, that language cannot be reduced to empirical psychology, and a separate condition for this is necessary-- not touching yet whether that condition is the Vedas or something else. Neither the concept that “causes” a moral practice in Kant's practical reason, nor the logical space of reason raised by Sellars and McDowell seem to be able to be reduced to a particular basis.

Besides, the separation of ultimate truth and conventional truth made by Madhyamakas, and their believing the world to be, after all, an “irreducible conventional”are read by Arnold as an urge similar to Mimansakas that persists in the necessity of a individual condition of mind for linguistic mental elements. They both, to Arnold, reject naturalizing intentionality. Besides, Dharmakīrti spends pages on “the necessity of the first-person perspective” and the “intentional level of description,” using a strategy like Kant's in 《Second Critique》 to deal with the issue from the perspective of morality (one universal as the cause and its result in real action). This is the topic of the sixth chapter of the book.


(In progress, please do not cite any part of the short essay)]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Wed, 12 Sep 2012 15:57:32 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,24799,24799#msg-24799 汪純瑩：所與與所思之間：關於 Dan Arnold《Brains, Buddhas, and Believing》之「導論」 (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,24799,24799#msg-24799
（In progress，請勿引用）

本書關注的問題：
◎佛教可被自然化嗎？「超越觀點下的經驗」能被「科學」驗證嗎？心靈到底來說是經驗的，或者是理性的（或邏輯的、超越的、概念的）？
◎無我觀，是否相容於物理觀~一切心靈活動都只是可受因果律制約、可被化約到物理世界之中的活動？轉世理論，令佛教絕不可能與物理論相容？然而，同樣都主張「唯有能進入因果關係之內的東西到底來說才是真的」的法稱與當代物理論者如Fodor來說，如何回應意向論者如Sellars、彌曼莎以及中觀派提出的挑戰：涉及語言的心靈活動，無法被化約到物理經驗裡面？在這個意義下，法稱的「描述的意向層次」與「必要的第一人稱觀點」相關主張又代表什麼樣的知識觀。
◎意向，作為一種心靈活動，其具有之指涉關係（心靈關注與所關注之對象之間），是個因果關係~物理論者＆法稱，還是其他~所謂建構式的指涉關係？
◎I believe that... 如何看待「相信/信仰」～意向性在「態度」上有別於「內容」引起了存有論問題：一切唯名嗎（法稱）？當我相信現在正在下雨，那是否不管我相不相信，外面在下雨是個獨立存在的事實？那當我相信一切法空，是否不管我相不相信，事實上的確是一切法空？或者名言有其外在、甚至獨立的客觀性（彌曼莎）？Not only intention, but also intension.


一、所與與所思之間—所有問題的開端。
陳那《集量論》一開始說：「因為有自相與共相，所以立現量與比量」。這看似簡簡單單的陳述，正是所有問題的開端。康德《純理批判》也是披頭就說：「一種知識不論以哪一種方式、透過哪一種工具而與對象有關，直接與它們（這些對象）相關的，且為一切思維作為工具所指向，就是直觀。但直觀只可能發生在某對象被給與於我們的情況下；而這，至少就人類來說，只可能發生在心靈以某種特定方式被影響的時候。這個通過我們被對象所影響而收受表象（representation）的能力，即，感受力，我稱作「感性」。對象通過感性被給與於我們，而感性單獨地產出我們的直觀；他們（直觀）被知性所思維，而從知性產生概念。但是一切思維一定都直接或間接地通過一些特定標誌（案，先驗範疇）究竟地與直觀相關聯，從而，對我們（人類）來說，與感性相關，這是因為除此之外，沒有其他方式對象可以被給與於我們。」（A19/B33）

二、北美康德學/分析心靈哲學的脈絡：Sellars的「logical space of reason1」與McDowell的闡揚

Sellars, Wilfrid（1912-1989）主張思維是一種「inner speech」，並極力抨擊所謂的「謎樣的所與」這樣的迷思（這種所與並不要求一個與之相對應的、合理的認識能力），他主張，所有人類的意向（intentionality）活動全都發生在一個「理性空間」裡，這個空間意指一種「證成或者能證成一個人所言說的空間」，任何attributions知識只有在這裡面有其狀態，包含一般認識活動、語言活動以及在這些溝通意義底下的真理（如我們可以去許可某些人對於某些世界觀察的描述具有評判的權威性）等等，並就此反對所思以某種神秘的所與為基礎的認識理論的基礎主義（同註1）。換言之，Sellars意見類似康德所主張的，人類對感性經驗的理性判斷不是一種只在判斷裡對該經驗的一種反應（response），反而理性的運作是直接在經驗裡面，成為經驗之所以如此成為可能的必要條件之一部分。

McDowell 給過一個例子2：A見到一隻北美紅雀，但A本身從沒學過什麼是北美紅雀，甚至可能完全沒有這個「北美紅雀」概念，也沒有相關的理解。在同一情況，B也見到了同一隻北美紅雀，而B也認出來了這是北美紅雀。單單就視覺經驗來說，A與B的覺察沒有什麼差別，但是，B的經驗會促使他說「這是隻北美紅雀」，但A類似的經驗卻不可能促使他說「這是隻北美紅雀」。這個例子要顯示的是：（1）人們對經驗的描述裡那些對被描述對象的特定規格、屬性一方面是在那個經驗裡面被「*實際」且「*非推論地」接收為知識，但是（2）該些被描述的特定規格或屬性卻不屬於那個實際的非推論經驗，然而同時（3）這些可以被辨認出並且可以進一步以言說去描述為某些特定屬性或規格的內涵，確是屬於認識能力的。那個不同於直接經驗，而令人類描述成為可能（並令描述成為可被證成的）的範圍，是McDowell所理解的 Sellars的「理性邏輯空間」。對我們這裡來說的意義是：（1）可被描述的內容不本然地存於直接經驗，否則A不會在其經驗中不可能說出「這是隻北美紅雀」；進一步來說，（2）直接經驗的內容不可以是propositional，而應該是另外一類；因此，（3）我們必須接受兩種不同的認識能力。而，若直接經驗與間接經驗都是通過認識能力而成為可能，則某種「內在主義」，也就是說不論是直接經驗或者間接經驗都不具有「物自身」的狀態或形式，換用佛教的術語來說，不論直接經驗與間接經驗，都不包含某種（不依附於認識能力）獨立的自性，也沒有任何直接經驗不涉有假名戲論。在這個意義上，佛教並不是一種神秘主義。


三、本書架構與企圖
在Arnold 2005年發表於《Asian Philosophy》的文章（Is Svasamvitti Transcendental?）裡，Arnold並陳兩條他以為平行的哲學史的發展路線：（1）康德-德國觀念論-北美康德學；（2）陳那-法稱-中觀，後康德的德國觀念論發展以一種傾向於個人主義式或傾向單純觀念論的發展，在進入北美學界傾向於實在論或物理主義的反動之後，似乎比較回歸康德的「條件論式」先驗理論；與此對比的，是後陳那的法稱傳承，也傾向於主體主義或單純觀念論，以至於陳那的自證理論被接受為一種類似「絕對主體」的系統產物，而這為中觀派月稱所批判（自證之無窮後退），這個反動促使寂護（Santaraksita）不約而同地往「條件論式」與「意向性」方向修正陳那的自證理論。

在 Arnold 2010年發表於《Indian Philosophy》的文章（Self-awareness and Subjectivity in Buddhist Philosophy），他以Paul Williams兩種模型「感知式模型」與「建構式模型」來回顧陳那思想的傳承，建議歷史上的發展，是從感知式的理解朝向建構式的理解，Arnold也從perceptual model與constitutive model之間排除了前者，而將法稱的「第一人稱視角的必要性」單純置於constitutive model框架下看待。就此，展開佛教學者法稱v.s.濕婆教學者Rāmakaṇṭa，以及現象學v.s.康德先驗論的爭議脈絡，深化constitutive model的討論。

在這本書裡面，Arnold以法稱為中心，一方面，以強調「能進入因果關係的事物才能是事實」而將法稱與當代北美物理論者或自然論者如Fodor相提並論，另一方面，以強調認識活動（意向活動）在「事實」上面所扮演的必要角色，而又將法稱與理性認知論者如Sellars相提並論，這一方面要去凸顯出法稱思想本身的複雜，另外一方面，也是凸顯了這些問題本身，就不是很容易整理得乾乾淨淨的。我們的解讀，不太需要去猜測Arnold是否要將法稱歸作哪個社群，或者他要怎麼給這些談論到的思想體系如何的定位，用我之前說過的說法，他不過是利用問題統整的方式，將這些不同時、地但關注相關議題的哲學傳統，放到同一個論壇裡面去了。此外，我們也應該注意到，這本書的主角是法稱，而法稱與陳那思想的差異，我們必須帶有意識。

法稱是瑜伽行派的「知識論式觀念論」者，一切為我們所察覺的都不具有存有論價值，而都只是「心靈事件」，是心靈的實在，是在認識層次上有因果效力特定心靈事件（p.11中間）。

問題是，共相如何與自相有關？透過apoha理論，從越廣泛的概念排除而鎖定更局部的概念，認識意義才越發明晰與確定，這令法稱主張，唯有從感官當中的「特定」，「普遍」才有意義來源；更重要的是，明晰與確定的認識意義，才是「實在的」（p.10）。

Fodor的意象實在論：《Propositional Attitudes》 (1978)，Fodor主張心靈狀態不過就是心靈的、單獨的表象，《A Theory of Content and Other Essays》 (1990) ，透過批判標準實在論（Standard Realism）者，如Daniel Dennett（主張我們不需要承認心靈表象的實在仍能主張心靈狀態的實在），呼籲我們必須接受包含心靈、腦為實在，語言、思考與感官的運作同樣為編碼在腦神經裡面的實在，例如 Searle 的例子：思考作為腦的功能是真實的，如同消化是消化器官的功能一般。Arnold知道法稱不會同意認識單單為腦功能而已，但他以為法稱與Fodor都在「存乎於內」的「自相」之間的因果關係中找尋「實在」的來源，並為抽象提供解釋基礎（p.11）。

Arnold主張，對法稱與Fodor來說，正在進行的工程，就是把意向性非意向化（p.11，末段），當實在的不是意向所關乎的對象，而是意向本身時，一則意向本身並不因為關乎其對象而獲得意義（而是意向本身就具有智性，在意向當中即具有意義～自證理論），一則意向實質上並沒有在意向什麼，而是在產生智性--產生某種認識。Arnold認為，實在化意向，正是當前熱門的「自然化意向」的哲學工程主要的工作。而這樣的工作，使得認識成為一種在主觀心理的、經驗的狀態中，將某抽象概念排除、確定到某些「特定的」並具「因果效力」的心靈狀態，以產生實在的意義。

但，如果一切都以特定的心靈事件或狀態為意義來源，並且是「實在的」，那本質上不屬於「特定」心靈事件或狀態的「共相」一開始是從哪裡來的？誠如法稱被外道所質疑，排遣結果之所以能被直接知道，是因為它只牽涉到共相，不牽涉到自相（p.12首段），而光光憑著說人有能力以特定心靈事件為基礎，令從較廣泛的概念排除、確定到較局部的概念產生意義與解釋，並無法完整解釋意向（p.12末段）。類似彌曼莎學派堅持的，「語言」無法被化約到心靈的心理（經驗論式）事件裡，一種與語言相關的獨立的心靈條件是必須的，姑且不論那條件是吠陀或是其他。類似康德實踐理性所提供的行動理據（一個概念）或者Sellars-McDowell所稱的理性空間，沒辦法被化約到某個特定基礎當中。

另外，中觀的勝義諦與世俗諦之區別，以及這個世界終究是個「不可被化約的世俗」，被Arnold理解為與彌曼沙一樣，堅持「語言相關」的心靈條件是必須的，而反對「自然化意向性」。而法稱自己也為了解釋其「意向之必然」與「描述的意向層次」，採取了與康德《實踐理性批判》一樣的策略，從道德事件（一個共相因與一個行為果）進行處理（第六章）。

（In progress，請勿引用）]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Wed, 12 Sep 2012 15:56:30 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,17863,17863#msg-17863 智的直覺 - 導讀： Dan Arnold: “Self-Awareness (svasaṃvitti) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists” in Indian Philosophy (2010) 38: 323-78. (1 reply) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,17863,17863#msg-17863 Dan Arnold: “Self-Awareness (svasaṃvitti) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists” in Indian Philosophy (2010) 38: 323-78.

I.根源問題
II.陳那的自證理論
III.如何看待自證這個「東西」
IV.法稱的解套：自證的必要性，從Manorathanandin的法稱詮釋談起
V.自證的本質與結論



導讀人：汪純瑩（政大哲學研究所博士生）
政治大學研究大樓哲學基礎研究室 2011/11/12

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I. 根源問題


1.Dan Arnold 此文以當代英美分析哲學資源中的感知式（perceptual）自證模型與建構式（constitutive）自證模型探討意識，一方面回顧歐陸歷史上重要的意識哲學，並以此架構來對比理解Paul Williams（1998）建議的兩種理解佛教知識論中自證理論的方式：感知式模型的理解中，五識現量與意現量為前後兩階段的直觀感知經驗，其中的第二階段的直觀經驗，即意識直觀地取透過五識而得的外境，便為自證；建構模型不將自證或意識直觀理解為一種特殊的、優越的「認識」，而將之視為建構一般認識的必須要件（條件）。


2.與漢地初期現量理論（仁宥法師，TPA 2011）以及勝主智《集量論大疏》梵本所揭櫫的一致，Dan Arnold偕同Kellner（據Arnold所指出）也指出五識現量與意識現量是「俱起」或者「前後兩階段生起」是陳那自證理論論述傳統中的核心問題，但不論哪一個傾向的解讀，都同意一個大前提：「五識必然需要意識才能成為經驗」。
2.1.月稱（Candarkīrti）對陳那自證理論的批評中，指出：意識，不具有現量特性，但「直接」以五識與五識對象之間的「互動/作用」為「訊息」，換言之，五識不過是一種簡單的傳感器（simple transducers），直接提供訊息給意識「運作」。（Arnold P. 338）
2.2.法稱（Dharmakīrti）：不提「意現量」，只提「意識」[按，或許是接受了月稱批評]，認為意識乃由「前在」的五識所「直接」產出。（Arnold P. 340）
2.3.*智作慧（Prajñākaragupta）：唯有當前五識為意識所「實現」（Arnold, realize），「量」才真正可算作是「量」。（Arnold P. 340）
[這裡意涵的是：意現量的核心問題，涉及了何以現量既能是「認識上地具有意涵」而又同時為「非分別、非概念」這個衝突，衝突所在之處在於，「意涵」非得經由分別、概念構作才能成立。]
2.4.法上（Dharmottara）：只有當現量是在量果狀態時，才真正「成量」，而作為「未成量」的量時，其作用為「領受」感性經驗，當作為被實現的（Arnold, realized）量時，其作用為，針對前面所說「已領受」的材料，給出有認識意涵的判斷
[按，至此，法上已從前後兩階段論走向建構條件論]


3.Arnold：以上理論，皆跳過、或未正視陳那的「自證之為量果」的理論（Arnold P. 344），自證乃唯一的量，至少就現量來說。
[按，Arnold的意思，應該是說：就文獻證據來說，五識現量、意現量、瑜伽現量等等多種現量，都是未成量的量；真正的量，也是唯一的量，就是自證。但為何說「至少」，或許他想的是，就哲學系統性意義來說，就連現量、比量都必須在自證意義下才算做真正的量，那所謂自證為唯一的量，就不只在現量範圍內而言了。但因文獻證據不足，又哲學系統性論述尚缺，所以有所保留。]
[按，Arnold意圖在於顯現，從月稱至法上的詮釋，都不符合陳那原意，也就是說， Arnold反對二階段論的詮釋。但如何approach陳那的自證理論，或所謂的「建構式」模型理解下的自證理論，Arnold 採取了「現象學式」或者「意向論式」的解決，以自我意識的「自我指涉性質」（self-referentiality）的必要性，來超越前說。 ]


4.[我以為這與牟宗三先生「智的直覺」問題高度相關：何謂直覺？牟先生以「非識心感受自身」的「逆覺」來批評康德對智的直覺的反對（《現象與物自身》第三章），這涉及到的便是自證究竟是一感知，或是一「感知併認識」的建構條件）此一問題，而Arnold若在此研究中依舊保有其以康德先驗論來理解佛教量論的興趣，這個問題更值得在此帶出。（若後面有時間希望可以開展討論）]


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II. 陳那自證理論


1.陳那《集量論》第九頌的問題：依據勝主智的《大疏》，Arnold偕同與Kellner、Chu（如Arnold所指出）等認為，五俱意識（意識與五識共轉）在陳那的論辯脈絡中已是共識，境的「相」與自證的「相」的一致，才是陳那所要提出的爭議重點。
[特別值得注意的是，Arnold以「contentful具有意涵」來理解「自證」作為「境顯現/相分」與「自顯現/見分」之間的一致性，有別於Hattori（1968）與Chu（Diss. 1999）甚至是傳統漢譯「相分」將自證理解為帶相性（帶有form相的特性）以成就自顯現（見分）與境顯現（相分）之間「相的一致」（the conformity between the akara of the visya, i.e., artharūpa, in visyajñāna and the akara of “tatjñāna”, i.e., the jñāna of that jñāna, in anubhava, anubhavarūpa）有很大的差別，我以為Arnold的解法是已先行帶入現象學/意向論觀念的理解。盼後面有時間聽取大家意見]


2.在第九頌前，陳那先指出他不同意單純實在論者將「主體」獨立於「對象」，而指出自證既然必須一直伴隨著對象，且對所謂的「主體」來說自證是直接可親就（accessible），而他也提出「量真正的意涵在於使識具有對象的相，或按照Arnold，使識具有對象的意涵」（verse 9c-d），則以此可以駁斥單純實在論。
2.1.Shinya Moriyama：從第九頌到第十頌，有個詮釋上的歧異，他認為按瑜伽行派的理解，第十頌中的境顯現（相分）指的是識的對象；自顯現（見分）指的是量果/自證，而在九頌後半中，因為預設了外在境物的存在，於是令境顯現（相分）為量，反而不是令自顯現（見分）為量。
就Arnold對上述的理解，瑜伽行派理解中，境顯現（相分），即「認識之具有意涵」，亦即「認識之顯相（appearance）為x」這樣結構的特性）為所量，見分為量，而自證為量果。
Shinya Moriyama復指出，經量部解讀下，相分（瑜伽行派的所量）為量，而瑜伽行派的見分則完全不見了，據此，Moriyama認為經量部理論缺少了自證（論）的關鍵部份。
2.2.Arnold批評，陳那造論目的應該在於整合經量部與瑜伽行派的基本教條，故Moriyama的解讀方式令他存疑。


2.3.Arnold的提議：我們應該要正視陳那強調的「量即量果」，既然量即量果，則境顯現性（相分性）viṣayābhāsatā就該被理解為自證。

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III. 如何看待自證這個「東西」


1.Arnold引入他所謂「具非觀念論者傾向」的近代印度學者Bilgrami（2006）的自我意識理論
1.1.Bilgrami指出，自我意識不會是單純感知的（perceptual），因為感知令感知的對象（object）與其意涵（perceptual content about the object）相互獨立。
若自我意識是單純感知的，則自我意識之對象與其意涵則會相互獨立，這便與自我意識的意義與現況相悖～自我意識的感知性質不與自我意識本身相互獨立！
1.2.Arnold認為，因為Bilgrami的非觀念論立場，使他不會像佛教學者那樣直接否認外境，他轉而將認識與外在對象在本質上做出區分。據Arnold，Bilgrami認為，當感知以外在對象為對象時，這個對象與感知意涵是相互獨立的；然而，當感知以認識為對象，即在自我意識當中，則不是這麼一回事。正是在這樣的觀照下，Bilgrami說這樣的區分也解釋了為何陳那與法稱必須說：當我們論及外在對象的感知認識時，我們必須令認識不涉及外在對象，而僅涉及認識[的境顯現]本身。


2.Arnold駁斥Bilgrami的見解，他指出，陳那用以成立自證理論的不是感知模型，而是建構模型
2.1.「認識之具有意涵」[即Arnold所理解的境顯現]是在一感知認識中「建構地」為主體所知。
2.2.第一人稱之必然：我們的一切認識與經驗，都必須伴隨一個第一人稱視角，而這個第一人稱視角的意義，就是：當我們感知一對象時，就是認識到該感知帶有對象的意涵，即該感知具有意向性。
3.Arnold評論Bilgrami對陳那將外在對象的感知限制在自證範圍內的解釋是錯誤的，陳那之所以這麼做，正是因為所有外在對象的感知認識，都「必須」通過上述理解中的第一人稱的認識。
4.反過來說，具有觀念論傾向的佛教學者，不會認同Bilgrami所談論的「感知對象與感知意涵的分離（相互獨立）」，其理據一樣是「第一人稱的必然」，感知對象與感知意涵本已建構地在認識之中共存，哪裡有什麼分離。

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IV.法稱的解套：自證的必要性，從Manorathanandin的法稱詮釋談起


1.困難：自證「既然發生在某個偶然當中」，自證必有其「起因」，但這個起因卻無從察覺也無對象可言。
我們只能說，自證只取相（form of cognition）、或按Arnold的說法，自證只令感知具有對象的意涵，而且該相或者該意涵內在於識。


2.而這個「自證取相/自證具有意涵」是一個現象上的事實，既然不論是經量部或者瑜伽行派，自證的必然伴隨於一切認識必須被接受，主體取相/自證之具有意涵本身即為一種「領受apprehension」的條件：
即，當這個條件被滿足時，我們才說有領受這麼回事，
例如，當主體領受了某青色物而使領受的條件完滿[，即自證具有了青色物的認識形相/意涵]，我們說該認識者有了青色物的領受。
Arnold強調，這個領受的條件，就是該認識者對青色物的「感知」及「思維」的結合。[也就是我一直強調的現量與比量的直接交涉、意識之必然且直接伴隨五識認識、即意現量在陳那因明量論所佔的系統核心位置，或康德所謂的感性與知性的先驗統一。]


至此，Arnold說，我們必須接受，自證同時在邏輯上與認識上為基礎。[即康德的先天綜合所要成立的觀點]


3.Taber：法稱的「密不可分的一致性（identity of indiscernible）」
3.1.若無對於青色的覺察，則我們也無從思維起青色；
若無對於青色的覺察，我們也無從思維青色自身
因著這樣「覺察」的必然性，被認識的青色（自身）與對青色的認識，有一致的本質，據Arnold的理解，這兩者有同一的自性（svabhavā）
3.2.但，Taber強調，這個所謂的密不可分的一致性，不關聯於認識之外，而只就自證來說，因此並無任何外在的關聯，就此，法稱拒絕了「根境的觸為認識的起因這樣阿毘達磨的立場」。
3.3.然法稱認為自證本質上與覺察不同，覺察總關聯於一對象，而自證是一種內在的、反思性格的「智性」（Arnold, autonomous intelligible），因此認識總關於、或者說限制於現象世界[，而這個部份與Arnold另外帶入的situated theory所論一致。]
而藉由令自證為單純智性，法稱也解決了自證無窮後退的問題。
3.4.Arnold評論，Taber的法稱解讀下，我們也不能說我們所認識的是這個世界自身，我們事實上只認識到認識本身，外境存有不存有，對此理論的自我滿足毫無影響。


[但這個部份的談論，法稱是就瑜伽行派立場，針對一個假施設的瑜伽行派對辯者解釋的部份，能否以此為法稱的立場，或法稱的處理全貌為何，仍舊為一開放問題。]

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V. 自證的本質


前言：
回顧此文脈絡，Arnold利用現象學方法，從perceptual model與constitutive model之間排除了前者，而將法稱的「第一人稱視角的必要性」單純置於constitutive model框架下看待。就此，展開佛教學者法稱v.s.濕婆教學者Rāmakaṇṭa；現象學v.s.康德先驗論的爭議脈絡，深化constitutive model的討論。


1.Sacks（2005）以現象學立場挑戰康德：並非是我們所與生俱來的某特殊認知結構的「染汙」導致該第一人稱視角的必要性 [Sacks反對先驗論在現象脈絡外「另闢戰場」]；而是因為經驗必然就是帶有第一人稱視角，所以該經驗強行加入了這些相關的[認知]結構 [Sacks建議要在現象脈絡中研究）


1.Arnold解釋：
1.1.先驗推論本身不在現象內，Sacks所要強調的是：經驗就是帶有「現象學地被內建及被導向/意向（Sacks, directed）」這樣的特質；如同法稱說：我們只能也必須將任何事物認識為「第一人稱地被認識」
1.2.這樣的立場就不是先驗論立場，而只強調「非得如此」我的現象經驗才是現象經驗
1.3.按此看來，康德的「先驗統覺的統一」並不能、或不旨於點出經驗具有「現象的統一性格」，而在於勾勒出：若經驗果真必然地被概念所構作，則經驗就只能具有該現象的統一性格。        
[此理解下的先驗推論實際上跳過康德的先驗方法，只就先驗成素來談。這是未先釐清先驗成素（量）的「方法、權便」角色而先行投入先驗分析所獲得的結果，所能得到的理解。]
[例如，「非得如此」在先驗方法上即為推設先驗觀念的歸準與理據。]


2.Watson（2006）：Rāmakaṇṭa對佛教（法稱）自證理論的批評
2.1.Rāmakaṇṭa對法稱破壞性的挑戰，特別就法稱「識的剎那顯現性格」的認可來說。Arnold在此也正確地指出，就此議題，陳那將站在Rāmakaṇṭa這一邊，否定識的剎那顯現性格。[即，陳那比法稱還不現象學。]
2.2.Rāmakaṇṭa的「我論ātmavāda」有別於一般婆羅門理論，他反對將我的存有視為優越於識。他強調「我就是識consciousness」
Arnold：這令他加入了佛教學者的行列，一起破斥「我們意識片段的流轉是關聯於一個常住不變的我」這個立場。
2.3.Rāmakaṇṭa的智性本質的統覺者：他說，若如法稱所稱，識不只存在，還以剎那相「顯現」，則不只當下的識存在，前剎那已滅的統覺者，與後剎那未生的統覺者這兩種存有都該成立，但若我們現象學地/反思地自識[，即以識考察識]，這樣的說法根本make no 「sense」、在三時中根本都無該顯現的事實。
Arnold：故我們必須接受經驗在其帶有意涵的面向上具有「片段性episodic」，但一個同一的統覺者必須被接受，只是我們不能將這個同一的統覺者誤認為一種顯現[，而只有智性性格]。

2.4.Rāmakaṇṭa's quote (Arnold, P. 371, bottom)：「我們只意識到當下，而當下是諸片段中的一個。但在當下我們也意識到時間流，而時間流不在片段中發生。故，當下也不是個片段。」以此，Rāmakaṇṭa在Arnold的理解下，想要說得應該是：
2.4.1.經驗現象不是剎那生滅，而是一個「延展continuation」
2.4.2.佛教對手（法稱）對此應會回應：整體佛教修行計畫的目標，正旨於看破此一延展的非實在性，並從對其執著中解放出來。
2.4.3.兩造都集中在自我意識主體的「直接性」，但在「解釋」該現象上有分歧
2.4.4.陳那、法稱站在觀念論立場上，對他們來說，需要解釋的部份是：外在對象如何以外在對象的形式而存在[，即被認識到]
2.4.5.而Rāmakaṇṭa則旨於解釋，這(些)相關的、被加上的「結構」為何，而致使我們的現象經驗必須如此這般。
2.4.6.在Watson的解釋下，Rāmakaṇṭa對法稱、或者佛教的自證理論提出一個另類解讀：實際顯現的就是各個前後相續的意識片段，以及對該片段的統覺之同一 ，但因其相續間隔太過迅速[我則認為我們在此根本不能談及時間]，以至於我們妄執出一個相續、恆住的我。
2.4.7.Watson說：兩造的爭議便不落於意識本質為剎那顯現性或者延展性，而在於意識當中的自證性是svasaṃvadana（自我意識）還是vikalpa（概念、分別）。
2.4.8.Arnold的結論：如同本文一開始所引John McDowell對康德的批評：一方面，我們必須正視「意識的先驗條件」無法回答「意識是什麼？」這個問題，另一方面我們仍然未能確定「意識是什麼？」這個問題最終很有可能不會有、或不該有任何答案。
2.4.9.[然而一直到這裡，Arnold仍舊忽視了陳那那邊早已強調的重點，意根雖為分別根，但意作為一根，且正因著自證的（本文所謂的）「直接性」，即「堪為現量性」，意現量是必然可以成立的。而這「智性的直覺」本身就既是svasaṃvadana也是vikalpa（當專只就意現量/自證來說的話）。
問題在於，現象的直接經驗性質，與「純自證」的性質必須釐清，前者暫且容我們說是「在時間流裡面的空間經驗（空間經驗即外在經驗）」，後者為「純時間」但卻既無「片段」也「無流」可言，無顯相，僅有「直接性」，而我會認為這是自證的本質。若我們「現象學地在自我意識與反思當中以識考察識」（如Rāmakaṇṭa所強調的研究方法/觀法），這是我們唯一能說的一點。
另外還值得提到的點是，時間的延展性必須在空間當中（即有片段意識的經驗）的條件下才顯現為延展的，而在純時間中，亦無延展性可言。
若就這樣來說，若牟先生所言智的直覺是限縮在「感性形式」，則必須進一步釐清的是：有顯相與否，若牟先生的智的直覺是有顯相的直覺則我認為康德對智的直覺的反對略勝一籌，若無顯相，則他的思想與康德無異。（© gustav 2011/11/12）

