

gustav / October 13, 2010 11:12PM

[Logic and the Non-perceivable \(I\) \[Dignāga's Nyāyamukha\]](#)

T32n1628\_p0001b28(13) 夫立宗法理應更以餘法為因成立此法。若即成立有法為有。或立為無。

T32n1628\_p0001b29(01) 如有成立最勝為有。現見別物有總類故。

T32n1628\_p0001c01(00) 或立為無。不可得故。其義云何。

1. 最勝：primordial matter (pradhāna), postulated to be existent by the Sāṅkhyas 數論 (Tucci, 沈劍英, 鄭偉宏), primary and unevolved matter or nature (M.W.)

2. \*總類：二十三諦總屬於自性諦 (沈劍英、鄭偉宏), general analogy (Tucci),

3. 不可得：Chinese Buddhism's key term, e.g. in 《金剛經》etc., 桂紹隆：anupalabdhi, non-cognition

4. TRANSLATION:

夫立宗法，理應更以餘法為因成立此法。若即成立有法為有、或立為無，如有成立「最勝為有，現見別物有總類故」，或立為「無，不可得故」，其義云何？

(The question might be proposed): “whenever a thesis-predicate is to be established, it should be the case that another predicate (to the thesis-subject) be employed as the proof to establish the [thesis]-predicate. But suppose we are to establish that the subject exists or not, for instances, to establish, if it is the positive case, that “the primordial matter (pradhāna) exists, because all that appears to the aware being must belong to the ultimate class of the primordial matter”, or to establish, if it is the negative case, that “nothing (no primordial matter really) exists, because it cannot be perceived”, what is the \*meaning/matter?

T32n1628\_p0001c02(05) 此中但立別物定有一因為宗。不立最勝故。無此失。

T32n1628\_p0001c03(01) 若立為無。亦假安立不可得法。

T32n1628\_p0001c04(05) 是故亦無有有法過。若以有法立餘有法。或立其法。

1. 假安立：in a figurative sense (upacāra, Tucci); 假 by means of;

2. \*有有法過：有「有法的過失」（因談論對象不屬於有法之範疇）

3. TRANSLATION

此中但立「別物定有\*一因」為宗，不立最勝，故無此失。若立為「無」，亦假安立「不可得法」，是故，亦無有有法過。

Here (in the case of the Sāṅkhyas) the thesis to be established is actually that \*any thing (that belongs to the 23 categories) must belong to the most general category of having a cause – not the existence of the primordial matter, so there is no flaw. As for (the Buddhist case trying to) establish that nothing (no primordial matter) exists, [the proposition] is completed by means of verbally attributing “that which cannot be perceived (anupalabdhi)” to [the inference], and hence there is no such an flaw of the objects of substance (for both the subject/thesis and the predicate/reason are verbally figurative, and the criteria for the objects of substance does not work in this case).

4. The four kinds of pseudo-proof consists of a complete condition for a proper proof, namely, (1) the subject in the thesis, the predicate in the thesis and the proof-predicate must be or can be determined in cognitions; (2) the relation that the predicate in the thesis is attributed to the subject of the thesis is problematic, namely, to be proved – but the relation must be possible; (3) the relation that the proof-predicate can be attributed to the thesis-subject must be valid. Required is also (4) the assumption that the relation between the proof-predicate and the thesis-predicate must be valid in a way that the former could help establish the relation that the latter can be attributed to the thesis subject. All of the four folds of the condition must correspond to the necessary condition of cognition so that the validity of the condition for a proper proof makes sense. However, on the other hand, the discussion about the ultimate truth, namely, about the existence of the primordial matter, or the non-perceivable, is tricky.

If the three parts of the inference, namely, the thesis-subject, thesis-predicate and the proof-predicate must be determinable, that is, must be possible for our experience, and if the structure of these parts must be determinable as well, the object pre-cognition becomes problematic. Dignāga's discussion about the fourth kind of pseudo-proof and the following discussion about the Sāṅkhyas's and Buddhist's inference about the existence of primordial matter exactly rests upon the middle of the problem.

If an object could become a candidate for a proper thesis-subject, it must be perceivable. If a perceivable object could become real, its properties must be on the one hand distinguished/recognized and on the other hand perceived as attributing to it. Now, if something which is never possible to be an object of cognition, what could be the status of "its predicates"?

To understand the part about Sāṅkhyas requires further research. However, the Buddhist part is quite clear. The thesis-subject and the thesis predicate are made only in a figurative sense. And this is out of the scope of the existing objects 有法. This indicates that the scope of inference is restricted with the cognizable objects and states of affairs. If it is the case, then the role of logic in the context of Buddhist soteriology becomes more interesting.

In 《金剛經》(Jing gang jing), it is said that “若見諸相非相，即見如來”; in 《法華經》，it is said that “一切諸相，皆悉空寂”、“無有二相，猶如虛空”; 傳大士 attaches the verse to the Jing gang jing paragraph that “如來舉身相，為順世間情，恐人生斷見，權且立虛名，假名三十二，八十也空聲”; similarly, 川禪師 attaches that “有相有求俱是妄，無形無見墮偏枯，堂堂密密何曾問，一道寒光燦太虛”; 《中論觀法品》：“如佛經中說，斷有斷非有，是故知涅槃，非有亦非無”; if the jin gang jing verse is understood, following the fa hua jing verse, as “if it is perceived that both the representations and pre-representations are both illusory, the ultimate true status is perceived”, then the attempt of Nāgārjuna's “一切實、非實，亦實亦非實，非實非非實，是名諸佛法” and the attempt of such a Buddhist logic of Dignāga becomes identical.

At the Nāgārjuna side, the attempt is understood as four steps: (1) to know it exists, where our consciousness arises, (2) to know it does not exist, where our consciousness ceases, (3) to know that it exists (when our consciousness arises) and that it does not exist (when our consciousness ceases), where it is known that no matter that it exists or that it does not exist, it is both merely the product of our consciousness, hence (4) to know that it (the non-perceivable) is not a matter of existence, i.e., the attribution of existing or not-existing has nothing to do with it. The logic supporting a proper inference explains in an exhaustive fashion the products, and their relations, of the arising and ceasing of our consciousness. When the exhaustiveness is known, that is, when all the cognizable are restricted within the scope of representation, namely, when all the representations and the non-representations are taken “merely” as representations (which has its validity ONLY within its own domain), the true nature of everything is “perceived” – the non-perceivable is “perceived”.

To put in dimensional model, let's say (x,y), while x is the dimension of existence while y is the dimension of non-existence. (1, 0) is to know it is; (0,1) is to know it is not; (1,1) is to know it is and it is not; (0,0) is to know it neither is nor is not. The empirical sequence, the sequence these possibilities gets aware of, is: (1,0) then (0,1) then (1,1) then (0,0); however, with a transcendental concern, it is nonetheless the case that the four possibilities of (1,0), (0,1), (1,1) & (0,0) must be altogether already there so that there could be possibly (1,0) and (0,1). The "transcendental logic" is then the frame (x,y), whose operation makes each of the four possibilities possible as real ((1,0) & (0,1)), or ideal "-- valid figurative" ((1,1) & (0,0)).

Edited 5 time(s). Last edit at 10/21/2010 02:58AM by gustav.