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[The Meaning of 義 in Dignāga's 《Nyāyamukha》](#)

The Meaning of 義 in Dignāga's Nyāyamukha

{In the beginning of the Mukha where Dignāga explains the attempt he tries to achieve in the mukha, we find the term Yi (義, artha) has to be understood in the context of cognition.}

為欲簡持能立能破義中真實故造斯論。

The mukha is made in order to genuinely specify the object of that through which the establishable can be established and that through which the non-establishable can be destroyed.

Verse 1a: 宗等多言說能立，是中唯隨自意，樂

Verse 1b: 為所成立說名宗，非彼相違義能遣

宗等多言說能立者，由宗因喻多言辯說他未了義，故此多言於論式等說名能立。

The verse begins with “宗等多言說能立” indicates that through the (dissertator's) inferential formula consisting of verbal theses, reasons and instances, the object which is not yet conceived by the other (interlocutor) is tried to be unfolded. Hence, these verbal apparatuses in the formula are altogether entitled “能立 (that through which the establishable can be established)”.

又以一言說能立者，為顯總成一能立性，由此應知隨有所闕名能立過。

To entitle that through which the establishable can be established with a verbal name aims at uniting the nature of the establishable, with which any (possible) lacks (in the cases) in contrast [to the full unity of such nature] should be identified, and they are entitled “the flaws of the establishable”.

言是中者，起論端義，或簡持義。

Those that are meant by “among them” refer to the objects of dissertation or of specification.

*Object of dissertation: the object referred by the verbal thesis.

*Object of specification: the object referred by the apperceptive perspective chosen by the dissertator at certain circumstance.

是宗等中，故名是中，所名唯者，是簡別義。

Because [the objects are specified in] these verbal apparatuses such as thesis etc., hence they are entitled “in them”; that which is entitled “only” indicates that [the objects are] only [restricted (and therefore are conceived) within the specified scope and hence are] objects of specification.

隨自意顯：不顧論宗隨自意立。

[The objects] appear in accordance with the [dissertator's] own apperception. [This means,] disregarding [the manifoldness of the objects of specification that can be united under the object of] the thesis, [the dissertator] specifies whatever object of specification with [the dissertator's] own apperception.

*Ouyang Jingwu: Fashang's Zhengli Yidi Shi: “The object of the thesis-subject is manifold (with many properties), now these manifold cannot all be taken into an account, but one among them can happily be selected in apperceptive construction.”

法上《正理一滴釋》云：「自宗法義有多，今不悉顧，但樂立一也(，論即是宗，故云論宗)。」

{After Dignāga unites the full nature of a proper thesis and recites the flaws identifying the improper thesis, he writes:}

因與似因多是宗法，此差別相今當顯示：

Verse 2a: 宗法於同品，謂有、非有、俱

Verse 2b: 於異品各三，有、非有、及二

[The objects specified by] reasons and pseudo-reasons are [logically] often [a part of the objects that can be

specified] in the theses. The difference between them will be demonstrated through the following treatises:

[All that which can be specified in the object of dissertation, namely,] the thesis-predicates (dharma), can relate to the similar cases (sapakṣa) either as specifiable, non-specifiable, or both specifiable and non-specifiable. As well, they can relate to the dissimilar cases (vipakṣa) either as specifiable, non-specifiable or both specifiable and non-specifiable.

{Hence, the twofold meaning of the term 義, namely, 起論端義 and 簡別義 can be understood as: the object of the thesis, and the object further specified as properties of the first object. Later, Dignāga goes into the details about this.}

如是宗法三種差別，謂同品有、非有、及俱，先除「及」字。

Such thesis-predicates are divided into three kinds: specifiable in the similar cases, non-specifiable in the similar cases, and both specifiable and non-specifiable in the similar cases. The word “and” was omitted in convenience in the previous verse.

此中，若品與所立法鄰近均等，說名同品，以一切義皆名品故。

In them, (when distributing all the possible cases under the entries of all the possible predicates,) the cases that fall close to (namely, in the same group of) the object of dissertation specified by the thesis-predicate are entitled “the class of the similar cases”, because all the objects (in the first sense, as the objects of dissertation) are so entitled in classes, (i.e., with class names).

*All the objects are so entitled in classes, because, since the object of dissertation is manifold and further analyzable, such a distribution is valid.

若所立無，說名異品。

The class in which the object of dissertation in the thesis does not fall, (namely, the exclusion of the class of the similar cases) are entitled “dissimilar cases”.

非與同品相違或異，若相違者應唯簡別，若別異者應無有因。

(The distinction between the class of the similar cases and the class of the dissimilar cases) is not identified by contrary or by difference. If by contrary, it will be JUST too specific, (for the class of the cases with property contrary to property A takes ONLY part of the class exclusive of property A). If by difference, the class will contain cases in which (although the thesis-predicate is specifiable,) the reason-predicate is not specifiable.