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後記：Dan Arnold此文收錄在《Journal of Indian Philosophy》（(2010) 38,3）此一特刊（Special issue on 'Buddhist Theories of Self-awareness (svasamvedana) - Reception and Critique）中，該刊為2008年IABS會議中由Birgit Kellner女士主持之小組討論的後續發展，Arnold此文為針對本刊所輯文章的總回應與評顧。

若對Dan Arnold本文中涉及John McDowell, Sellars等等北美康德學的發展有興趣，特別針對「perceptual experience」、「normativity and rationality」與「nature」三個主題，可以參閱《John McDowell. Experience, Norm, and Nature》（Blackwell, 2008）。]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Tue, 15 Nov 2011 00:26:52 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,16949,16949#msg-16949 陳那的「轉向哲學」- 評論： 仁宥法師〈漢地所傳的早期現量理論 – 以五識與意識現量的認識對境為中心〉 (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,16949,16949#msg-16949 TPA發表稿）
仁宥法師 / 政治大學哲學所博士候選人

評論人：汪純瑩，政治大學哲學所博士生
臺北醫學院 2011/10/23臺哲會2011年會

1.仁宥法師此作將七世紀至八世紀初漢語文化圈中對佛教量論的討論以及對印度論典的消化進行考察，雖然仁宥法師整理的文獻仍舊需要進一步地放置在我們當今的思維脈絡裡解讀，也還需要進一步地與梵文、藏傳文獻會通，而漢、藏兩地相關的後續注疏傳統以及當代學者的考察也都應該還有許多材料值得開發，但從法師整理的材料內，我們可以發現六至八世紀間漢傳佛教內部所接受的量論理論，保留了尚未受到七世紀法稱詮釋影響的陳那思想，以及更早以無著為主、前於陳那的量論討論，這些養分在六、七乃至八世紀的漢地的獨立發展，與近幾年剛釋出、由 Steinkellner 重建的勝主智（Jinendrabuddhi）《集量論大疏（Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā）》梵本所揭櫫的前於法稱詮釋影響的陳那思想解讀，都一致指向「五識現量與意識現量對境」這個議題上，且都指出陳那思想中「五識現量與意識現量因其在自證中相（akara）的一致而俱起」，有別於法稱解讀下的意識取五識境的前後剎那兩階段詮釋，這部份的後續發展在我看來，是非常寶貴，也值得期待的。

2.依著仁宥法師此作整理的材料，我首先想問的是，量論，特別是陳那所傳的量論，在漢地佛教各宗之間所扮演的角色為何，特別是在教義解釋與實修方法之上，漢地佛教徒們是如何看待量論？要問這個問題之前，卻有另外一個問題我想要先提出：

3.文獻研究的困境：
佛教思想傳承的系譜特別多元，又我們對不同經典傳統之間以及不同教派之間的交涉迄今還未見有一個能令大部分人所普遍接受的態度，我想問的是，如同仁宥法師在此作中指出的，《大乘廣百論釋論》「雖是中觀論典，但由護法作釋」，又如同我們也能提出的「量論理論是單純屬於解釋《解深密經》的傳統，還是也可以看作解釋《般若經》的傳統（就算陳那本身，也曾把其量論理論含三性思想放置於《般若經》脈絡底下論述，試見《佛母般若波羅密多圓集要義論》）」，類似這樣的系譜學問題是否我們需要認真看待，或者我們該怎麼看待，這個是我想先提出來的問題。
進一步來說明，佛教思想探究的對象本身難以言喻，使用文字的指涉習慣與體系也在各宗派之間迥異，再加之研究方法的不確定性，以及極大部份地仰賴「不易」被跨主體地驗證的「反省 reflection」，在這種觀照下，前面的這個針對系譜學所提的問題想問的是，系譜學研究上的「真」為「真」嗎，其「真確結果」對佛學研究的意義為何？佛教內部有分裂嗎？《解深密經》與《般若經》在講不同的真理嗎？我們應該如何來 approach 文獻？如果所探究的是可跨主體普世化的真理，那「系譜」的意義在哪裡？這個問題我們已先提出，現在也得暫時先懸擱。

4.陳那的「轉向哲學」：
陳那量論追求的是「可普世化universalizability」，一方面他預設了，或者說接受了心識作用的跨主體普遍性，一方面他將量限縮於現量（這個認識自相particular-aspect的認識能力）與比量（這個認識共相universal-aspect的認識能力）這兩個基本心識作用、排除了聖教量等其他量，另外他在方法上有所創新（這方法的創新展現在《集量論》v2中，他說「因為我們必然且只能認識到自相與共相，所以我們必然且只有現量與比量，別無他量」），這讓我可暫時說是一種陳那的「轉向哲學」。這個轉向特別標示出的意義，就在於普世道理優先於教條，在異宗、乃至於異教之間普遍有效。

依著他方法的創新，陳那確立現量與比量為認識的兩個基本條件作用，而比量的分別、概念化與推論的作用，在傳統識論中被認為是意識（manas）的作用，陳那的「意現量」理論就成了一個系統上的核心要點。

陳那定義現量的基本性格為「離分別」，其意義有二：「依根」，與「直接」。意根為根，這就滿足「依根起」這個意義；且據陳那在《集量論》v6指出，「意識作為感受內在感受，或者不把對象看作為外於認識的對象（或我所理解的：對象顯現appear為自我意識當中的對象時），確實不表現分別性格，而屬現量境」的看法，意識具有直接性是個應被接受的事實，此外，因為認識非作用（在《因明正理門論》、《集量論》v9長行nirvyāpāra, devoid of function 與《大疏》光喻，都確認了這一點），意現量與五識現量無分別，就被成立[註一]。

這樣的結論的系統性意義在於：意現量的成立，表示五俱意識的成立；五俱意識的成立，表示現量與比量（在條件上）的必然直接交涉；現量與比量的直接交涉，則表示三分說的成立[註二]；三分說的成立，則表示「比量的推論」所具有的「是、非確定性」在認識範圍內是跨主體有效的；而比量在認識範圍內的有效，一方面世俗有可被推論，而「勝義實相」與「世俗法相」直接相關就能成立，且不只是理論意義上的成立—假如陳那方法上的創新被充分重視的話（誠如現量與比量直接相關，我們可把陳那現量理論看作解釋《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》小如品，「如如」的推論）
                        
5.至此，我想建議，論典解讀者若以宗派之見來見論典，則恐怕置論典意圖於不義，至少在陳那系統之內，或在佛教「整體」意義底下來看。而系譜學的研究，該放在什麼樣的概念底下看待，這還是需要進一步討論的開放問題。

6.但若以上陳那的哲學轉向能被接受，則許多相關議題可以在跨主體普世化的脈絡中開展：
例如，若上述哲學轉向的系統能被接受，從陳那所確立的「「量」的「無作」」這個原則，如圓測所處理「根是否為現量」或者「根境實有或非實有」的問題（仁宥1.2, 1.3）或可被釐清：「根是否為現量？」這個問題，是把「根」與「現量」看作具有本體狀態的存有、或者抽象意義、非「實際修證脈絡底下的方法」存有。若量無作，這個看法就無效力，而「根」與「現量」作為一種practical的哲學工具，在該哲學系統內部意義的展現，旨在引導自我意識解消自我意識。而當世俗有與勝義實相的關係經過這種哲學轉向的處理，一方面在自我意識當中確立境的假有性—有條件地普遍有效，一方面也解消自我意識，而將「根境實有或非實有」這個問題帶到另外一種不同層次的觀照（即「非有見」的觀照）底下看待。

7.漢地諸家對於《大乘廣百論釋論》「雖許意識知五識境，然各自變，同現量攝，俱受新境非重審知，由是故說：「無有一義二識能知」」所引發的談論，大多傾向、或者較保守地來說，是顯著地傾向「五識意識俱起」（其中，玄奘、窺基《成唯識論》一系之五俱意識是立場最清楚的處理，杜順「意識不得現量境，云何得有過去現量境耶？」之問，普光「意識緣一切法，通三量故」，智周「唯證行轉」為五俱意識具現量性格的條件之說等等），開展出相當有別於在藏傳注疏傳統中受法稱詮釋影響的五識、意識前後剎那兩階段論的解讀傳統。相信對這個部份的後續研討，能為量論研究展開新局。（© gustav 2011/10/23）


註一：
gustav 2010/10/29

註二：
現量比量直接交涉，則表示非感官、以共相為對象的推論經驗-邏輯思維，是自證的「直接」對象，因為這個「直接性」，我們可確立見分（事物顯現為屬於認知主體的）、相分（事物的客觀顯現於時空中）與自證分（前兩者之總合）在「自證」的反思狀態中，就是一直接的經驗，儘管顯像appearance內部已有可比度的成份。這，標示的是，一切所知皆是於自我覺察當中顯像。]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Sun, 23 Oct 2011 23:59:53 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,12242,12242#msg-12242 An Essay Establishing Critical Epistemology – Following Dignāga and Kant / 汪純瑩 Chun-Ying WANG (1 reply) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,12242,12242#msg-12242 An Essay Establishing Critical Epistemology – Following Dignāga and Kant
Chun-Ying WANG


Abstract

        This essay as a philosophical enquiry tries to establish Critical Epistemology (CE) by reporting the observations in the conduct of critical epistemology itself along with accepting Dignāga's and Kant's methods and observations. “Critical” indicates the reflective and circulative nature of this specific type of epistemology, namely, letting cognition cognize itself and producing self-knowledge upon which all cognitions as *results are explained and justified. “Epistemology” indicates the status suspending any ontological premiss. The general attitude is: to accept the direct facts, and to be sceptic about the hidden assumptions, contrary to the relatively more popular approach: to question about the direct facts with tacit strong assumptions. The report is put in this format in order to get itself engaged in the philosophical forum with the two traditions while to avoid playing any agency roles for them.

        One major result obtained through the conduct is the immediate relation between the faculty for the immediate knowledge and the faculty for the mediate knowledge, with which we can find that the both CE conductors have agreed. Such an immediacy is supplied from the direct, necessary accompany of the faculty for the apperception (manas, urteilskraft) with the five external sensational senses. Then, a non-representational model, though it is accepted that all that we know is representations, directly follows, i.e., the cognizing gets the activity itself directly engaged in reality while the world is never the cause – except in postulation, but the result of cognition. With the awareness of such an immediacy, the world as appeared outside, the world as appeared inside and the subject as appeared to “know the world in which the subject itself occur” are altogether sharply accepted as one unity of the conditioned representations. Consequently, on the one hand, the “validity” or “effectiveness” of the empirical knowledge and its generalization, especially with regard to vyāpti (universal pervasion) and the basic function of apoha (exclusion) finds its ground, for the conceptualization “imposes” the effectiveness without exception in appearance on the one hand and make the sensory results appear as extending in space and succeeding in time on the other. On the other hand, such a cosmological view puts the cosmological conflicts between close universe and open universe in a dialectical observation by unfolding the conditioning process through which the conflicts occur. If (a) the universe is close and (b) the universe is open are in a way found congruent, a spiritual development from the constrained to liberty can then happen as a dynamical process, in a sense that, in stead of the development as one-way from the constrained to liberty, the dialectics between the constrained and the liberty self-sustainingly continue to happen in parallel and get entangled with each other. It then follows that on the one hand, the validity of empirical sciences and the values of morality in our experience find their effective supporting ground, and, on the other hand, the spiritual development and freedom find theirs as well.


Key tags: manas 意（識）, apperception 統覺, Dignāga 陳那, Jinendrabuddhi 勝主智（勝主慧）, Kant 康德, transcendental idealism 先驗理想論, critical philosophy 批判哲學, antinomy (rational conflict) 二律背反（理性先驗矛盾）, epistemology 知識論, soteriology 救度學,

Related Website:
http://buddhica.nccu.edu.tw/ ｜ Event 20110507
http://iabs2011.ddbc.edu.tw/iabs2011//paper/view/355
IABS Brief English ｜ Chinese

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An Essay Establishing Critical Epistemology – Following Dignāga and Kant

Chun-Ying WANG


This essay tries to establish Critical Epistemology (CE) by reporting the observations in the conduct of critical epistemology itself along with accepting Dignāga[1]'s and Kant[2]'s methods and observations. “Critical” indicates the reflective and circulative nature of this specific type of epistemology, namely, letting cognition cognize itself and producing self-knowledge upon which all cognitions as results are explained and justified. “Epistemology” indicates the status suspending any ontological premiss. The general attitude, as following Dignāga's and Kant's methods, is :to accept the facts, and to be sceptic about the hidden assumptions, contrary to the relatively more popular approach: to question about the direct facts with tacit strong assumptions..

To speak before in a non-precise fashion, reasons for putting Dignāga and Kant together should be given. Both fit the description of critical epistemology above. Both try to establish a middle position against idealists (who question the particular aspect of experience) and realists (who either question or have problems with the universal aspect of experience). Both try to *idealize a system consisting of faculties according to the fact that in experience there are only two aspects, namely, of the particular and of the universal. Both emphasize the immediate experience by beginning with its faculty first in their representative masterpieces, and both insist the immediate relation between the immediate experience and the concepts, claiming that in order for cognition to arise, five senses must be accompanied by the apperception. Both hold firmly that all one can grasp in cognition is but representation, while both accept and try to prove the distinction between the valid and the invalid cognition. From both, the conclusion that self is empty, as well as the conclusion that the logic and causality are perfectly effective in the world cognized, while freedom is nonetheless possible for the beings of cognition, can be obtained; to infer further, both conclusions allow for morality and the possibility for spiritual development in the world-cognized. With these reasons, especially with the first one beginning with “Both fit..” and the last possibility of inference for morality and spiritual development, our putting them together is acceptable.


1. The method

To carry out the essay, an apparatus has to be brought forth first. Since the critical epistemology has a reflective and circulative nature, namely, to observe the cognition with cognition itself, the result of the observation can be the basis for a specific form of idealization: the idealized system is postulated via the self-observation of cognition while the result of such an observation-postulation is deduced and supported solely because of the specific form itself. Hence, CE can accept Dignāga's establishment of the only two means/systematic faculties: pratyakṣa (perception) and anumāna (inference) upon the ground that there are only two aspects of cognized object, the immediate svalakṣaṇa (the form of the particular) and the mediate sāmānyalakṣaṇa (the form of the universal) (PS 1.2[3]). As well, CE can accept Kant's distinction between the immediate Anschauung (the knowledge-mode of intuition) and the mediate Begriff (the knowledge-mode of concept), as much as between Sinnlichkeit (sensibility) and Verstand (understanding) (KrV A19/B33[4]).

Besides, CE can accept Kant's clue of investigation, namely, to request the condition of all possibilities of experience, which means the condition through which every possible cognition becomes possible, and Kant's framework of transcendental method, i.e., to entitle the postulated system “transcendental” while to entitle the result of the postulated system “empirical,” whereas CE has to keep in mind that the postulated and the produced result are one and the same due to the specific nature of the idealization. On this account, CE can similarly accept Dignāga's idea that the three factors of cognition, namely, prameya (the object of cognition), pramāna (the means of cognition) and phala (the result of cognition), “are not separate from one another” (PS 1.10). Jinendrabuddhi[5]'s interpretation is also acceptable here: there is indeed no process of production or resulting, just like the light, for example – the statement that the light illuminates itself is only valid metaphorically, while, in *reality, the light's illuminating itself solely because the illuminating of the light itself has the form of the light itself, and there is no process of the light's illuminating itself (PSV 70,11[6]). These two acceptances accord with CE's position that there is only one *reality, which is, on the one hand, the support upon which CE's idealization is postulated, and which is, on the other hand, the result of the operation of the postulated system.

Hence, CE concludes that because the object of cognition has necessarily only two aspects, namely, the aspect of the particular and the aspect of the universal, CE can postulate the immediate faculty and the mediate faculty through which the *real object's necessary possession of two aspects (of the particular and of the universal) becomes possible. At meanwhile, CE holds that the postulated system of the immediate faculty and the mediate faculty cannot be separated from both the observed *real object and the result of the system.


2 Between the immediate experience and the mediate experience

CE holds that the immediate experience has to connect with the effect of five senses, for all the experience of the five senses has the immediate form of the particular aspect, on the one hand, and for the relation between the immediate experience from the five senses and the mediate experience in thinking is immediate, as well, on the other.

2-a. Five senses and the immediate experience

Following the above position, CE can accept Dignāga's own etymological explanation in Nmukh[7], that pratyakṣa is so entitled because it is in close connection with (prati) each sense faculty (akṣa)[8], and his systematical explanation, with his reference to Vasubandhu and his textual explanation thereupon, namely, “it is named after the sense-organs (faculties better) because they are its specific cause (asādhāraṇahetu)”, in PS (PS 1.4ab)[9]. Remarkably, in Dignāga's mind, there should be more than five senses; the sense of mind (manas) is also a sense-faculty (indriya).

CE can also accept Kant's claim that the empirical intuition has to take place only in so far as the mind is affected (affiziert werden) in a way of *receiving matters with senses. Also remarkably, in Kant's mind, beside of the outer sense (der äußere Sinn), which lets us represent to ourselves objects as outside us, the inner sense (der innere Sinn) via which the mind intuits itself or its inner state (KrV A22/B37), is also a necessary part of the way of receiving matters – although no matters from the latter alone is ever possible.

2-b. What's going on with the sixth sense and the mediate faculty

CE can accept Kant's treaties of postulating outer sense and inner sense and his observation that via the former the form of intuition “space” is given to experience (i.e., the way to receive the object of cognition as outside us is to represent it in (the form of) space) while via the latter the form of intuition “time” is given to experience (i.e., the way to receive to self-cognition of the object of cognition or the inner state of mind, is to represent the object of cognition or the inner state in (the form of) time); space and time as forms of intuition are in immediate relation, too, because, from the perspective of CE, all experience of space is necessarily observed in time, and, from Kant's perspective, in the cooperation of the mediate faculty, namely, understanding (Verstand), in connection with the immediate faculty, namely, sensibility, the manifold (Manigfalltigkeit) of the intuition apprehended from sensibility is necessarily united and recognized in the conceptualization so that cognition or experience becomes possible at all (the issue to deduce in the two editions of the Deduction in KrV)[10].

Similarly, we can accept Dignāga's theory about the two-fold appearance, namely, the appearance via which the object is represented as outside and the appearance via which the cognition is represented as inner (PS 1.11) and observation that there is no *real separation between the mental perception and the perception of the five senses. We can find and accept the textual supports for this observation in the following materials: (1) “Here our distinguishing various kinds of perception is in response to the view of others. However, all kinds of perception are indeed [one and the same, namely, that is] free from conceptual construction” (Dignāga's self-interpretation to PS 1.5, emphasis made by me) – the treatises of separate perceptions are “in response to the view of others”, and to the own thesis, there is only one perception, namely, that which is devoid of conceptualization. (2) “There is also mental perception, which is of two kinds: awareness of an external object and self-awareness of such subordinate mental activities such as desire and the like” (PS 1.6ab) and “The mental perception which, taking a thing of color, etc., for its object, occurs in the form of immediate experience (anubhava) is also free from conceptual construction. The self-awareness (sva-saṃvedana) of desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, etc., is also recognized as mental perception because it is not dependent on any sense-organ (faculty)” (self-interpretation to PS 1.6ab). It's also greatly obliged to Steinkellner's reconstruction of the Sanskrit text of Jinendrabuddhi's PSV and Junjie Chu's translation and introduction of that into German that we find valuable side support: Jinendrabuddhi gave us a perspective closer to Dignāga than our modern understanding by pointing out that in the Indian tradition, it is the conformity between the form of the object-cognized and the form of self-cognition (the conformity between the akara of the visya, i.e., artharūpa, in visyajñāna and the akara of “tatjñāna”, i.e., the jñāna of that jñāna, in anubhava, anubhavarūpa) that is to be argued for, not the proposition that every cognition of the object has to be accompanied by a cognition of the cognition which is commonly agreed at that time (PSV 77,6; PSV 79,6; PSV 82,10); owing to such conformity, Jinendrabuddhi holds that the “distance” between anubhava in mānasaṃ and the pratyakṣa are too close to be regarded as distinguishable, refusing Dharmakīrti's idea to separate the phase of indriyajñāna from the phase of mānasaṃ. We can agree with Junjie Chu that as well as Kuiji 窺基 must have his textual source in Dignāga when claiming that the experience of five senses must be accompanied with the experience of the mind (manas), namely, 五俱意識, Jinendrabuddhi's information gives us supportive ground as well. Jinendrabuddhi read plenty of Dignāga's original texts in Nālandā Temple (which has the most complete collection of Dignāga), by which he can argue against the mainstream interpretation of Dharmarkīrti on Dignāga, while Kuiji's master Xuanzang does not receive any influence of Dharmarkīrti school; hence, both's interpretation on Dignāga about the immediate relation between the sense-organ perception and the mental perception is highly precious.

However, CE cannot be satisfied with the argument of Jinendrabuddhi that the distance is “too close to be regarded as distinguishable.” If we appreciate enough Dignāga's own words, we may find better argument: “there is no need for admitting another separate means of cognition for cognizing the combination of the two above-mentioned aspects of the object (the svalakṣaṇa and the sāmānyalakṣaṇa)” (PS 1.2cd) and “In the case of the cognition which cognizes a thing of color, etc., as noneternal, firstly, one cognizes the inexpressible particularity and the universal, color-ness. Then, by means of the operation of the mind (manas), one relates the color-ness to the universal, noneternity, and expresses the resulting cognition in the judgment 'the thing of color, or the like, is noneternal” (his self-interpretation to PS 1.2cd). In order to make such a judgment, the ground upon which the judgment can be made, namely, the relation between the universal the color-ness and the universal noneternity can be determined, must be obtained first; the ground is exactly “the thing of color and the like”, viz., “the combination of the particular and the universal.” Only under the circumstance that the relation between the particular and the universal must be united as the necessary condition for cognition and experience, such a ground for all empirical judgment can ever be obtained.

CE can then accept Jinendrabuddhi's “conformity of artharūpa in indriyajñāna and anubhavarūpa in mānasaṃ” by interpreting it with Dignāga's “combination of the particular and the universal” and with Kant's “synthesis.” That is, with the idea that the condition for all possible cognition as well as for all possible experience is the a priori unity of the particular and the universal. That is, with the very basic observation of CE in Section 1 of this essay.

Hence, CE concludes that, although the immediate experience and the mediate experience are sharply distinguished with our method, the a priori combination of the postulated faculties for them is the necessary condition for all possible cognition and empirical existence – the immediate-mediate difference is only of aspects, not of *realty.

CE also holds that the ground, for example, the thing of color and the like, which is the result of the combination of the particular and the universal, is the reality. This view holds, that is to say, that the ontical state out of which any ontological studies can only make sense, has to be the result of cognition, never as the cause, except for restricted in an idealization as ours.


3. Perfect causal net in *reality, reciprocally supported by the immediate relation between the immediate and the mediate faculty

CE holds that logic is necessarily effective in *reality, since the relation between our immediate experience and mediate experience is direct. Without the conceptualization in the mediate experience, the immediate experience is never cognized, and without the reception in space and time, the mediate experience is never cognized, either. Because the later recollection and thinking about the immediate experience before indeed has truth-value, namely, our empirical judgment can either fit or not fit the *reality, we can idealize that, among all possible logical connections, there are some necessary, some actual, and some mere possible – yet to make a remark, the three sets are not in a relation of logical implication (viz., svābhāva-hetu), for the difference of the three sets does not belong to the scope of the result of its own employment, to which logical implication is effective; rather, it belongs to the difference of the various operative modes of mind. It is the logical modes, or functions, of the mind being a part of the necessary condition of our experience, that can on the one hand make the “objective valid relations” in *reality possible and effective, and, on the other hand, receive/represent the “object” in space and time.

Hence, CE can accept Kant's project of “Transzendentale Logik” whose “ultimate purpose” is to determine the scope and limits of itself (KrV A154/B193)[11]. In conformity with the internal, systematic coordination of the operation of understanding (die logischen Funktion des Verstandes in Urteilen, the logical function of understanding in judgments) (KrV A70/B95), the transcendental object (the object-ness we can find in every empirical object) has the conceptual structure (consisting of die Kategorien, the categories) (KrV A76/B102). Since all possible cognition has the “conformity” as its necessary condition, the object-ness can be found in all empirical objects. We can accept Kant's effort to schematize the categories (demonstrating how the concepts, the coordinated pure concepts of the categories, are applied to/in intuition) and accordingly to draw the system of all principles of pure understanding in the second Book of the “Transzendentale Logik”: with the mode of quantity, the unit-ness of the object-ness is offered while the matter united in the unit-ness is received/represented in the extension (of space); with the mode of quality, the degree-ness of the object-ness is offered while the matter produced as the sense effects is received/represented in the intensity (of space[12]); with the mode of relation, the units obtained in previous moment (das vorige Moment[13]) are objectively determined as subject/substance-predicates/properties, cause-effect and reciprocal relations while the matter is received as duration, succession and co-existence (with such a mode, time has its transcendental source in the idealized system, in another words, so time becomes possible experience); with the mode of modality, the determination of relations obtained in the previous moment, are subjectively determined as possible (when the condition of the necessary unity of the particular and the universal is satisfied), actual (when the material condition, namely, with sensation, is satisfied) and necessary (when the universal condition, namely, with the modes of the mind themselves, is satisfied) while the determination itself here is sole formal modification of what has been received/represented in space and time.

Following the above, CE can understand and accept Dignāga's observation of twofold appearance (PS 11ab) and in a backhand fashion explain how to relate the “combination” (PS 2cd) and his theory of anumāna, as well as Kant's theory of valid cognition. Since the mind has the function to form a grasping conceptual structure as an object-ness holder (in anumāna) on the one hand and to receive/represent anything in possession of such object-ness in space and time (will explain more together with the second half of the two-fold appearance theory in the next section) in the direct form of experience, namely, in pratyakṣa, on the other, anything in reality, namely, anything cognized in space and time as an object, must appear as objective and outside (which however in our idealization is actually mere representation, ākāra). Thus we can understand the function of manas and how to make the relation between the particular and the universal mediate through it while at the same time make kalpanā (formation of appearance) possible. Based on this, we understand Dignāga's “even conceptual construction, when it is brought to internal awareness, is admitted as a type of perception. However, with regard to the external object, the conceptual construction is not admissible as perception, because it conceptualizes the object” (PS 7ab) as: in the discourse about conceptual construction's being brought to the internal awareness, manas is a faculty reaching down to (“bis herunter zu” in note 10) the reception of matters in space and time, as indicated in the previous paragraph; in the discourse about conceptual constructions' being with regard to the external objects, manas is a faculty to produce the object-ness holder for empirical objects of cognition. Besides, owing to the nature of logical function, on the one side, all possible units made by manas are put in a systematic network of connections in the realm of possibilities; on the other side, all possible objects cognized must go through the operation of such logical function of manas. Hence, the world, namely, the world-post-cognition, must be in a perfect order which is necessarily understandable to the logic[14].

Following the above, CE can interpret Kant's holding that the scope of possibility is no larger than the scope of actuality in his “Postulate”: the difference between these two scopes are not in a logical implication one may hold, namely, the possibility contains the actuality; rather, Kant would hold that the scopes cover all possible objects, while the difference comes from whether the formal condition of experience is supplied by perception or not. Similarly, CE can also accept Kant's claiming that “unity of nature in time and space, and unity of the experience possible for us, are one and the same[15]” (Section 4 of the first-edition Introduction to Kritik der Urteilskraft). Further, CE can understand Kant's mysterious notion of the conformity between the manifold of a priori sensibility (the synopsis contained in the sense, as the synopsis for the synthetic unity of the transcendental apperception[16], KrV A97) and the manifold in determined intuition[17]: the former refers to the realm of possibilities, while the latter refers to the realm of actuality. Since the difference between the realms depends on the subjective modification whether the senses have been effected and have offered materials, objectively speaking, the world to be cognized and the world cognized are one and the same – the world is the world, given one is cognizing it or not. Hence, we can also accept Jinendrabuddhi's explanation about Digāga's idea of identity of pramāna, pramaeya and phala: the object of cognition as means and the object of the result of cognition is one and the same[18] (PSV73,3).

Then, with the conformity or non-conformity between the conceptual construction as the condition of cognition which is immediately represented in space and time and the conceptual construction associated in the action of judgment, there is the value of truth and non-truth. Besides, only then, Dignāga can establish his theory of proper inference. From the observation of the smoke rising in the mountain, we can infer that there is fire, together with the previous instances such as the fire in the kitchen is connected with smoke and with the previous instances such as the lake is not connected with smoke. Now the real experience is the observation of smoke in the mountain; with the knowledge induced from past experience (namely, the world, given cognized or to be cognized,) we know that smoke can be caused by fire and nothing else so far, i.e., the smoke and the fire are two units whose relation is causally determined in our experiencing. Hence, the inference can be a proper one. Yet, we have to make a remark here: the significance of such theory of inference is not to assure the absolute truth value of this particular inference “there is fire in the mountain.” What is necessary is not the fire's being the cause of the existence of smoke; rather that all that can take place in the world must take place in causal networks is necessary. That is to say, the inference, though it is proper with the support we have so far, can be a mistake, as long as we find another stronger, more immediate support, for instance, a fairy's magic is making that happen to our own eyes and we can check that in our public community. The point is, there must be a truth, although all that exist are but representations.


CE thus concludes that reality as in space and time is exactly the world to be cognized as well as the world cognized, with two aspects. Every thing in space and time is thus mere representation and a result, but as a valid representation, not as the image-representation which is the copy or imitation of any a priori external entities. Hence, there must be a distinction between valid cognition and invalid cognition, as well as a distinction between true judgment and false judgment. Besides, CE can thus accept the sutra's verse 應無所住而生其心–any thing received in space and time as well as apperceived in mind is exactly the mind itself, or, we can say, the world is exactly the mind.


