Change History

Between the Determined and the Indeterminable, from the Viewpoints of Kant and Hegel


Knowledge is the result of the act of determination, and the act of determination occurs in the unity of (a) something which is to be determined and yet always stays indeterminable and (b) something which is to determine certain object as certain object. The above would be commonly admitted by Kant and Hegel and commonly recognized as the subject of the philosophical investigation at least in Critique of Pure Reason (aligned with Critique of Judgment ) and Science of Logic. However, they take different approaches to the issue and consequentially bring up two different kinds of systems: Kant with his transcendental epistemology approaches the unity, while Hegel adopts a metaphysical as well as ontological strategy to （reveal the unity; consequentially, Kant reaches his theory of the unity of transcendental apperception, and Hegel arrives at the tour demonstration of the indeterminable determination in his dialectics. Besides, significantly relevant to the approach difference, they set different philosophical beginnings: Kant sets the determined experience (which includes the unity) as the beginning while Hegel sets the indeterminable (which includes, or more precisely, is also the unity) as the beginning, as the result of which Kant's system is oriented toward a demonstration of the identity of the system of the indeterminable and the system of the determined by crosising over from the study of the determined to the study of the indeterminable admitting the latter as prior to the former, whereas Hegel's, taking the indentity for granted, reveals the nature of rationality, i.e., the overall underlying structure of reality by demonstrating in his dilectics the “elevation” of our conditioned, particualr determination of mind as reality to our unconditional determination of mind as true reality, exhibiting the full view of the unity “concretely”. With my poor knowledge about Hegel and never-enough knowledge about Kant, in this report I only attempt to make an initial juxtaposition how the unity of the determined and the indeterminable is reavled in each system the best I could. I dare not give any futher comment yet. By reconstructing Kant's system to cope with Hegel's pursuit in Science of Logic, I hope to reassure myself of their common admiting to the unity referred at the beginning as the goal of their philosophical investigation. However, the reverse project is far beyond my present ability, for the lack of which I have to beg your pardon.

Contrary to Kant's approaching the indeterminable with the investigation of the determined, Hegel takes what is to be determined and yet always remains indeterminable as the philosophical beginning as well as takes the indentity of the system (totality) of the determined and the system (totality) of the indeterminable for granted. Hegel also thinks the necessary unity, the indeterminable determination, alone has its content: when the subject is aware of the nature, the spirit is limited in the limited self-awareness, in the sense of which the matter of the unity between the indeterminable and the determined has no chance to reveal itself so that people like Kant would mistakenly claim that it has no content; but when the subject is cultivated and elevated to be aware of the unity itself, of its internal tension of the opposites in unity as well as the unity in opposition, the spirit is in the absolute self-awareness, with regard to which the unity reveals itself.1 With the grasp of the existence, the indeterminable, as such, Hegel futher and more boldly deliberates the transcendental idealism in the notion that not only reality is conditioned and made possible by mind so that reality must have forms as how it is conditioned and made possible, but more acurately reality is mind. Taken the indentity for granted at the ouset, it thus follows that logic, the underlying structure of all reality, is itself an ontology and encompasses, beside of all the analyses of the cognitions, also nothingness, changing (becoming, development), existence, reality, essence, reflection, concept, and method etc. And then, in reality, i.e., in history of the activities of the development of human mind no matter individually or collectively, rationality reveals itself. Observed into the self-revelation in dialectics, into the inner tension of the opposites in unity as well as the unity in opposition, rationality is reported and concluded by Hegel as the expansion with the basis of the absolute unity: immediate mediacy and the indeteminable determination. The philosophical beginning, i.e., the indeterminable being, is thus assured as the most suitable beginning at the backhand to the viewpoints of limited conceptually-grasped awareness, as well, for the indeterminable is exactly the development spanned necessarily through the unity. It seems to me that Hegel's demonstration is an ontological – and hence metaphiscal – reconstruction, or at least, counterpart parallel, of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception in his epistemical system. If Hegel's “reality is mind” is put in Kant's system, the sentence would be saying that the indeterminable appearance (the manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori) as a whole and intuition which, as a whole, too, is manifold yet as resulted from determinations, are identical.

Kant takes the act of determination as the philosophical beginning, and he transcendentally idealized a system which corresponds to the necessary forms of the result of the determination. Because there must be the reference of the universal and the particular in any instance of cognition, the connexion of the universal and the particular must be united within the act of determination, more specifically, there must be a transcendentally-ideal unity which “makes” the reference in experience possible. In Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), he presents his theory of threefold synthesis of apperception, claiming that in order for experience as such to be possible at all, the apprehension of intuition, the reproduction in imagination and the recognition in concept must already be united in a schema; this is the condition of all possible experience.