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[The Meaning of 義 in Dignāga's 《Nyāyamukha》 \(II\)](#)

Following the understanding of 同品 and 異品 in the light of the understanding of 義 (as 起論端義 and 簡別義) presented last week, we are now to examine Dignāga's theory of 九句因.

First, the cognitive model will be described; second, the logical function as distributing cases with its rules will be described; then, we will come back to 九句因.

Non-representational model. With the immediacy between (the operation of) the five senses and (the operation of) manas, the cognition arises in a form as: the world as appeared outside, the world as appeared inside and the subject as appeared to “know the world in which the subject itself occurs” are altogether sharply given as one unity of the conditioned representations, namely, the real.

It then follows that the logical functions we can observe in our own reflection dwell (operate) directly in the world,

neither the case that “the sensational impressions are taken in, processed with the logos and produced to be knowledge” nor the case that “the res cogitans in time (as developing concepts) relate to the res extensas in space in a harmonious correspondence”. With the operation of the living logic in the “first cause” that turns out, post-critically, to dwell (operate) in every instance of cognition and directly in reality, the object of cognition (一切義) is twofold: the object to be specified (起論端義, 宗法(義)) and the object as specified (簡別義). (Although twofold, there's no real distinction between the folds, since the first cause only comes into effect “formally”. Such a causality is the supporting source for Jinendrabuddhi's term “formal conformity between the object of cognition and the cognition of that cognition”.)

The object to be specified is in possession of manifold specific ways determining itself, but it comes into reality only in a unity once a time. The realized specific way determining the object makes the object itself the one as specified. E.g., “(the cup as) the cup”, “(the cup as) my cup”, “(the cup as) white object”... are one and the same object. This is what Dignāga's internal process in which an object is inferred, namely, the inference-for-oneself (svarthānumāna), may refer to. With such an operation of the direct logic, the inferential measures for others in the parārthanumāna (inference-for-others) such as the dharmin-dharma (subject-predicate) relations, similar instances and dissimilar instances, falling near or far (與所立法鄰近均等) in the distribution of cases, etc., come into effect, too. And thus this is the light in demand to shed on understanding these inferential measures.

Formally speaking (in a sense as the conditioning of the logical functions), since the direct logic contributes unity, which forms the definite scope of a dharmin, all the possible objects to be specified are empty, neutral cases (something like the infinite neutral nodes in the information topology). When the material specification comes in, namely, when experience through cognition comes in, namely, when things appear, all the possible ways of self-determination of each case are determined (prior to the taking-place of any specific cognition action, and non-effected by the free determination of the cognizer) – this is the material distribution.

Since all the possible cases that can appear have their own manifold ways of self-determination, while the ways themselves are the objects as specified again (a mini-critical circle in a single conscious structure), the distribution process (as formal activity in reflection, namely, in svarthānumāna) by means of the ways of specification has its ground to perform. I.e., since every empty case can be so-specified (P) or non-so-specified (-P) with certain specification (“P”), all the cases must be able to be distributed as a group of P and its exclusive group -P. (一切義皆名品故)

Now, as into the concern of the verbal inference (parārthanumāna), the object to be specified is indirect and needs the help of another object as specified among the object's possible ways of self-determination. Then, the determined relation between these two ways of self-determination of the object must be obtained as valid first. E.g., the mountain as having smokes is to be specified as one having fire, when the having-fire-ness as a way any dharmin can appear to a cognizer must co-occur with the having-fire-ness as a way any dharmin so can. The two distribution systems of the same web of neutral information nodes applying dharma A (e.g., specifiable with having-fire-ness) and applying dharma B (e.g., specifiable with having-smoke-ness) must be identical: all that can be specified with A are all that can be specified with B, while the exclusive scope of A is the one of B equally.

Therefore, in Dignāga's analysis of the reasons and pseudo-reasons (九句因), only the way of self-determination presented as the inferential reason which can successfully makes the contrast (against the way of self-determination presented as the inferential target宗法) of the two distribution systems resultful, i.e., makes the two distribution systems identical (同品有, 異品無), the reason is legitimately effective.

Beside of the perfect situation, there is only one kind of legitimate reason left, namely, 同品有無俱, 異品無. All that cannot appear as specified with the thesis-dharma is identical with all that cannot appear as specified with the reason-dharma; some that can appear as specified with the thesis-dharma can fall in the group as appearing as specified with the reason-dharma, while the left of that which can appear as specified with the thesis-dharma, cannot appear as specified with the reason-dharma. E.g., voice is non-eternal, because it is produced by human effort, like the pots or lightening, and unlike śūnyatā (emptiness). This distribution systems in contrast are identical

as well, for the equation does not be harmed with the cases which is non-specifiable with the thesis-dharma -- the distribution of the cases specified with the thesis-dharma falls within the distribution of the cases specified with the reason-dharma, while the distribution of the later cases does not fall without the distribution of the former cases.

The other seven kinds of reasons will be discussed later.

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