

gustav / October 07, 2010 10:34AM

[Pseudo-thesis, proof, and facts \[Dignāga's Nyāyamukha\]](#)

T32n1628_p0001b17(02) [color=#9999CC]即為善說。[/color]由是。若有彼此不同許。定非宗法。

T32n1628_p0001b18(00) 如有成立聲是無常。眼所見故。

T32n1628_p0001b19(04) 又若敵論不同許者。如對顯論所作性故。

T32n1628_p0001b20(04) 又若猶豫如依煙等起疑惑時。成立大種和合火有。

T32n1628_p0001b21(00) 以現煙故。或於是處有法不成。

T32n1628_p0001b22(03) 如成立我其體周遍於一切處。生樂等故。

T32n1628_p0001b23(03) 如是所說一切品類所有言詞皆非能立。

T32n1628_p0001b24(04) 於其同品有非有等。亦隨所應當如是說。

1.*顯論：vyākaraṇam. The school admits that sound appears by means of the satisfaction of condition of all the aware beings, but does not admit it is produced by the satisfaction of condition, for they hold that the sound itself as soundness has its OWN self-standing body.

2.大種和合火：According to 沈劍英, fire in ancient India is divided in 性火 elementary fire & 事火 real fire, the former is the elementary force of fire which exist in every material objects, while the latter is real burning fire which consists of the four elements: earth, water, fire and wind, and derived from the material elements (Tucci).

3.我其體週遍於一切處：我 (ātman), self, whose status as substance is rejected by Buddhists. 體 is taken as the characteristic of being the substance extensive in space and continue in time. From the perspective of critical epistemology, since every object of cognition must occur in (form of) space and time, the cognition of every object can be accompanied with feelings of the subject. (Tucci also holds similar interpretation, while 沈劍英 holds another interpretation: every aware being has soul, because every aware being can produce the feelings such as joy).

4.TRANSLATION:

由是：(1) 若有彼此不同許，定非宗法，如有成立「聲是無常，眼所見故」；又(2) 若論敵不同許者，如對顯論所作性故；又(3) 若猶豫，如依煙等起疑惑時，成立「大種和合火有，以現煙故」；或(4) 於是處有法不成，如成立「我其體周遍於一切處，生樂等故」。如是所說一切品類所有言詞皆非能立，於其同品有、非有等，亦隨所應，當如是說。

Following the above reason: (1) when both parties of the debate CANNOT agree with it (the predicate to the subject of the thesis), it must not be a proper predicate to the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharmā), for instance, to establish "sound is impermanent, because it is seen by the eyes"; nor (2) when the opponent CANNOT agree with it, for instance, to establish in the heart of a *vyākaraṇam opponent that "[sound is impermanent], because it is produced (which is not admitted by the vyākaraṇam)"; nor (3) when there's indetermination, for instance, when there is a doubt about [identification of] the smoke, from the observation of which it is [nonetheless] established that "there truly is the real fire produced from the material elements, because smoke appears"; or (4) [when] the substance (dharmin) CANNOT be possible at the situation, for instance, to establish "self (ātman) is pervasive, because it [can] produce feelings such as joy etc. [in all instances of consciousness]", (while, as Buddhists hold, there is no possibility for self to be substance). The above-mentioned, exhaustive kinds of verbal proofs do not make proper inference (sādhana), and as for the decision of [belonging to] the same group [of objects] and the other categories, (the criteria for the proper inference) have to be effective as well accordingly.

5.CANNOT: The discussion here follows the previous topic beginning with "令彼憶念本極成故...", namely, the goal of the inference is to help recollect the knowledge (in the opponent), and every empirical debate must be eventually determinable. That the empirical fact (not in an external-realistic point of view but in an epistemological sense) is always there for reference is the ground negating the four kinds of pseudo-thesis, so the categorization of the four kinds of pseudo-thesis must be originated in the logical function of judgment and hence must be conditional. Thus the translation with the term "CAN" or "CANNOT" is intended to indicate the nature of condition and to respond to the previous topic.

6.The relation between the predicate in the thesis and the predicate in the proof – why the criteria for proper thesis HAS TO be involved with proof?

The topic here is about the thesis, the criteria for proper thesis, but the criteria offered here focus on the predicate in the proof. The oddity proves that the logic formulation here is not formal, but empirical and cognition-dependent. The assumption in the formulation here include: (1) there must be valid objective facts (not in an external-realistic sense) which become experience only through the necessary condition of cognition; (2) there must be, following (1), valid objective (as well) categorization of the developments of the facts. Unless with assumption (1), to help recollect memories about the dharmin's properties (including the predicate in the subject of the thesis and the predicate in the proof) cannot on the one hand happen at all and on the other hand cannot promote the establishment of the inference. Unless with assumption (2), the proof cannot be effective in the inference. To spell out the assumptions and their "operation", we have to introduce the critical epistemology in the interpretation.

7. The fourth kind of improper thesis & Buddhist soteriology

If the Buddhist soteriology aims at unfolding the ineffable, whose self-nature (svhabava) and then its substance are rejected, the fourth kind of pseudo-thesis seems to rule out the room for the inference of this kind – any Buddhist doctrinal statement seems to be no topic of inference. Yet, the rejection for the ends of Buddhist soteriology to become the topic of inference turns out to be a contra-proof which on the one hand proves that all that we know is but representational and conditional, and on the other hand leaves room for the ineffable. Similar to Kant's religious attempt. We ran into the problem when reading “若非違義言聲所遣，如立一切言皆是妄” as well.

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