In Critique of Judgment (CJ), he divides judgment into determined and reflective (indeterminate); in the former, the association of imagination is based on the rules of a concept which the object of the association is to be known about, while in the latter, the association of imagination gives a basis for understanding to apply various concepts to. To put in less technical vocabulary, judgment is an ability of locating a particular as, i.e., in imagination, contained under a universal; when the universal is given and the judgment subsumes a particular under it, this is determined; when only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, the judgment is reflective. To characterize the former with the model in CPR, imagination relates the synthesized manifold intuition α as well as the appearance X, i.e., manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori, in accordance with the conceptual unity (labled with 'α') of this synthesis through transcendental apperception. Once the condition is satisfied, the groud determination that the particular X/α is subsumed under the universal 'α' is made, from which arises the consciousness of an α which is known as a case of the governing concept 'α' as well. Such consciousness is the basis of our judgment that this (X/α) is 'α'. In an indeterminate judgment, on the contrary, imagination creates an object X which understanding keeps trying to find a concept for. To characterize this with the model in CPR again, the particular X is given (in nature) or created (in art – nature via human) first through imagination, and various universals such as 'α', 'β', 'γ', 'δ' etc. try to be found to grasp the manifold X when imagination at the same time reproduces intuitions α, β, γ, δ etc.

What is cognized is what is determined; and determination is made through imagination's following understanding's rules in association producing intuition. But the pre-cognized intuition, viz., appearance, which is part of the apperception in its origin but loses the indeterminacy in its result, gives to cognition nonetheless the characteristic of the manifoldness as openness to all possibilities of conception and readiness for all possible conceptualization. With such a basis a priori we are able to obtain a united, determined awareness so that we know and know about (in analysis) something, and with the same basis we are able to produce various intuitions (particularly determined awareness) in relating to the intuition itself (pre-cognitive perception with a manifold synopsis) in “freedom” to “appreciate” something when various concepts to match the indeterminable intuition can keep occurring and along holding up various correspondent particular intuitive awareness of it; because of such purposiveness of the employment of understanding and the employment of intuition, that intuition and concept are necessarily (such a necessity is assured for the unity's being transcendental) referable, first, the indeterminable can be known determined, and second, with the determined the indeterminable is witnessed. The significance of the above is: first, although the known is always determined, since the known must have the aspect of indeterminacy, for there is the conceptual-unity-based crossover between the manifold a priori and the manifold a posteriori, the pre-cognitive indeterminable, i.e., the manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori, must agree in form with the indeterminate witnessed with the determined, i.e., the openness to all possible conceptions and the readiness for all possible conceptualizations; and then, the intuition which is accompanied with a proper reference to its counterpart concept, i.e., “determined perception,” is identical with the indeterminable perception, for if we exhaust all possible ways of presenting the intuition, i.e., if we apply all possible concepts to the intuition so that the intuition's all possible aspects are shown in unity – in the intuition itself alone, i.e., if we appreciate freely the object, the known object is immediately the true perception, the indeterminable a priori. This is evidenced in the fact that we only experience one world, that we experience the sensible world and the intellectual world as one identical world, and that in experience the referableness of the universal to the particular is nessary, given the reference is correct or not.

By the above, I think Kant would accept the general description of Hegel's project in Science of Logic, that reality is the intuitive determination of mind to which the origin of our knowledge is significantly relevant. The difference between Kant and Hegel regarding the issue about the unity of the indeterminable and the determined is not in the essence of their systems but in the framework, that is, one in epistemology and the other in ontology/metaphysics. If an epistemoligical reconstruction of Hegel's system could be compatible with Kant's, perhaps Hegel's project might be the metaphiscal development asked for by Kant in his Prolegomena?