4. The empty *self

CE's special idealism is distinguished from other idealism with regard to its persistence in the immediacy between the outer experience and the intuitiveness of the self-knowledge (the immediacy of self-awareness in the awareness of an object) beside of the conceptualization in pure apperception. From such persistence we can demonstrate to us the mistrust in the outer experience held in problematic or dogmatic idealism indeed leads to the inapplicability of the knowledge of inner experience and consequently shows that such knowledge itself is actually as mistrustful as the outer experience so held. It is the persistence in the intuitiveness of the self knowledge beside of the pure apperception that grants the experience and the knowledge of it trustworthy, at the meanwhile properly settling ourselves with a position to accept the facts that on the one hand the world and the self must be known through our consciousness while on the other hand the consciousness is not of an idea but of the world in real space and time – the reality is both objectively in the mind and subjectively accessible by the mind. Besides, self is but the way perceiving the world.

Hence, CE can accept Dignāga's theory of svasaṃvitti (self-awareness). Dignāga holds that the cognition itself is primarily the result in a way of the formal conformity, not in a way as his opponents do, i.e., to admit that means and result are different via the process of production (PS 1.8cd); he emphasizes, there is no real vyāpāra (activity, function)[19]. We can also accept Jinendrabuddhi's explanation that the means and the result should not be mediated with a third for, on the one side, the formal conformity should be sufficient while the verbal separation is only metaphorical, and, on the other side, if it is the case that there is a third, then we would have the problem of anavasthā (infinite regression) (PSV 65,11). To this step, Dignāga has established the self-appearance nature of cognition, a characteristic to appear the object of cognition as cognized by a self.

CE can accept Dignāga's twofold appearance idea that “Every cognition is [*]produced with a twofold appearance, namely, that of itself as subject (svâbhāsa) and that of the objet (viṣayâbhāsa)” (self-interpretation to PS 1.9a); and because the arthaniścaya (determination of the object) and the self-cognition (the cognition of the cognition) are in formal conformity (which we have explained in detail with Kant's help in the previous section), CE can happily accept Dignāga's entitling the cognition's possession of twofold appearance and the svasaṃvitti are both “the result” (self-interpretation to PS 1.9a; PS 1.9b). Jinendrabuddhi's explanation is also valuable especially with regard to the problem of the identity of pramāna, pramaeya and phala, when he points out that with the verse “it is known only through this, viz., through cognition's having the form of it [, namely, the object]” (PS 1.9d2), Dignāga shows that the object has to be determined through the power of cognition (in manas) so that we can admit the power is a pramāna (PSV 72,10); yet, this is not our main concern here, while this is also dealt with when we point out the devoid of vyāpāra in previous paragraph (as Dignāga does in the end of his self-intepretation to PS 1.9d2 by pointing out that all elements of existence, sarvadharma, are devoid of function, nirvyāpāra), so we do not go into further detail. We want to point out here that, in Dignāga, cognition as means and result has the nature that on the one hand the object of cognition has the aspect of immediate particular and the aspect of mediate universal, and on the other hand the cognition has twofold appearance: the appearance of the object and the appearance of itself as subject.

CE refuses to accept the idea some people may hold that pramāna= svâbhāsa; pramaeya=viṣayâbhāsa; phala=svasaṃvitti. Not only we can bring up Dignāga's own saying: cognition's possession of twofold appearance and the svasaṃvitti are both the result (self-interpretation to PS 1.9a); we can also show the idea's oversimplification with CE's accomplishment. Pramāna, pramaeya and phala are mere apparatuses of idealization (devoid of function, nirvyāpāra) in identity, while svâbhāsa, viṣayâbhāsa and svasaṃvitti are not in that kind of relation – the former two are features or forms of the appearance while the appearance and the third together are the features of cognition. In section 3, CE has shown the twofold function of manas, which, on the one hand, makes everything take place in immediate form of space and time, and, on the other, makes everything take place in a perfect network of logical connection. It is also shown that the relation between the result of the former function and the result of the latter function is immediate. The result of cognition would appear as an object because on the one hand it is determined through manas with the objectness and at the same time the objectness makes the object received/represented in the immediate form of space and time where the web of logical connections are embedded. On the other side, since the object is immediate in nature, it is possessed by the subject, too, for it is “to the subject” that the term “immediate” stands for. Owing to such twofold function and the direct relation between our immediate experience and our mediate experience, we can represent object as an object outside in space and time (viṣayâbhāsa), while also as an object of the subject (svâbhāsa). Pramāna, pramaeya and phala are one and the same – it is on the one hand the cognition, and on the other hand the world cognized and to be cognized. Svâbhāsa, viṣayâbhāsa and svasaṃvitti are forms of cognition and the *real mental status. The former distinction can be said in transcendental language, while the latter distinction is only with regard to the result. Otherwise, if it is the case that the latter distinction is also a transcendental distinction, the false conclusions that (1) there might be the world in itself; (2) that there might be an absolute self prior to cognition and conducting the activity of cognition; and (3) that there must be an superior power which connect the world in itself and the subject, would be drawn, and these must contradict not only CE, but also Dignāga's and Kant's epistemology.


CE can also accept Dignāga's using “recollection” and “motion cognition from one object to another” to support the self as an empty modifier. Dignāga argues, the immediacy of the modifier –the immediacy to the world in space and time, the immediacy to conceptual constructions and the immediacy as belong to the modifier itself – is established for the cognition must have two forms (svâbhāsa and viṣayâbhāsa), or otherwise recollection cannot take place (PS 1.11cd and its self-interpretation). Since recollection must have certain relation to previous cognition (PS 1.11d), “if the cognition had only one form, either that of the object or of itself, then the object which was cognized by a preceding cognition could not appear in a succeeding cognition;” because “that object of the preceding cognition does not exist when the succeeding cognition arises and could not be the object of the latter” (self-interpretation to PS 1.11b). Jinendrabuddhi explains, it is first agreed that the cognition must belong to the the cognition itself, and it is through the formal conformity of the object in previous cognition and in succeeding recollection that such identity of the object of previous cognition and that of the succeeding memories can make sense (PSV 77,6 – 81,13). CE holds similarly, since all that can take place in the world must have been through cognition and the determination of manas, then: (1) in the previous cognition, there must be the formal conformity between the particular in space and time and the conceptual construction; (2) in the previous cognition, there must be the formal conformity between the object of cognition (namely, the object-ness perceiving/reprenting the object in space and time as well as grasping the object in the object-ness) and the cognition itself (the immediacy as being perceived/represented in space and time); (3) owing to the network of logical connections which also grants the spatial and temporal sequence via the necessary role of manas, the object cognized before would not vary without any logically identifiable development, while, on the other side, owing to the same reason, the modifier itself that can only exist only as appearing in the determining of manas, will remain permanently identical. Hence, (4) in recognition or recollection, the universals by which one recognizes or reproduces the object previously experienced in its re-appearance or in its absence is still immediate to the immediacy of the former cognition.

Dignāga also argues: to avoid anavasthā, we should admit the self-referential nature of cognition and not allow a third cognition making the previous cognition an object of the recollection-cognition (self-intepretation to PS 1.12b); and he continues, if it is the case, then “there could be no motion of cognition from one object to another” (PS 1.12cd). To this point, Dharmakīrti explains: if the cognition requires another cognition to cognize itself, then the series of cognition would be broken at some point – the last in the series would have no next cognition to cognize itself; since the movement of the cognition from one to another is admissible, we should not accept the requirement of another cognition but accept the self-referential nature (PV, III, 539-540; Hattori note 80). With Kant, CE holds that the synopsis of the a priori sensibility, namely, all possible experience which meet the formal condition of cognition, is the ground for the empirical, actual succession of cognitions in a series (note 17). Because the formal condition of cognition assures the objective identity as well as the modifier's subjective identity, that is to say, the world extending in space and succeeding in time as well as the modifier receiving/representing the world in space and time with its apperceptive object-ness always remains one and the same (the mediacy between the immediate and the mediate experience), the affinity of all possible combinations of the particulars and the universals, namely, the affinity of all possible conceptualization of the world in space and time (the only particular) is identical to the affinity of the succeeding actual cognitions, namely, the cognitions with certain concepts combined with the same particular. If the modifier itself is also perceived/represented in space and time, as the opponents to Dignāga hold that let another cognition cognizes the cognition, the immediacy between the immediate experience and the mediate experience will be destroyed while the identity of the world to be cognized and the world cognized will be destroyed, too. Hence, CE cannot accept the non-empty modifier, neither can Dignāga and Kant. Further, it is the persistence in the refusal against the immediacy between the outer experience and the intuitiveness of the self-knowledge which is also in immediate relation to the conceptualization in pure apperception that leads the opinion-holder to have problems with the connection between knowledge and reality the knowledge is about.


Hence, CE concludes that self is an empty modifier which grants the immediacy between the outer experience and the intuitiveness of the self-knowledge which is also in immediate relation to the conceptualization in pure apperception.


5. Liberation and the directions of further development

Following the above section, CE holds that the motion cognition from one object to another (*āśraya-paravṛtti) is acceptable. This indicates the fact, as we have shown in the previous section, that, the affinity of all possible cognition, namely, the world to be cognized, and the affinity of all the actual cognition, namely, the world cognized, are identical, exactly because both affinity must be made in the determining of manas with its formal condition of experience. Besides, since the formal condition grands the distinction between the world outside and the internal awareness, as well as the permanence of the world-identity and the self-identity, with the a priori synopsis that entails all possibilities, the motion of cognition from one actual cognition to another signifies the fact that our cognition is not direct response to the stimuli outside, or otherwise, we would not have the experience of the aspect-difference between the world and our cognizing the world and the experience of the motion cognition. We do not receive the world as the affinity of all possible or all actual cognitions, we have the world there but we appreciate it in a series of motion cognition. Hence, we can conclude that the being of such cognition is free, in a sense that although all that exist to us is representations through the determining of manas, our cognition is different from the world cognized. By this, CE refuses the opinion that the cognition is possible for the self is effected by the world a priori.

Although the determined mediate representation and the indeterminate immediate representation are contradictory with each other, but in *reality they are mutually dependent. Determined representation is obtained through the grasping of manas, while the indeterminate representation grasps nothing and grasp all. If the indeterminate representation is to be understood as not-yet grasping, then it would never become an experience. However, the motion cognition is acceptable. Hence we admit that the indeterminate representation is not not-yet grasping. This keeps CE away from nihilism. On the contrary, if the indeterminate representation is to be understood as grasping, we would have problem explaining the indeterminate representation can ever be immediate, for all the grasped are grasped with concepts. With CE's observation of the operation of manas, we know the detail in the determining and can accept that indeterminate to be a special grasping, as self-grasping of the formal condition of experience. At this point, we are liberated from the determined representation.

For instance, if I cognize a cup, I cognize its color first, and its touch, its weight etc. in a series. In the succeeding cognitions, I determine myself with the determined representations. However, if it is the case that, in the previous event, the motion cognition from one to another is nothing but the series of the cognition of the single form of its color, that of its touch, that of its weight etc. in a series, then there is no possibility for us to know that I am cognizing this, this and that. This is the proof for an empty modifier self which nonetheless can grasp everything – both via its immediate faculty gets itself engaged in the whole world (the world to be cognized), and via its manas gets itself always prepared to grasp all that could be possibly grasped. This we can also find a supporting ground in CE's specific idealization form: since we must cognize the cup in the world of space and time, we must postulate that the cup exists in the world. Similarly, since the cup must be endlessly analyzable within or outside of it, the cup must be in a complete network of connections which can be picked up by the logic. And since the cup must be in a complete network of connections for it must be so cognized, the empty modifier is supported while its freedom as the postulation according to the fact of motion cognition and its endless possibilities has a reasonable ground.

If the network of logical connections in the world of space and time and the freedom are both acceptable, there is room for morality. And CE can further investigate the direct result of the indeterminate representation to prove that the internal status in freedom is pleasure. But now we have to stop for the time being. (© gustav 2010/10/29)


[hr]

Footnotes:
[1] In this essay, I mainly rely on Hattori's translation of Chapter One of Pramānasamuccaya (1968). The annotated punctuation “ [ ] ” of Hatorri's are all removed by me in this essay, while my additional phrases are put in it.

[2] The standard edition of the original text is Kants Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (Walter de Gruyter, 1902), viz., Akademie Aufgabe; there's another also widely used later edition by Wilhelm Weischedel, which is advantageous over the former for its being closer to the original and indicating the tacit changes made by the former. I used Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft's reprography of the Wilhelm Weischedel edition in 1998. For citations and terminological translation, I mainly use Kemp Smith's translation in 1965 for the Critique of Pure Reason, while, when necessary, I'll use Pluhar's translation in 1987 for the Critique of Judgment.

[3] “PS” stands for Pramānasamuccaya; “1.2” stands for chapter 1 and verse 2.

[4] “KrV” stands for Kritik der reinen Verfunt, Critique of Pure Reason; “A19” stands for “Page 19 in the first edition in 1781”; “B33” stands for “Page 33 in the second edition in 1787.” The pagination follows the Akademie Aufgabe.

[5] In this essay, I rely on Junjie Chu's German translation (1999) and his lectures in NCCU Summer School, 2010. Besides, I also have a copy of 韓清鏡 Qingjing Han's manuscript at hand. The former are precious for they follow the Sanskrit originals of Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (PSV) reconstructed by E. Steinkellner et al. in 2005.

[6] “PSV” stands for Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (PSV) reconstructed by E. Steinkellner et al. in 2005. “70,11” stands for “the paragraph beginning at the 11th line on page 70 of the reconstructed text.

[7] “Nmukh” stands for Nyāyamukha; in this essay I can only rely on Xuanzang 玄奘's Chinese translation after the Sanskrit and Tucci's translation after Chinese and Tibetan materials in 1978 for checking. However, we also have Hattori's findings in the footnotes of his translation of PS.

[8] Hattori's note 11 to PS 1.2ab has accumulated plenty of contextual materials before and after Dignāga regarding the term “pratyakṣa.”

[9] Hattori's note 32 to PS 1.5 has precious contextual information.

[10] “Auf ihnen [,i.e., Kategorien,] gründet sich also alle formale Einheit in der Synthesis der Eibildungskraft, und vermittelst dieser auch alles empirischen Gebrauchs derselben (in der Rekognition, Reproduktion, Assoziation, Apprehension) bis herunter zu den Erscheinungen, weil diese, nur vermittelst jener Elemente der Erkenntnis und überhaupt unserum Bebußtsein, mithin uns selbst angehören können” (KrV A125, emphasis made by me).

[11] “Denn, nach Vollendung dessselben, kann sie (die transzendentale Logik) ihrem Zweck, nämlich den Umfang und die Grenzen des reinen Verstandes zu bestimmen, vollkommen ein Gnüge tun.”

[12] Although the sense effects, the qualia, are represented as internal, because the effects are represented as being caused externally, the reception of them is in form of space, as well. For instance, on a heating morning, we can feel that the temperature is rising, i.e., the degree of the sense effect is getting more intensive. But the heating is represented as the changes of the status of the air, not of the sense itself, so we say the quality is received in form of space, not time. Kant would agree with this as well, for he wants to preserve the time to the last two sets of the categories, namely, relation and modality.

[13] In German, there are two words: der Moment (masculine) and das Moment (neutral). The former has a temporal sense, while the latter has a dynamical sense. Since the discourses about the transcendental elements are all idealized, postulated conditions, there should be no temporal relation among the moments here, since time only is *real in resulted cognition.

[14] The discourse does not imply that logic has its transcendental employment so that we would have any specific a priori rules beside of the necessary ones logic discovers in itself in the endeavour of the transcendental investigation. If it is the case, then any empirical proposition of a determined relation, namely, any specific “actual” relation would become necessary.

[15] “Denn Einheit der Natur in Zeit und Raum und Einheit der uns möglichen Erfahrung ist einerlei...”

[16] “Wenn eine jede einzelne Vorstellung der andern ganz fremd, gleichsam isoliert, und von dieser getrennt wäre, so würde niemals so etwas, als Erkenntnis ist, entspringen, welche ein Ganzes verglichener und verknüpfter Vorstellungen ist. Wenn ich also dem Sinne deswegen, weil er in seine Anschauung Mannigfaltigkeit enthält, eine Synopsi beilege, so korrespondiert dieser jederzeit eine Synthesis und die Rezeptivität kann nur mit Spontaneität verbunden Erkenntnisse möglich machen.” (Emphasis by me.)

[17] In Kritik der Urteilskraft, judgment is divided into determined and reflective (indeterminate); in the former, the association of imagination is based on the rules of a concept which the object of the association is to be known about, while in the latter, the association of imagination gives a basis for understanding to apply various concepts to. To put in less Kantian technical vocabulary, judgment is an ability of locating a particular as, i.e., in imagination, contained under a universal; when the universal is given and the judgment subsumes a particular under it, this is determined; when only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, the judgment is reflective. Kant describes our judgments as the interactions between the faculty of rules, understanding, and the faculty of association, imagination. In a determined judgment, understanding offers a set of rules which is implied by a concept while imagination associates in accordance with the rules. To characterize this with the model in KrV, imagination relates the synthesized manifold intuition α as well as the appearance X, i.e., manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori, in accordance with the conceptual unity 'α' of this synthesis through transcendental apperception. Once the condition is satisfied, the judgment that the particular X/α is subsumed under the universal 'α' is made, from which arises the consciousness of an α which is known as a case of the governing concept 'α' as well. In an indeterminate judgment, imagination creates an object X with manifold which understanding keeps trying to find a concept for. To characterize this with the model in KrV again, the particular X is given (in nature) or created (in art) first through imagination, and various universals such as 'α', 'β', 'γ', 'δ' etc. are tried to be found to grasp the manifold X when imagination at the same time reproduces intuitions α, β, γ, δ etc.

[18] “pramāṇaphalayor viṣayabhedo na bhavati.”

[19] This emphasis conforms with CE's position of “idealization” and the nature of the “functions” of the postulated faculties. As Dignāga himself says, “it is metaphorically called means” but “ultimately speaking devoid of activity (self-interpretation to PS 8cd).]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Sat, 07 Jan 2012 15:19:21 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,9959,9959#msg-9959 Dreyfus 談法稱「本體論-知識論衝突」及其「現實的界域」 (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,9959,9959#msg-9959 Briefing to Dreyfus's "The Purview of the “Real”" in
Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations
2010/12/18 @國立政治大學研究大樓哲學基礎研究室
汪純瑩
©gustav


Abstract:
Dreyfus立場：不承認法稱學說為具有單純（naive）一致系統性的學說，而是調和數個衝突立場或觀點的複雜體系，認為法稱在方法上採行一種「動態、上升式的分析策略」以進行調和，於是參考Śākya Chok-den的本體論四階詮釋（前三階承許外境實有，第四階解消此一預設，展現法稱之瑜伽行性格）以此提出一種另類的法稱學說解讀進路。

[hr]

1.Atomic Theory：

1.1背景：一般經驗中的物體如何由單子（atoms）構成？其本體狀態為何？
（整體-部份問題 / 其實也是「系統問題」）

1.1.1 阿毘達磨：
（a）本體論上：物質實體由四種實有成素（地水火風）構成；
（b）現象地：通過五感之形式領受（色聲香味觸）
一切物質存有由「地水火風」與「色香味觸」八種成份組成，耳的對象則再另加上「聲」之成份（聲非物質性存有）

1.1.2 毘婆沙宗的傳續：四成素與五種現象範圍（成素之「積聚」）皆實有
（Dreyfus指出，現象若與成素本體狀態一致是自相矛盾的看法，按：這樣「成素之積聚」之現象型態與成素之素樸實存其實是有衝突的，本體狀態至少不能一致，否則兩類型之間的關係建立不起來 - 基本上這是一個本討論中的關鍵問題！稍後都會圍繞在這一個問題上）

1.1.3 經量部：世親認為毘婆沙宗的解讀混淆了本體與現象之區分
（a）就本體論：四成素為實體；就現象來說：色香味觸可接受為實體（substance）
（b）只有本體論意義上的實體可算作實有，我們所認識的現象只是本體實體之因果效果

1.2 問題：法稱內部的（本體論與知識論之間的）衝突
1. 2.1 法稱本體論主張：在空間延展中的存有非實有
（因為自相優先於共相，於是由實有的個別成素所構成的空間性延展在本體論上只能是次性的或人為構作的）
1.2.2 法稱認識論主張：透過現量感知提供了不失真的實有性格
1.2.3 Dreyfus 認為法稱自身對此衝突有明確意識，且有正面處理，他描述法稱的正面處理是一種 ascending scales of analysis
1.2. 4. Dreyfus的分析手段（以藏傳注疏為資源）～四階物質存有：
（a）不可分割、不可得見的單子
（b）單子構成成較大、較複雜的分子
*（c）分子構成可被感知的、僅具單一(五)根形式的積聚體（collection）
*（d）一般經驗中的、五根形式綜合（共感）的對象（coarse）

[hr]

2.An Alternative Interpretation
2.1.標準解讀：法稱學說認為積聚的、單一感官形式對象的整體物件與一般經驗中、五感綜合的物件皆非實有

2.2 文獻證據（一）反對標準解讀（p. 87-88）:

正理學派：佛教反對概念化之共相的實存，但根識之對象涉及到極微的積聚，這當中便已涉及了概念化的構作，所以佛教（阿毘達磨）的說法有內部矛盾。



法稱：根現量並非以極微之實際綜合體為對象，而是極微的積聚本身。單子本身不具認識效力，於是說單子並非現量之所行對象。唯有組合能引起認識，所以說組合的共相也為現量所行。由此，物質實有不可被化約為單子構作，而標準解讀於此獲得推翻。

2.3 文獻證據（二）反對標準解讀（p. 88）:

正理學派：若無統一的整體，怎麼能有統一的經驗對象？



法稱：如芝麻粒之間並不需要一個特定結構關係來允許我們認識到這一堆芝麻，而芝麻堆的確可被認識到，而且既然它們分別都對認識有效力，它們之整體也一樣，因此也是實有。

2.4 上兩則文獻證據，一方面與法稱薄弱的本體論立場相悖，一方面也有違他在他處說過的「物質實有可被化約為單子構作」（Dreyfus 稱：源自世親）

2.5 Dreyfus: 本體論上，法稱反實在論立場驅使他必須將現實延展體化約為極微，但在知識論上，既然現量反應實在性格，法稱非得接受某種程度的延展體為實有。
迫使法稱得有非常複雜的本體論立場！

2.6 以一場辯論為例（Śākya Chok-den），來檢視且綜覽法稱的問題：
所有與辯者共許不可再分的單子以及意識之動態（moment）為實有，而在延展體之實有與否上有出入：
（a）與標準解讀立場一致：唯有單子與意識之動態為實有，延展物非實有
（b）實有範圍可納入單一根形式的積聚體 (collection)
（c）實有範圍可納入一般經驗物（coarse）

[hr]

3. No Extended Object Can Be Real (標準詮釋)

3.1 困境（p. 90）：（按，如世親對毘婆沙宗之批評）假如空間中的延展體是實有，則其部份（spatial parts）也是實有，則這個延展體要不就是與其延展的各部份一致，要不就是不一致，而這兩者都不可能，因為如果一致，則實際上，一個延展體就是一個帶有各延展部份的延展體，這麼一來，會讓一個整體的延展體成為「多（部份）」而讓其各部份成為「一（整體）」（按，即作為整體其系統性不被納入此觀點，而作為部份，其合目的性也不被納入此觀點）；按，另一方面，如果不一致，則兩者皆為實有則自相矛盾。

結論：於是如同 Śākya Chok-den的立場，要讓整體可被化約為部份之積聚，必須把（不可分割的）部份視為實有，而其積聚卻可成為我們認識的對象（對認識有效力）。
這雷同於現代學者對法稱的「標準解釋」

3.2 問題：那延展物之本體狀態為何？
3.2.1 若延展物非實有，則成為「常」，若說共相為常，那還可以接受，那單一（五）根形式的積聚（collection)，如顏色、形狀等也是常嗎？
3.2.2 一些藏傳注疏家與現代學者硬生生地堅持色、形狀等也是常。
3.2.3 Śākya Chok-den的解決：在法稱有效力的實有（specially characterized phenomena）與無效力的概念構作之間，插入「世俗狀態」：collection本質上不同於具有效力與自性的實有，沒有實際作用，但在世俗（假名）意義上假立為有效力。
3.2.4 Go-ram-ba批評：此舉為不尊重法稱原始學說之架構，沒有正面面對法稱所處理的本體論-知識論衝突。（Dreyfus以為，Śākya Chok-den其實也不該犯這種詮釋過錯，因為他自己都承認法稱的學說採用一種ascending scale of analysis）

[hr]

4. Some Extended Objects Are Real （另類詮釋）

4.1 Sa-paṇ與其師Śākya Śrībhadra：collection也是具有因果效力的實有的一部份，實有是由不可分割的單子以及其積聚所組成，它們一起引起了我們的認識。
4.2 如果這個法稱詮釋為真，那麼一般認識對象（五感共知的對象，如瓶）呢？
4.3 Lo Ken-chen：有兩種延展物，其一為世界普遍所知、其一為哲學分析普遍所知。從世界的觀點來看，一般對象有實體；從分析觀點來看，如世親的看法，五感領域為實體，而一般對象則不為實體；從而，collection因屬五感之領域故為實體，而一般對象則非實體。
Lo Ken-chen：我們一般認識中，我們其實只認識到各種單一（五）感領域之結合，而從未認識到物體整體本身。我們以為作為一個個體的對象，其實是種無法經驗的抽象物。

[hr]

5. Extension in Space and Time

5.1 時序上的積聚實有嗎？我們無法實際經驗到時間的整體，而只經驗到時序的延展，這與空間延展有性格上根本的差異（按，空間延展之各部份「共時存有」，時間延展之各部份本質上就是異時的），於是（Sa-gya學者）說：時間的延展非實有。

5.2 Go-ram-ba與Śākya Chok-den：如同法稱反破數論派（論諸個體與自然整體是否皆為實有）、或Sa-paṇ反破素樸實在論者一樣，如果時間延展為實有，那麼其與其部份要不就是一致，要不就是不一致，但兩者都不正確。
5.2.1如果說一致的話（具有同等實有性格），則
5.2.1.1 第一瞬間要不就可以實際地與第二瞬間分離，這本質上有違延展之義；
5.2.1.2要不第一瞬間在第二瞬間之後各瞬間也都必須持存，這就成了「常住」的實有，這也不正確
5.2.2 若不一致，則「都是實有」就不正確

5.3 上述論點基礎在於：延展體之整體與其部份不能基於（決定於）共同的外因（極微的積聚）
5.3.1 因：若延展體之實際整體為其部份之實在的總和，則部份的生滅就造成整體的生滅
5.3.2 於是：若兩者不決定於共同的外因，就不能同時具有實在性
5.5.3 Sa-paṇ：四種差異
5.3.3.1 形狀等實有物與可觸摸的對象不同；僅有此項涉及本體差異，以下接無涉及本體論狀態與價值
5.3.3.2 如虛無等非實有的現象與存有之事物本體論上不為同一；不涉及本體差異，因涉及「準實體」，所以只是「準本體差異」
5.3.3.3 常與事物在概念上有差別，但實際上為同一實有
5.3.3.4「月」與「寒光」皆為同一對象之不同名相

[hr]

6. All Extended Objects Are Real

6.1 基於第5部份的困境，Sa-paṇ等第三組西藏學者認為：collection與coarse物件都是實有～這也比較符合一般常識的直覺。（Dreyfus：這個立場其實有出現於法稱的談論中，他偶爾說道瓶、火、煙等常識中的對象為實有，而Ge-luk 格魯派的立場與此相應。）

6.2 Dreyfus：其實西藏學者大多都傾向認同於一般常識的直覺，只是看是要把一般常識中對象的實有歸為「世俗實有」（e.g. Go-ram-ba）或者「真正實有」。

6.3 Dreyfus：不過這種傾向，卻不常見於印度注疏文獻。大部分印度思想家都把coarse對象歸在實有範圍之外，這應當源自他們對阿毘達磨外在實在論之領受。

6.4 Dreyfus藉上點批評Stcherbasky：Stcherbasky的詮釋中，法稱將自相看作一種超越（先驗）且先天的東西，而一般常識的對象歸到實有範圍之外。Dreyfus認為：法稱這樣的歸類，應該是接受阿毘達磨的知識單子論之結果。

[hr]

7.Who Is Right?

