

gustav / November 16, 2009 11:21AM

[中論觀如來品第二十二 Examination of Tathagata](#)

T30n1564_p0029c02(00) || 中論卷第四

T30n1564_p0029c03(00) ||

T30n1564_p0029c04(00) || 龍樹菩薩造梵志青目釋

T30n1564_p0029c05(00) || 姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯

T30n1564_p0029c06(00) || 觀如來品第二十二(十六偈)

T30n1564_p0029c07(00) || 問曰。一切世中尊。唯有如來正遍知。

T30n1564_p0029c08(02) || 號為法王。一切智人是則應有。答曰。今諦思惟。

T30n1564_p0029c09(00) || 若有應取。若無何所取。何以故。如來。

--取！What does this exactly mean? If translated as “grasp,” this is an ontological explanation; if “employ,” this is an epistemological explanation.

T30n1564_p0029c10(00) || 非陰不離陰 此彼不相在

T30n1564_p0029c11(00) || 如來不有陰 何處有如來

--Not the constituents, not different from the constituents, the constituents are not in him, and he is not in them. A tathagata is not possessed of a constituent; in this, which is a tathagata?

--If tathāgataḥ is real, it is only possible when the tathāgataḥ (nom. sg.) T and the five skandhāḥ (pl./ skandhā sg./ skandhas) S are in one of the following relations:

(1) T is S

(2) T is distinct away from S

(3) S is in T

(4) T is in S

(5) T is possessed of S

Now, Nāgārjuna has refuted all of the possibilities, it is then only possible that the premise is not acceptable and that tathāgataḥ isn't real.

--青目's explanation:

(1) is not acceptable, because if so, tathāgataḥ would be as “real” as empirical objects which “would be born and would die.” If tathāgataḥ were as such, it contradicts the eight denials. Besides, the employer 受者 and the employed 受法 are one and the same, which we find implausible here.

--Critique: However, saying tathāgataḥ is the five skandhāḥ does not necessarily mean the former is the product of the latter. Tathāgataḥ could yet be the five skandhāḥ in the sense that (a- transcendental reading) the former is the transcendental subject which makes the empirical objects fit the characteristics of possessing the aspects of the latter, so that it can be reasonable that the former could be so transcendently idealized; (b-absolute reading) the former is an “external” cause of the latter (which is denied in (2)) that the cause makes possible the effect from which five skandhāḥ can be empirically distinguished.

--Critique: Besides, why not the employer and the employed cannot be one and the same, if, resonated with Dignāga's svasamvitti theory, the “resulting cognition (pramāṇaphala)” and the “means of cognition (pramāṇa)” should not be separated as the realists believe. Is exactly at this very point that Madhyamika find Dignāga's theory non-acceptable? But, Candrakīrti's criticism that if Dignāga's theory is accepted then there would be infinite regress problem regarding the svasamvitti's pre-existence, is not plausible if we explain away the realist's paralogism regarding the pramāṇa-pramāṇaphala distinction... How would Nāgārjuna himself response to the question here?

--青目's explanation:

(2) is not acceptable, because if so, the independent tathāgataḥ would be free of birth-death, and then tathāgataḥ would be external 常, which contradicts the eight denials.

Besides, if there were such independent tathāgataḥ, the functioning of the five senses could not result in as such, as known to the subject (tathāgataḥ).

--Critique: How should we treat the eight denials? Are they the end of the argument or the beginning of the argument?

--Suggest: In 深觀、波若波羅蜜, it is intuited that the ultimate reality is best conventionally characterized as such, and hence the eight denials need argued for conventionally, yet the argument can be made only with the ultimate, a priori, intuition to “consult with” – a reconstruction from Kant's idea of pure intuition.

--Reflection: Eight denials are all conventional characterization. People who has observed the intuitive source of them can both ultimately and conventionally “grasp” the characterization; people who has not observed the intuitive source of them can only conventionally grasp it. That's why Buddha's words is a practical teach!