The report is limited to the following materials:
1. Kant, Immanuel. <i>Kritik der reinen Vernuft</i>.
2. Kant, Immanuel. <i>Kritik der Urteilskraft</i>. (“Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft”).
3. Hegel, G. W. F. <i>Wissenschaft der Logk</i>. (“Einleitung,” “Allgemeiner Begriff der Logik,” “Allgemeiner Eintheilung der Logik,” “Womit muß der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht wedern?” und “Allgemeine Eintheilung der Logik” ).）

Between the Determined and the Indeterminable, from the Viewpoints of Kant and Hegel


Knowledge is the result of the act of determination, and the act of determination occurs in the unity of (a) something which is to be determined and yet always stays indeterminable and (b) something which is to determine certain object as certain object. The above would be commonly admitted by Kant and Hegel and commonly recognized as the subject of the philosophical investigation at least in Critique of Pure Reason (aligned with Critique of Judgment ) and Science of Logic. However, they take different approaches to the issue and consequentially bring up two different kinds of systems: Kant with his transcendental epistemology approaches the unity, while Hegel adopts a metaphysical as well as ontological strategy to reveal the unity; consequentially, Kant reaches his theory of the unity of transcendental apperception, and Hegel arrives at the tour demonstration of the indeterminable determination in his dialectics. Besides, significantly relevant to the approach difference, they set different philosophical beginnings: Kant sets the determined experience (which includes the unity) as the beginning while Hegel sets the indeterminable (which includes, or more precisely, is also the unity) as the beginning, as the result of which Kant's system is oriented toward a demonstration of the identity of the system of the indeterminable and the system of the determined by crossing over from the study of the determined to the study of the indeterminable admitting the latter as prior to the former, whereas Hegel's, taking the indentity for granted, reveals the nature of rationality, i.e., the overall underlying structure of reality by demonstrating in his dilectics the “elevation” of our conditioned, particualr determination of mind as reality to our unconditional determination of mind as true reality, exhibiting the full view of the unity “concretely”. With my poor knowledge about Hegel and never-enough knowledge about Kant, in this report I only attempt to make an initial juxtaposition how the unity of the determined and the indeterminable is reavled in each system the best I could. I dare not give any futher comment yet. By reconstructing Kant's system to cope with Hegel's pursuit in Science of Logic, I hope to reassure myself of their common admiting to the unity referred at the beginning as the goal of their philosophical investigation. However, the reverse project is far beyond my present ability, for the lack of which I have to beg your pardon.

Contrary to Kant's approaching the indeterminable with the investigation of the determined, Hegel takes what is to be determined and yet always remains indeterminable as the philosophical beginning as well as takes the indentity of the system (totality) of the determined and the system (totality) of the indeterminable for granted. Hegel also thinks the necessary unity, the indeterminable determination, alone has its content: when the subject is aware of the nature, the spirit is limited in the limited self-awareness, in the sense of which the matter of the unity between the indeterminable and the determined has no chance to reveal itself so that people like Kant would mistakenly claim that it has no content; but when the subject is cultivated and elevated to be aware of the unity itself, of its internal tension of the opposites in unity as well as the unity in opposition, the spirit is in the absolute self-awareness, with regard to which the unity reveals itself.1 With the grasp of the existence, the indeterminable, as such, Hegel futher and more boldly deliberates the transcendental idealism in the notion that not only reality is conditioned and made possible by mind so that reality must have forms as how it is conditioned and made possible, but more acurately reality is mind. Taken the indentity for granted at the ouset, it thus follows that logic, the underlying structure of all reality, is itself an ontology and encompasses, beside of all the analyses of the cognitions, also nothingness, changing (becoming, development), existence, reality, essence, reflection, concept, and method etc. And then, in reality, i.e., in history of the activities of the development of human mind no matter individually or collectively, rationality reveals itself. Observed into the self-revelation in dialectics, into the inner tension of the opposites in unity as well as the unity in opposition, rationality is reported and concluded by Hegel as the expansion with the basis of the absolute unity: immediate mediacy and the indeteminable determination. The philosophical beginning, i.e., the indeterminable being, is thus assured as the most suitable beginning at the backhand to the viewpoints of limited conceptually-grasped awareness, as well, for the indeterminable is exactly the development spanned necessarily through the unity. It seems to me that Hegel's demonstration is an ontological – and hence metaphiscal – reconstruction, or at least, counterpart parallel, of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception in his epistemical system. If Hegel's “reality is mind” is put in Kant's system, the sentence would be saying that the indeterminable appearance (the manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori) as a whole and intuition which, as a whole, too, is manifold yet as resulted from determinations, are identical.

Kant takes the act of determination as the philosophical beginning, and he transcendentally idealized a system which corresponds to the necessary forms of the result of the determination. Because there must be the reference of the universal and the particular in any instance of cognition, the connexion of the universal and the particular must be united within the act of determination, more specifically, there must be a transcendentally-ideal unity which “makes” the reference in experience possible. In Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), he presents his theory of threefold synthesis of apperception, claiming that in order for experience as such to be possible at all, the apprehension of intuition, the reproduction in imagination and the recognition in concept must already be united in a schema; this is the condition of all possible experience.