7.1.從第3~6部份，並非詮釋家的詮釋問題，而是法稱自身體系之複雜所致。Dreyfus援引Śākya Chok-den的三層分析，一起宣稱法稱依據此一上升結構進行其知識論考察之工作：
7.1.1 一般常識層次：一切經驗對象為實有
7.1.2 深一層次第（另類詮釋觀點層次）：從五感形式分析，解構前層之預設觀念，形象（表象）與經驗對象有別
7.1.3 更深一層次第：唯有其不可分割之單子才是實有的

7.2.但是用此一結構考察，法稱仍然選擇與陳那一樣，不說第三層次為究竟真理，而朝向更符合一般經驗直覺（即第一層次）的認識實踐去調和。

[hr]

8.Yogācāra in Dharmakīrti's System

8.1 據證據，法稱有通融「延展體為實有」此一常識立場之傾向，但若僅限於collection層面而未能涵蓋至coarse層面，怎麼回應正理派的質問：「感知當中的整體感unitariness怎麼來的？」
8.2 關於實有的問題，究竟的答案其實得回到「認識」來找，特別是perception，以及其於客觀事物之關係。
8.3 兩種觀點之間：
_____1 單子構成collections，每個單子對一個「整體的」感知都有貢獻，但不必具有此整體性
_____2 單子在積聚之中「得到了」兩種面向：不可得（感知）之極微面向與可得之coarse面向。
Kaluphana：毘婆沙宗採2；經量部採1
服部正明與Keyt（依據窺基的注疏）：毘婆沙宗採1；經量部採2

8.4 Dreyfus認為，這兩觀點源自兩個「形上現實論」預設：
_____1.認識如實反應外在實在
_____2.外在實在為單子之積聚

8.5 這一部份，Dreyfus說，法稱依循陳那的系統，拒絕了上述的預設：
8.5.1 陳那（《Investigation of Objects》）：既然構成物件的單子不能分別形成延展的認識，所以說「外在有實有物與我們的認識相應」是不可能的。
8.5.2 外道或許回應：單子個別不會形成認識，可是其積聚會形成認識啊？
陳那：若單子散亂積聚，我們因以樹林概念、名相認識這些零散積聚而以為時有樹林，但實際上只是單子零散堆積，而外在無樹林此一整體。若單子有序積聚，如軍隊，此序屬於認識，而非外在。故整體性之認識基礎不會在外。（按，intersubjectivity）
8.5.3 法稱並沒有區分無序與有序之積聚，但隨陳那宣稱：認識並非反應外在實有，而是反應我們如何認識它們。每個單子對認識（之形象）有作用以至於我們能感知延展體，並非我們的認識反應了外在物之存在狀態。（按，一切皆representation但並非representational theory）
8.5.4 於是，法稱帶入第四個層次（瑜伽行觀點）：
.既然（a）延展體與單子既不能一致（因作為延展體本質尚可切分，而單子無法再切分），也不能不一致（兩者間之關聯會失去），且（b）既然我們從未經驗過所謂外在存在的單子，我們拒絕一切外在實在，所以（c）外在物之為外在是因為我們把它認識為外在的（相分），而我們以為事物存在於外是出於「見分-相分」此一認識結構之結果，事實上並沒有外在實在。

[hr]

9.Is Dharmakīrti Contradicting Himself?

若法稱認為究竟解答落於此瑜伽行模型，那為何在他的文獻中鮮少見到證據？
Dreyfus：如同佛陀在所有教法中講空性實相者最少，法稱也是就「教育策略」考量而不總是直接談論究竟道理。

[hr]
文獻資料：
Georges B. J. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations, Chapters 2-4 （pdf）]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Sat, 18 Dec 2010 23:48:30 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,9623,9623#msg-9623 《因明正理門論》現量部份 (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,9623,9623#msg-9623 T32n1628_p0003b11(04)║彼聲喻等攝在此中。故唯二量。由此能了自共相故。
T32n1628_p0003b12(00)║
T32n1628_p0003b13(15)║非離此二別有所量為了知彼更立餘量。故本頌言。
T32n1628_p0003b14(00)║　現量除分別　　餘所說因生

譯：要使自己產生認識，只有通過「現量」與「比量」這兩個知識根源。（古因明、正理派的）聲教量與譬喻量，皆包含在這兩者之中，所以說只有這二量，這是因為透過此二者可以了知自相與共相的緣故，而並非在此自相、共相之外還有他者需要另立他量來了知。所以本頌說：「現量者，離概念思維分別者；其餘（比量）者，由因（三項）推論而得之知識。」

現量：直接知識（直觀、直接感知）的根源、認識條件或工具。
比量：間接知識（概念、概念思維或構作）的根源、認識條件或工具。
由於認識當中一切對象惟且皆有自相、共相二面向之別，所以推說認識的前在條件唯有二者，分別命名作現量與比量。

T32n1628_p0003b15(00)║此中現量除分別者。
T32n1628_p0003b16(08)║謂若有智於色等境遠離一切種類名言。假立無異諸門分別。
T32n1628_p0003b17(00)║由不共緣現現別轉。故名現量。故說頌言。
T32n1628_p0003b18(00)║　有法非一相　　根非一切行
T32n1628_p0003b19(00)║　唯內證離言　　是色根境界

譯：其中所謂「現量除分別者」，指的是對色（聲、香、味、觸）等對象的正確認識（智），而且不與一切種類（jāti如牛）、專有名詞（nāmen如陳那）等（後來可形成言說者）相關聯者。於下（對現量之區分）僅是以（分析、方法地）名詞來分別推定各種不同現量，實際上各門別無差異（可參照PSV 5長行）。各種現量（不依所緣對象如色境等命名，而）依眼等根（色根）命名為現量（pratyakṣa，與根有關者），是因為（根）為不共因（緣），各根分別對應對象之各面向而不相互雜染。所以頌言說：「有法具有雜多面向，而透過根現量所認識的並非共相；內在地認識離分別言說者，是色等根的對象。」

PSV 5 長行：為了回應他宗，所以分別就各種現量說明，但是實際上，現量者，惟離分別者。

不共因（緣）：對象（境）雖然也有各根所對應之面向（色等境），但是這些面向之成為認識對象，也需要其他根（官能）所共同促成（如需要意根的分別、摭取以成對象），所以若要分別命名現量的話，必須依根，不依境。（參見《集量論》四～六頌，服部正明認為此說依據於世親，世親提供兩種依根不依境來命名現量的理由：一、根強則識強；二、不共因：境為多人之根所共取，因境為共因，不具標示簡別作用，故不依境。連結；若依世親之不共因理由，則偏向外在實在論觀點。若依前述境必須牽涉意根而無現現別轉之說，則不必落入外在實在論立場，因境能為多人所共取是透過意識作用與邏輯達到。陳那所言「由不共緣現現別轉」，其實已經脫離落入外在實在論立場的危險。）

內證：現量之認識為「內在」，是因為（作為結果的）認識若連結於外境的話，其意根之作用是將對象進行分別理解而產生對外境之認識（自證），這就與「現量離分別」的要求相悖了。但這裡是單就前五根所言。前五根僅能由內證才能簡別（specify）其現量認識之特質，若是外證（已形成時空中的實際認識），則已有分別了。但意現量是另一回事。

T32n1628_p0003b20(00)║意地亦有離諸分別唯證行轉。
T32n1628_p0003b21(04)║又於貪等諸自證分。諸修定者離教分別皆是現量。

譯：意根的認識也有離分別而單單認識其形相者（對認識之認識），這也是現量；另外，對意識自身如慾望等感受的直接認識，也是現量。反正只要是符合離分別此一標準的，都是現量。

《莊嚴疏》：證行，證為證受，行指行相（akara）；證受，即了知，行相，即顯像。（沈劍英2007，頁118）

T32n1628_p0003b22(01)║又於此中無別量果。以即此體似義生故。
T32n1628_p0003b23(01)║似有用故假說為量。

譯：另外，在量的運作、產生之中，其實並不與其結果有所分別，這是因為其結果就近在其運作之體內，而顯相為內外的緣故，看似有實際產生之作用，但實際上沒有，稱之為「量/工具」，也只是假名安立而已。

其實這裡已經比《集量論》說明得更清楚，《集量論》只說量與量果之分為假名安立，實無有分；《門論》清楚地說明：量的作用並無實際作用。勝主智之《集量論大疏》的解釋（量之生產並無實際生產過程，如光之映照自身，其能照亮是其性質，而非有一實際照亮自身的生產過程），或許就是根據於《門論》。

T32n1628_p0003b24(09)║若於貪等諸自證分亦是現量。何故此中除分別智。

譯：[或許有人會問：]假如貪等自證也是現量所認識，那麼經由分別所產生的對象也是現量的對象，怎麼還能說現量是離分別的認識？

T32n1628_p0003b25(05)║不遮此中自證。現量無分別故。

譯：[答說：]分別的對象是產生貪等感受的對象，而此分別對於認識對此些感受直接的認識並無妨礙，所以說現量離分別還是可以成立的。


T32n1628_p0003b26(09)║但於此中了餘境分不名現量。由此即說。
T32n1628_p0003b27(10)║憶念比度悕求疑智惑亂智等於麤愛等皆非現量。
T32n1628_p0003b28(05)║隨先所受分別轉故。

譯：但是除此之外其他[非離分別]的對象[之面向]，就不稱作現量[的對象]了（，即，除了五根現量、意現量之外，沒有其他現量種類了—瑜伽現量於《集量論》中有討論，連結。）因此，也就是說，憶念（過去）、比度（比較、分析、度量、計算、類比現前對象）、悕求（未來）、疑智（不定）、惑亂智（幻想、官能失常）等如麤愛等，都不是現量[的對象]。這都是因為這些對象都牽涉到了已經經驗過的分別對象而被分別了。

麤愛：
慧沼《因明入正理論疏》：「西域共呼陽炎為鹿愛。以鹿熱渴謂之為水而生愛故。」（鄭偉宏：鹿渴時是陽炎為水而生愛）
回諍論：「若鹿愛中妄取水體。非因緣生。汝喻相當。鹿愛因緣彼顛倒見。顛倒見者以不觀察因緣而生。如是得言因緣而生。」海市蜃樓。


T32n1628_p0003b29(14)║如是一切世俗有中瓶等數等舉等有性瓶性等智。皆似現量。
T32n1628_p0003c01(06)║於實有中作餘行相假合餘義分別轉故。

譯：同理，像一切世俗認識中瓶等、數等、舉等、有性、瓶性等認識（皆因涉及概念分別）而為似現量。這是因為這些認識都是在（通過認識之後被顯像（相分）為）實體對象上，再以[意識的概念構作連結]其他對象所產生的新的組合認識實體的緣故。

瓶等：（鄭偉宏）舉勝論派六句義「實」（實體）、德（實體之性質）、業（實體之運動）、大有（存在性）、同異（事物之共性與特性）、和合（前五巨義之相合不離），因皆為已被認識（故已透過意之分別作用而產生），所以為似現量。「似」，因為不依五根或意根（非因緣生），而是依意根之分別之重組構作；似「現量」，因為透過意之直接性而恰似「直接經驗」。

似現量除幻覺外，其他對象與對象之間以關係連結而組成的新對象，如果「關係」合乎邏輯條件，則為可靠的推論，是為比量的對象，若「關係」不能成立，則非比量對象。]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Tue, 30 Nov 2010 23:20:14 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,9012,9012#msg-9012 The Meaning of 義 in Dignāga's《Nyāyamukha》 (1 reply) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,9012,9012#msg-9012 Nyāyamukha

{In the beginning of the Mukha where Dignāga explains the attempt he tries to achieve in the mukha, we find the term Yi (義, artha) has to be understood in the context of cognition.}

為欲簡持能立能破義中真實故造斯論。
The mukha is made in order to genuinely specify the object of that through which the establishable can be established and that through which the non-establishable can be destroyed.

Verse 1a: 宗等多言說能立，是中唯隨自意，樂
Verse 1b: 為所成立說名宗，非彼相違義能遣

宗等多言說能立者，由宗因喻多言辯說他未了義，故此多言於論式等說名能立。
The verse begins with “宗等多言說能立” indicates that through the (dissertator's) inferential formula consisting of verbal theses, reasons and instances, the object which is not yet conceived by the other (interlocutor) is tried to be unfolded. Hence, these verbal apparatuses in the formula are altogether entitled “能立 (that through which the establishable can be established)”.

又以一言說能立者，為顯總成一能立性，由此應知隨有所闕名能立過。
To entitle that through which the establishable can be established with a verbal name aims at uniting the nature of the establishable, with which any (possible) lacks (in the cases) in contrast [to the full unity of such nature] should be identified, and they are entitled “the flaws of the establishable”.

言是中者，起論端義，或簡持義。
Those that are meant by “among them” refer to the objects of dissertation or of specification.

*Object of dissertation: the object referred by the verbal thesis.
*Object of specification: the object referred by the apperceptive perspective chosen by the dissertator at certain circumstance.

是宗等中，故名是中，所名唯者，是簡別義。
Because [the objects are specified in] these verbal apparatuses such as thesis etc., hence they are entitled “in them”; that which is entitled “only” indicates that [the objects are] only [restricted (and therefore are conceived) within the specified scope and hence are] objects of specification.

隨自意顯：不顧論宗隨自意立。
[The objects] appear in accordance with the [dissertator's] own apperception. [This means,] disregarding [the manifoldness of the objects of specification that can be united under the object of] the thesis, [the dissertator] specifies whatever object of specification with [the dissertator's] own apperception.

*Ouyang Jingwu: Fashang's Zhengli Yidi Shi: “The object of the thesis-subject is manifold (with many properties), now these manifold cannot all be taken into an account, but one among them can happily be selected in apperceptive construction.” 法上《正理一滴釋》云：「自宗法義有多，今不悉顧，但樂立一也(，論即是宗，故云論宗)。」

{After Dignāga unites the full nature of a proper thesis and recites the flaws identifying the improper thesis, he writes:}

因與似因多是宗法，此差別相今當顯示：
Verse 2a: 宗法於同品，謂有、非有、俱
Verse 2b: 於異品各三，有、非有、及二

[The objects specified by] reasons and pseudo-reasons are [logically] often [a part of the objects that can be specified] in the theses. The difference between them will be demonstrated through the following treaties:

[All that which can be specified in the object of dissertation, namely,] the thesis-predicates (dharma), can relate to the similar cases (sapakṣa) either as specifiable, non-specifiable, or both specifiable and non-specifiable. As well, they can relate to the dissimilar cases (vipakṣa) either as specifiable, non-specifiable or both specifiable and non-specifiable.


{Hence, the twofold meaning of the term 義, namely, 起論端義 and 簡別義 can be understood as: the object of the thesis, and the object further specified as properties of the first object. Later, Dignāga goes into the details about this.}

如是宗法三種差別，謂同品有、非有、及俱，先除「及」字。
Such thesis-predicates are divided into three kinds: specifiable in the similar cases, non-specifiable in the similar cases, and both specifiable and non-specifiable in the similar cases. The word “and” was omitted in convenience in the previous verse.

此中，若品與所立法鄰近均等，說名同品，以一切義皆名品故。
In them, (when distributing all the possible cases under the entries of all the possible predicates,) the cases that fall close to (namely, in the same group of) the object of dissertation specified by the thesis-predicate are entitled “the class of the similar cases”, because all the objects (in the first sense, as the objects of dissertation) are so entitled in classes, (i.e., with class names).

*All the objects are so entitled in classes, because, since the object of dissertation is manifold and further analyzable, such a distribution is valid.

若所立無，說名異品。
The class in which the object of dissertation in the thesis does not fall, (namely, the exclusion of the class of the similar cases) are entitled “dissimilar cases”.

非與同品相違或異，若相違者應唯簡別，若別異者應無有因。
(The distinction between the class of the similar cases and the class of the dissimilar cases) is not identified by contrary or by difference. If by contrary, it will be JUST too specific, (for the class of the cases with property contrary to property A takes ONLY part of the class exclusive of property A). If by difference, the class will contain cases in which (although the thesis-predicate is specifiable,) the reason-predicate is not specifiable.]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Thu, 11 Nov 2010 01:58:24 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,8915,8915#msg-8915 A Step Back: What's the Point to Be Critical? [Dignāga's Nyāyamukha] (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,8915,8915#msg-8915
Ou-yang Jing-wu 歐陽竟無 attaches a nice brief commentary to the 《Nyāyamukha》 in 《Zangyao藏要》, which begins by pointing out that the essence of the logic rests upon its “productivity and creativity” (有產生創立之能) so that the study of it surpasses any other empirical sciences which can never transcend their own predicaments (無超跡（走＋亦）濟窮之望). His analysis of the text, which holds that the part of the establishing (能立) of the text is divided in (a) the criteria for, or true meaning of, the proper thesis (能立) and (b) the means for it (立具), namely, the pramana (perception and inference). By the above, we can say that Ou-yang would agree with the approach as well to put logic back to its epistemological context, and we can even say that he is aware of the function of the additional dimension (pramana as “conditions”) that makes the transcendence in spiritual development possible.

An instance of the incongruent conflict is between (a) logic is inductive and (b) logic is deductive. When both (a) and (b) are restricted in the scope of the results of cognition, they are contradictory to each other. When we know that the science of the conditioned is valid for all that can ever happen must be so conditioned, the empirical rules we obtained in experience and the necessary logic functions which allow for inferential reasoning find their grounds in logical function of cognition itself.

Another instance of the conflict is between (a) the universe (i.e., the synthesis of space and time) is close and (b) the universe is open. If (a), then (a-1) there must be an independent first cause for time must have a beginning, (a-2) there must be a simple, non-divided basic entity for otherwise the close composition of the universe would become impossible, (a-3) the developments of all existents must be determined in causality, and (a-4) the world in itself as the a priori cause must be there. If (b), then (b-1) time never begins, for the beginning of it presupposes a previous stage, (b-2) no smallest spatial unit exists, for the division of space is in infinite regress, (b-3) beside of the natural causality, there must be an additional cause (free from temporal order) so that the first cause happens not a priori but in every activity of cognition, for otherwise there is no possibility for development at all, and (b-4) the world in itself as a cause is impossible. If (a) is located in the scope of the result of cognition, while (b) is located in the scope of the conditions for the cognition, while both scopes are regarded as one and the same world in a proper identification of perspective, i.e., (a) as the resulted/produced of logic while (b) as the producing operation of logic in so far as the production here is remarked as without a real process in time, the illusoriness of the conflict in between would be unfolded.

If (a) the universe is close and (b) the universe is open are found congruent, a spiritual development from the constrained to liberty can then happen as a dynamical process, in a sense that, in stead of the development as one-way from the constrained to liberty, the dialectics between the constrained and the liberty self-sustainingly continue to happen in parallel and get entangled with each other. It then follows that on the one hand, the validity of empirical sciences and the values of morality in our experience find their effective supporting ground, and, on the other hand, the spiritual development and freedom are possible as well. This philosophical perspective echos with Nagarjuna's middle way as well: do not fall into the persistence in grasping 有見 and the nihilism 斷滅.]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Thu, 28 Oct 2010 11:15:51 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,8762,8762#msg-8762 Logic and the Non-perceivable (II) [Dignāga's Nyāyamukha] (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,8762,8762#msg-8762 T32n1628_p0001c23(00)║　依第五顯喻　　由合故知因

1.
鄭偉宏（2007）：五支作法：
我常（宗）I am permanent (thesis)
不為根所覺者（因）not perceived by the senses (proof)
如虛空（喻）like emptyness (instances)
我是不為根所覺者（合）I am not perceived by the senses (combination)
我常（結）I am permanent (conclusion)

2.
第五顯喻：lna-bahi mthah-candpe（第五顯喻集量作有第五轉聲之喻，〈因明正理門論本證文〉）
《因明入正理論疏》（窺基）：「第五轉聲。由者因由。第三轉攝。因由敵證。」
T44n1840_p0133b20(17)║似同法喻有其五種一能立法不成二所立法不成。三俱不成四無合五倒合。　述曰。
T44n1840_p0133b21(01)║下依生正釋有二。初標列。後別解。標列有二。
T44n1840_p0133b22(01)║初標列同。後標列異。此初也。因名能立。
T44n1840_p0133b23(03)║宗法名所立。同喻之法。必須具此二。因貫宗喻。
T44n1840_p0133b24(02)║喻必有能立。令宗義方成。喻必有所立。
T44n1840_p0133b25(04)║令因義方顯。今偏或雙。於喻非有。故有初三。
T44n1840_p0133b26(03)║喻以顯宗。令義見其邊極。不相連合。所立宗義不明。
T44n1840_p0133b27(00)║照智不生。故有第四。初標能以所逐。
T44n1840_p0133b28(03)║有因宗必定隨逐。初宗以後因。乃有宗以因其逐。
T44n1840_p0133b29(00)║返覆能所。令心顛倒。共許不成。他智翻生。
T44n1840_p0133c01(01)║故有第五。依增勝過但立此五。
T44n1840_p0133c02(06)║故無無結及倒結等。以似翻真故亦無合結。

An instance (no matter similar or dissimilar) can be analyzed/checked with the following five elements: (1) proof-predicate, (2) thesis-predicate, (3) the residence of the former two in the instance (?), (4) the relation between the instance and the thesis-predicate (?) and the (5) co-occurrence of the proof-predicate and the thesis-predicate assured through the similar instances and the dissimilar instances (?)

初標：能以所逐，有因、宗必定隨逐；初宗以後因，乃有宗以因其逐，反覆能所、令心顛倒、共許不成，他智翻生。

3.
TRANSLATION
說因宗所隨，　　宗無因不有；
依第五顯喻，　　由合故知因。
The proof-predicate and the thesis-subject must co-occur in the thesis-subject; the proof-predicate does not reside alone in the thesis-subject without the thesis-predicate. Owing to the fifth fold of determination in the instances, the proof is perceived from the combination-part of the five-part inference.

*The fifth fold of determination in the instances: consulting with Kuiji's Shuji, the fifth moment/fold in the formation of proper similar and dissimilar instances assures, i.e., make perceived, the necessary co-occurrence of the proof-predicate and the thesis-predicate. For instance, “where there is fire, there is smoke, while where there is no fire, there is no smoke” makes the rule “fire and smoke must co-occur” perceived.

*Combination-part: in the pre-Dignāga five-part inference, the combination-part makes perceived the determination between the thesis-subject and the proof-predicate. The making-perceived of the determination occurs when the necessity of the co-occurrence of the proof-predicate and the thesis-predicate is perceived through the instances.

4.
In Dignāga's epistemology, the objective form and the subjective form which belong to the same item, for they share a mutual formal conformity, appear as outside and inside. Thus, the mind appears to exist as well. In a Critical Epistemological reflection of the idea stated above, the formal conformity has to do with the logical function of the judgment/cognition, which makes possible the logic on the one side and the appearances on the other side.

Yet, the appearance of an object is manifold, e.g., the real cup appears to me can be grasped with the idea “this cup is white”, “this cup is extensive”, “this cup is on the desk”.... All the grasping activities are the “application of conceptual constructions to the appearance”, which means the “affinity” of all possible conceptual constructions makes the logical space of analysis of the corresponding object. Since all the conceptual constructions can be applied to the appearance, no matter supported by the senses or not, the “affinity” itself equates the appearance of the object. This supplies for the assumption in the NM (Nyāyamukha) inference that the thesis-predicate and proof-predicate can reside in the same thesis-subject.

Among all possible conceptual constructions, three relational types can be divided. As predicate to subject, the relation can only be accidentally real but can be assured with the present support of the senses, e.g., the mountain has smoke, the mountain is green. As cause and effect, the relation must be necessary, i.e., anything happens must has its cause in the previous stage in which it must have been through. As reciprocal relation, something whose causal relation to another object is never interfered by a third object, must stand with the third simultaneously. From the three, the temporal form in which objects appear (as duration, succession and co-existence) become possible. The temporal logical functions supply for the assumption in the NM inference that any object must stand with some objects as “similar group” and “dissimilar group”, for (a) as an object, i.e., an affinity, several onto-predicates must reside in it, (b) among the onto-predicates, the causes or effects reside in the subject in an irreversible fashion, (c) from (a) and (b) the rules of co-occurrence in succession order could be established in experience, and the groups become possible (either as having the same specific observable onto-predicate, or as having the same specific non-observable onto-predicate which can be proved via another rule of co-occurrence via causality).

The sharp distinction between the perceivable and the non-perceivable (empirical reality v.s. transcendental ideality): that which can be perceived can be classified with the rules we induced from the accumulation of the past cases, for the past cases are so perceived; that which can never be perceived can nonetheless be classified with the pure rules of the logical functions of judgment, for we can not do otherwise, e.g., that which is not perceivable is different (from what we can ever know). This supplies for the assumptions in the NM inference: (empirically) once we perceive that sound is perceivable, we can know that sound and all the perceivable belong to the same group; (empirically) we induce the rule about the group that all that is perceivable is not permanent; (logically) we create a group of the non-perceivable for we know that all the perceivable belong to the same group; (logically) we assume that that which does not belong to this group does not have the most general onto-predicate shared by all the cases of the group, so we assume that all that is not perceivable is not impermanent, for all that is permanent must be perceivable. However, the non-perceivable and the permanent are not onto-predicates; the best, they are the Jiaming 假名 which does not have any substance and could be a possible verbal predicate whose sensible support can not be found but whose ideal support can be found in the logical functions of judgment itself.]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Thu, 21 Oct 2010 02:55:31 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,8606,8606#msg-8606 Logic and the Non-perceivable (I) [Dignāga's Nyāyamukha] (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,8606,8606#msg-8606 T32n1628_p0001b29(01)║如有成立最勝為有。現見別物有總類故。
T32n1628_p0001c01(00)║或立為無。不可得故。其義云何。

1.最勝：primordial matter (pradhāna), postulated to be existent by the Sāṅkhyas數論（Tucci, 沈劍英, 鄭偉宏）, primary and unevolved matter or nature (M.W.)
2.*總類：二十三諦總屬於自性諦（沈劍英、鄭偉宏）, general analogy (Tucci),
3.不可得：Chinese Buddhism's key term, e.g. in《金剛經》etc. ，桂紹隆：anupalabdhi, non-cognition
4.TRANSLATION:
夫立宗法，理應更以餘法為因成立此法。若即成立有法為有、或立為無，如有成立「最勝為有，現見別物有總類故」，或立為「無，不可得故」，其義云何？
(The question might be proposed): “whenever a thesis-predicate is to be established, it should be the case that another predicate (to the thesis-subject) be employed as the proof to establish the [thesis]-predicate. But suppose we are to establish that the subject exists or not, for instances, to establish, if it is the positive case, that “the primordial matter (pradhāna) exists, because all that appears to the aware being must belong to the ultimate class of the primordial matter”, or to establish, if it is the negative case, that “nothing (no primordial matter really) exists, because it cannot be perceived”, what is the *meaning/matter?


T32n1628_p0001c02(05)║此中但立別物定有一因為宗。不立最勝故。無此失。
T32n1628_p0001c03(01)║若立為無。亦假安立不可得法。
T32n1628_p0001c04(05)║是故亦無有有法過。若以有法立餘有法。或立其法。

1.假安立：in a figurative sense (upacāra, Tussi); 假 by means of;

2.*有有法過：有「有法的過失」（因談論對象不屬於有法之範疇）

3.TRANSLATION
此中但立「別物定有*一因」為宗，不立最勝，故無此失。若立為「無」，亦假安立「不可得法」，是故，亦無有有法過。
Here (in the case of the Sāṅkhyas) the thesis to be established is actually that *any thing (that belongs to the 23 categories) must belong to the most general category of having a cause – not the existence of the primordial matter, so there is no flaw. As for (the Buddhist case trying to) establish that nothing (no primordial matter) exists, [the proposition] is completed by means of verbally attributing “that which cannot be perceived (anupalabhdi)” to [the inference], and hence there is no such an flaw of the objects of substance (for both the subject/thesis and the predicate/reason are verbally figurative, and the criteria for the objects of substance does not work in this case).

4.The four kinds of pseudo-proof consists of a complete condition for a proper proof, namely, (1) the subject in the thesis, the predicate in the thesis and the proof-predicate must be or can be determined in cognitions; (2) the relation that the predicate in the thesis is attributed to the subject of the thesis is problematic, namely, to be proved – but the relation must be possible; (3) the relation that the proof-predicate can be attributed to the thesis-subject must be valid. Required is also (4) the assumption that the relation between the proof-predicate and the thesis-predicate must be valid in a way that the former could help establish the relation that the latter can be attributed to the thesis subject. All of the four folds of the condition must correspond to the necessary condition of cognition so that the validity of the condition for a proper proof makes sense. However, on the other hand, the discussion about the ultimate truth, namely, about the existence of the primordial matter, or the non-perceivable, is tricky.

If the three parts of the inference, namely, the thesis-subject, thesis-predicate and the proof-predicate must be determinable, that is, must be possible for our experience, and if the structure of these parts must be determinable as well, the object pre-cognition becomes problematic. Dignāga's discussion about the fourth kind of pseudo-proof and the following discussion about the Sāṅkhyas's and Buddhist's inference about the existence of primordial matter exactly rests upon the middle of the problem.

If an object could become a candidate for a proper thesis-subject, it must be perceivable. If a perceivable object could become real, its properties must be on the one hand distinguished/recognized and on the other hand perceived as attributing to it. Now, if something which is never possible to be an object of cognition, what could be the status of “its predicates”?

To understand the part about Sāṅkhyas requires further research. However, the Buddhist part is quite clear. The thesis-subject and the thesis predicate are made only in a figurative sense. And this is out of the scope of the existing objects 有法. This indicates that the scope of inference is restricted with the cognizable objects and states of affairs. If it is the case, then the role of logic in the context of Buddhist soteriology becomes more interesting.

In 《金剛經》(Jing gang jing), it is said that “若見諸相非相，即見如來”; in 《法華經》, it is said that “一切諸相，皆悉空寂”、“無有二相，猶如虛空”;傅大士 attaches the verse to the Jing gang Jing paragraph that “如來舉身相，為順世間情，恐人生斷見，權且立虛名，假名三十二，八十也空聲”; similarly, 川禪師 attaches that “有相有求俱是妄，無形無見墮偏枯，堂堂密密何曾間，一道寒光爍太虛”; 《中論觀法品》： “如佛經中說，斷有斷非有，是故知涅槃，非有亦非無”; if the jin gang jing verse is understood, following the fa hua jing verse, as “if it is perceived that both the representations and pre-representations are both illusory, the ultimate true status is perceived”, then the attempt of Nāgārjuna's “一切實、非實，亦實亦非實，非實非非實，是名諸佛法”and the attempt of such a Buddhist logic of Dignāga becomes identical.
At the Nāgārjuna side, the attempt is understood as four steps: (1) to know it exists, where our consciousness arises, (2) to know it does not exist, where our consciousness ceases, (3) to know that it exists (when our consciousness arises) and that it does not exist (when our consciousness ceases), where it is known that no matter that it exists or that it does not exist, it is both merely the product of our consciousness, hence (4) to know that it (the non-perceivable) is not a matter of existence, i.e., the attribution of existing or not-existing has nothing to do with it. The logic supporting a proper inference explains in an exhaustive fashion the products, and their relations, of the arising and ceasing of our consciousness. When the exhaustiveness is known, that is, when all the cognizable are restricted within the scope of representation, namely, when all the representations and the non-representations are taken “merely” as representations (which has its validity ONLY within its own domain), the true nature of everything is “perceived” – the non-perceivable is “perceived”.