--Critique: the argument 青目 offers here can only rule out the absolute reading (b) above, for a transcendental

tathāgataḥ is not independent from the five skandhāḥ. The transcendental reading still survives.

--Critique: Besides, if we say, further tuned transcendental reading, that the tathāgataḥ could be the five skandhāḥ in the sense that both terms are just names 假名 for in ultimate truth, tathāgataḥ and skandhāḥ be not reasonable at all: we have conventional, empirical experience as such, which can be characterized with the the skandhāḥ theory and hence it can be postulated that there might reasonably be tathāgataḥ. But the characterization and the postulation above can only be valid in relation to experience; hence, the transcendental reading is tuned to tone with the denial of "tathāgataḥ being the five skandhāḥ."

青目's explanation:

(3)and

(4)are not acceptable, for, by applying the method 一異 in the denial 不一不異, it is required that tathāgataḥ and the five skandhāḥ are different so that the former could be the container of the latter or vise versa; and if the former and the latter are different, it contradicts the denial 不常.

(5)Is not acceptable, for, by applying the method 一異 in the denial 不一不異 as well, it is required that tathāgataḥ and the five skandhāḥ are different so that the former could be the possessor of the latter; and if so, it also contradicts the denial 不常.

--Critique: Again, how should we treat the eight denials?

--Summary: With the absolute reading of the tathāgataḥ-skandhāḥ problem, it is then said all the five postulations are wrong; with the reading bearing the idea that tathāgataḥ is not real (our conventional demand for reality always targets the ultimate reality, based upon which the reality as such should be denied so that the ultimate reality and the conventional reality can both be preserved)*, similarly, with the transcendental reading, it just does not matter at all whether you hold the five postulations or not.

*The real in "tathāgataḥ is not real" is paralogic for what we can say ever of the real and what is demanded in the sentence is not mutually qualified. Hence, the denial of such "reality" can break the paralogism embedded: denying the absolute, cognition-free, skandhāḥ-free reality of tathāgataḥ is actually the refuse to such a demand from conventional realm to the ultimate realm; without such a crossover, it just does not matter with the five postulations.

T30n1564_p0029c12(00) 若如來實有者。為五陰是如來。
 T30n1564_p0029c13(04) 為離五陰有如來。為如來中有五陰。
 T30n1564_p0029c14(06) 為五陰中有如來。為如來有五陰。是事皆不然。
 T30n1564_p0029c15(04) 五陰非是如來。何以故。生滅相故。五陰生滅相。
 T30n1564_p0029c16(03) 若如來是五陰。如來即是生滅相。若生滅相者。
 T30n1564_p0029c17(01) 如來即有無常斷滅等過。又受者受法則一。
 T30n1564_p0029c18(01) 受者是如來。受法是五陰。是事不然。
 T30n1564_p0029c19(04) 是故如來非是五陰。離五陰亦無如來。
 T30n1564_p0029c20(04) 若離五陰有如來者。不應有生滅相。若爾者。
 T30n1564_p0029c21(02) 如來有常等過。又眼等諸根不能見知。
 T30n1564_p0029c22(03) 但是事不然。是故離五陰亦無如來。
 T30n1564_p0029c23(04) 如來中亦無五陰。何以故。若如來中有五陰。
 T30n1564_p0029c24(03) 如器中有果水中有魚者。則為有異。若異者。
 T30n1564_p0029c25(02) 即有如上常等過。是故如來中無五陰。
 T30n1564_p0029c26(04) 又五陰中無如來。何以故。若五陰中有如來。
 T30n1564_p0029c27(03) 如床上有人器中有乳者。如是則有別異。
 T30n1564_p0029c28(03) 如上說過。是故五陰中無如來。如來亦不有五陰。
 T30n1564_p0029c29(00) 何以故。若如來有五陰。如人有子。
 T30n1564_p0030a01(03) 如是則有別異。若爾者。有如上過。是事不然。
 T30n1564_p0030a02(02) 是故如來不有五陰。如是五種求不可得。
 T30n1564_p0030a03(02) 何等是如來。問曰。如是義求如來不可得。
 T30n1564_p0030a04(02) 而五陰和合有如來。答曰。
 T30n1564_p0030a05(00) 陰合有如來 則無有自性
 T30n1564_p0030a06(00) 若無有自性 云何因他有

--If a buddha [exists] by means of the constituents, he does not exist with regard to self-nature. And if he does not exist with regard to self-nature, how can he with regard to other-nature.

