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[Logic and Reality \[Dignāga's Nyāyamukha\]](#)

Logic and Reality [Dignāga's Nyāyamukha, hetus tri-rūpaḥ]

EXAMPLE:

It is known that there is fire in the mountain,
 because smoke can be observed in the mountain,
 like the kitchen ranges etc. from which smoke can ONLY (eva) be observed
 and unlike the lake etc. from which smoke can NEVER (naiva) be observed.

ANALYSIS in NM:

Elements:

1. 有法 (dharmin, object of inference) = the mountain (which is in possession of the property (dharma) fire)
2. 因法 (liṅga, inferential mark) = the smoke
3. (宗) 同品 (sajātīya/tattulya/sapakṣa[1]; similar case/ similar to/the subject, similar instances) = kitchen ranges etc.[2]
4. (宗) 異品 (vijātīya/asapakṣa/vipakṣa[3], dissimilar instances) = lake etc.
5. 定有 (eva, only)
6. 遍無 (naiva, never)

Formulation:

Three parts of the formal condition[4]:

遍是宗法性 (I) The relation that a dharmin is in possession of the dharma to-prove could be determined/inferred with the reason (hetu) that the liṅga is observed to be possessed by the dharmin, and

同品定有性 (II) A valid reason (hetu) must contain a liṅga whose connection to the dharma in thesis MUST be proved (eva) by all the similar instances (all the dharmins in a group always in possession of the liṅga in connection with the dharma to-prove)

異品定無性 (III) and MUST be disproved (naiva) by all the dissimilar instances (all the dharmins out of the group in possession of the liṅga in connection with the dharma to-prove).

META-ANALYSIS:

It is obvious that we know various entities fill up the space through time, and the dynamic inclinations of development of these material entities can be classified in groups. The validity of classification allows for the formal condition of inference analyzed above – only when such validity is accepted, the determination of the dharmin-dharma relation in the thesis is ever acceptable and the “similar instances” can be distinguished from the “dissimilar instances”. Yet, from the point of view of later Dignāga in *Pramanasamuccaya* (PS), as well as from the point of view of any other form of critical epistemology, the validity is not convenient. On the contrary, the investigation into the validity exactly results in indicating the non-triviality and then the representational nature of such validity. After all, without this concern, a Buddhist logic cannot self-justified in the outset establishing the proper formulations for the “material entities out there in space and time”.

Later Dignāga in PS ostensibly establishes a common agreement with Sautrāntika on the validity of the world as represented (suspending the issue of whether there be anything non-representational corresponding to the representations). But his essay constructing the mental means/condition of such a world represented tacitly implies that we Mahayana Buddhists have got an own groundwork, which is needed in the opponent's position as well, while, as Nāgārjuna had succeeded in refuting, a successful groundwork according to the external-realistic position is still in await.

In the following, I try to introduce a brief epistemological support for the logic formulation.

A conscious being gets him- or herself directly engaged in “the world in space and time” by on the one hand receiving anything cognized into the sensible form of space and time and on the other hand contributing the object-ness in the reception. This is required for admitting the conformity between the akara (form) of the visya (object) in visyajñāna (consciousness of the object), i.e., artharūpa (form of the entity/object), and the akara of

“tatjñāna”, i.e., the jñāna of that jñāna (the consciousness of that consciousness), in anubhava (experience, perception), i.e., anubhavarūpa[5].

The two-fold action of cognition, in other words, rephrases the above obvious knowledge of the world:

Owing to the cooperation of the faculty receiving “it” in spatio-temporal form and the faculty contributing objectness for “it”, the world as well as the entities filling inside are altogether appeared on the one hand as directly known (as inside) and on the other hand as outside in object-units and in space and time. Arising from the former source of knowledge, manifoldness to be united in the affinity of consciousness is given; from the latter, the uniting structure making possible the manifoldness is contributed. Upon such an epistemic-ontological ground, we come to know that various entities filling up the space through time.

By admitting such a cooperation as the necessary condition of all possible experience, all possible entities to be cognized will then be brought in consciousness as unities which can be logically operational (no matter as forming an ontological basis or as relations thought in understanding). On the other hand, the validity is not only limited in thinking but also effective in objects “themselves” pre-thinking (yet still in space and time). I have no space here for more detailed explanation regarding the two-fold action of cognition and how the logical measures is effective in materials.

To be brief, the object-ness in all possible objects, which is contributed in cognition, allows for the following facts: (1) entities have to be known (by a conscious being) as objects; (2) a consciousness unity is an affinity of manifold dharmas, the unity of which is contributed in cognition, the manifold dharmas as content of which are given in perception, while the manifold dharmas as units of which are contributed in cognition as well; (3) (2) allows for repeatable empirical rules and consequently allows for classification.

Footnote:

1. [Katsura 2007 Taipei Lecture 2](http://buddhica.nccu.edu.tw/) (location: <http://buddhica.nccu.edu.tw/>)
2. Śaṃkarasvāmin's Nyāyapraveśa, Xuanzang's translation: 「謂所立法均等義品說明同品」、「異品者謂於是處無其所立」 (大正藏)
3. Ibid.
4. Śaṃkarasvāmin's Nyāyapraveśa, Xuanzang's translation: hetus tri-rūpaḥ 因三相: pakṣa-dharma-tvaṃ sapakṣe sattvaṃ vipakṣe ca asattvaṃ iti 遍是宗法性、同品定有性、異品遍無性。(郭良鑒 1999) The three items constituting the condition of a valid inference are in a difference of aspects, since the three items are entitled “tri-rūpaḥ, 三相,” as the distinction between the “two-fold appearance” (the conformed objective form of the object artharūpa and subjective form of the object anubhavarūpa) in PS.
5. PS I, 11ab.

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