To put in dimensional model, let's say (x,y), while x is the dimension of existence while y is the dimension of non-existence. (1, 0) is to know it is; (0,1) is to know it is not; (1,1) is to know it is and it is not; (0,0) is to know it neither is nor is not. The empirical sequence, the sequence these possibilities gets aware of, is: (1,0) then (0,1) then (1,1) then (0,0) ; however, with a transcendental concern, it is nonetheless the case that the four possibilities of (1,0), (0,1), (1,1) & (0,0) must be altogether already there so that there could be possibly (1,0) and (0,1). The "transcendental logic" is then the frame (x,y), whose operation makes each of the four possibilities possible as real ((1,0) & (0,1)), or ideal "-- valid figurative" ((1,1) & (0,0)).]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Wed, 13 Oct 2010 23:12:21 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,8403,8403#msg-8403 桂紹隆（Shoryu KATSURA）因明正理門論研究七篇及其他著作 (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,8403,8403#msg-8403 因明正理門論研究（一）
広島大学文学部紀要 Vol.37 page.106-126 (19771215)

因明正理門論研究（二）
広島大学文学部紀要 Vol.38 page.110-130 (19781215)

因明正理門論研究（三）
広島大学文学部紀要 Vol.39 page.63-82 (19791215)

因明正理門論研究（四）
広島大学文学部紀要 Vol.41 page.62-82 (19811215)

因明正理門論研究（五）
広島大学文学部紀要 Vol.42 page.82-99 (19821215)

因明正理門論研究（六）
広島大学文学部紀要 Vol.44 page.43-74 (19841224)

因明正理門論研究（七）
広島大学文学部紀要 Vol.46 page.46-65 (19870131)

カルナカゴーミン作『量評釈第1章復注』和訳研究(1)
広島大学文学部紀要 Vol.54 page.22-40 (19941220)

カルナカゴーミン作『量評釈第1章復注』和訳研究(2)
広島大学文学部紀要 Vol.56 page.38-55 (19961227)

インド論理学における遍充概念の生成と発展 : チャラカ・サンヒターからダルマキールティまで
広島大学文学部紀要. 特輯号 Vol.45 no.1 page.1-122 (19860115)

ダルマキールティ『他相続の存在論証』 : 和訳とシノプシス
広島大学文学部紀要 Vol.43 page.102-120 (19831224)




資料來源：廣島大學學術情報網]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Fri, 08 Oct 2010 17:33:48 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,8329,8329#msg-8329 Pseudo-thesis, proof, and facts [Dignāga's Nyāyamukha] (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,8329,8329#msg-8329 T32n1628_p0001b18(00)║如有成立聲是無常。眼所見故。
T32n1628_p0001b19(04)║又若敵論不同許者。如對顯論所作性故。
T32n1628_p0001b20(04)║又若猶豫如依煙等起疑惑時。成立大種和合火有。
T32n1628_p0001b21(00)║以現煙故。或於是處有法不成。
T32n1628_p0001b22(03)║如成立我其體周遍於一切處。生樂等故。
T32n1628_p0001b23(03)║如是所說一切品類所有言詞皆非能立。
T32n1628_p0001b24(04)║於其同品有非有等。亦隨所應當如是說。


1.*顯論：vyākaraṇam. The school admits that sound appears by means of the satisfaction of condition of all the aware beings, but does not admit it is produced by the satisfaction of condition, for they hold that the sound itself as soundness has its OWN self-standing body.

2.大種和合火：According to 沈劍英, fire in ancient India is divided in 性火 elementary fire & 事火 real fire, the former is the elementary force of fire which exist in every material objects, while the latter is real burning fire which consists of the four elements: earth, water, fire and wind, and derived from the material elements (Tucci).

3.我其體週遍於一切處：我 (ātman), self, whose status as substance is rejected by Buddhists. 體is taken as the characteristic of being the substance extensive in space and continue in time. From the perspective of critical epistemology, since every object of cognition must occur in (form of) space and time, the cognition of every object can be accompanied with feelings of the subject. (Tucci also holds similar interpretation, while 沈劍英 holds another interpretation: every aware being has soul, because every aware being can produce the feelings such as joy).

4.TRANSLATION:
由是：（1）若有彼此不同許，定非宗法，如有成立「聲是無常，眼所見故」；又（2）若論敵不同許者，如對顯論所作性故；又（3）若猶豫，如依煙等起疑惑時，成立「大種和合火有，以現煙故」；或（4）於是處有法不成，如成立「我其體周遍於一切處，生樂等故」。如是所說一切品類所有言詞皆非能立，於其同品有、非有等，亦隨所應，當如是說。
Following the above reason: (1) when both parties of the debate CANNOT agree with it (the predicate to the subject of the thesis), it must not be a proper predicate to the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharma), for instance, to establish “sound is impermanent, because it is seen by the eyes”; nor (2) when the opponent CANNOT agree with it, for instance, to establish in the heart of a *vyākaraṇam opponent that “[sound is impermanent], because it is produced (which is not admitted by the vyākaraṇam)”; nor (3) when there's indetermination, for instance, when there is a doubt about [identification of] the smoke, from the observation of which it is [nonetheless] established that “there truly is the real fire produced from the material elements, because smoke appears”; or (4) [when] the substance (dharmin) CANNOT be possible at the situation, for instance, to establish “self (ātman) is pervasive, because it [can] produce feelings such as joy etc. [in all instances of consciousness]”, (while, as Buddhists hold, there is no possibility for self to be substance). The above-mentioned, exhaustive kinds of verbal proofs do not make proper inference (sādhana), and as for the decision of [belonging to] the same group [of objects] and the other categories, (the criteria for the proper inference) have to be effective as well accordingly.

5.CANNOT: The discussion here follows the previous topic beginning with “令彼憶念本極成故...”, namely, the goal of the inference is to help recollect the knowledge (in the opponent), and every empirical debate must be eventually determinable. That the empirical fact (not in an external-realistic point of view but in an epistemological sense) is always there for reference is the ground negating the four kinds of pseudo-thesis, so the categorization of the four kinds of pseudo-thesis must be originated in the logical function of judgment and hence must be conditional. Thus the translation with the term “CAN” or “CANNOT” is intended to indicate the nature of condition and to respond to the previous topic.

6.The relation between the predicate in the thesis and the predicate in the proof – why the criteria for proper thesis HAS TO be involved with proof?

The topic here is about the thesis, the criteria for proper thesis, but the criteria offered here focus on the predicate in the proof. The oddity proves that the logic formulation here is not formal, but empirical and cognition-dependent. The assumption in the formulation here include: (1) there must be valid objective facts (not in an external-realistic sense) which become experience only through the necessary condition of cognition; (2) there must be, following (1), valid objective (as well) categorization of the developments of the facts. Unless with assumption (1), to help recollect memories about the dharmin's properties (including the predicate in the subject of the thesis and the predicate in the proof) cannot on the one hand happen at all and on the other hand cannot promote the establishment of the inference. Unless with assumption (2), the proof cannot be effective in the inference.
To spell out the assumptions and their “operation”, we have to introduce the critical epistemology in the interpretation.

7.The fourth kind of improper thesis & Buddhist soteriology

If the Buddhist soteriology aims at unfolding the ineffable, whose self-nature (svhabava) and then its substance are rejected, the fourth kind of pseudo-thesis seems to rule out the room for the inference of this kind – any Buddhist doctrinal statement seems to be no topic of inference. Yet, the rejection for the ends of Buddhist soteriology to become the topic of inference turns out to be a contra-proof which on the one hand proves that all that we know is but representational and conditional, and on the other hand leaves room for the ineffable. Similar to Kant's religious attempt. We ran into the problem when reading “若非違義言聲所遣，如立一切言皆是妄” as well.]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Thu, 07 Oct 2010 10:34:34 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,7986,7986#msg-7986 Logic and Reality [Dignāga's Nyāyamukha] (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,7986,7986#msg-7986 Nyāyamukha, hetus tri-rūpaḥ]

EXAMPLE:
It is known that there is fire in the mountain,
because smoke can be observed in the mountain,
like the kitchen ranges etc. from which smoke can ONLY (eva) be observed
and unlike the lake etc. from which smoke can NEVER (naiva) be observed.

ANALYSIS in NM:
Elements:
1. 有法 (dharmin, object of inference) = the mountain (which is in possession of the property (dharma) fire)
2. 因法 (liṅga, inferential mark) = the smoke
3. （宗）同品 (sajātīya/tattulya/sapakṣa[1]; similar case/ similar to/the subject, similar instances) = kitchen ranges etc.[2]
4. （宗）異品 (vijātīya/asapakṣa/vipakṣa[3], dissimilar instances) = lake etc.
5. 定有 (eva, only)
6. 遍無 (naiva, never)
Formulation:
Three parts of the formal condition[4]:
遍是宗法性 (I) The relation that a dharmin is in possession of the dharma to-prove could be determined/inferred
with the reason (hetu) that the liṅga is observed to be possessed by the dharmin, and
同品定有性 (II) A valid reason (hetu) must contain a liṅga whose connection to the dharma in thesis
MUST be proved (eva) by all the similar instances (all the dharmins in a group always in possession of the liṅga in connection with the dharma to-prove )
異品定無性 (III) and MUST be disproved (naiva) by all the dissimilar instances (all the dharmins out of the group in possession of the liṅga in connection with the dharma to-prove ).

META-ANALYSIS:
It is obvious that we know various entities fill up the space through time, and the dynamic inclinations of development of these material entities can be classified in groups. The validity of classification allows for the formal condition of inference analyzed above – only when such validity is accepted, the determination of the dharmin-dharma relation in the thesis is ever acceptable and the “similar instances” can be distinguished from the “dissimilar instances”. Yet, from the point of view of later Dignāga in Pramanasamuccaya (PS), as well as from the point of view of any other form of critical epistemology, the validity is not convenient. On the contrary, the investigation into the validity exactly results in indicating the non-triviality and then the representational nature of such validity. After all, without this concern, a Buddhist logic cannot self-justified in the outset establishing the proper formulations for the “material entities out there in space and time”.

Later Dignāga in PS ostensively establishes a common agreement with Sautrāntika on the validity of the world as represented (suspending the issue of whether there be anything non-representational corresponding to the representations). But his essay constructing the mental means/condition of such a world represented tacitly implies that we Mahayana Buddhists have got an own groundwork, which is needed in the opponent's position as well, while, as Nāgārjuna had succeeded in refuting, a successful groundwork according to the external-realistic position is still in await.

In the following, I try to introduce a brief epistemological support for the logic formulation.

A conscious being gets him- or herself directly engaged in “the world in space and time” by on the one hand receiving anything cognized into the sensible form of space and time and on the other hand contributing the object-ness in the reception. This is required for admitting the conformity between the akara (form) of the visya (object) in visyajñāna (consciousness of the object), i.e., artharūpa (form of the entity/object), and the akara of “tatjñāna”, i.e., the jñāna of that jñāna (the consciousness of that consciousness), in anubhava (experience, perception), i.e., anubhavarūpa[5].

The two-fold action of cognition, in other words, rephrases the above obvious knowledge of the world:

Owing to the cooperation of the faculty receiving “it” in spatio-temporal form and the faculty contributing objectness for “it”, the world as well as the entities filling inside are altogether appeared on the one hand as directly known (as inside) and on the other hand as outside in object-units and in space and time. Arising from the former source of knowledge, manifoldness to be united in the affinity of consciousness is given; from the latter, the uniting structure making possible the manifoldness is contributed. Upon such an epstemic-ontological ground, we come to know that various entities filling up the space through time.

By admitting such a cooperation as the necessary condition of all possible experience, all possible entities to be cognized will then be brought in consciousness as unities which can be logically operational (no matter as forming an ontological basis or as relations thought in understanding). On the other hand, the validity is not only limited in thinking but also effective in objects “themselves” pre-thinking (yet still in space and time). I have no space here for more detailed explanation regarding the two-fold action of cognition and how the logical measures is effective in materials.

To be brief, the object-ness in all possible objects, which is contributed in cognition, allows for the following facts: (1) entities have to be known (by a conscious being) as objects; (2) a consciousness unity is an affinity of manifold dharmas, the unity of which is contributed in cognition, the manifold dharmas as content of which are given in perception, while the manifold dharmas as units of which are contributed in cognition as well; (3) (2) allows for repeatable empirical rules and consequently allows for classification.



Footnote:

1. Katsura 2007 Taipei Lecture 2 (location: http://buddhica.nccu.edu.tw/)

2. Śaṃkarasvāmin's Nyāyapraveśa, Xuanzang's translation:「謂所立法均等義品說明同品」、「異品者謂於是處無其所立」（大正藏）

3. Ibid.

4. Śaṃkarasvāmin's Nyāyapraveśa, Xuanzang's translation: hetus tri-rūpaḥ 因三相: pakṣa-dharma-tvaṃ sapakṣe sattvaṃ vipakṣe ca asattvam iti 遍是宗法性、同品定有性、異品遍無性。 (郭良鋆 1999) The three items constituting the condition of a valid inference are in a difference of aspects, since the three items are entitled “tri-rūpaḥ, 三相,” as the distinction between the “two-fold appearance” (the conformed objective form of the object artharūpa and subjective form of the object anubhavarūpa) in PS.

5. PS I, 11ab.]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Wed, 29 Sep 2010 21:46:21 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,7738,7738#msg-7738 Judgment and Reality [Dignāga's Nyāyamukha] (2 replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,7738,7738#msg-7738 Judgment and Reality
The core problem is “what is the ontically real?”, and the path to the answer rests upon the problem “what's the relation between reality and knowledge (the act to know)?”[1] However, the answer seems not to be a direct one to the “what” in the core problem. The “what” will become no matter – unless in a sense as a pure formal modification, like a world view unfolding a wider scope of life; in stead, the path leads to spiritual development, from nihilism to meaningfulness and from constraint to liberty at once. This is my main concern with and interest in Dignāga, as well as in the relation therefrom to Kant. As well, this is my perspective cutting in Nyāyamukha during the semester.

The method: with an established system of critical epistemology (CE) which is also a report of conducting the critical reflection along with accepting Dignāga's and Kant's methods and observations, on the one side, I try to continue the philosophical enquiry in both of them; on the other side, I sort of make an announcement that my responsibility in the inquiry is not to retell their theories piece by piece again but to understand their major issues (which we still have now) and solutions, and to sort them out in our own era.

With the concern to the core problem, the interpretations[2] of Dignāga's logic treating it as Greek syllogism or as formal formulations seem very odd. The point is, we want to find the condition (means) of a valid judgment in observation of making the judgment itself[3]. Katrsura points out (2007 Taipei Lecture 2) Dignāga's “logical epistemology” is integrated with the previous two traditions: (syllogistic, formal) logic in debate tradition and the pramāṇa-debates between Naiyayikas and Buddhists. With the same reason in Kant's own claiming that once the Aristotelian syllogism and categories are brought into the consideration of “the condition of all possible experience”, the logic steps into a different scope already, given how much content they share in common – I hereby also address that Dignāga's integrated logic has already a different role than the formulation role in the debate traditions.

Xuanzang's translation of NM begins with “為欲簡持能立能破義中真實故造斯論 (In order to concisely hold firmly in hand the true meaning and object of that-which-can-be-established and that-which-cannot-be-established, I make this book)”, this already entails that the book targeting no formulation, but the “condition” – that-which-can-be and that-which-cannot-be.

The established CE holds that the immediate means (perception/intuition) and the mediate means of cognition (inference/concept) are in immediate relation, which makes the condition of any possible cognition. Then, with the conformity or non-conformity between the conceptual construction as the condition of cognition which is immediately represented in space and time and the conceptual construction associated in the action of judgment, there is the value of truth and non-truth. Only then, Dignāga can establish his theory of proper inference. From “the observation of the smoke (liṅga 因) rising in the mountain” (hetu, 因), we can infer “that there is fire” (pakṣa宗), together with the previous instances (dṛṣṭānta喻) such as the fire in the kitchen is connected with smoke and with the previous instances such as the lake is not connected with smoke. Now the real experience is the observation of smoke in the mountain; with the knowledge induced from past experience (namely, the world, given cognized or to be cognized,) [4] we know that smoke can be caused by fire and nothing else so far, i.e., the smoke and the fire are two units whose relation is causally determined in our experiencing. Hence, the inference can be a proper one.

Yet, we have to make a remark here: the significance of such a theory of inference is not to assure the absolute truth value of this particular inference “there is fire in the mountain.” What is necessary is not the fire's being the cause of the existence of smoke; rather that all that can take place in the world must take place in causal networks is necessary. That is to say, the inference, though it is proper with the support we have so far, can be a mistake, as long as we find another stronger, more immediate support, for instance, a fairy's magic is making that happen to our own eyes and we can check that in our public community. The point is, there must be a truth, although all that exist are but representations.






Footnotes:

1. In India, the original Naiyayikas hold all that we can grasp is but representations and develop sophisticated epistemological treaties on “means” to knowledge, basically showing that the objects corresponding to our representations “out there” are indeed real, including the (four) means themselves (Sharma, 1997). The stand is refused by Nagārjuna who points out the contradiction to hold positive of both the reality of the means and the reality of the objects at once. Later Naiyayikas modify their own refined theories coping up with Nagārjuna, and we can find their impact upon the Abhidharma scholars (Hatorri, 吳汝鈞 trans., 2006). The development through the Abhidharma Vasubhandu to the Sautrāntika Vasubhandu coiled around determining the ontical status. Dignaga in his Pramanasamuccaya tries to deliver a common basis to Sautrāntika stand especially with regard to the theorem of akārā, namely, all that we know is but representations, suspending the decision of ontical status, and with his great effort on “Nyāya”-mukha we may smell something behind in his trying to go back to the center of the path (of knowing) to reality – smell the purpose of Naiyayikas' interest in finding “means” to valid and invalid cognitions.

2. Tucci, 1930.

3. This is a similar attempt we can find in Naiyayikas, perhaps in Sautrāntika as well. However, definitely we can find this attempt in Dignāga's pramāṇavada.

4. By this, we are not accused to mix ourselves with inductive logic. In order for induction to be possible, the logical condition in cognition must be satisfied first.]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Wed, 27 Oct 2010 19:55:24 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,5272,5272#msg-5272 陳那《集量論．現量品》四、五、六頌討論 (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,5272,5272#msg-5272 典範：Masaaki Hattori翻譯（1968）

[hr]

心得：
這回再細讀陳那《集量論．現量品》，有抓出幾個方法論的重點，包括量必須依境而推定（註一）；五根的對象在其作為外在存有時必得同時具有自、共二相，境必定與心之概念構作高度相關（註二），由此衍生出「截然二分的現、比二量如何共同運作（意現量）」以及「物自身之存在樣態為何（瑜伽直觀）」等問題（註三）。

這兩個問題其實是個互為混雜的問題，涉及到更細緻的方法論問題，其中一個關鍵決定在於：自相與共相之區分是對象的「面向的區別」亦或「存有的區別」，倘若是前者，則將導出如下存在論觀點：「外境唯一，唯必定出自不同量之協同運作」；若是後者，則「外境紛雜，唯存有於一客觀秩序之中」。由Hattori翻譯來看，陳那本身就傾向前者，因自相與共相就被翻譯作「兩個面向two aspects」；從論據來看，也傾向前者，如從陳那反對依諸憶念立量，其中包含了的立場即是「雖然境中有對象與一再生起的憶念相應，但不由憶念的一再生起而產出不同的憶念對象，是故不應依諸憶念再立量」。

倘若由此觀之，則極微的聚集（aggregates of atoms）才能形成的現量對象，與該聚集的內部結構（各個極微的單位區分，與其之間的關聯），應當同時以不同面向存在於同一境中（第四頌）；又，雖境物之單純質性（即極微聚集的全貌）為五官的對象，但是單一境物的諸多質性不同時為五官對象，仍得透過比量的概念構作（第五頌），而這單純質性與諸多質性之集結（affinity）同樣也以自相與共相兩個不同面向存在於同一境物上。這樣的觀點，應該推翻五官的對象之存有先於意現量之存有，又意現量之存有復先於比量對象之存有那樣的「時間順序」觀點，前者以面向區別為方法基礎，諸量之對象間的次序為「邏輯次序」，而後者以存有區別為方法基礎。

若謹守面向區分為基礎方法，極微的聚集與分別到底誰先存有就不是時間問題，我們不應當質問「倘若極微尚未聚集（未有分別）怎麼能有自相？又，倘若極微已聚集（已分別）又怎能有離分別的自相？」而邏輯上來說應當同時存在，這麼一來，我們也堅守了「自相、共相皆為相」這個立場。至此，才能更進一步討論「純粹直觀」還有不與五根相關的「瑜伽直觀」。


註一：第三頌，量只有兩種，現量與比量，前者以境物之「自相」為對意象而立，後者以境物之「共相」而立；再者，以「無窮盡故」而排除的選項「對某境物之再認知」被定義為「每一種與境物有關的心靈活動」既因其以境物為對象緣故被假定為量再與以排除，表示一種方法立場：means of cognition不只指向認知對象，還指向存在於外的對象。
註二：第四頌，現量品主旨在於確立現量除分別，我以為第四頌討論依根立現量而非依境是用以作為該主旨的證據，因為境涉及分別，若現量本質上的標誌性出於其依根而非依境，則現量本質上就離分別，唯此，現、比二量能互立。再者，外境不只具有共相，因為出於五根就同時也具有自相，現量與比量一同便應是為外境生起的條件（這立場同等於康德第一《批判》的先驗推證之宗旨）。（法稱也應認同於此註，見下方引介之Hattori 註1.34。）
註三：見下方引介之 Hattori註1.46。


[hr]
第四至第六頌筆記：

第四頌：
主旨為現量乃免除概念構作之量，因其依根而立（推定出來）而非依境而立、進而免除於心之概念構作。此外，此說也相容於Abhidarma立場。

為何以根立現量之名（praty-akṣa）而非以境（prati-viṣaya）？ 因為五根是現量的特別因（不共因asādhāraṇa-hetu）。        

[color=#0000FF][size=small]Hattori Note 1.31: [世親於《Abhidharmośabhāṣya》] Bauddhas普遍接受「識端賴五根（indriya）與境物（viṣaya）」，世親（Vasabandhu）問：「為何我們稱說『眼識（cakṣur-vijñāna）』，由根非由物呢？」（何因識起俱記二緣，得所依名在根非境）世親回答：「首先，根強則識強，根若則識弱，故根為識之基礎；再來，根為不共因，某人之識只因其根（不因他人之根）而某境物同時可為多人之識的共因。」Hattori認為此處陳那所援引對象為世親。[/size][/color]

陳那說明，物為多人認知的共因，而我們依不共因作為指涉之道，如我們稱「鼓聲」而非「棒聲」、「麥芽」而非「泥芽」。

[color=#0000FF][size=small]Hattori Note 1.32: [法稱於《量評釋（pramāṇavārttika）》] 物之名取自其標誌（indicator），稱作「麥芽」便知不是「稻芽」。
Hattori Note 1.33: Hattori認為月稱批評陳那此處的論點不恰當， 因為月稱側重世親「根強則識強」之說，而陳那此處側重「不共因故」。
Hattori Note 1.34: Hattori說明，根現量自身證明其自身為免除概念構作者。[法稱於《量評釋（pramāṇavārttika）》] 當人由一切外境抽離而完全被動時，仍可有（色）現量，由是證明根現量免除心之概念構作。這表示法稱認為：
(1)概念乃心之造作；
(2)概念與境物高度相關/境由心生；
(3)有純粹直觀的存在（境乎？非境也，自相矛盾故。）[/size][/color]

陳那在陳述完自己的觀點之後，也從論敵（Abhidharma）的立場來辯護自己的觀點，他說論敵的經典中也接受人可以擁有物之質性，而未與概念關聯，論敵也認同人可以感知到青色而不必要知道「這是青色」。此外，論敵所謂的「極微（atoms）」的問題也可獲得解決。極微的聚集（aggregates of atoms）端賴概念構作（其一、區分出最小單位來；其二，連結諸極微），那未有概念造作，怎麼感知當中可以有極微的聚集？陳那也在論敵的經典中找到論敵其實也認可這樣的感性認知是以自相（particular）為對象，而非以極微的連結結構為對象。根以極微之聚集的整體（自相）為對象，非以其內部結構為對象，故現量免除於概念之構作並不與Abhidharma理論相悖。

[color=#0000FF][size=small]Hattori Note 1.38: Hattori 引《Ālambanap》等經典，區分出三種實在論者對認知對象的看法：(1) as substance/ individual atoms; (2) as aggregate of atims; (3) as gathering of atoms。
Hattori Note 1.40: the object of the sense is the totality of individual atoms or things simultaneously. 法稱於《量釋評》中也說， 依Sautrāntika的理論，極微（individual atoms）不可感知，唯有聚集時，才具有某種顯著的質性以顯現於認知。[/size][/color]


第五頌：
主旨為一物擁有的諸多性質的一切面向不能由感官（根）認識；感官的對象是某物之所以單純為其自身的形式，且不可被表述。

第六頌：
主旨為對外境的覺察與對自我狀態的覺察二類意現量也免除於概念構作、瑜伽行者對物自身的直觀也免除於概念構作。

陳那說明：對外境的覺察，如將一物的色相當作覺察對象時，由於該感知的形式是直接經驗（anubhava），於是免除於概念構作。對自我狀態的覺察，如慾望、氣憤、忽視、愉悅、痛苦等等由於不依賴感官（根），於是也是一種現量。

[color=#0000FF][size=small]Hattori Note 1.46: 據 [Jinendrabuddhi 《集量論解說》] 的語法解釋，陳那的對外境的意現量的理論可以解釋為：意現量的對象由直接前於感官感知的對象衍生而來，如某物之色，且以直接經驗為形式進行， 因而也免除於概念構作。
這個回應，Hattori認為是受到法稱對意現量相關問題的探討所影響，這些問題包括(a)假如意現量的對象與根現量的對象同一，為了避免無窮後退之缺失，意現量不應為量，如第二頌；(b)若意現量的對象與根向量的對象不為同一，則感官受損的人應該也可以透過意現量而感知到其感官所不能感知者。法稱回答這兩個問題：(a')意現量所感知者「直接」跟隨在根現量所感知者之「後」；(b')意現量的感知對象受根現量的感知對象所限定。
另外，在法稱之後，這個以外境為對象的意現量有如下討論：（1）把意現量為一種經典設立之量來接受，如Dharmottara認為根本無從證明意現量之存在，在無妨害之虞的情況下接受它；(2)有些把意現量接受為根現量與比量之間的過度，現量、比量若無預設一個中介者，感性質料如何被心以概念構作認識就無從解釋；另外有些人(3)把意現量當作人的「智的直覺」，得透過不斷        的冥想訓練達到，這種看法下，意現量與瑜伽現量無差別，然而Dharmottara認為意現量與瑜伽現量之間仍存有差別，前者受根現量限制，而後者不受根現量限制，因為瑜伽現量可以洞察到他者的感知狀態因而不應受根現量所限。
Hattori Note 1.49: [Vibhūti] 由āgama（appearance）所得來的認知是一種比量（anumāna），Akalaṅka批評陳那既然把現量與根從本質上綁在一起，就不能把瑜伽直觀當作一種現量，因為瑜伽現量與根無關。Dharmottara前面的對意現量與瑜伽現量的區分也與此觀相符。
[/size][/color]]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Thu, 11 Mar 2010 11:00:39 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,2956,2956#msg-2956 國科會哲學學門人才培育計畫-佛教知識論研究計畫介紹 (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,2956,2956#msg-2956 國科會哲學學門人才培育計畫：佛教知識論研究
計畫介紹
【活動緣起】

　　去年（ 2006 ）年中時，哲學學門李明輝召集人希望擇定學門內幾個有發展潛力的領域組成研究小組，每一小組由一位資深學者主持，邀請目前執行國科會相關計畫的學者（尤其是新進學者）參加，透過定期聚會、研讀會、邀請國外學者講學等方式進行整合，以期推動多年期整合型計畫。「佛教哲學」是選定的領域之一，李召集人希望由我來負責推動，我也覺得這是頗富前瞻性的做法，對於國內佛學研究不僅可以達到提升佛教哲學研究的質量，整合國內的研究人力，形成研究團隊，還可以和國際佛學界接軌，尋求台灣學界於該領域上的國際合作機會，因此我就承擔推動這佛教哲學人才培育計畫的任務。

【活動目的】

　　佛學研究作為一門學科，在九十年代以後開始在台灣學界迅速發展，十餘年來形成具有一定規模的學術社群。從國科會哲學學門的研究計畫申請件數來看，有關佛教研究的計畫案即佔有可觀的比重，質量上頗有和歐陸哲學、英美哲學、中國哲學相抗衡之勢。這是台灣哲學界特有的現象，有其特殊的主客觀條件。其中，台灣社會在解嚴之後宗教部門的能量獲得釋放，台灣佛教蓬勃發展，有助於研究人才的培育，特別是教界派遣學僧前往日本與歐美大學名校接受現代佛學研究的訓練（歷史上佛教即有出國取經的傳統），使得台灣的佛學研究始終保有足夠的國際視野。