In Critique of Judgment (CJ), he divides judgment into determined and reflective (indeterminate); in the former, the association of imagination is based on the rules of a concept which the object of the association is to be known about, while in the latter, the association of imagination gives a basis for understanding to apply various concepts to. To put in less technical vocabulary, judgment is an ability of locating a particular as, i.e., in imagination, contained under a universal; when the universal is given and the judgment subsumes a particular under it, this is determined; when only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, the judgment is reflective. To characterize the former with the model in CPR, imagination relates the synthesized manifold intuition α as well as the appearance X, i.e., manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori, in accordance with the conceptual unity (labled with 'α') of this synthesis through transcendental apperception. Once the condition is satisfied, the groud determination that the particular X/α is subsumed under the universal 'α' is made, from which arises the consciousness of an α which is known as a case of the governing concept 'α' as well. Such consciousness is the basis of our judgment that this (X/α) is 'α'. In an indeterminate judgment, on the contrary, imagination creates an object X which understanding keeps trying to find a concept for. To characterize this with the model in CPR again, the particular X is given (in nature) or created (in art – nature via human) first through imagination, and various universals such as 'α', 'β', 'γ', 'δ' etc. try to be found to grasp the manifold X when imagination at the same time reproduces intuitions α, β, γ, δ etc.

What is cognized is what is determined; and determination is made through imagination's following understanding's rules in association producing intuition. But the pre-cognized intuition, viz., appearance, which is part of the apperception in its origin but loses the indeterminacy in its result, gives to cognition nonetheless the characteristic of the manifoldness as openness to all possibilities of conception and readiness for all possible conceptualization. With such a basis a priori we are able to obtain a united, determined awareness so that we know and know about (in analysis) something, and with the same basis we are able to produce various intuitions (particularly determined awareness) in relating to the intuition itself (pre-cognitive perception with a manifold synopsis) in “freedom” to “appreciate” something when various concepts to match the indeterminable intuition can keep occurring and along holding up various correspondent particular intuitive awareness of it; because of such purposiveness of the employment of understanding and the employment of intuition, that intuition and concept are necessarily (such a necessity is assured for the unity's being transcendental) referable, first, the indeterminable can be known determined, and second, with the determined the indeterminable is witnessed. The significance of the above is: first, although the known is always determined, since the known must have the aspect of indeterminacy, for there is the conceptual-unity-based crossover between the manifold a priori and the manifold a posteriori, the pre-cognitive indeterminable, i.e., the manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori, must agree in form with the indeterminate witnessed with the determined, i.e., the openness to all possible conceptions and the readiness for all possible conceptualizations; and then, the intuition which is accompanied with a proper reference to its counterpart concept, i.e., “determined perception,” is identical with the indeterminable perception, for if we exhaust all possible ways of presenting the intuition, i.e., if we apply all possible concepts to the intuition so that the intuition's all possible aspects are shown in unity – in the intuition itself alone, i.e., if we appreciate freely the object, the known object is immediately the true perception, the indeterminable a priori. This is evidenced in the fact that we only experience one world, that we experience the sensible world and the intellectual world as one identical world, and that in experience the referableness of the universal to the particular is nessary, given the reference is correct or not.

By the above, I think Kant would accept the general description of Hegel's project in Science of Logic, that reality is the intuitive determination of mind to which the origin of our knowledge is significantly relevant. The difference between Kant and Hegel regarding the issue about the unity of the indeterminable and the determined is not in the essence of their systems but in the framework, that is, one in epistemology and the other in ontology/metaphysics. If an epistemoligical reconstruction of Hegel's system could be compatible with Kant's, perhaps Hegel's project might be the metaphiscal development asked for by Kant in his Prolegomena?


The report is limited to the following materials:
1. Kant, Immanuel. <i>Kritik der reinen Vernuft</i>.
2. Kant, Immanuel. <i>Kritik der Urteilskraft</i>. (“Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft”).
3. Hegel, G. W. F. <i>Wissenschaft der Logk</i>. (“Einlei3. Hegel, G. W. F. <i>Wissenscha Loft der Logk</i>. (“Einleitung,” “Allgemeiner Begriff der Logik,” “Allgemeiner Eintheilung der Logik,” “Womit muß der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht wedern?” und “Allgemeine Eintheilung der Logik” ).