--If a buddha's existence "depends" on the coordinated operation of skandhāḥ, then such an existence is not with svabhava. Without svabhava equals without his-nature.

--Critique: The baseline is, the existence of a buddha is free of svabhava; based on this, the verse can be read that the existence of a buddha indeed depends on the coordinated operation of skandhāḥ and hence has no svabhava and hence no his-nature. Then, perhaps it is one option to say that the existence of a buddha "depends" on the coordinated operation of skandhāḥ. But here comes a question: if this verse fundamentally contradict with the first verse? Is such a dependence not one of the five possibilities, say, T is S, then the existence becomes a birth-death matter, empirical, post-cognition?

T30n1564_p0030a07(00) 若如來五陰和合故有。即無自性。何以故。
 T30n1564_p0030a08(00) 因五陰和合有故。問曰。
 T30n1564_p0030a09(06) 如來不以自性有。但因他性有。答曰。若無自性。
 T30n1564_p0030a10(03) 云何因他性有。何以故。他性亦無自性。
 T30n1564_p0030a11(04) 又無相待因故。他性不可得。不可得故不名為他。
 T30n1564_p0030a12(01) 復次。
 T30n1564_p0030a13(00) 法若因他生 是即為非我
 T30n1564_p0030a14(00) 若法非我者 云何是如來

--It is plausible to call he who is independent on other-nature "non-self"; And he who is non-self, then how will he be the tathagata?

--Critique: the sayings of the above two verses are puzzling, for if the sayings are his stand, then Nāgārjuna seems to contradict his own theory of the denial of svabhava. It is either Nāgārjuna's stand or not. But on this level of decision between either-or, it is only revealed that the it just does not work to think of buddha's existence in terms of "nature性" which is always a posteriori, post-cognition. Or it is neither Nāgārjuna's stand nor not. On this level, his stand can at last be revealed: away from the idea of nature 性見, one can begin to "talk about" tathāgataḥ.

--青目's explanation: Just as the five fingers make a fist possible for the latter depends on the former's certain function, the five skandhāḥ make a self possible. What is made possible in the above analogy has no self-existence, for it "depends" on others. Then it is asked what a buddha's existence can be?

--Critique: This verse is a response to the former verse's left-over question: a buddha's existence cannot depend on the coordinated operation of five skandhāḥ, for if so, the former would depend on others and then loose self-nature; without self-nature, how can it be the existence of buddha.

--Critique: Now Nāgārjuna becomes someone for self-nature? NO! The term "anātmā iti" non-self does not equal self-nature. Self-nature is an abstract, absolute nature which is regarded as self-dependent; non-self is non-subjectivity. Tathāgataḥ has no self-nature, but has to have subjectivity! However, why not the case that tathāgataḥ depends on five skandhāḥ and still has subjectivity? Does the analogy of finger-fist work? I do not think so. Finger and fist are both cognized objects, whereas tathāgataḥ and skandhāḥ may not so decisive. But perhaps this is Nāgārjuna's point? Perhaps tathāgataḥ and skandhāḥ are cognized objects, too, since it is the case that we "know" there is tathāgataḥ and we "know" there are skandhāḥ, and hence our in-decisiveness is the cause of all problems? But with the reconstruction to "transcendentalize" the "know" here, the problem of the "dependence" here may be resolved, since the know become an "idealization" and no longer a linguistic reference!

