Change History

In section 11, Kant wrote in the beginning:

<i>Whenever a purpose is regarded as the basis of a liking, it always carries with it an interest, as the basis that determines the judgment about the object of the pleasure. Hence a judgment of taste cannot be based on a subjective purpose.</i>

I don't quite understand why the the statement of the second sentence is true, and I don't see the connection between the first and the second sentences.

And, I also noticed something interesting in the last sentence ((§11):

<i>Therefore the liking that, without a concept, ...... , can be nothing but the <b>subjective purposiveness in the presentation of an object</b>, without any purpose (whether objective or subjective), and hence the mere form of purposiveness, insofar as we are conscious of it, in the presentation by which an object is <u>given</u> us</i>.

In section 11, Kant wrote in the beginning:

Whenever a purpose is regarded as the basis of a liking, it always carries with it an interest, as the basis that determines the judgment about the object of the pleasure. Hence a judgment of taste cannot be based on a subjective purpose.

I don't quite understand why the the statement of the second sentence is true, and I don't see the connection between the first and the second sentences.

And, I also noticed something interesting in the last sentence (11):

Therefore the liking that, without a concept, ...... , can be nothing but the subjective purposiveness in the presentation of an object, without any purpose (whether objective or subjective), and hence the mere form of purposiveness, insofar as we are conscious of it, in the presentation by which an object is given us.