Between the Determined and the Indeterminable,
from the Viewpoints of Kant and Hegel


Knowledge is the result of the act of determination, and the act of determination occurs in the unity of (a) something which is to be determined and yet always stays indeterminable and (b) something which is to determine certain object as certain object. The above would be commonly admitted by Kant and Hegel and commonly recognized as the subject of the philosophical investigation at least in Critique of Pure Reason (aligned with Critique of Judgment ) and Science of Logic. However, they take different approaches to the issue and consequentially bring up two different kinds of systems: Kant with his transcendental epistemology approaches the unity, while Hegel adopts a metaphysical as well as ontological strategy to reveal the unity; consequentially, Kant reaches his theory of the unity of transcendental apperception, and Hegel arrives at the tour demonstration of the indeterminable determination in his dialectics. Besides, significantly relevant to the approach difference, they set different philosophical beginnings: Kant sets the determined experience (which includes the unity) as the beginning while Hegel sets the indeterminable (which includes, or more precisely, is also the unity) as the beginning, as the result of which Kant's system is oriented toward a demonstration of the identity of the system of the indeterminable and the system of the determined by crossing over from the study of the determined to the study of the indeterminable admitting the latter as prior to the former, whereas Hegel's, taking the indentity for granted, reveals the nature of rationality, i.e., the overall underlying structure of reality by demonstrating in his dilectics the “elevation” of our conditioned, particualr determination of mind as reality to our unconditional determination of mind as true reality, exhibiting the full view of the unity “concretely”. With my poor knowledge about Hegel and never-enough knowledge about Kant, in this report I only attempt to make an initial juxtaposition how the unity of the determined and the indeterminable is reavled in each system the best I could. I dare not give any futher comment yet. By reconstructing Kant's system to cope with Hegel's pursuit in Science of Logic, I hope to reassure myself of their common admiting to the unity referred at the beginning as the goal of their philosophical investigation. However, the reverse project is far beyond my present ability, for the lack of which I have to beg your pardon.

Contrary to Kant's approaching the indeterminable with the investigation of the determined, Hegel takes what is to be determined and yet always remains indeterminable as the philosophical beginning as well as takes the indentity of the system (totality) of the determined and the system (totality) of the indeterminable for granted. Hegel also thinks the necessary unity, the indeterminable determination, alone has its content: when the subject is aware of the nature, the spirit is limited in the limited self-awareness, in the sense of which the matter of the unity between the indeterminable and the determined has no chance to reveal itself so that people like Kant would mistakenly claim that it has no content; but when the subject is cultivated and elevated to be aware of the unity itself, of its internal tension of the opposites in unity as well as the unity in opposition, the spirit is in the absolute self-awareness, with regard to which the unity reveals itself.1 With the grasp of the existence, the indeterminable, as such, Hegel futher and more boldly deliberates the transcendental idealism in the notion that not only reality is conditioned and made possible by mind so that reality must have forms as how it is conditioned and made possible, but more acurately reality is mind. Taken the indentity for granted at the ouset, it thus follows that logic, the underlying structure of all reality, is itself an ontology and encompasses, beside of all the analyses of the cognitions, also nothingness, changing (becoming, development), existence, reality, essence, reflection, concept, and method etc. And then, in reality, i.e., in history of the activities of the development of human mind no matter individually or collectively, rationality reveals itself. Observed into the self-revelation in dialectics, into the inner tension of the opposites in unity as well as the unity in opposition, rationality is reported and concluded by Hegel as the expansion with the basis of the absolute unity: immediate mediacy and the indeteminable determination. The philosophical beginning, i.e., the indeterminable being, is thus assured as the most suitable beginning at the backhand to the viewpoints of limited conceptually-grasped awareness, as well, for the indeterminable is exactly the development spanned necessarily through the unity. It seems to me that Hegel's demonstration is an ontological – and hence metaphiscal – reconstruction, or at least, counterpart parallel, of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception in his epistemical system. If Hegel's “reality is mind” is put in Kant's system, the sentence would be saying that the indeterminable appearance (the manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori) as a whole and intuition which, as a whole, too, is manifold yet as resulted from determinations, are identical.

Kant takes the act of determination as the philosophical beginning, and he transcendentally idealized a system which corresponds to the necessary forms of the result of the determination. Because there must be the reference of the universal and the particular in any instance of cognition, the connexion of the universal and the particular must be united within the act of determination, more specifically, there must be a transcendentally-ideal unity which “makes” the reference in experience possible. In Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), he presents his theory of threefold synthesis of apperception, claiming that in order for experience as such to be possible at all, the apprehension of intuition, the reproduction in imagination and the recognition in concept must already be united in a schema; this is the condition of all possible experience.