T30n1564_p0030a15(00) 若法因眾緣生。即無有我。
 T30n1564_p0030a16(05) 如因五指有拳。是拳無有自體。如是因五陰名我。
 T30n1564_p0030a17(01) 是我即無自體。我有種種名。
 T30n1564_p0030a18(06) 或名眾生人天如來等。若如來因五陰有。即無自性。
 T30n1564_p0030a19(02) 無自性故無我。若無我云何說名如來。
 T30n1564_p0030a20(03) 是故偈中說法若因他生是即為非我。
 T30n1564_p0030a21(05) 若法非我者云何是如來。復次。
 T30n1564_p0030a22(00) 若無有自性 云何有他性
 T30n1564_p0030a23(00) 離自性他性 何名為如來

--If there is not self-nature, how would there be other-nature? Without self-nature and other nature, who is this tathagata?

--Critique: the verse is a question: if without svabhava and parabhava, what is sufficient for calling a tathagata? I would answer: subjectivity.

T30n1564_p0030a24(00) 若無自性。他性亦不應有。
 T30n1564_p0030a25(05) 因自性故名他性。此無故彼亦無。是故自性他性二俱無。
 T30n1564_p0030a26(00) 若離自性他性。誰為如來。復次。
 T30n1564_p0030a27(00) 若不因五陰 先有如來者

T30n1564_p0030a28(00) 以今受陰故 則說為如來

--If there were to exist a tathagata not employing the constituents, he would be employing [them] at this moment, therefore he would exist employing them.

--If we assume that there were to exist a subject before any employment of the five skandas; only when the subject were employing them there would exist such a subject.

--Critique: this verse is too jumpy in relation to the former arguments...

T30n1564_p0030a29(00) 今實不受陰 更無如來法

T30n1564_p0030b01(00) 若以不受無 今當云何受

--There does not exist any tathagata who is not employing the constituents; and he who does not exist, not employing [them], how does he employ [them]?

--Critique: The verse is a response to the former verse, saying that the later half of the former verse is actually a self-contradiction. If only the subject with the operation of the five skandas were to exist, there would exist no subject without the operation of the five skandas. Also, if the subject without the operation of five skandas were not to exist, what would be going to employ them? Given that the subject without operation of five skandas is assumed, it is then only an assumption.

--Critique: What if we just idealize the subject whose ideality can only base itself on the ground of the operation of the five skandas? Also, if we do not assume a subject, how can we believe the operations of the five skandas belong to certain identity?

T30n1564_p0030b02(00) 若其未有受 所受不名受

T30n1564_p0030b03(00) 無有無受法 而名為如來

--The tathagata never exists as an ungrasped grasping; and in no way is there a tathagata without grasping.

--Critique: 鳩摩羅什's translation is not quite following the Sanskrit in the first half of the verse. The translation means: without employment, what the employment (the grasping) is resulted in cannot be entitled "grasped". This half nonetheless obviously indicates that the non-employed employment makes no sense, refusing the model of non-employed employer which is potential to employ the five skandas. The later half of the verse reinforce the statement.

--Critique: the transcendental subject as a mere idea whose basis can only be found in the employment of five skandas, is indeed a tathagata non-employed yet potential to employ which only exists at the moment of employment. Would Nāgārjuna reject that?

T30n1564_p0030b04(00) 若於一異中 如來不可得

T30n1564_p0030b05(00) 五種求亦無 云何受中有

--The tathagata, who being sought after in five ways through identity and difference does not exist, through the act of grasping, how can he be understood?

--The tathagata, that we try to find with the method of identity and difference, i.e., check with the criteria of 不一、不異, that we have rejected by arguing that since tathagata and five skandas cannot be different (as suggested in the claiming of the five possibilities for tathagata to be real), cannot be found either in the argument of employment.

T30n1564_p0030b06(00) 又所受五陰 不從自性有

T30n1564_p0030b07(00) 若無自性者 云何有他性

Also that which is grasping at this place, that is not known through self-nature; and what does not exist through self-nature, from where is that through other nature?