　　台灣近來擁有一批基本上訓練良好的佛學研究人力，其中不少獲得國外著名大學（英國的牛津大學、布里斯托大學、倫敦大學亞非學院、德國漢堡大學、波昂大學、日本東京大學、九州大學、駒澤大學、大正大學、美國柏克萊加州大學、哈佛大學、天普大學、維琴尼亞大學）的博士學位，或在佛教語言（梵語、巴利語、藏語）方面，或在方法論方面，均有良好的訓練。由於作為現代學門的佛教學研究起源於歐洲，發煌於日本，開花於北美，至今歐美與日本的佛學研究仍居於領先的前沿，其嚴謹的學風對於國內年輕一輩的學者有深刻的影響，使得相較於其他華語地區，台灣的佛學研究擁有相對的優勢。

　　其次，從歷年來國科會有關佛學研究的計畫來看，論題多元，或佛教史、或佛教藝術、或佛教經典、或佛教儀軌之研究，或從歷史文獻學的進路入，或從宗教學的進路入，或從傳統教義學的進路入，各有精彩。從哲學學門發展的角度來看，台灣的佛教哲學研究可謂甚具潛力，惟若能夠從當前稍嫌分散的研究狀態進行適當的規劃整合，當能有效地提升該領域的研究能量與水平。整合台灣佛學研究社群，強化其在大華語地區的優勢，進而融入國際佛學學界，這是本計畫的主要目標。

　　在諸多的佛教研究領域中，選擇佛教哲學中的知識論（量論）作為專案規劃重點，乃著眼於該領域的發展前景，以及對整體哲學學門的可能貢獻。在東方哲學傳統中，佛教以其縝密的哲學系統著稱，不論是印度的初期佛教、阿毘達磨佛教、中觀哲學、唯識哲學，或中國的天台、華嚴、淨土、禪宗，均體系恢弘，各具特色。然追本溯源，印度大乘佛教哲學的方法論基礎乃在於知識論與邏輯。佛教知識論與邏輯（因明）特別在瑜伽行唯識學派中發展，而於七世紀時為玄奘傳入中土，對於佛教哲學在中土的發展影響深遠。二十世紀初期，因明研究一度復興，蔚為顯學，然後因時局變化，又歸沈寂，直至八十年代後大陸學界又重理因明學，略有成果。唯彼岸中文學界頗諳於國際學界的研究趨勢，以致於局限於傳統的疏解工作，未能有所突破。

　　佛教知識論與邏輯在國際佛學界為重點領域，除早期奠基學者如維也納學派的 E. Frauwallner、義大利的 G. Tucci、日本的宇井伯壽、武邑尚邦、 北川秀則、服部正明、梶山雄一之外，當今以維也納大學的 Ernst Steikellner 、德國的 Eli Franco、洛桑的 Tom J. F. Tillemans 、日本的 桂紹隆、北美的 Richard Hayes、 John D. Dunne、 Georges Dreyfus、Dan Arnold，以及為數眾多的日本學者，均對陳那與法稱的因明體系各有專精，並以二年一屆的法稱國際研討會為中心，形成旗幟鮮明的國際佛教知識論學術社區。更重要的是，近年因 Jinendrabhuddhi 的 Pramanasamuccayatika 梵本出土，將可預見未來重回陳那因明學的新一波研究熱潮，使得漢傳因明學的研究傳統得以和晚近以梵藏因明文獻為主的國際學界接軌。

　　佛教哲學中的知識論領域當然不限於以陳那與法稱為主的量論傳統，而可擴及任何學派關於知識的討論，此可見於初期佛教、阿毘達磨、中觀學派、唯識學派，或中國的天台宗、華嚴宗、禪宗相關的文獻與論述。本計畫歡迎參加成員從其專長領域出發，在研習討論的過程中，引發對於佛教知識論的興趣與認識，進而有機會投入該領域的研究。

【舉辦情形】

　　這次計畫的活動在核定之後，馬上在去年底著手規劃進行的方式。原則上邀請年輕學者擔任導讀的工作，分別從「初期佛教知識論」、「阿毘達磨佛教知識論」、「陳那知識論」、「法稱知識論」、「初期中觀學派知識論」和「中期中觀學派知識論」等階段，選讀既有代表性又有導論性的著作來研讀，並開放給研究生來參與。

　　第一場的研討（ 1 月 19 日 ）由中山大學的越建東助理教授帶讀 K. N. Jayatilleke 的名著，《初期佛教知識論》 ( Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge , 1963 ) 的最後一章〈知識的來源與限制〉 ( 頁 416-476) 。越教授也提供二篇幫助瞭解 Jayatilleke 的資料： Richard H. Robinson 的書評 （ Philosophy East and West , 19/1, 1969 ） 和 M. W. Padmasiri de Silva 在 Jayatilleke 過世時寫的誄詞與生平（ Philosophy East and West , 21/2, 1971 ）。越教授這次的導讀主要關注下列的問題：一、 初期佛教的巴利聖典提出那些獲取知識的手段？二、其知識論的重要詞彙 ( 梵、巴、英 ) 和解釋為何？三、日常知覺和超常知覺的區分何在？四、透過禪修以獲得「更高層知識」（證智）的方法在知識論上有何意涵？五、佛教的知識論與其他印度宗教傳統的知識論有何不同？六、如何用現代哲學理論來詮釋和理解佛教的知識論？七、推理（比量）與感官知覺（現量）的關係為何？八、佛教因果論或因緣論的特點為何？九、知識有界限嗎？佛教如何克服這些界限？這些問題提供往後的討論非常有用的背景性知識。

　　第二場研討（ 3 月 3 日 ）、第三場研討（ 3 月 31 日 ）和第四場研討（ 4 月 28 日 ）分別由法鼓佛教研修學院的蔡伯 郎助理 教授和玄奘大學的 陳一標 助理 教授導讀法光（ K. L. Dhammajoti ）教授的《阿毘達磨教義與關於知覺的爭論》（ Abhidharma Doctrine and Controversy on Perception , 1997/2004 ）。當時選擇這本著作，主要考慮到時下國際學界的因明量論研究多接著藏傳的發展來講，集中在六世紀的陳那與七世紀的法稱身上，往往忽略先前的保留在阿毘達磨文獻中的 主流佛教，特別是說一切有部和經量部的論點，其中如「根見說」和「識見說」，「有相知識論」和「無相知識論」的爭論，對於瞭解陳那與法稱的量論是關鍵性的問題脈絡。法光專長於北傳阿毘達磨教義，尤其關注佛教知識論的議題，該書國內少有人注意，這次大家研讀之後，莫不佩服其學養紮實，研析深入。其中， 蔡教授負責導讀 討論《俱舍論》和《順正理論》 「根見說」和「識見說」的爭論， 陳 教授則以二次的時間導讀說一切有部的「直接知覺說」和經量部的「間接知覺說」，以及對於「行相」的不同看法。

　　接著下來的 第五場（ 4 月 28 日 ）和第六場（ 6 月 2 日 ） 活動則由南華大學的何建興副教授導讀陳那的《集量論‧現量品》前十頌。 何 教授提供以 Ernst Steikellne r 所重建的《集量論‧現量品》梵文本為底的漢譯，再參考服部正明的英譯，逐頌討論。法稱部分，則準備閱讀 提勒曼（ Tom J. F. Tillemans ）的二篇論文： “How to Talk about Ineffable Things: Dignaga and Dharmakirti on apoha ” 和 “On Pararthanumana , Theses and Syllogisms” 。這二場活動為接著下來的 「陳那與法稱知識論講座」提供暖身的準備。

　　這場連續三天（ 6 月 21 、 22 、 23 日）在政治大學舉辦的系列講座是本計畫的壓軸活動，我們邀請到國際上頗享盛名的 桂紹隆教授和提勒曼 教授來主講陳那知識論和法稱知識論。 桂紹隆出生於 1944 年， 1962 年畢業於京都大學，專攻佛教學。 1974 年獲多倫多大學博士， 1987 年獲京都大學 文學 博士。自 1976 年開始任教於廣島大學，直至 2004 年退休後，轉任龍谷大學佛教學教授。桂紹隆曾在許多歐美著名大學擔 任客座教授（ University of Michigan、UC Berkeley、Universitat Wien、Oxford University、 University of Calgary、Universitat Hamburg ），除了在北美的活動，特別也和歐洲的維也納大學和漢堡大學有密切的合作關係。他的專長以佛教邏輯和知識論為主，兼及印度邏輯和知識論、大乘佛教哲學（中觀和唯識）、阿毘達磨哲學、《華嚴經入法界品》等研究，可以說是全面性的佛教哲學專家。重要的著作甚多，為人所熟知的有《印度人的論理學》（中央公論， 1984 ），〈《因明正理門論》研究〉、〈印度論理學中遍充概念的產生與發展〉、〈陳那的認識論與論理學〉（《講座大乘佛教》， 1984 ）等。這次的陳那講座分為三次演講：一、陳那論存在與認識（ Dignaga on what exists and how to know it ），二、陳那的邏輯（ Dignaga's system of logic ），三、陳那的遮遣理論（ Dignaga's theory of apoha ）。主講法稱知識論的提勒曼教授， 1950 年出生於荷蘭，畢業於加拿大英屬哥倫比亞大學哲學系，因感興趣於佛學，先遊學印度，後去瑞士洛桑大學，獲博士學位，並長期任教於該校，也擔任國際佛教學會（ IABS ）秘書長。提勒曼教授專長於印度與藏傳因明學和中觀哲學，出版數部專著，其中的《提婆、護法、月稱研究資料》 （ Materials for the Study of Arydeva, Dharmapala and Candrakirti , Wien, 1990 ）、《法稱《釋量論‧為他比量品》譯註》 ( Dharmakirti's Prmanavartika , Wien, 2000) 和《經典、邏輯、語言 — 法稱及其後學之研究》（ Scripture, Logic, Language , 1999 ）最為人知。他為這次的法稱講座準備三場演講：一、法稱的論證與邏輯（ Dharmakirti on argumentation and logic ），二、法稱的宗教哲學（ Dharmakirti's philosophy of religion ），三、法稱的語言哲學與形上學（ Dharmakirti on language and metaphysics ）。

　　在六月的「陳那與法稱知識論講座」之後，九月與十月將舉辦二場討論中觀學派對於佛教知識論的批判與吸收，論題尚未完全定下來。原則上將討論的重點擺在月稱《淨名句論》首品中對於陳那與清辨的批判，以及中後期中觀哲學關於量論的態度上。主講者目前預定為 萬金川 教授（中央大學中文系）與見 弘助理 教授（法鼓佛教研修學院）。最後，本計畫還規劃一場「佛教知識論研究」的綜合研討，希望集思廣益，規劃未來可能的研究方向。至此，本計畫的活動將可以劃下完美的句點。

【成效與展望】

　佛教邏輯與知識論由於內容艱澀，號稱難治之學。當初承辦此計畫，雖明知是小眾之學，還是多少擔心參與情況的不足。等到推動之後，每次來參加的人數固定維持在二十人左右，反應的熱烈超出原初的期待，讓我們對於這門領域的拓展生起信心。我們舉辦活動的地點是政治大學文學院的百年樓，該樓即以政大故校長，也是因明大家陳大齊教授（字百年）命名。陳先生晚年治因明學，著有《因明入正理論悟他門淺釋》與《因明大疏蠡測》，為中國現代因明研究的代表性人物。可惜，很少人知道此學術淵源。我們這次在百年樓推動此計畫，特別有「繼絕學」的感觸，希望這次的計畫能夠提升台灣關於佛教知識論研究的水平，並且得以和國際學界接軌。

　　基於研究佛教哲學一定要和國際學界保持密切合作的認知，最近由本人和美國悅家丹（ Dan Lusthaus ）教授向美國宗教學會（ American Academy of Religion ）於今年十一月在聖地牙哥舉行的年會上申請組織「陳那在中國」（ Dignaga in China ）研討主題，已獲得接受。該小組將發表四篇論文，強調陳那因明學可從漢傳資料（漢譯典籍與漢傳注疏）獲得新的照明，以對顯於長期以梵藏資料為主的研究導向，指出漢傳的阿毘達磨資料和漢傳因明注疏中，有許多猶待開發的新領域。這種做法是我們參與國際佛學界的最佳切入處。當然，以梵藏資料為主的量論研究仍是不可或缺的基礎，而這正是我們這次計畫的研討重點。

[Link: http://buddhica.mepopedia.com/2008/]]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Mon, 30 Nov 2009 12:01:46 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,1002,1002#msg-1002 Between the Indeterminate and the Determined-- from the Viewpoints of Dignaga and Kant. Also an Attempt to Reconcile Epistemoligists and Metaphysicians (9 replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,1002,1002#msg-1002 Also an Attempt to Reconcile Epistemoligists and Metaphysicians

        As Dan Arnold in his “Is Svasamvitti Transcendental?”[1] has captured, there seems to always exist a tension between epistemological approach and metaphysical approach towards the most urgent yet lasting question – what's going on with our very own existence and how we can better it. In the early middle age India there were Dignaga's epistemology and the following debate between Madhyamika opponents and Dignaga's advocates regarding the issue self-awareness (svasamvitti); in the eighteenth to the early nineteenth century Europe, there were Kant's epistemology and the following debate on the same issue between the anti-epistemic German-idealist reconstructors and the epistemologist-Kant's sympathisers. With presenting the parallel, as well as with entangling these two lines so that the both ends on the one line reflects upon their comrades on the other, Dan Arnold tries to demonstrate how a transcendental reconstruction of Dignaga's epistemology in Kant's fashion (Dan Arnold's interpretation of Santaraksita's comment on Dignaga) could help out the middle age Indian epistemologists from the attacks of Madhyamika thinkers and thus suggests a positive answer to the proposed question: Dignaga's svasamvitti as reconstructed by Santaraksita is indeed transcendental. In this article, as a supplement, I attempt to argue that with Dignaga's own teachings alone in the Pramanasamuccaya, Dignaga's pramanavada agrees with Kant's transcendental idealism. And then, after the transcendental nature of both epistemologies get assured, I will focus on the relation between Dignaga's perception and inference and the relation between Kant's intuition and concept; on the one hand, I will try to clarify their systematical difference, and on the other, I will try to reconcile the two systems with a “schematic” reconstruction in terms of the swing between the indeterminate and the determined. Hopefully the effort here could also resolve the antinomy that epistemology such as Kant's and Dignaga's is a righteous course and that metaphysics such as Madhyamika's is a righteous course, too, regarding the most urgent and lasting question.


        Kant distinguishes “transcendent” and “transcendental” as “not interchangeable terms” in the beginning of his “Transcendental Dialectic” in Critique of Pure Reason, CPR, where he entitles the principles “whose application is confined entirely within the limits of possible experience, immanent,” i.e., transcendental, while the principles “which profess to pass beyond these limits, transcendent.” (CPR A 296/B 352) Also, the transcendental is distinguished from the empirical that the latter must be obtained via the employment of sensibility and thus must be a posteriori, while the former must come a priori, i.e., must be required so that the employment of sensibility is possible; the knowledge a posteriori must be the result of our apperception, via which our consciousness arises, while the knowledge a priori is the condition of our apperception and thus known to us in our consciousness yet as form or as transcendental ideas. Clearly we can see that the division between the transcendental and empirical is a division of the origin of knowledge and/or awareness and the effect of that origin; due to such a division, our knowledge and awareness are thus allowed to be characterized with two aspects: form and matter. In his Critique of Judgment, CJ, where the employment of our cognitive power is further characterized as an ability about “determination.” This development, I believe, is a further exploration of the primordial status of apperception and judgment, namely, his so-called “transcendental reflection” in CPR, the form of judgment prior to all judgments, one which makes possible the reference of a concept to an intuition. It is in this part of his transcendental task the notion of transcendental is put in a brighter light.
        
        In Kant's theory of threefold synthesis in CPR, the notion of transcendental is presented in a mechanical fashion: via the synthesis of apperception, the inner determination of our mind[2] is accomplished, that is, our mind becomes conscious of the object of the determination which is always accompanied by self-awareness, a thought[3], too. The synthesis is then taken as the condition of our consciousness and thus of our all possible experiences. It is said in the deductions (the first edition mainly) of CPR that in order for experience to be possible at all, the apprehension of intuition, the reproduction in imagination and the recognition in concept must already be united in a schema; this is the condition of all possible experience. To put in a fashion more critical, we have our experience as such must be resulted from a system in coordination as such a priori which causes, i.e., conditions and makes possible, the experience as such, or otherwise, the aspects of our experience (appearance, intuition, and concept) cannot co-occur in our experience as in unity.

        In CJ, judgment is divided into determined and reflective (indeterminate); in the former, the association of imagination is based on the rules of a concept which the object of the association is to be known about, while in the latter, the association of imagination gives a basis for understanding to apply various concepts to. To put in less Kantian technical vocabulary, judgment is an ability of locating a particular as, i.e., in imagination, contained under a universal; when the universal is given and the judgment subsumes a particular under it, this is determined; when only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, the judgment is reflective. Kant describes our judgments as the interactions between the faculty of rules, understanding, and the faculty of association, imagination. In a determined judgment, understanding offers a set of rules which is implied by a concept while imagination associates in accordance with the rules. To characterize this with the model in CPR, imagination relates the synthesized manifold intuition α as well as the appearance X, i.e., manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori, in accordance with the conceptual unity 'α' of this synthesis through transcendental apperception. Once the condition is satisfied, the judgment that the particular X/α is subsumed under the universal 'α' is made, from which arises the consciousness of an α which is known as a case of the governing concept 'α' as well. In an indeterminate judgment, imagination creates an object X which understanding keeps trying to find a concept for. To characterize this with the model in CPR again, the particular X is given (in nature) or created (in art) first through imagination, and various universals such as 'α', 'β', 'γ', 'δ' etc. are tried to be found to grasp the manifold X when imagination at the same time reproduces intuitions α, β, γ, δ etc. Here Kant has actually presented to us a further exploration of the transcendental.

        First, we have experience without exception in such coordination, and hence we gain the reason to idealize a system coordinated as such. Second, the idealized system must be the origin and cause of our experience for we so idealize it. Third, the necessary coordination in our experience is that in every instance of consciousness there must be a relation between a particular and a universal, so we idealize a system with two faculties as the epistemic origins of the particulars and the universals respectively. Fourth, in order to approve the ontological commitment so that our daily life, our interactions with the world, the interpersonal activities and morality can make sense at all, we must take it for granted that the particulars have external cause. But to our experience, our consciousness must come after the employment of sense, imagination and apperception, and hence we have no idea at all about the external cause except for such a causal commitment. Fifth, the particulars in our experience is fuzzy that they are both manifold and singular. This is schemed in CPR and explained in CJ. In the former, the manifold of the particulars have their origin in the sense, perhaps with a relation to the conceptualization, that we are given the form of sense as manifold, and they can be reproduced in imagination and cognized in concept. In the latter, when imagination becomes an ability that not only produces and reproduces intuitions with the ways of association originated from understanding, but can create as well something indeterminable (the appreciation of nature or the artistic object in imagination are created), something as manifold as the manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori and yet welcome to a lot of, even all possible conceptions. We can see the critical role imagination plays in our idealization here; it links the three modes of synthesis in the idealized coordination system. The so-far so-called idealization distinguishes itself for its self-referential nature, i.e., on the one hand the idealized system is directly inferred from the necessity in experience while the necessity in experience is deduced from the idealization; on the other, it is so idealized that the idealized system is the cause of experience as its function and that because of our experience has such forms we can have good reason supporting such an idealization. This kind of idealism is thus distinguished from what he calls “empirical idealism” (including dogmatic idealism such as Berkeley's and sceptic idealism such as Descartes's) which in general is potential to lead to the conclusion of mistrust of the particulars; in dogmatic idealism the objects of sensation, i.e., the objects in space, is merely imagined, while in sceptic idealism the objects of sensation cannot be established, and only the inner objects, the objects in time, can be indubitable. And the ground for such a premature conclusion is that the idealization is made in experience so that the idealized are regarded as empirically reachable entities, either as something we are totally live in though it is only imaginary, or as something we can directly cognize and completely indubitable and veiling up the particular making it mediate. From here, the transcendental is shown as the nature of such a distinguished idealization that the idealized is put into the position of the systematical cause of the systematical function (experience) and as the condition which gives forms to the function, and via the conditioning the idealization can be reasonable at all. Consequentially, we do not give up any of the particular and the universal; moreover, we preserve the manifold and immediate nature of the particular and the determined and mediate nature of the universal in well explanation, as how we indeed experience. To concretely define the scope of the transcendental nature, the relation between the particular and the universal has to be regarded in the position of an idealized cause only whose result enables any of us to know things. If it is the particular alone or the universal alone that is idealized, the idealization is made solely in our knowledge, that is, the relation between the particular and the universal is linked empirically, either as an empirical induction from the direct particular to the indirect universal or as an empirical inference from the direct universal to the indirect particular.


        Stick to the above characterization of Kant's transcendental idealism, we can find that Dignaga's epistemology meets the spirit of it in terms of the following two points. On the one hand, Dignaga holds that there's a causal relation, which yet makes no distinction, between means of cognition and cognition as result and there's correspondence between the forms of the result and the original means. On the other, he holds that the sharply divided two means of cognition are divided in the origin, rejecting valid reachable independent universals (such as Descartes's the indubitable), recognizing conceptualization to be part of valid cognition, i.e., rejecting the independent particular as mere imaginary. Both points can be conveniently shown in Masaaki Hattori's comments (Note 1.9.) in his translation of Pramanasamuccaya[4]: “Dignaga's theory is unique on each of these four points: (1) He recognizes perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumana) as the only two means of cognition, and does not admit verbal testimony (sabda), identification (upamana,), etc. as independent means of cognition... (2) He characterizes perception as “being free from conceptual construction” (kalpanapodha), and does not recognize determinate perception (savikalpala-pratyaksa) as a kind of perception... (3) He sharply distinguishes the particular (svalaksana) and the universal (samanya-laksana), which are respectively the objects of perception and inference. He denies the reality either of the universal as an independent entity or of the particular as qualified by the universal... (4) Rejecting the realist's distinction between the means and the result of cognition, he establishes the theory of non-distinction between the two” – Dignaga writes “we do not admit, as the realists do, that the resulting cognition (pramanaphala) differs from the means of cognition (pramana). The resulting cognition arises bearing in itself the forms of the cognized object and thus is understood to include the act of cognizing (savyapara)” (k. 7cd-8ab.) and “it can be maintained that the self-cognition or the cognition cognizing itself (svasamvitti) is here the result of the act of cognizing” (k. 9a.) … “because the determination of the object (artha-niscaya) conforms with it, viz., with the self-cognition” (k. 9b.).

        Before I mixed the two epistemologies from the viewpoint of determination versus indeterminacy, I have to point out the systematical discrepancy between the two and also clarify the issue of Kant's I-think as a thought while Dignaga's svasamvitti, self-awareness, as an intuition, which is also noticed by Dan Arnold.
        
        Although both rejects the reality of independent universal (mere conceptual construction without a proper particular for it), Kant and Dignaga holds different views of truth: Kant tempts to take as truth the proper reference between the particular and the universal, whereas Dignaga groups the particular as qualified by universal, i.e., determined perception, with the untrue cases, embracing the particular which can never be generalized or conceptualized as truth. Moreover, the distinction between intuition and concept in Kant and the distinction between perception and inference in Dignaga are not well-paralleled. To Kant it is not sharply divided between appearance (manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori) and intuition, both being the object and product of imagination, while to Dignaga the determined particular is not true perception, only the indeterminate perception is perception. Due to the discrepancy, there occurs the chance for the issue whether Dignaga and Kant disagree with each other on the nature of self-awareness being a perception or a thought.

        The issue can be conveniently get passed by bringing Dignaga's words: “even conceptual construction, when it is brought to internal awareness, is admitted as a type of perception. However, with regard to the external object, the conceptual construction is not admissible as perception, because it conceptualizes the object.” (k. 7ab) To Kant, the unity of apperception must be a thought, I-think, that unites the manifold of sense and the manifold of intuition; the thought here is not an empirical thought, but a transcendental thought which conditions and makes possible the self-awareness in cognition. Actually we can observe here that Kant's self-awareness and Dignaga's self-awareness do not equate each other: first, Kant presents the notion in transcendental vocabulary, while Dignaga presents the notion not in such a strong distinction between a priori and a postiriori; moreover, Kant's talking about self-awareness is confined mostly within the scope of being the unity of apperception while Dignaga tends to include the inner feelings, which to Kant would also be intuition yet merely as empirical one and hence not included in the talking. Nonetheless we can explain as well that Dignaga takes the conceptualization unity as part of perception, too, with his own explanation that such a conceptualization is not one over an object, but a mental activity which is brought into internal awareness. But, there's much more to talk about in this issue. Because Kant emphasizes more on the reference between the particular and the universal, stowing away the fuzzy relation between indeterminate particular and the determined particular by assigning both tasks under imagination's shoulder, his major goal is naturally set at explaining how such a reference can be possible, as consequence of which the uniting side of the transcendental unity pops out as the core nature of self-awareness. However, in CJ, we can find Kant moves his attention on the united side of the transcendental unity --indeed, in CPR, Kant already holds that the intuition has to be ready for conceptualization; however, in CJ, he reaches the principle of purposivessness which works in the relation between imagination and understanding and in the relation of the object of imagination and the object of understanding, and he gets closer to the standpoint that the indeterminate judgement is prior to determined judgment. On the contrary, to Dignaga what is important is the manifoldness of perception, the independent particularity. Unlike Kant's holding the firm ground of how the particular is determined so that the indeterminacy becomes the pursue, Dignaga embraces the indeterminacy in the outset so that it becomes an issue needing explained that in a valid cognition, how the conceptual construction can be admitted as perception, i.e., self-awareness. But the significance of the above-mentioned meeting of the two directions (from uniting side to the united side and the reverse) lies at one common goal of both projects: there must be two transcendental origins/means so that its result, the cognition, is possible as such – as with two aspects: the particular and the universal; there must be a transcendental unity of the two means as the cause and origin of our cognition as such, so that we can experience as such – as with the reference between the particular and the universal; the transcendental unity must be the idealized origin of what we attribute with “I” and hence it must be a combination of the uniting and the united. It is at this very point that Kant and Dignaga departs away from each other: Kant grasps firmly the combination so that the empirical reality is committed, while Dignaga leaves the combination and embraces the united, or better, the to-be-united, in order to get close to which an epistemology as such (making clear with strict and careful critique and excluding step by step the uniting conceptions, then the particular as qualified by the uniting conceptions, helps reach the to-be-united) must be made.

        Dignaga's refusing the determined particular to be the untruth corresponds to Madhyamika's distinction between the ultimate truth and the conventional truth (二諦), whereas his admitting perception and inference can be altogether transcendentally idealized may upset the Madhyamika thinkers for in consequence this admitting could blur the sharp distinction between the ultimate and the conventional. The worry can be eased by arguing that, not forgetting the distinction of perception and inference lies in idealization and hence as mere forms or aspects of reality so that we should not simply identify perception with the ultimate truth and identify inference with the conventional truth, the sharp distinction between ultimate truth and the conventional truth is safe because the distinction is actually a distinction between the transcendental and the empirical: before determined and cognized, perception is indeterminate, the apperceptive result of which, viz., pramanaphala, however must be always determinedly known – both perception and inference being transcendental means makes no harm to the distinction of their being transcendental ideas and their being forms/aspects of cognition. What is ultimately true is the indeterminable perception with manifoldness, which is thus ineffable unless in symbolism, but in order to assure a workable and moreover valuable conventional reality, it is significant to insist the inference must be properly related with perception, inference here including at once the conventional languages and especially the symbolisms targeting the true perception, such as theologies, metaphysics etc. – significant as Dignaga's doing pramanavada that expresses the two aspects of cognition are originated from two means of cognition and yet resulting in single cognition with two aspects, the particular and the universal, as well as Kant's idealizing those conceptual constructions for which no intuitions can be found and admitting the rest as physically true with the firm groundwork a priori expressed in CPR that the appearance (manifold sensible awareness a priori), intuition (sensible awareness a posteriori) and concept of an empirical object are transcendentally united. Only after assuring the valid inference and physical reality and its relation to the pre-cognitive state, our views of the conventional truth and the ultimate truth can both at once be well explained and well re-oriented (oriented in accordance with what is given to us) so that paralogical symbolisms targeting the ultimate which greatly enhance people's confusion can be avoided.

        Kant's final effort in his critical philosophy sketches the swing between the determined and the indeterminable. What is cognized is what is determined; and determination is made through imagination's following understanding's rules in association producing intuition. But the pre-cognized intuition, viz., appearance, which is part of the apperception in its origin but loses the indeterminacy in its result, gives to cognition nonetheless the characteristic of the manifoldness as openness to all possibilities of conception and readiness for all possible conceptualization. With such a basis a priori we are able to obtain a united, determined awareness so that we know and know about (in analysis) something, and with the same basis we are able to produce various intuitions (particularly determined awareness) in relating to the intuition itself (pre-cognitive perception with a manifold synopsis) in “free-play” to “appreciate” something when various concepts to match the indeterminable intuition can keep occurring and along holding up various correspondent particular intuitive awareness of it; because of such purposiveness of the employment of understanding and the employment of intuition, that intuition and concept are necessarily (such a necessity is assured for the unity's being transcendental) referable, first, the indeterminable can be known determined, and second, with the determined the indeterminable is witnessed. The significance of the above is, as Hattori comments on Dignaga: “rejecting the realist's distinction between the means and the result of cognition, he establishes the theory of non-distinction between the two” (Note 1.9.), first, although the known is always determined, since the known must have the aspect of indeterminacy, for there is the conceptual-unity-based crossover between the manifold a priori and the manifold a posteriori, the pre-cognitive indeterminable, i.e., the manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori, must agree in form with the indeterminate witnessed with the determined, i.e., the openness to all possible conceptions and the readiness for all possible conceptualizations; and then, the intuition which is accompanied with a proper reference to its counterpart concept, i.e., Dignaga's “determined perception” is identical with the indeterminable perception, for if we exhaust all possible ways of presenting the intuition, i.e., if we apply all possible concepts to the intuition so that the intuition's all possible aspects are shown in unity – in the intuition itself alone, i.e., if we appreciate freely the object, the known object is directly the true perception, the indeterminable a priori. This is evidenced in the fact that we only experience one world, that we experience the sensible world and the intellectual world as one identical world, as well as in Dignaga's insisting on rejecting realists' distinction between the idealized means and the reality of cognition and in Kant's refuting empirical idealism. Both the realists Dignaga rejects and the idealists Kant refutes are empirically separating the world into reality and ideas. They both take the means of cognition as objects known, namely, empirical objects, though they entitle them with “ideas”, and take the transcendental idealization as cognizable causal relation; that is to say, they mistakenly realize the transcendental ideas. Consequentially, they think they should try to make themselves go beyond the phenomena and get true knowledge of the “transcendent” ideas, and thus beside of the world of cognition, another world of ideas is diverged. It is exactly this point that bothers Madhyamika thinkers. Candrakirti's criticism against Dignaga's epistemology is basically with the incentive to reject svasamvitti's being real, as if there were indeed svasamvitti in an empirically spiritual, ideal world.