In Critique of Judgment (CJ), he divides judgment into determined and reflective (indeterminate); in the former, the association of imagination is based on the rules of a concept which the object of the association is to be known about, while in the latter, the association of imagination gives a basis for understanding to apply various concepts to. To put in less technical vocabulary, judgment is an ability of locating a particular as, i.e., in imagination, contained under a universal; when the universal is given and the judgment subsumes a particular under it, this is determined; when only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, the judgment is reflective. To characterize the former with the model in CPR, imagination relates the synthesized manifold intuition α as well as the appearance X, i.e., manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori, in accordance with the conceptual unity (labled with 'α') of this synthesis through transcendental apperception. Once the condition is satisfied, the groud determination that the particular X/α is subsumed under the universal 'α' is made, from which arises the consciousness of an α which is known as a case of the governing concept 'α' as well. Such consciousness is the basis of our judgment that this (X/α) is 'α'. In an indeterminate judgment, on the contrary, imagination creates an object X which understanding keeps trying to find a concept for. To characterize this with the model in CPR again, the particular X is given (in nature) or created (in art – nature via human) first through imagination, and various universals such as 'α', 'β', 'γ', 'δ' etc. try to be found to grasp the manifold X when imagination at the same time reproduces intuitions α, β, γ, δ etc.

What is cognized is what is determined; and determination is made through imagination's following understanding's rules in association producing intuition. But the pre-cognized intuition, viz., appearance, which is part of the apperception in its origin but loses the indeterminacy in its result, gives to cognition nonetheless the characteristic of the manifoldness as openness to all possibilities of conception and readiness for all possible conceptualization. With such a basis a priori we are able to obtain a united, determined awareness so that we know and know about (in analysis) something, and with the same basis we are able to produce various intuitions (particularly determined awareness) in relating to the intuition itself (pre-cognitive perception with a manifold synopsis) in “freedom” to “appreciate” something when various concepts to match the indeterminable intuition can keep occurring and along holding up various correspondent particular intuitive awareness of it; because of such purposiveness of the employment of understanding and the employment of intuition, that intuition and concept are necessarily (such a necessity is assured for the unity's being transcendental) referable, first, the indeterminable can be known determined, and second, with the determined the indeterminable is witnessed. The significance of the above is: first, although the known is always determined, since the known must have the aspect of indeterminacy, for there is the conceptual-unity-based crossover between the manifold a priori and the manifold a posteriori, the pre-cognitive indeterminable, i.e., the manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori, must agree in form with the indeterminate witnessed with the determined, i.e., the openness to all possible conceptions and the readiness for all possible conceptualizations; and then, the intuition which is accompanied with a proper reference to its counterpart concept, i.e., “determined perception,” is identical with the indeterminable perception, for if we exhaust all possible ways of presenting the intuition, i.e., if we apply all possible concepts to the intuition so that the intuition's all possible aspects are shown in unity – in the intuition itself alone, i.e., if we appreciate freely the object, the known object is immediately the true perception, the indeterminable a priori. This is evidenced in the fact that we only experience one world, that we experience the sensible world and the intellectual world as one identical world, and that in experience the referableness of the universal to the particular is nessary, given the reference is correct or not.

By the above, I think Kant would accept the general description of Hegel's project in Science of Logic, that reality is the intuitive determination of mind to which the origin of our knowledge is significantly relevant. The difference between Kant and Hegel regarding the issue about the unity of the indeterminable and the determined is not in the essence of their systems but in the framework, that is, one in epistemology and the other in ontology/metaphysics. If an epistemoligical reconstruction of Hegel's system could be compatible with Kant's, perhaps Hegel's project might be the metaphiscal development asked for by Kant in his Prolegomena?


The report is limited to the following materials:
1. Kant, Immanuel. <i>Kritik der reinen Vernuft</i>.
2. Kant, Immanuel. <i>Kritik der Urteilskraft</i>. (“Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft”).
3. Hegel, G. W. F. <i>Wissenschaft der Logk</i>. (“Einlei3. Hegel, G. W. F. <i>Wissenscha Loft der Logk</i>. (“Einleitung,” “Allgemeiner Begriff der Logik,” “Allgemeiner Eintheilung der Logik,” “Womit muß der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht wedern?” und “Allgemeine Eintheilung der Logik” ).