--Besides, we can understand that tathagata cannot be found also with the method of 無自性他性.

T30n1564_p0030b08(00) 若未受五陰。先有如來者。

T30n1564_p0030b09(06) 是如來今應受五陰。已作如來。

T30n1564_p0030b10(10) 而實未受五陰時先無如來。今云何當受。又不受五陰者。

T30n1564_p0030b11(04) 五陰不名為受。無有無受而名為如來。

T30n1564_p0030b12(05) 又如來一異中求不可得。五陰中五種求亦不可得。

T30n1564_p0030b13(02) 若爾者。云何於五陰中說有如來。又所受五陰。

T30n1564_p0030b14(00) 不從自性有。若謂從他性有。

T30n1564_p0030b15(04) 若不從自性有。云何從他性有。何以故。

T30n1564_p0030b16(04) 以無自性故。又他性亦無。復次。

T30n1564_p0030b17(00) 以如是義故 受空受者空

T30n1564_p0030b18(00) 云何當以空 而說空如來

--In this way, both the act of grasping and the person who is grasping are altogether empty. And how is an empty tathagata understood through what is empty?

T30n1564_p0030b19(00) 以是義思惟。受及受者皆空。若受空者。

T30n1564_p0030b20(01) 云何以空受。而說空如來。問曰。

T30n1564_p0030b21(05) 汝謂受空受者空。則定有空耶。答曰不然。何以故。

T30n1564_p0030b22(00) 空則不可說 非空不可說

T30n1564_p0030b23(00) 共不共叵說 但以假名說

It is not to be said that he could be “empty” or “non-empty,” “both” or “neither”; For it is described [thus only] for the purpose of explanation.

T30n1564_p0030b24(00) 諸法空則不應說。諸法不空亦不應說。

T30n1564_p0030b25(01) 諸法空不空亦不應說。

T30n1564_p0030b26(08) 非空非不空亦不應說。何以故。但破相違故。以假名說。

T30n1564_p0030b27(02) 如是正觀思惟。諸法實相中。不應以諸難為難。

T30n1564_p0030b28(00) 何以故。

T30n1564_p0030b29(00) 寂滅相中無 常無常等四

T30n1564_p0030c01(00) 寂滅相中無 邊無邊等四

In this matter, in the undisturbed state, from where are the fourfold permanent, impermanent and the rest? Also in this matter, in the undisturbed state, from where are the fourfold limited, limitless and the rest?

--Critique (A Kantian reconstruction) If we make sure that the empty is properly received, how do we understand the ultimate truth it self, i.e., time and space? Time and space are not external, independent property nor external, independent relations, but cognition-dependent and thus experience-dependent “sense” through which we present the world in time and space to ourself-- and hence they are mediate and the fundamental assay for further inference. The eternity, non-eternity, not eternal and not non-eternal that we “realize” are possible only in “experience世間,” cognition-dependent and experience-dependent. Leave cognition and experience, we cannot still stick to the “sense” of time, and it just does not matter regarding the four aspects of the temporal sense; space is similar with its four aspects: limitless, limit, not limitless and not limit. Everything begins with the birth of space and time, altogether, not only the objects we realize in them, but also the aspects of the senses of space and time themselves. The same reason as we reject the svabhava of everything, we reject the svabhava of space and time.