        Candrakirti argues, according to Dan Arnold, that Dignaga mistakenly creates something defining svalaksana, which conventionally means the property of the thing in itself and the reference its name refers to, depriving the names of their external, in-itself references on the one hand, and castrating svalaksana's self-defining nature on the other. Besides, the thing that Dignaga believes to define svalaksana must be itself svalaksana again and requires another created thing to define it, inviting the endless regression problem. The criticism above is made on the misunderstanding of the means of cognition as cognizable, empirical objects and on mistaking the causal relation between means of cognition and cognition to be cognizable, empirical causality, which leads to Dignaga's object of refutation: the empirical distinction between means of cognition and cognition. But more significantly, what bothers Candrakirti is that Dignaga seems to admit that “self” indeed exists as any empirical object, to which of course Dignaga directly expresses his dissent in his Pramanasamuccaya. But Candrakirti is not satisfied with the simple dissent. The following argument might respond to this attack. Though there is svasamvitti and svasamvitti is perception in Dignaga, svasamvitti is not empirical, for he won't call anything empirical “perception” since true perception does not include determined perception. Hence, svasamvitti should be something which allows means of cognition to operate like this so that its result, cognition, is brought up to us as known (known object and known to us), but not itself one object of cognition. Since svasamvitti is true perception and not itself one cognizable object, it is impossible to equate Dignaga's svasamvitti with the conventional, empirical self. And based on this clarification, we can point out that the conventional meaning of svalaksana leads to something Candrakirti may dislike. Granted that svalaksana is independent property that defines itself and allows itself to be referred to by names, then it becomes an issue how it is known to self. The answer to the issue will be that either we have the imaginary of everything and that's all mere imaginary or we have intensions which correspond to but never equate the extensions. Both of the candidates needs an empirical I. I think the Madhyamika thinkers, Dignaga and Kant all won't be happy with it.

        On the contrary, Madhyamika's antinomy that the ultimate truth and the conventional truth are sharply distinct and yet the ultimate truth and the conventional truth coexist so that we can live our conventional life sincerely and yet are possible to reach nirvana are in such an epistemological project explained and expressed with conventional words which are understandable to conventional people. Hence the tension between Madhyamika thinkers' as well as German Idealists' metaphysical talk about emptiness (the indeterminable)'s being the ultimate truth while encouraging conventional practices, and Dignaga's as well as Kant's epistemological project establishing the means of valid cognition, should be reconciled. (Dept. of Philosophy, NCCU)


Reference

Arnold, Dan. “Is Svasamvitti Transcendental? A Tentative Reconstruction Following Santaraksita” in Asian Philosophy Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 77-111.
Hattori, Masaaki trans. Dignaga, On Perception, being the Pratyaksapariccheda of Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions. Cambridge & Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. by Norman Kemp Smith. Bedford, St. Martin's, Boston & New York: Macmillan, 1929.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Trans. by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987.



Endnotes:
[1] Arnold, Dan. “Is Svasamvitti Transcendental? A Tentative Reconstruction Following Santaraksita” in Asian Philosophy Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 77-111.
[2] Representation, our awareness of an object, is defined in CPR as “inner determination of our mind in this or that relation of time” (CPR A 197/B 242).
[3] “In the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, and therefore in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of my self, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition” (CPR B 157).
[4] Hattori, Masaaki trans. and comment. Dignaga, On Perception, being the Pratyaksapariccheda of Dignaga's Premanasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetean versions. Cambridge & Massachusetts: Havrod University Press, 1968.]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Tue, 17 Nov 2009 23:39:34 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,585,585#msg-585 Report on Dan Arnold's Article "Is Svasamvitti Transcendental?" (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,585,585#msg-585 I. The Intent:

According to Paul Williams, two understandings of svasamvitti 自證 in Indian tradition are: (a) one of the Madhyamika中觀 thinks such as Candrakirti月稱 and Santideva寂天 who understand svasamvitti as “other cognition,” i.e., a special kind of intentional cognition which is always implied and believed to cooccur with all cognitions (as long as an object of cognition is obtained, it must be the object of svasamtti as well) and thus vulnerate Dignaga's view of svasamvitti for “infinite regression”; (b) one innovated by Santaraksita寂護 who believes svasamvitti as a feature of cogniton: “intentionality” – as constitutive of subjectivity.

Arnold agrees with Santaraksita寂護's position, and believes his understanding of svasamvitti is similar with Kant's understanding of “transcendental unity of apperception,” and that the reconstruction of Santaraksita寂護's svasamvitti theory with Kant's conceptual framework gives us two advantages: (1) Candrakirti月稱's critique of svasamvitti can not, indeed, be thought to undermine Santaraksita寂護's; (2) there's a close parallel between the Indian debates regarding svasamvitti and the debates in post-Kantian philosophy regarding “transcendental unity of apperception.”

The thinking thread will be then:
1.Introduction to post-Kantian interpretations of transcendental unity of apperception;
2.Dignaga's svasamvitti theory (innovation of svasamvitti)
3.Candrakirti's commentary
4.Santaraksita's commentary with reference to Dignaga
5.Conclusion: Candrakirti's arguments fails to undermine Santaraksita's views

A remark:
Arnold thinks since svasamvitti自證in Dignaga is perception現量, it cannot be something capable of being invlolved with “objective judgment” in Kant, while he thinks Santaraksita寂護's understanding of svasamvitti is open to entertaining something other than mere subjective occurance as the locus of truth-- both of which together, perhaps, give the reason why he thinks Santaraksita is more similar to Kant and not Dignaga.

※But I think this reading is not quite plausible. For, transcendental unity of apperception as the pre-condition for objectivity, and then as being involved with objective judgments, more precisely with objectification, does not imply at all that the condition itself cannot be an intuition-- as a intuitive condition!

II. Kant's “Transcendental Unity of Apperception”
1.Categories: the condition of all possible empirical knowledge
2.data of perception are discrete.
3.The condition of all possible experience: the imposition of some unifying coordination on the discrete data of perception; and the out-come: any knowledge has two sources, and thus has two forms: understanding and sensibility (sense and imgination), and thus concept and the intuition
4.Subjectivity must consist in the ordering of “synthsis.”
5.A Deductiomn: constructing his transcendental synthesis with perspective of “personal identity:” as begin with the notion that what we are thinking now is the same as what we thought a moment before, and all reporductions in the series of represetations must presuppose a transcendental unity imparted in the formation of consciousness.
6.Problem to A Deduction: How the condition is related to the empirical self so that “I” know that all the representations are in series? Strawson tries to answer by giving his suggestion to Kant at this point that “the ascription of states to a subject requires the subject itself to be an intuitable object for which there exist empirically applicable criteria of identity” (Strawson, 1966, p. 107). This is believed by Arnold to be already considered in Kant's B Deduction under the term “I-think”.
Kant: (Arnold, p. 81) “That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition. All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the “I-think” in the same subject in which this manifold is found. But this representation is an act of spontaneity, that is, it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it pure apperception, to distinguish it from empirical apperception, or again, original apperception, because it is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation “I think” (a representation which must be capable of accompanying all other representations, and which in all consciousness is one and the same), cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation.” (CPR B 131-132)
7. Robert Pippin (1989) (Arnold, p. 81) : there are two readings of Kant's transcendental unity of appecption in post-Kantian German philosophy : (1) Logical condition reading: “Kant is clearly referring to apperception as a logical condition, that it must be logically possible for me to ascribe my representation to myself.” (Pinpin, p.20) (2) Cartesian reading, e.g., Ficht: “all consciousness, including what Kant is calling experience, is a species of self-consciousness, representing objects is at the same time attending to the mind's activities and the objects.”
8.Arnold writes, the Cartesian reading of Kant, like Fichte's (Kant's transcendental unity of apperception theory implies that all instances of intentional consciousness must be accompanied by an additional intentional consciousness), is simliar to the Madhyamikas中觀 Candrakirti月稱 and Santideva寂天's reading of Digana's svasamvitti自證.
Both the Madhyamikas reading and the Cartesian reading faces the vulnerable issue “infinite regress.”
Besides, first, Kant has said, as repeated by Arnold, that transcendental apperception has to be divided from empirical apperception, and that self-consciousness “while generating the representation “I think” cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation;” secondly, anyone who follows interpretations such as Fichte's will be unable to distinguish Kant's position from Des Cartes's, which is also a distinction Kant wants to make--
Aganist Des Cartes, Kant writes: “In the synthetic original unity of apperception I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition.” (B157)
-- This looks like a problem when comparing Kant with Dignaga, for to Dignaga svasamvitti is perception.
※But I think the problem is not really a problem. There's subtle systematic discrepancy so that the parellel of intuition-concept and perception現量-inference比量 fails to work here!! A quick explanation is: Kant regards the transcendental unity as the logical cause; while Dignaga regards svasamvitti as the real result!!
If we read on what Kant writes after the quoted above: “Now in order to know ourselves, there is required in addition to the act of thought, which brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, a determinate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given; it therefore follows that although my existence* is not indeed appearance (still less mere illusion), the determination of my existence can take place only in conformity with the form of inner sense, according to the special mode in which the manifold, which I combine, is given in inner intuition.” (B157) Also, a note is given to the “my existence” in the quote above: “The 'I think' expresses the act of determining my existence.” – I would suggest that “”this representation is a thought, not an intuition” should be read as “this representation is a thought, not an empirical intuition” meaning that the transcendental appcerception does not give an additional empirical intution, i.e., appearance, to any instance of consciousness, which is quite in conformity with the “logical condition” reading, or Santaraksita's reading.
9.Arnold repeats Strawson's interpretation of the logical condition, or the intentionality side to give operational concpetual tools for reconstructing Santaraksita's svasamvitti theory: what is necessary to all our possible experiece is that there be a distinction of what is aware of and what is aware, and that's all. That is, the necessity has its basis at the structure of intentionality, which can be featured as “self-referential.” – Any particular state or experience must be “owned” by a subject for a state or experience is individuated with reference to its subject.


III. Svasamvitti in Dignaga
1.Dignaga's position: Twofold appearing of cogniiton-- (Arnold, 87; Hattori's trans.) “Cognition arises as appearing twofold: [having the appearance of itself [as subject], and the appearance of an object. In terms of these two appearances, the one that is apperception is the one that is the result.”
“In this regard, it is not the case, as for proponents of external objects, that a pramana is something other than its result; rather, there arises a cognition, existing as the result, containing the representation of an object; and this very [cognition] is understood as comprising the action [of a putatively推定的！ 'instrumental' pramana. Hence, the action is figuratively designated as being the pramana, though [the latter is in fact] devoid of activity. ”
“Thus, [it should be understood that the roles of the means of cognition (pramana) and the object to be cognized (prameya), corresponding to differences of [aspect of] the cognition (grahakakara), are [only] figuratively象徵地、比喻地！ attributed to the respective distinctive factor in each case. ”
“That which appears is the object known (prameya), while the pramana and its result are, [respectively,] the subjective aspect of [the cognition] (grahakakara) and the cogniton [itself]; hence, these three are not separated.”
※The above statement is corresdent with the meaning of Kant's “transcendental”!
2.“Perception現量” in Dignaga is not necessarily “sensory,” but “whatever cognition immediately, free of conceptual elaboration. (Arnold 87).
3.In so far as Dignaga could be regarded as a representationalist epistemologist as such!
Richard Hyes: the only thing which we are immediately acquanted is the contents of our own mental states, and this cannot be mistaken! – can provide with, Arnold implies, the insignt of svasamvitti, since svasamvitti is the only really occurant sort of cognition.
But, what if Dignaga should be regarded as a strong idealsit? – The difference is only the following: either to be an ontological claim that mental events are all that exist, or an epistemological claim that mental events are all that we can directly know. Make no difference to the problem:
If subject-object is a two-aspect relation, as Dignaga himself has characterized as “twofold” relation, how the subjective aspect can seem phenomenologically to mean something objective?
4.Arnold concludes that the materials so far in Dignaga could be read like Ficht's reading of Kant: the twofold relation is one between a cognition and an always-accompanying self-awareness, and then will fall into the issue of infinite regress.
※But I think Dignaga's own material is enough to refute the Cartesian or Madhyamika中觀 reading. If we take Dignaga's view already as transcendental, i.e., the logical relation is a substratum-substance relation, not a previous cause-subsequent effect, the result itself and the cause are not separatable, and then there's no question who accompanies whom!


Candrakirti's critique
1.Candrakirti thinks “svalaksana自相” in the conventional meaning is “defining characteristic,” but Dignaga takes it for something as “uniquely particular objects of perception.” If it is the latter, then one lacks the referents of words – only the difining characteristic is or has properties at all. If svalaksana is not or does not have sole properties which can define itself, but is an object, it requires then another properties to define itself, and that would be svalaksana— again. Candrakirti thinks Dignaga's theory of apperception is only to serve as the “another” svalaksana which defines the known svalaksana-- infinite regress.
2.In Madhyamaka's view, there's no existence of appeception. (※Echoed with Kant's position that apperception is a thought, not an empirical intuition.) “I think” does not exist, and there's no operation of a characteristic without a locus.


Santaraksita's innovation: Svasamvitti as a defining characteristic, not an action
1.Dharmottara法上's revision of Dharmakirti法稱's interpretation. Focus shift from pramana as instrument to pramana as the completion, pramanaphala量果; from causal relation (produced and producer) to intentional relation (intened and the intentional). He refutes the position to take svasamvitti as an invariable concomitance with the causally efficacious object that produced the cognition, for the causation does not guarantee intentionality, e.g. sprouts are not intentional though the production of themselves are necessarily in concomitance with seeds. On the contrary, the result which must be a completion of the whole process including the function of intentionality, has to be intentional. – phenomena are better, as long as we admit that phenomena are necessarily intentional, than the putative assumption.
2.Moksakaragupta's explanation of Dharmottara: the relation of object-agent has been replaced by the relation of intended-intentional
3.Santaraksita understands svasamvitti as defining feature of cognition, which indicates being distinguished from the dead objects. And the core of that feature is intentionality.
4.Santaraksita thinks it's not good to interpret Dignaga's appeception theory in an agent-instrument-object analysis, for intentinality is not guaranteed; rather, it's better to treat apperception as the constitutively subjective aspect that defines any cognition as a cognition.
That is, svasamvitti does not exemplify intentionality, it itself is the intentionality.
Moreover, in so far as cognition is distinct from putatively material objects, it makes more sense for the direct objects of cognition to be of the same nature, to be of the nature of intellect, ※so that they can be connected with each other as a intellectual web.
5.And since svasamvitti is not any instance of intentionality but the intentionality itself, i.e., since the relation between the object of cognition and the cognition is characterized as intentional rather than causal (agent-instrument-object), there's no problem with infinite regress, as Candrakirti criticizes.


[心得]
首先，我認為Dan Arnold這篇文章不論就論點或闡述，完全沒有涉及到是否自證是先驗與否，雖然他所謂陳那之後的兩種對陳那自證說的詮解之間的爭辯的確與康德之後兩派對康德先驗統覺說的詮解之間的爭辯在系統意義上有雷同，但我認為要說明寂護之說能為陳那辯護且駁斥中觀月稱的批評，最多只需要引進「意向性」這個概念即可，完全不需要提及康德及後康德的德國哲學發展，就算不用引進「意向性」這一個概念，在陳那、月稱以及寂護三者的材料內便能達到。所以，我打算先在這三者所有的材料內部來重新摘要Dan Arnold的論述梗概即可，然後在該梗概上約略介紹一下後康德德國哲學發展上與此雷同之處。爾後，我會聚焦在陳那的自證說，並嘗試就其材料內部的系統意義以及康德的先驗理論進行初步的比較工作。

根據Dan Arnold引Hatorri的譯文，陳那認為認知昇起時便具有兩個面向，一方面具有對認知者自身的自我意識這樣的表象，另一方面具有對象的表象。而因這樣的雙重面向性，所謂統覺者即是結果。不像實在論者那樣把持著量異於其結果的立場，陳那認為當認知運作時，其結果就包含了對象，而整個認知譬喻地包含著一個（被推定的）量的運作，但量就陳那自身的說法並不具動作性。 陳那強調，作為認知手段的量以及被認知的對象，只是在每一個認知的例子當中截然不同的面向而已。而在一個認知當中，被意識到的是對象、而這個認知屬於主體的面向者是量，認知完整的自身是量的結果，這三者是無法被分離的。

這樣的自證說，根據Dan Arnold，在中觀派月稱的理解中，把自證當作一個必然伴隨著一切認知的一種直接的覺察，即當我認識到一棵樹，這樣的認識必須伴隨著一個關於自我的認識。月稱批評，自相素樸的語用中，意指「定義自身的特性」，而這樣的特性是語言的所指對象（intension），是認識對象的本質(extension)，一旦被陳那扭曲為「一種特殊的現量」，語言便失去指涉對象，而且當自相不再是定義自身的特性，而需要另外一個東西來定義它，那個東西還是會需要另外一個東西來定義它，而月稱認為陳那的自證理論，就是作為另外一個特殊的現量去定義一個認知經驗當中的現量，而這並不能自圓其說反而會陷入一種無窮後退。此外，就中觀立場，「我」並不存在，而任何的運作都需要一個存在著的發生位置，假若沒這個位置，其實也不需要自證這樣的「推定」。

根據Dan Arnold，寂護順著（雖然寂護老於法上，但Dan Arnold認為以法上為背景更容易感受到寂護的價值）法救將對量的關注焦點從量作為手段轉移到量作為結果，以及將量、果與對象的關係也從量為因、果為果而人為執行者這樣的因果、執行關係，轉換成一種在結果上的被關注者與關注者的關係，從而提出自證是一種規約認知之為認知的特性，而因此特性區分出有智性生命者與無智性生命者的差異。認知是有智性生命的，而其特性是在「結果」上關注對象與關注者之間有一種循環因果的關係：我關注的對象造成我對我關注對象的關注，而我對我關注對象的關注造成我關注到我關注的對象。這一來，修改了簡單因果關係解釋之不足：因為一個結果因為某個原因而被造成，並不保證這個結果是關注於那個原因的，如種子是芽的因，但芽並不關注著種子，這樣的發展並不是智性生命者的發展；另一來，也以接受這種特性的循環以及消除自證知作為一個特殊的現量這樣的可能性，而僅是一個限制、定義認知之為認知的發展圖界的特性，駁斥了中觀的無限後推攻訐。

Dan Arnold指出，這樣的歷程也發生在康德即後康德德國哲學當中，此說當然正確。康德提出先驗統覺理論以解釋一切經驗的條件裡，便先驗地以統一的形式限制了、並始經驗成為可能，因而經驗總是統一在一個主體的。Fichte便發展出一個絕對主體，這個絕對主體一直伴隨著任何的認知，所以所有的認知都在經驗主體的伴隨之下被統一成一個連貫的發展。這樣的解讀，同樣因其無限後退為人所詬病，因為對主體的認識—自我，也是一種認識，也需要一個絕對主體去統一進來這個認識。有另一派人如Strawson則把康德的先驗統覺理解成一種邏輯條件，而因著這個邏輯條件而生成的認知，具有意向性。這也比較接近康德的原意，康德自己也講「當我思這樣的一種（伴隨在任何一個心智的內在確定性，且在所有的意識片段當中都是同一的）心智的內在確定性被生成時，自我意識本身無法再被任何其他的內在確定性伴隨」（CPR B 131-132）。他還說「在綜合原初的統覺統一當中，我對我自己的意識並不是一種我的表象，也不是我在我內部存在的意識，而純粹是我存在。而這樣的一種內在確定性是一個想法，不是一種直觀」（B157）。

Dan Arnold在此發覺，康德把先驗統覺當作一種想法，而不是直觀，且因這種先驗統覺總關涉到客體的判斷，而該類判斷以概念為決定性的基礎，於是認為與陳那的自證知有出入，因為陳那的自證是一種現量。不過我在這裡反對Dan Arnold的意見。我認為這裡有幽微的系統性差異以至於我們若未釐清，不能隨便類比陳那的現量與比量於康德的直觀與概念。一個初步的說明是，康德看待先驗統覺的統一是從把它當作一種邏輯的原因這樣的方向來看，而陳那是把自證當作一種發生的結果這樣的方向來看，而這樣的差異進一步指名的話，應該是康德以他的「先驗」觀念為核心架構，而陳那沒有。康德在Dan Arnold引的第二版（B 157）那段話後面，他還接著說：「為了要認識我們自己，還另外需要一個思考的動作，這個動作將每個可能的直觀的雜多統一在一個統覺中，那是一種確定式的直觀，透過此直觀被給予給主體。於是，雖然我的存在*斷非[經驗]表象（更不是幻象），而我自身的存在的確定性只能按照內感官的形式來發生，按照我所組構的並給予給內感官的雜多的特別模式」，而針對這個引言中的「我的存在」有個註腳：「這個「我思」所表達的，是確定我的存在動作。」我依此會建議這麼讀這個句子「這樣的一種內在確定性是一個想法，不是一個直觀」：這樣的一種內在確定性是一個（先驗的）想法，不是一個經驗的直觀，意思是，先驗的統覺並不給予任何一個意識的片段一種特殊的「我、或我思」的經驗直觀（表象），而這已經展現出與所謂的邏輯條件式的解讀、或者寂護的解讀一致的方向了。

最後，按照Dan Arnold的題目「自證是否先驗？」，我會建議直接把康德的「先驗」的想法拿來比較是否「自證說」，或「自證」是先驗的，倘若答案肯定，則馬上我們能帶進先驗的特殊「因果關係」去幫陳那反駁中觀的無窮推論的批評，而寂護的說明只需拿來作為補充，而更不需要西方現代的意向性理論。凡先驗者，是藉由在現有、有限的經驗中進行的批判工作，而推定出的一切可能經驗的條件，而這樣的工作之所以可能，正因為這些一切可能經驗的條件以一種特殊關係先驗地「必然造成」這個現有經驗，所以在現在的有限經驗中，我們有理據去推定這樣的條件 ～ 這迴圈關係實際上是一切意向性自我指涉模型的根源，且是一種因果同時的同時因果。陳那首先認為認知有兩重性，在認知昇起時同時意識到對象以及自身，另外他認為在一個認知當中，被意識到的是對象、而這個認知屬於主體的面向者是量，認知完整的自身是量的結果，這三者是無法被分離的，這樣的想法，隱含著的模型是量作為一種因而完整的認知是量的果，在果中包含著對象，也包含著我，倘若進一步，或者說借用先驗性，如同寂護所說自證不過就是一種制約認知發展歷程以及結果的具定義性性質，來解讀量與量果的關係：量是一切認識於是也是一切經驗的條件，而這條件中隱含一種以自我形式統一一切可能的認知與經驗於一個一貫性中，果必然都被意識成為量的樣態，如有概念性（比量）有直接性（現量），且都伴隨著一個自我意識（自證）。而以此再重新描述才剛提出的模型：量作為一個因，而任何一個完整的認知、經驗（或意識）的片段是為果，而在量當中以包含一種前在的統一條件將一切量的可能運作先於後在的實際運作給出能串連在一起成為一貫的條件，且又因著量的特性、有概念性有直接性，以至於我們能在運作中（即意識中）直接地（因現量）掌握對象的獨立性（因比量），又可一致地（因自證）將同一對象又按它的其他特性（因比量有一獨立「其他」特性，因現量又直接可掌握其其他「特性」）直接關聯於其自身（因自證可直接把兩種特性、兩個前後剎那的直接對象，直接一貫於一個統一的對象；因現量，於自證的統一性也有了依據可以把兩種特性歸給同一對象）。而由上面的模型的描述，若我們現觀我們的實際意識活動與該描述一致，那或許自證應該是直接的現量，否則我們的經驗不會是如同我們經驗的那樣。回過頭來，這又不與康德說的先驗統覺是為一種想法，而非經驗直觀相違，因為作為一個先驗的因，永遠是著於經驗但不是經驗，而這點，我想陳那或許也會同意，因為他也說自證雖看似活動但不具活動性，至少得這麼來反駁中觀的挑戰，而且還能保全自性空、我空等等基本立場。




Arnold, Dan. "Is Svasamvitti Transcendental? A Tentative Reconstruciton Following Santaraksita." Asian Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 77-111.]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Thu, 07 May 2009 17:50:21 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,525,525#msg-525 Punctus contra punctum：陳那《集量論．現量品》v.s. 康德先驗哲學 (1 reply) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,525,525#msg-525
（1）        禮敬成量、利有情、尊師、善逝、救護者，
                為立量故，作集論，於此總攝諸自著。

※
「（陳那）為了成立諸量，於此總攝《正理門論》，作《集量論》，以遮遣他者的量。... 因所量（prameya）的理解有待量之本性與數目等的確認」。他進一步推論「現量、比量二為量（pratyaksam anumanam ca pramane）...乃因自共二相為所量（laksamadvayam|prameyam）」、因為在自相、共相之外，再沒有其他所量，所以量只有現量、比量兩種。

先驗（transcendental）分析，是在意識經驗中，（在理性-某種基礎原則似的東西-以其自身對自身的批判中）就現有經驗考察一切「可能」經驗的先驗（前在）條件。因為意識的覺察的對象有直觀、有概念，且只有這兩者，所以我們賴以能有這般經驗的先驗條件能力有感性、有知性。

※
接下來提出的問題是，現量以自相為境（visaya），比量以共相為境；若是這樣，那我們怎麼能「依無常等相（akara）」識取色等物，或對其再認知又該怎麼解釋？這個問題，帶到了陳那第二頌：

（2）        於彼 [二相]結合處，無須[另立]其他量。

※
「因為，人先依不可說（avyapadesya）自相、和色性（varnatva）共相、識取該色等物，再藉意識（manas）將無常性[共相]連結至[該物，形成]「這色等物是無常」[的認識]，因此無須再立他量」。

康德認為，意識的前在先驗條件是先驗統覺的統一性：直觀的領受、想像的再製以及概念的辨別三重綜合的統一；唯有這個條件滿足，我們始有意識經驗、對象始為可能。而正因為這個條件前在地制約且使經驗成為可能，我們在經驗中便可以「有把A對象（作為一個現下有直觀基礎的覺察）判為B類」的能力，其meta-level的意義是：在一切可能（的確定）性中，知性把我們對A實在的覺察與對B這個概念類別的覺察、依知性的（自然）法則必然地確定下來，以至於想像力的聯想不能有他，該聯想正是一個判斷的基礎（而該基礎是由現下意識的一切可能性中抽取出的一個關係）。

※
此外，還有其他理由為何為此二量不作他設：

（3）         也非再認知處，無窮過故，如憶念等。
                現量[知覺]離分別，[分別]連繫名、種等。

※
雖然我們能對某對象重複認知，但不用另立其他的量，假若設一切識知（jnana）為量，將會有無盡的量。另外，回憶、意欲與嗔怒等能力，也因同樣原因不設其他量。

再認知，涉及到判斷基礎，而判斷基礎是：對一個現下的實際對象A，知性能合理地以B概念的規則組要求想像力將對A的覺察與對B的覺察在當下關聯起來。就先驗精神的知識論立場來說，這些都是經驗範圍內的結果，斷非我們賴以能有這般經驗的前在條件。對現下的實際對象的覺察、A與B的特定關聯都在經驗中，先於經驗的只是我們怎麼能有A對象的經驗，我們怎麼能把A對象與B對象合理（合乎自然法則）地關聯起來。

回憶，則是把過往的某一個判斷基礎拿出來要求想像力構想、欲求是把某一覺察對象關聯於主體的內在感受，這也都是在經驗中發生（即，都得先有覺察，才有此些關聯，且此些關聯不具先驗性），便不是先驗條件。

※
現量，是無概念分別的識；分別，是把對象限定在某名、某類、某屬性、某動作、某實體上。如「『那』是張三」、「『那』是人」、「『那』是高的」、「『那』在跑」、「『那』是持杖者」。

直觀具有雜多性，即在一個直觀對象中，有諸多可能的關聯可被確定出來（在認知範圍中已經夠多，在審美範圍中是一切可能的確定性都可以）。不過，康德認為直觀總得在一個確定關係中才首度被人認識到，除非是種特殊的非認識的意識，但那不在知識的（現象的sensible）範圍內。應在知性（intellectual）範圍內，按，或許其意是在「自由」的範圍內：認識，是結束；自由，是創始--在美的範圍，是自由本質展現的場合；在道德、是自由作為基礎的場合。


※
問：為何現量依根、境二者而生，為何依根立名為「相應於根（pratyaksa）」而不依境立名為「相應於境（prativisaya）」？

（4-1）以不共因故，依根建立彼[現量]之名。

解釋：「不依色等境立名，是因為此等境亦共通於意識（manovijnana）和他相續識，而為此等識知共同的對象因。」何並旁引《俱舍論》：「及不共者，謂眼唯自眼識所依，色亦通為他身眼識及通自他意識所取，…不共因故，識得名隨根非境；如名鼓聲及麥芽等」（T29: 12c）。

