

gustav / October 23, 2008 11:43PM

[Re: 佛教現象學 Buddhist Phenomenology/ 純瑩的心得](#)

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gustav / October 05, 2008 12:31AM

[Re: 佛教現象學 Buddhist Phenomenology/ 純瑩的心得](#)

哈 我不能針對文章回應嗎？好像都是針對第一篇回應。

gustav / October 05, 2008 12:30AM

[Re: 佛教現象學 Buddhist Phenomenology/ 純瑩的心得](#)

I do not agree with you. I think we should stick to "Empirical Realism." Trarara!

gustav / October 05, 2008 12:29AM

[Re: 佛教現象學 Buddhist Phenomenology/ 純瑩的心得](#)

Wang, Chun-Ying

97154502

Buddhist Phenomenology

Professor Chen Kuo Lin

Week01: Transcendental Idealism or Transcendental Realism, Which Ideology Is Purposive for Phenomenology?

From Johan Heinrich Lambert (1728-77) and Kant on, the term phenomenology has been used to refer to the systematical study of the description of consciousness and experience in abstraction by investigating its intentional structure, the structure by means of which the consciousness is "directed". Following Brentano, mainly, Husserl stressed that intentionality was the distinctive indication of consciousness, and he believes if we know how, or by means of what structure, the consciousness is directed, we know how, or by means of what structure, we mean.

Smith points out a contrast between Husserl and Kant (pp. 203): Kant believes space and time are the forms of pure intuition, while Husserl thinks "[t]he world has its structure in itself and our consciousness develops meanings through which we comprehend things in space and time" (ibid.). And he says that the contrast is a big "technical difference" and Husserl believes "none of" Kant's transcendental idealism. If I take his account of Husserl in the above quotes for granted, I guess he tries to point out in Husserl's believing "the world has its structure in itself" actually he believes: the world is in time and space-- time and space are part of "the structure in itself". But later Smith writes that in the development of meaning "we comprehend things in space and time"; this is exactly part of the insight of Kant's idea that space and time are the forms of pure intuition. Husserl did take all of Kant's account on time and space. It is either Smith jumps to a quick conclusion here, or Husserl did not make himself clear enough.

A "look" stuck to the idea that time and space are mere forms of pure intuition is transcendental idealistic look, and the rest is transcendental realistic look. We can believe that the world has structure in itself and that we have certain ways to comprehend the world as "it is, i.e., how it appears to us", but such beliefs can either be transcendental idealistic or transcendental realistic. If phenomenology is a rather "conservative" study that carefully confines the investigation in conscious experience and aims at figuring out what conditions substrate the experience and the investigation, we can never have the chance to hold that space and time are structure in the world itself. We can only comprehend things in space and time in the development of meaning, but we cannot then suppose time and space are in the world itself as its structure in itself. If by "the world" you mean "the world

pre-intentionalized”, which is never tasteful to Heidegger and his followers I guess, then you contradict the idea of phenomenology! If by “the world” you mean “the world which is realized by our intentional structure”, you just agree Kant's transcendental idealism-- space and time are forms of pure intuition, which is comprehended in the development of meaning/consciousness. Heidegger tries to criticize Kant by saying that we should not distinguish the world as it appears and the world as it is in itself, we should take the world as it is, i.e., a comprehension post-intentionalized. I think Heidegger's criticism is due to the same puzzles as Husserl (or Smith) here on Kant's notion of the world as it is and the world as it appears.

In Kant's transcendental idealism, the world in itself is just an assumption-- so that we can be meaningfully conscious of something in a proper context. It is never part of the content of critique, and never part of the consciousness. But the assumption substrates the critique and the conscious experience; thus the assumption is necessary. I see no chance transcendental realism can co-operate with phenomenology.

gustav / October 05, 2008 12:19AM

[佛教現象學 Buddhist Phenomenology](#)

第一週討論：

討論吧！

不過不能新增tag喔。

Edited 2 time(s). Last edit at 10/05/2008 12:27AM by gustav.