T30n1564_p0030c02(00) 諸法實相。如是微妙寂滅。但因過去世。

T30n1564_p0030c03(01) 起四種邪見。世間有常。世間無常。

T30n1564_p0030c04(04) 世間常無常。世間非常非無常。寂滅中盡無。何以故。

T30n1564_p0030c05(01) 諸法實相。畢竟清淨不可取。空尚不受。

T30n1564_p0030c06(02) 何況有四種見。四種見皆因受生。

T30n1564_p0030c07(05) 諸法實相無所因受。四種見皆以自見為貴。他見為賤。

T30n1564_p0030c08(00) 諸法實相無有此彼。

T30n1564_p0030c09(08) 是故說寂滅中無四種見。如因過去世有四種見。

T30n1564_p0030c10(04) 因未來世有四種見亦如是。世間有邊。世間無邊。

T30n1564_p0030c11(01) 世間有邊無邊。世間非有邊非無邊。問曰。

T30n1564_p0030c12(01) 若如是破如來者。則無如來耶。答曰。

T30n1564_p0030c13(00) 邪見深厚者 則說無如來

T30n1564_p0030c14(00) 如來寂滅相 分別有亦非

By whom is held firmly the understanding that a solid tathagata “exists,” conjecturing, he would also imagine “he does not exist” in the ceased [state].

T30n1564_p0030c15(00) 邪見有二種。一者破世間樂。

T30n1564_p0030c16(05) 二者破涅槃道。破世間樂者。是麤邪見。言無罪無福。

T30n1564_p0030c17(00) 無如來等賢聖。起是邪見捨善為惡。

T30n1564_p0030c18(02) 則破世間樂。破涅槃道者。貪著於我。分別有無。

T30n1564_p0030c19(00) 起善滅惡。起善故得世間樂。

T30n1564_p0030c20(05) 分別有無故不得涅槃。是故若言無如來者。

T30n1564_p0030c21(04) 是深厚邪見。乃失世間樂。何況涅槃。若言有如來。

T30n1564_p0030c22(01) 亦是邪見。何以故。如來寂滅相。而種種分別故。

T30n1564_p0030c23(00) 是故寂滅相中。分別有如來。亦為非。

T30n1564_p0030c24(00) 如是性空中 思惟亦不可

T30n1564_p0030c25(00) 如來滅度後 分別於有無

And with this being empty in respect to self-nature, the thought is never plausible [that] beyond cessation a buddha

either “is” or “is not”.

T30n1564_p0030c26(00) || 諸法實相性空故。

T30n1564_p0030c27(09) || 不應於如來滅後思惟若有若無。若有無。如來從本已來畢竟空。

T30n1564_p0030c28(00) || 何況滅後。

T30n1564_p0030c29(00) || 如來過戲論 而人生戲論

T30n1564_p0031a01(00) || 戲論破慧眼 是皆不見佛

[Those] who dwell on a buddha passed beyond hinderances and imperishable, they all afflicted by hinderances, do not see the tathagata.

T30n1564_p0031a02(00) || 戲論名憶念取相分別此彼。

T30n1564_p0031a03(05) || 言佛滅不滅等。是人為戲論。

T30n1564_p0031a04(10) || 覆慧眼故不能見如來法身。此如來品中。初中後思惟。

T30n1564_p0031a05(05) || 如來定性不可得。是故偈說。

T30n1564_p0031a06(00) || 如來所有性 即是世間性

T30n1564_p0031a07(00) || 如來無有性 世間亦無性

What is the tathagata as self-nature, that is this world as self-nature; the tathagata is without self-nature, this world is without self-nature.