意思應該是：境是複雜的（not simple），色境（倘若真能獨立於其他如聲、香、味、觸）至少有眼根與意根兩個共因（暫且站在唯識觀點，不認為外境還有他因），若以色境立名是不對的。簡言之，眼根與眼根現量是一對一關係，故可稱眼根現量；「色境現量」（其實理應不可稱作現量，暫時稱之）與眼根（色之因）卻不對稱，屬多對一關係，因色境現量還有意根現量作為成份）；此外，色境既含有意根為共因之一，實際上已有分別，反言之，不可有離分別之色境，是故，色境不可稱作現量。然而意根卻可對意現量，蓋因為意現量乃分別者、非被分別者。

復旁引《阿毘達磨論》：「眼識了別（vijanati）藍色，而非[了別說某物]是藍色」。

意思應該是，眼識自身（若理論地說、可獨立開來的話）僅能提供色的感官材料，但尚無分別。雷同於康德立場：感官材料在直觀當中被領受，還得與想像力的再製、概念的確認相綜合，且在這綜合之中，便有了判斷的確定性的諸多可能產生。換言之，感官提供「postive」材料供判斷在其邏輯機能中質的環節裡被「negatively」限制為「affirmative」以進一步在被進行量的、關係的、樣態的限制使一個判斷基礎完滿。先驗的分析來回瞻第四誦前半段，我們的意識是個統一體，（先驗地）因為前在條件正是一種綜合（先驗綜合），我們在經驗中的考察（即，批判），便是在找一對一的先驗關係，如我們不以為經驗概念或經驗的知性規則為先驗者一樣，一方面因為那會讓一切判斷基礎與這些判斷基礎的基礎混淆，另一方面，以經驗的對象作為先驗者，本身就是一種不可取的矛盾。識、或意識，是集所有先驗條件於一個先天綜合的協作下而生，綜合者裡的單純，只能是一種形式，如色、聲皆是形式，集合在一個完整的意識中，復又被分別以某某知性的規則、概念於是成為特定的對象，如這色、那聲。若依境立現量名，猶如把色、聲之為形式，與「色」、「聲」之為意識的某一對象再度混淆，或猶如以經驗內之物（經過綜合的）稱呼作先驗的條件（單純的），是不恰當的。

小結：         
                根 v.s. 根現量
                與
                先驗官能 v.s. 經驗形式

                五根 – 意根
                與
                五官（以空間作為形式） – 內感官（以時間作為形式）

                現量 – 比量
                與
                感性（以直觀為對象） – 知性（以概念為對象）


※
續問：「如果五識的所緣其實是諸事自相所積聚而成的共相，它們啟不應有概念分別？」

（4-2）彼處，多物所生故，以總相為自對境。

解釋：「由於[現量知係由諸極微等]諸多實事（dravya）所生，論中說它於自境處以總相（samanya）為對境，但不是說它於諸差別物中構想一無差別相。」此句有兩註，何認為由此可感受到陳那接收極微的實在性（尤與本品第二節比較後），另外一註旁引Hattori解《俱舍論》（T29: 3a），即註10，說「多物」也可指積集中的諸極微，也可指如林中樹或軍隊等形成一群體的事物，The object of the sense is the totality of individual atoms or things，這引發了一個問題：陳那的「自相」將可含括諸如森林或軍隊等群體。但是，仍限制在陳那的堅持中：現量知覺可以無分別地以一藍色物「總相」為對象，卻不涉及概念分別地於諸別異物中構想一個無差別的共相。

康德認為直觀具有雜多性，即（我的理解）包含判斷一切可能的確定性於一，且未有判斷前（未抽出一切可能的確定性之一時），該直觀對我來說是盲目的（未識的），不過我們對該直觀可無盡地分析下去，如那是A、A是B、B包含a、b、c...，A也是C、C包含a' 、b' 、c' ...等等，而B與C或B與a'又有這樣或那樣的關係等等。然而，由於我實在無法確定「極微」是什麼，此處僅是一種興起的聯想。不過，儘管直觀具有雜多性，那只是一種未確定的可被確定性，並不是一種確定性，先驗理論上來說，直觀本質就與概念有別，可被概念化，但不是概念。對這個部份，我自己進一步的想法已於之前的weekly report：〈什麼是直觀？〉與各位分享過。可以多提供的出自康德的材料還有：在先驗統覺的綜合當中，直觀的領受與想像的再製兩者之間very tricky：直觀，既是感官「在領受」中的效果，同時也是想像力的對象（運作結果），前者，是製造的想像力，後者，是再製的想像力。這部份，我與內感官與外感官的關係，也不得不隨同五根與意根的關係，聯想在一塊。

（5）        有法具有非一相，根非一切相皆行；
                唯自證知離言相，方是色根所行境。

※
解釋：「五根所生現量知並無概念區別（avikalpaka）。此處，這[「五根所生」的]限定係考慮及他人的見解，實則，一切[種類的現量知覺]都沒有概念分別。」且：

（6-1）        意識處境物知，貪等自證，皆無分別。

※
解釋：「意識處若以色等境物為所緣，依現證相（anubhavakara）而[有意現量]生起，亦無分別。復次，有關貪等的自證知（svasamvedana），由於不待諸根的緣故，也是意識處的現量知。」

意思應該是，意識之為一種複合物以色等境物為所緣（為對象），意識包含至少有色等境物以及經驗者的自覺（即現證相？），而不管是依色等境物這些面向來看，或者就自覺的面向（意現量）來看，都是無分別的。五根現量作為現量有無道裡，是前面的問題，姑且不論這樣的現量是一種形式面向或者是一種可以獨立存在的經驗，至少我們可說，來自五官的感官材料給予我們具有無窮盡理解可能性的positive factor使我們進一步能去限制、排除（negate）所有可能而僅取其一。至於自我意識（即就我的反省經驗而言）是能即於五官（外感官）的內感官與知性的協作能力：首先，康德認為意識的三重先驗綜合便要求直觀的領受（起源於外感官的受動以及想像力的直接製造）、想像力的重製、以及可被概念確定，也就是說，在這個先驗綜合裡外感官、內感官以及知性三者就必須協作才可滿足意識經驗的條件；再來，我進一步說，經驗形式裡我們所能想像的，是空間（外感官的對象的形式）必定存乎時間（內感官的對象的形式），時間未必存乎空間，而有時間必有自我意識（思維主體智性的形式）、有自我意識也必定有時間；再回到康德的先驗分析架構，（1）當外感官受外因（X）而動，是想像力按知性的雜多的特定規則R進行直接製造形成感官直觀Intuition-1（X），在此，感官材料有了來源，（2）同時，想像力按造知性的某些特定規則r/R進行聯想形成心智針對X的內在確定inner determination（即X作為某物O應該是P這樣的判斷、分別 ）而形成意識的直觀Intuition-2（X＝O⊃P, while ⊃ in accordance with r/R），而（3）要滿足意識的先驗條件，（1）與（2）必須同時具足。就發生來說intuition-2即 intuition-1—想像力的活動只有發生一次，但是就認知來說intuition-2（X＝O⊃P）不被認同於intuition-1（X），不過intuition-2（X）與intuition-1（X）是直接同一的，這裡的出入是來自於（2）當中知性要求以某一特定的可能性（r/R）去確定（2）這個活動自身，而不因為intuition-2與intuition-1在起源本質上（as X）存有差異。

另外，貪欲、interest、愉悅或舒適感與否等內在感受，康德認為，是出自於想像力聯想活動的結果（他說，生命感的來源是想像力的運作—《Anthropologie in pragmatische Hisicht》），感受屬感官經驗的一環，同屬直觀，具有可被概念化的特性但本身不是概念也不是被分別的，只是這樣的感受與我們的認知對象之間的不同的關聯方式造成interest, desire, emotion, satisfaction等等活動的差異。

[9th-Apr.]

（6-2）瑜伽行者離師教，觀物自身[是現量]。

※瑜伽行者離聖教分別（agamavikalpa），對於物自身（arthamatra）的直觀（darsana）也是現量。

Hatorri's translation: “the yogin's intuition of a thing in itself unassociated (avyatibhinna) with the teacher's instruction [is also a tpye of perception].”
Hatorri comments: “The yogin's intuition which is not associated (avyavakirna) with any conceptual construction of the agama (the authoritative words of the teachers) and which apprehends only a thing in itself is also perception.”

從上面的評述，arthamatra似乎指向類似康德的「物自身」而我們可以在對該對象的感知中握有對該物的直觀，而這樣的直觀也是種現量；從Hatorri的評述，arthamatra斷非類似康德「物自身」這樣的對象，而是「直觀」本身、未被概念化的直觀本身（intuition-1, X, in 6-1）。不過者裡指的teacher是誰？什麼又是the authoritative words of the teachers？與一般的語言或概念有差嗎？

不過，順著上解，會指向類似牟宗三所謂的「我們能以智的直覺掌握物自身」這樣的想法，進而解讀「瑜伽現量」為一種屬於覺者、智者的特有手段能直接掌握「外」物本身。順著Hatorri解，會較符合我的想法，就判斷發生之「際」包含的「直觀的領受」應該是意識的內容，也可以是意識的直接對象，不過那樣的直接性不是透過「掌握」（後於判斷），而是透過「活動、創造」（存於判斷之際）而存在；而照這樣進一步解讀「瑜伽現量」，那是一種康德式的「美」的現量，是反省（Reflektionen作為一種interdisciplinary relationship among all means of all knowledge/experience）、意識以及判斷自身於意識中的自我呈現，像沒有軸的（或具有一切可能的軸的）純粹向量，是只要具有一切可能經驗的條件（造出知識的工具、畫出軸的公理）的人都可能可以做到的。我感覺第一種解讀，似乎覺者與未覺者之間的鴻溝好像太大，大到不能溝通，好像覺者只能指望未覺者透過修行與機緣、或者天賦，才能早日獲得救渡；相較之下，第二種解讀下，覺者與未覺者的差別僅在於「覺了」沒有，而不在根基上、在「量（pramana）」上有本質性的差異。

※
問：如果貪等自證知（svasamvitti）是現量，則概念分別知想必也是[現量]？答案是肯定的：

（6-2）分別於自證，許[現量]；分別故，非緣物時。

※
解釋：「[概念分別知緣取]境物時，一如貪等[緣境]時，[以分別境物的緣故，]並不是現量。[但在分別知]證知自身時，[沒有分別作用，則認許為是現量]。
Hatorri comments: “When it [viz., conceptual construction] is directed toward an object, it is not perception, any more than desire or the like. However, the internal awareness [of conceptual construction] is not [itself a conceptual construction], and hence there is no harm [in admitting it as a type of perception].”
上面的意思與Hatorri在此無明顯出入，在意現量中的分別，對所緣境物來說是分別故非現量，而分別知自身來說並非被分別的對象故仍可說是現量。

「緣取境物」，或「將概念應用到直觀、用知性規則要求想像力聯想產生特定、確定直觀意識」時，的確有一層面是具有雜多性的純粹直觀非得透過知性的規範才能「有意義地」呈現於意識之中（才有所謂緣取、所謂境物），這樣的知性的規範，正是分別；不過另外一個層面，這樣的確定性來自於分別主體對兩種覺察對象（例如「這」與「花」）在某種關係下（如X是P、該關係對主體來說是可肯定的）的內在的確定性（inner determination），對外境「這是花」來說當然已被聚焦同時其餘可能性也被排除，但是對這個內在確定性來說，依舊是意識的直接對象否則如同該關係對主體來說是可肯定的這樣的樣態關係不會有效力、而該內在確定性也不會直接成為意識的成分，就這層意義來說，判斷是分別者，而非被分別者。

Quick note:
purposiveness (i) between imagination and understanding, (ii) between cognitive powers, i.e., imagination and understanding, and its object, and (iii) between the present activity of cognitive powers and the following one！

（7）        錯亂知、世俗有知、推論、推論所生果，
                憶念及欲求，皆似現量，為[分別]所覆。

※
「此中，錯亂知（bhrantijnana）於陽炎等，分別為水等而生起的緣故，是似現量（pratyaksabhasa）。」
Hatorri comments: “Erroneous cognition is not a true perception because it arises conceptually constructing, for exemple, water, etc., out of such things as vapor floating over sand. ”

「[世俗有知也是似現量，]已於世俗有（samvrtisat）處增益其他對象，分別彼[世俗有]體像而限起的緣故。」
Hatorri comments: “Cognition of empirical reality (samvrti-saj-jnana) is not a true perception because it superimposes something extraneous upon things which are only empirically true (samvrti-sat), and thus functions through the conceptulization of forms of these extraneous things.”

「推論[活動]及其所生果等識知，分別先前現證的對象的緣故，也不是現量。」
Hatorri comments: “Inference and [the cognition which is] its result, etc., are not perceptions because they arise through the conceptualization of what formerly has been perceived. ”

錯亂知、世俗知與推論，都是對先前所有（先前現下、或記憶裡）的直觀採取的進一步概念性確定，若是該確定性不具有知性的規範來源，就是錯亂；若具有知性的規範來源，就是世俗的。而推論由於不依據直接的直觀根據，而是依世俗知的體系來進行類比，也是概念的建構引導直觀的確定。All in all，都是概念的建構引導直觀的確定，所以都不是現量。

康德第一批判的工作於此稍作個簡單類比的話，是在區分錯亂知與世俗知，一方面確定世俗知有先驗的基礎所以在經驗界來說是客觀有效的，另一方面給予方向建議如何排除錯亂知：不具有感知基礎的概念堆砌就是錯亂的（paralogism）。不過這裡的另外一個議題是，是否接受經驗界的客觀有效性，就直接同意了實在論立場呢？其實不然，假若我們願意嚴格對待康德所謂的「先驗理想主義, i.e., 經驗現實主義」以及表象（representation/ Vorstellung）作為一種主體的內在確定性，維該確定性在先驗來源上有客觀基礎與否罷了。


        （8-1）審知有用故，[說為]量，彼實即為量果。

※
「實在來說，量果非如外道[所說]，是別異於量的其他物是。彼作為量果的識知，據境界相（visayakara）而生起，審知[其似]有[緣取境物體相的]作用，依此假設施設（upacaryate）其為「量」，雖說它實際上並無[緣取]作用。譬如，某一果法似其因法而生，說為「取因相」，雖則它並沒有[摭取因法體相的]作用。」證入同

        （8-2）或，自證知是量果，依彼而境物決定。即彼具境相是量，緣此[境相]而了知。

「識知具二種顯現相（abhasa）而生起，亦即，自顯現相（=見分）與境顯現相（=相分）。這兩種顯現相的自證知（=自證分）即是量果。」因為，「當具境物（=內境相）的（savisaya）識知是對象時，我人依自證知，盼別[這作為內境相的]對象為可欲或不可欲。另方面，當以外境為所量時，不考慮識知為自身所證知的自性，而已「它之具境物顯現相」（一義）即是量。」即，「凡某境物體相（arthalara）以白或非白等[相]顯現（pratibhati）於識知內，該境物即依該相（rupa）被了知。」

Hatorri comments: “Here we do not admit, as the realists do, that the resulting cognition (pramana-phala) differs from the means of cognition (pramana). The resulting cogntion arises bearing in itself the form of the cognized object and [thus] is understood to include the act [of cognizing] (savyapara). For this reason, it is metaphorically called pramana, the means of cognition. For instance, an effect is said to assume the form of its cause when it arises in conformity with its cause, although [in fact] it is devoid of the act of assuming the form of its cause. Similar is the case with this resulting cognition. ”

此誦，可謂道出康德先驗方法的insight！康德認為：我們的所知僅能是在我們表象能力的形式（如具時間、空間屬性的、具直觀屬性的、具概念性的等等在某一系統關係網路下）所允許的樣貌被我們認識，而這些形式以一種先驗的關係制約我們的認知進而制約我們的經驗，並使我們的經驗成為可能。某物的實存，是因為某物觸發我們的認知能力，以致我們的認知能力運作，而認知能力運作按照其先天具有的形式條件而造就了我們對該物的意識，其中，有某些經驗的、感官的屬性屬於該物特有（特有的意思，是該物對感官的觸動使感官結果以一特有方式呈現在我們的意識中），而這些特有性被知性以規則的方式區分著，而某些必然屬性屬於認知能力的先天形式。        

（to be continued...）]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Fri, 15 May 2009 00:34:13 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,507,507#msg-507 五根與意根 / 空間與時間，以及先驗性 (no replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,507,507#msg-507
五根現量中的對象皆存於空間內，而意現量的對象則存於時空之內，若讓整個意識觀照且收攝到整個意識自身則意現量的對象就僅有時間性，就此，似乎我可以稱呼五根為外根且其對境為空間的對象，而意根為內根且其對境為時間的對象（而時間的對象包含了純粹時間的對象以及時空的對象），且似乎意根有「在作用上」獨立於五根的性質（然而這不必然隱射意根的作用不能以五根為基礎），因為我們能有純粹時間的經驗，就此，意現量似乎不該只是一種彌補現量與比量之間距的假設，而是一種先驗的經驗基礎。

以上的反省，是由康德在《純粹理性批判》的〈先驗感性論〉中「時間與空間作為直觀的純粹形式，與表象(Vorstellung, Representation, i.e., inner determination of mind)的純粹形式」的宣告就開始被引發。他區分感官為內感官與外感官（五官），他宣稱內在感性經驗的純粹形式為時間，外在感性經驗的純粹形式為空間，而他也同意可以把一切外在感性經驗「抽離(abstract)」後還有內在感性經驗。此外，他強調時間與空間僅僅只是我們意識的形式，而非屬物自身，這是他的先驗理想主義很重要的一個判準，因為由這個立場引申出來的是，我們所習慣的在時間與空間內的世界是由我們的認識的基本形式所「造設」，而不是我們藉由我們的認識活動察覺到了這個世界本身所具有的時空特性。我認為，堅持時間與空間單純屬於我們的認知的感性基礎形式這個立場，就等於堅持物自身不可識，這個堅持後續引出的，我認為是：客觀性僅出於兩物（更好的說法，我會說，對兩物的覺察）之間的關係是僵固不可武斷改變的，而該僵固性一方面來自於我們的感受性不紊亂地感受到其「肇因」，這個「不紊亂」一方面我們必須預設該「肇因」是穩固的，另一方面我們的感受性本身必須有自我規範的特性，而就此，我們可以存活於一個客觀有效的世界，而這個世界是「外在」的，因為來自於感性之基本形式的客觀性來源—五官，是空間的。

或許回到桂紹隆之前，還可向各位報告一下康德上述的談論，是站在對於現代神經系統研究的理解上談論（在其Anthropologie in pragmatische Hinsicht我們可以清楚讀到），整個神經系統的協同運作，允許我們有五種不同的外在刺激，且對於這些刺激我們以「空間」與「時間」為基本形式感受成為各種感官經驗，不論是內在的或外在的、客觀的或主觀的。

回到桂紹隆，假若他的陳那果能不堅持意根之狀態等同於五根，而將其讓渡為一種理論需求之假設，則似乎表示他不能同意人能有純粹時間的經驗，他應只相信人只能在空間內物的接續間體會到時間～這似乎與他「The initial non-concptual perception of Dignaga ... is also a hypothetical assumption, for by definition we ordinary people are not able to [be] aware of such cognition」的主張呼應著；而這，將會始他不得不遠離能包容現實主義的理想主義（意指康德的先驗理想主義）或者否定外境的瑜伽行派。因而或許因為這樣，他對因三相論（trairupya）的認識論意義的討論，陷落為一種經驗的一般邏輯，而不是先驗邏輯或者具有救渡（解脫）意義的邏輯。]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Fri, 27 Mar 2009 10:24:15 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,454,454#msg-454 什麼是直觀？ (6 replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,454,454#msg-454
康德因應前述的強硬區分在一個體系當中分別地推論了知性與想像力作為概念與直觀的專職官能，這給我很好的討論架構，所以我想在此也用這個架構來講我對這個強硬區分的肯定與看法。為了用這個架構說明，我必須先介紹康德的幾個想法：（一）知性的對象是概念、想像力的對象是直觀，也可說，概念的起源在知性運作、直觀的起源在想像力運作，更深入來說，知性是依據我們推論的必要形式而給予規則的能力、想像力是按照知性給的規則去聯想而形成直觀的能力–這是就認識的領域來說，在道德與美的領域來說 ，想像力還可推翻知性所給予的規則迫使知性得再另立規則藉此打破自然界的目的性、因果性網絡使人獲得自由；（二）康德認為任何一個意識內的經驗片段、或任何一個知覺，概念與直觀缺一不可，亦即知性與想像力是協同運作的，在每一個意識中都有直觀也都有概念，康德說「沒有概念的直觀是盲目的，沒有直觀的概念是空洞的」，更甚地把這個想法的內容挖出來說，這否認了如同海德格所謂未分別的原初直觀可被分別還可在分別中再被回溯回去那樣的模型；（三）直觀是雜多的，跟著（二）的論點，概念化為意識形成的條件之一，也就是說直觀是可被概念化的、且可被一切概念概念化，直觀當中包含了一切概念的可能性（我舉例來說，你可以說「這是杯子」，你也可以對同一個對象說「這不是X」而X包含一切除了「杯子」這個概念以外的其他可能，或者說，你可以任意聯想兩個概念且形成意義，只要這個聯想被放置在恰當的理念基礎上）。

直觀與概念在起源上的差異，就猶如色彩與聲響在「起源」上的差異一般，不可作他想，把直觀與概念作強硬的區分，需要的是仔細的觀察，不是細緻的推論（在後面我會提供為何不可深究的原因，而現在在這層意義上，我把阿毘達摩學派、世親、陳那他們的申論當作是仔細觀察的報導，而非理論的建構），可是接受了這個強硬區分之後，繼之而起的問題是，那這兩者之間的關係是如何建立的？容我現在用消解康德的系統架構的方式，來說明這兩者之間的關係為何。我們具有「擁有且覺察到」意識的能力，這個能力有內在穩定性也有內在衝突性，內在穩定性允許這個能力能按造僵固的方式「給予」我們意識與對意識的覺察（即，直觀），但是這個穩定性「立」的同時也「破」了其自身，意思是，穩定預設了、或要求了被穩定的未穩定（只是，我們要去深究這個能力的源起，是很困難的事，因為我們的「深究」意指在意識中才能進行的事，稍後我們會再回到這個問題），針對這個單一能力之可給予我們意識與對意識的覺察（即，直觀）的功能，康德起了個「想像力」的名，針對這個單一能力之穩定性，康德起了個「知性」的名。事實上，唯一在發生的，只有直觀，而直觀形成的方式，若是穩定的，該方式就是規則，而在該直觀中所形成的被針對的對象就能被確定、被傳說、被命名，我們稱呼這種現象為我們有該對象的概念（Begriffe，用以抓取的）。也就是說，直觀是具體發生的，而概念是我們假想的，而假想之為有效，因為我們在直觀的源起當中已包含有能作這個假想的因緣了。藉此，我可以同意康德所謂任何意識或覺察都早已被概念化，而反對海德格之類的可回溯到未被概念化的純直觀假設 – 那是一種沒有根據的雙重幻想，先把概念想成像是一個不佔據時空卻具有類時空性的杯子一樣的詭異對象，再想像我們用該對象去分別直觀。

可是我們能不能「直觀」呢？我們當然能夠直觀，我們就在直觀！只是我們被訓練得太熟悉於理解，就像我們太熟悉語言，以至於忘記語言或理解都只是形成直觀的方式的部份，進而忘記我們唯一真正能全然地做的就是直觀，而不是理解。用先前我消解康德的系統架構的方式來進一步闡述這個想法，在我們認識的、意識經驗範圍內，我們只能認識到直觀的穩定狀態，所以一方面來說，在這個範圍裡形成直觀的這些僵固的方式（規則與概念）對我們來說普遍有效，也對這個範圍內的世界樣貌普遍有效，甚至也對這個範圍內的心理狀態普遍有效，因此我們的日常生活及其現實感在起源上是有根據的，而具有同樣經驗起源條件的人們彼此因而得以溝通。一旦習於且離不開這樣的世界，一旦習於且放不開這個世界的現實感與客觀有效性，我們便似乎不容易直接體會直觀，而只會覺得概念與規則好親切，而覺得直觀卻不可親。可是站在這樣的景況裡，我們又想像有某個最原初的剎那是概念與規則尚未污染的，可以藉由某些特殊的才能的培養回歸，這在我看來好像才是把直觀給解剖了。相反地，要提醒人們直觀確實是直接的，還是必須透過面對、處理且超越概念與規則才能讓人似乎是回憶起在意識還沒形成之際那未穩定的心靈狀態與意識形成之際的心靈狀態都是直接的（直接的，亦指該狀態本身的自證性，亦指兩種狀態之間也是直接的），且都可被用一切可能的概念去概念化，而正是「都」可被用一切可能的概念去概念化（即雜多的真正意義當中），給了我們當頭棒喝似的提醒。]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Sun, 15 Mar 2009 06:34:33 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,449,449#msg-449 心量 & 心智 (1 reply) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,449,449#msg-449
心智 - Carved block, with cultural preference, based on the given mode of social interaction （人为法）

一个草原牧民或一个贫民窟小破孩往往都有大于有文化的人的心量，即使他们没去转山也仿佛山在转着他们
心量不足的人可以靠接近大自然，或通过宗教或精神上的训练来 “从新培养” 心量，疏通以上两层之间的对流]]> mimizorro 佛教知識論 Tue, 10 Mar 2009 18:50:57 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,445,445#msg-445 Georges Dreyfus' talk on Dharmakirti's notion of intentionality at the Mind & Reality conference (8 replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,445,445#msg-445
Reference: http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-7639004123423742612&hl=en]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Fri, 24 Jul 2009 23:37:59 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,437,437#msg-437 Re: 量论 (1 reply) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,437,437#msg-437
“精神上的自由moska" moska 好像拼错了， moksha 才对

" 質或材料有最基礎的元素：極微分子. 極微分子，一般人只能感知到其組合體，非凡的人才能感知到極微分子。"

我不确定一般人和非凡者要怎么划分，但我在印度逛庙子的经验告诉我，有些地方或人物确实有 “极微分子”在作用，有些人是下意识的被影响了，有些人却可以直接的感受到某种粒子辐射。如果有一天有所谓的客观测量工具去探测那些灵现而幽微的 “反应堆” 那就太牛了，这好比是在度量 lifetronic, prana，ether space, qi 这些明知有却不愿被规化的概念。]]> mimizorro 佛教知識論 Sun, 08 Mar 2009 10:13:41 +0800 http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,397,397#msg-397 轉向與救贖 (3 replies) http://mepopedia.com/forum/read.php?143,397,397#msg-397 Foundations of Dharmakirti's Philosophy》第一章〈Pramana Theory〉裡介紹五、六世紀時印度的量論家們，尤其是陳那（Dignaga）與法稱（Dharmakirti），普遍接受的一種分析「知識」的架構，首先，把「知識」作為一個「動作事件」，而促成這個動作事件的基礎元素包含四個部份：認識者（the agent who knows, pramatr）、認識的動作（the action of knowing, pramiti or prama）、被認識的對象（the object kn0wn, prameya）以及被用來獲得該知識的工具（the instrument used to acquire that knowledge, pramana），而從佛陀以降到量論家們，都有以工具為專注點的傾向。陳那開始，繼之法稱，他們拒絕「認識者」這個想法，他們認為認知發生於知識與工具在本體論上同一之時，同時他們也認為被認識的對象是依賴認識工具的，因為本體上來說對象不離工具，且對象被工具自身的特性所決定。（pp. 21）
繼之，John Dunne說在所有的量論理論裡，都在救渡意義上把「經典」作為「工具」，當凡人閱讀經典之時，超凡的那些知識在閱讀之際發生，閱讀者的「工具」與「經典之為工具」同一時，似乎閱讀者正超凡入聖著。閱讀經典之際，閱讀者自有的知識工具與「經典」同一，這是因為一方面經典的文字也是經典撰寫者用同樣的知識工具、秉持赤誠態度所體證與再製，另一方面閱讀者憑著同樣的知識工具而對經典的知識對象與經典自身之同一性以及其涵有之赤誠態度有所感通，而閱讀經典者與經典及其對象的同一，目的是救渡，因為覺者藉由經典要告示眾生的沒有別的，就僅有通往涅槃的路數。我猜測這是John Dunne所謂「在救渡意義上」把「經典」作為工具的意思。

這與我去年在「佛教現象學」當中提過的、以康德第一、第三批判之間的關係為基礎、關於「communicability」的想法相互呼應（ 心得20081204 （A Theory of Communicability））。我認為讀經典或者欣賞事物以及高尚的行為，都具有一種「轉向」的特性，就康德批判理論的義理來說，是從貞定的（determined）意識基礎結構轉換成未定的（indeterminate）意識基礎結構；即，由理論的、認知的態度轉換為反省的、反向觀照意識自身的（reflective）態度。而就其結果與我們預期的目的來說，如果可以接著說的話，是在自由中鬆動我們對物性的執著。基於確立物理世界的客觀有效性這樣的目的來說，我們的確有好理由要一方面接納知性（understanding）立規則的功能，另一方面也接納「物自身」的預設。但是假若把接納這兩者的立場與態度套用到非物理的領域，即實踐的領域如道德、或對人（當然包含自己）的價值評斷，則是苦惱的肇因，因為我們便有傾向把價值、意義看待為有自性的客觀物，同時也讓價值與意義的創生根源沉睡。這也應是由「認識」過渡到「自覺」轉向上的「救渡意義」！]]> gustav 佛教知識論 Sun, 01 Mar 2009 18:44:22 +0800