Between the Determined and the Indeterminable,
from the Viewpoints of Kant and Hegel


Knowledge is the result of the act of determination, and the act of determination occurs in the unity of (a) something which is to be determined and yet always stays indeterminable and (b) something which is to determine certain object as certain object. The above would be commonly admitted by Kant and Hegel and commonly recognized as the subject of the philosophical investigation at least in Critique of Pure Reason (aligned with Critique of Judgment ) and Science of Logic. However, they take different approaches to the issue and consequentially bring up two different kinds of systems: Kant with his transcendental epistemology approaches the unity, while Hegel adopts a metaphysical as well as ontological strategy to reveal the unity; consequentially, Kant reaches his theory of the unity of transcendental apperception, and Hegel arrives at the tour demonstration of the indeterminable determination in his dialectics. Besides, significantly relevant to the approach difference, they set different philosophical beginnings: Kant sets the determined experience (which includes the unity) as the beginning while Hegel sets the indeterminable (which includes, or more precisely, is also the unity) as the beginning, as the result of which Kant's system is oriented toward a demonstration of the identity of the system of the indeterminable and the system of the determined by crossing over from the study of the determined to the study of the indeterminable admitting the latter as prior to the former, whereas Hegel's, taking the indentity for granted, reveals the nature of rationality, i.e., the overall underlying structure of reality by demonstrating in his dilectics the “elevation” of our conditioned, particualr determination of mind as reality to our unconditional determination of mind as true reality, exhibiting the full view of the unity “concretely”. With my poor knowledge about Hegel and never-enough knowledge about Kant, in this report I only attempt to make an initial juxtaposition how the unity of the determined and the indeterminable is reavled in each system the best I could. I dare not give any futher comment yet. By reconstructing Kant's system to cope with Hegel's pursuit in Science of Logic, I hope to reassure myself of their common admiting to the unity referred at the beginning as the goal of their philosophical investigation. However, the reverse project is far beyond my present ability, for the lack of which I have to beg your pardon.

Contrary to Kant's approaching the indeterminable with the investigation of the determined, Hegel takes what is to be determined and yet always remains indeterminable as the philosophical beginning as well as takes the indentity of the system (totality) of the determined and the system (totality) of the indeterminable for granted. Hegel also thinks the necessary unity, the indeterminable determination, alone has its content: when the subject is aware of the nature, the spirit is limited in the limited self-awareness, in the sense of which the matter of the unity between the indeterminable and the determined has no chance to reveal itself so that people like Kant would mistakenly claim that it has no content; but when the subject is cultivated and elevated to be aware of the unity itself, of its internal tension of the opposites in unity as well as the unity in opposition, the spirit is in the absolute self-awareness, with regard to which the unity reveals itself.1 With the grasp of the existence, the indeterminable, as such, Hegel futher and more boldly deliberates the transcendental idealism in the notion that not only reality is conditioned and made possible by mind so that reality must have forms as how it is conditioned and made possible, but more acurately reality is mind. Taken the indentity for granted at the ouset, it thus follows that logic, the underlying structure of all reality, is itself an ontology and encompasses, beside of all the analyses of the cognitions, also nothingness, changing (becoming, development), existence, reality, essence, reflection, concept, and method etc. And then, in reality, i.e., in history of the activities of the development of human mind no matter individually or collectively, rationality reveals itself. Observed into the self-revelation in dialectics, into the inner tension of the opposites in unity as well as the unity in opposition, rationality is reported and concluded by Hegel as the expansion with the basis of the absolute unity: immediate mediacy and the indeteminable determination. The philosophical beginning, i.e., the indeterminable being, is thus assured as the most suitable beginning at the backhand to the viewpoints of limited conceptually-grasped awareness, as well, for the indeterminable is exactly the development spanned necessarily through the unity. It seems to me that Hegel's demonstration is an ontological – and hence metaphiscal – reconstruction, or at least, counterpart parallel, of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception in his epistemical system. If Hegel's “reality is mind” is put in Kant's system, the sentence would be saying that the indeterminable appearance (the manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori) as a whole and intuition which, as a whole, too, is manifold yet as resulted from determinations, are identical.

Kant takes the act of determination as the philosophical beginning, and he transcendentally idealized a system which corresponds to the necessary forms of the result of the determination. Because there must be the reference of the universal and the particular in any instance of cognition, the connexion of the universal and the particular must be united within the act of determination, more specifically, there must be a transcendentally-ideal unity which “makes” the reference in experience possible. In Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), he presents his theory of threefold synthesis of apperception, claiming that in order for experience as such to be possible at all, the apprehension of intuition, the reproduction in imagination and the recognition in concept must already be united in a schema; this is the condition of all possible experience.