T30n1564_p0031a08(00) || 此品中思惟推求。如來性即是一切世間性。

T30n1564_p0031a09(00) || 問曰。何等是如來性。答曰。如來無有性。

T30n1564_p0031a10(01) || 同世間無性。

嘗試將頌文譯成白話漢語：

觀如來品第二十二

頌一：

非陰不離陰 此彼不相在

如來不有陰 何處有如來

白話：如來不是五蘊，也不離五蘊，彼此不在彼此中，如來不具有五蘊，那哪裡有如來呢？

頌二：

陰合有如來 則無有自性

若無有自性 云何因他有

白話：五蘊和合如來始存有，那麼如來應無自性，如果如來無自性，怎麼能說有他性？

頌三：

法若因他生 是即為非我

若法非我者 云何是如來

白話：事物只要依他物為因而生，其自身就無我，如果某事屬於此類，那斷非如來，那什麼是如來？

頌四：

若無有自性 云何有他性

離自性他性 何名為如來

白話：如果沒有自性，怎樣會有他性呢？若判離自性他性，那如來到底是怎樣而可稱作如來呢？

頌五：

若不因五陰 先有如來者

以今受陰故 則說為如來

白話：如果如來不依五蘊為他因而先於五蘊存有，待如來作動、五蘊始有，而該作動五蘊者稱作如來，這又如何？

頌六：

今實不受陰 更無如來法
若以不受無 今當云何受

白話：事實上，如果在如來不作動而五蘊不起之際，怎麼能說有如來實有呢？如果說五蘊不起如來不作動則無實有如來，我們現在還能說是誰在作動呢？

頌七：

若其未有受 所受不名受
無有無受法 而名為如來

白話：如果如來還未有作動，被作動而生的因未發生而不該被稱作作動，而沒有那種未作動而有的任何存有可稱作如來。（按鳩摩羅什漢譯）

如來從未以一種未取的摭取者存在，且不可能有一種未摭取的如來。（據梵英對照譯）

頌八：

若於一異中 如來不可得
五種求亦無 云何受中有

白話：如果用一異的方法（以不一不異為判準）去看，前述五個假若實有如來而如來可能存有的可能性都一一不能成立，那怎麼可以說透過這種作動說而可以說明如來的存有呢？（若窮舉窮盡如來實有條件下的可能性都一一不能成立，就是該條件本身不成立，若如來不實有，何必得用作動說來說明如來的實有？這條路還是行不通的！）

頌九：

又所受五陰 不從自性有
若無自性者 云何有他性

白話：又在以作動中而有生起的五蘊就表示它們自身不從自性有（無自性且不獨立於作動而實有），不藉由自性而有，怎麼能說藉由他性而能存在？（自性、他性都在同一條件下成立，即在生滅中成立，如果我們說在如來作動中有五蘊生起，則不論是作動、生起，都是生滅事，所以作動說不足以說明非生滅事的如來實相。這是對量論、知識論立場很大、但應可克服的挑戰！）

頌十：

以如是義故 受空受者空
云何當以空 而說空如來

白話：就此意義，作動與因作動而生的都是空的，那如何可以透過空而說明如來空性？

頌十一：

空則不可說 非空不可說
共不共叵說 但以假名說

白話：空不可言說，非空也不可言說，亦空亦不空不可說，非空非不空不可說，（因為空的範域與言說、生滅的範域就認識來說為orthogonal），對空的一切談論 都是以方便假名而說。

頌十二：

寂滅相中無 常無常等四
寂滅相中無 邊無邊等四

白話：空、寂滅相中一切皆無，時間亦無，所以常、無常、二者皆是與二者皆非這些想法都不能套用上去；同樣地，空間亦無，所以有限、無限、二者皆是與二者皆非這些想法也都不能套用上去。（反過來說，在言語、生滅的經驗範圍來說，是因為空間與時間這樣的生滅基礎相在認識當中必然被套用，所以常無常等四與邊無邊等四成為可思量的想

法。空中無時間、空間！)

頌十三：
邪見深厚者 則說無如來
如來寂滅相 分別有亦非

白話：邪見深厚的人，藉此就會說那根本就無如來存在啊。其實脫離生滅在空中要去分辨有或無，本來就是亂套（有無是生滅事，不是空中事）。

頌十四：
如是性空中 思惟亦不可
如來滅度後 分別於有無

白話：在空中，思維是無用的。如來滅度後，與有無是兩回事（入空與有無是兩回事，一個是發生的、一個是認識的）。

頌十五：
如來過戲論 而人生戲論
戲論破慧眼 是皆不見佛

白話：若說如來是「超越」戲論的，這是人所想像的戲論，這樣的戲論破壞了智慧之眼而始人不得見佛陀。

頌十六：
如來所有性 即是世間性
如來無有性 世間亦無性

白話：一切如來的性質，就是世間的性質；如來沒有自性，世間也沒有自性。

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