^{gustav / October 23, 2008 01:56PM} <u>第五週心得報告</u> 請大家把本週的心得報告回應到這個主題下!

若對個別的心得報告有興趣回應,可直接針對報告回應!

gustav / October 23, 2008 09:24PM

<u>Re: 第五週心得報告(純瑩)</u>

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Week05:

How Husserl and Kant approach differently to the "of"?
How to "regard" the reflection?

1.

Husserl's shift of focus from the objects of consciousness onto the consciousness of objects share the same end with Kant's idea of "Critique"-- they both focus on the "of" of "the consciousness of something," but they approach to the end by different ways. Husserl tries to abstract "ideal meaning" through which something becomes conscious. (And Smith claims such an approach is "transcenendental" (pp. 261), which is very distasteful to me.) Kant tries to abstract the inevitable forms in consciousness. The former approach leads Husserl to his method of brackets (attitude of suspending the object) and quotations (ascending our awareness from experience to reflection). The latter approach leads Kant to his discovery of the transcendental plan of our mind.

2.

Reflection means to think about the acts of consciousness in Husserl, according to Smith. And the way to get phenemenoligical description of our acts of consciousness is first to bracket the object of consciousness and then to asend, by series of quoting, from the experience to the way the conscious experience becomes possible. Accordingly, Husserl thinks "the way" has to do with "relations of entailment among propositions and the sematic correlations of meanings with object in the world" (237). Such a process is, on the one hand one is suspending the object of consciousness and on the other one is describing how the object begins to make sense to the experiencing subject.

Reflection means to Kant the way (i) how our capacities of mind work together as a mingled web, (ii) how each capacity comes to "function" spontaneously with its own proper domain, so it is (iii) the principle the mind disciplines itself and thus (iv) as a pre-condition of rationality. To "grasp" reflection, one has to "feel" how the mind works (properly). This means, one should focus on "the consciousness of something" while being aware of how every capacity is contributing its "function" in the "proper way." I think in Kant there are two occasions one has direct access to reflection: in the substitution of concepts for the same object (i.e., in free play, in the judgment of the beautiful), or in the "cognition in general," i.e., when one is very culticated in judging, i.e., very acquainted with his own power, one cognizes his own power.

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