In Critique of Judgment (CJ), he divides judgment into determined and reflective (indeterminate); in the former, the association of imagination is based on the rules of a concept which the object of the association is to be known about, while in the latter, the association of imagination gives a basis for understanding to apply various concepts to. To put in less technical vocabulary, judgment is an ability of locating a particular as, i.e., in imagination, contained under a universal; when the universal is given and the judgment subsumes a particular under it, this is determined; when only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, the judgment is reflective. To characterize the former with the model in CPR, imagination relates the synthesized manifold intuition α as well as the appearance X, i.e., manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori, in accordance with the conceptual unity (labled with 'α') of this synthesis through transcendental apperception. Once the condition is satisfied, the groud determination that the particular X/α is subsumed under the universal 'α' is made, from which arises the consciousness of an α which is known as a case of the governing concept 'α' as well. Such consciousness is the basis of our judgment that this (X/α) is 'α'. In an indeterminate judgment, on the contrary, imagination creates an object X which understanding keeps trying to find a concept for. To characterize this with the model in CPR again, the particular X is given (in nature) or created (in art – nature via human) first through imagination, and various universals such as 'α', 'β', 'γ', 'δ' etc. try to be found to grasp the manifold X when imagination at the same time reproduces intuitions α, β, γ, δ etc.

What is cognized is what is determined; and determination is made through imagination's following understanding's rules in association producing intuition. But the pre-cognized intuition, viz., appearance, which is part of the apperception in its origin but loses the indeterminacy in its result, gives to cognition nonetheless the characteristic of the manifoldness as openness to all possibilities of conception and readiness for all possible conceptualization. With such a basis a priori we are able to obtain a united, determined awareness so that we know and know about (in analysis) something, and with the same basis we are able to produce various intuitions (particularly determined awareness) in relating to the intuition itself (pre-cognitive perception with a manifold synopsis) in “freedom” to “appreciate” something when various concepts to match the indeterminable intuition can keep occurring and along holding up various correspondent particular intuitive awareness of it; because of such purposiveness of the employment of understanding and the employment of intuition, that intuition and concept are necessarily (such a necessity is assured for the unity's being transcendental) referable, first, the indeterminable can be known determined, and second, with the determined the indeterminable is witnessed. The significance of the above is: first, although the known is always determined, since the known must have the aspect of indeterminacy, for there is the conceptual-unity-based crossover between the manifold a priori and the manifold a posteriori, the pre-cognitive indeterminable, i.e., the manifold of sense through the synopsis of the manifold a priori, must agree in form with the indeterminate witnessed with the determined, i.e., the openness to all possible conceptions and the readiness for all possible conceptualizations; and then, the intuition which is accompanied with a proper reference to its counterpart concept, i.e., “determined perception,” is identical with the indeterminable perception, for if we exhaust all possible ways of presenting the intuition, i.e., if we apply all possible concepts to the intuition so that the intuition's all possible aspects are shown in unity – in the intuition itself alone, i.e., if we appreciate freely the object, the known object is immediately the true perception, the indeterminable a priori. This is evidenced in the fact that we only experience one world, that we experience the sensible world and the intellectual world as one identical world, and that in experience the referableness of the universal to the particular is nessary, given the reference is correct or not.

By the above, I think Kant would accept the general description of Hegel's project in Science of Logic, that reality is the intuitive determination of mind to which the origin of our knowledge is significantly relevant. The difference between Kant and Hegel regarding the issue about the unity of the indeterminable and the determined is not in the essence of their systems but in the framework, that is, one in epistemology and the other in ontology/metaphysics. If an epistemoligical reconstruction of Hegel's system could be compatible with Kant's, perhaps Hegel's project might be the metaphiscal development asked for by Kant in his Prolegomena?


The report is limited to the following materials:
ant, Immanuel. –– Kritik der Urteilskraft.(“Kritik der ästhetischen �� Kritik der Urteilskraft.(“Kritik mmanuel. KriUtik der Urteilsraft. (“Kritikr ästhetischen Urtei“Allgl. ”).
3. Hegel, G. W. F. Wissenschaft der Logk Wisse>. (“Ein Hegel, G. W. F. Wissenscha Loft der Logk. (“Einleitung,
gemacht �� “Allgemeiner Begriff der Logik,” “Allgemeiner Eintheilung der Logik,” “Womit muß der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht wedern?” und “Allgemeine Eintheilung der Logik” ).