

gustav / May 07, 2009 05:50PM

[Report on Dan Arnold's Article "Is Svasamvitti Transcendental?"](#)

I. The Intent:

According to Paul Williams, two understandings of svasamvitti 自證 in Indian tradition are: (a) one of the Madhyamika中觀 thinks such as Candrakirti月稱 and Santideva寂天 who understand svasamvitti as “other cognition,” i.e., a special kind of intentional cognition which is always implied and believed to cooccur with all cognitions (as long as an object of cognition is obtained, it must be the object of svasamvitti as well) and thus vulnerate Dignaga's view of svasamvitti for “infinite regression”; (b) one innovated by Santaraksita寂護 who believes svasamvitti as a feature of cogniton: “intentionality” – as constitutive of subjectivity.

Arnold agrees with Santaraksita寂護's position, and believes his understanding of svasamvitti is similar with Kant's understanding of “transcendental unity of apperception,” and that the reconstruction of Santaraksita寂護's svasamvitti theory with Kant's conceptual framework gives us two advantages: (1) Candrakirti月稱's critique of svasamvitti can not, indeed, be thought to undermine Santaraksita寂護's; (2) there's a close parallel between the Indian debates regarding svasamvitti and the debates in post-Kantian philosophy regarding “transcendental unity of apperception.”

The thinking thread will be then:

- 1.Introduction to post-Kantian interpretations of transcendental unity of apperception;
- 2.Dignaga's svasamvitti theory (innovation of svasamvitti)
- 3.Candrakirti's commentary
- 4.Santaraksita's commentary with reference to Dignaga
- 5.Conclusion: Candrakirti's arguments fails to undermine Santaraksita's views

A remark:

Arnold thinks since svasamvitti自證 in Dignaga is perception現量, it cannot be something capable of being involved with “objective judgment” in Kant, while he thinks Santaraksita寂護's understanding of svasamvitti is open to entertaining something other than mere subjective occurrence as the locus of truth-- both of which together, perhaps, give the reason why he thinks Santaraksita is more similar to Kant and not Dignaga.

✕But I think this reading is not quite plausible. For, transcendental unity of apperception as the pre-condition for objectivity, and then as being involved with objective judgments, more precisely with objectification, does not imply at all that the condition itself cannot be an intuition-- as a intuitive condition!

II. Kant's “Transcendental Unity of Apperception”

- 1.Categories: the condition of all possible empirical knowledge
- 2.data of perception are discrete.
- 3.The condition of all possible experience: the imposition of some unifying coordination on the discrete data of perception; and the out-come: any knowledge has two sources, and thus has two forms: understanding and sensibility (sense and imagination), and thus concept and the intuition
- 4.Subjectivity must consist in the ordering of “synthesis.”
- 5.A Deduction: constructing his transcendental synthesis with perspective of “personal identity:” as begin with the notion that what we are thinking now is the same as what we thought a moment before, and all reproductions in the series of representations must presuppose a transcendental unity imparted in the formation of consciousness.
- 6.Problem to A Deduction: How the condition is related to the empirical self so that “I” know that all the representations are in series? Strawson tries to answer by giving his suggestion to Kant at this point that “the ascription of states to a subject requires the subject itself to be an intuitable object for which there exist empirically applicable criteria of identity” (Strawson, 1966, p. 107). This is believed by Arnold to be already considered in Kant's B Deduction under the term “I-think”.

Kant: (Arnold, p. 81) “That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition. All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the “I-think” in the same subject in which this manifold is found. But this representation is an act of spontaneity, that is, it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it pure apperception, to distinguish it from empirical apperception, or again, original apperception, because it is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation “I think” (a representation which must be capable of

accompanying all other representations, and which in all consciousness is one and the same), cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation." (CPR B 131-132)

7. Robert Pippin (1989) (Arnold, p. 81) : there are two readings of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception in post-Kantian German philosophy : (1) Logical condition reading: "Kant is clearly referring to apperception as a logical condition, that it must be logically possible for me to ascribe my representation to myself." (Pippin, p.20) (2) Cartesian reading, e.g., Fichte: "all consciousness, including what Kant is calling experience, is a species of self-consciousness, representing objects is at the same time attending to the mind's activities and the objects."

8. Arnold writes, the Cartesian reading of Kant, like Fichte's (Kant's transcendental unity of apperception theory implies that all instances of intentional consciousness must be accompanied by an additional intentional consciousness), is similar to the Madhyamikas 中觀 Candrakirti 月稱 and Santideva 寂天's reading of Dignaga's svasamvitti 自證.

Both the Madhyamikas reading and the Cartesian reading faces the vulnerable issue "infinite regress."

Besides, first, Kant has said, as repeated by Arnold, that transcendental apperception has to be divided from empirical apperception, and that self-consciousness "while generating the representation 'I think' cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation;" secondly, anyone who follows interpretations such as Fichte's will be unable to distinguish Kant's position from Des Cartes's, which is also a distinction Kant wants to make--

Against Des Cartes, Kant writes: "In the synthetic original unity of apperception I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition." (B157)

-- This looks like a problem when comparing Kant with Dignaga, for to Dignaga svasamvitti is perception.

✕ But I think the problem is not really a problem. There's subtle systematic discrepancy so that the parallel of intuition-concept and perception 現量-inference 比量 fails to work here!! A quick explanation is: Kant regards the transcendental unity as the logical cause; while Dignaga regards svasamvitti as the real result!!

If we read on what Kant writes after the quoted above: "Now in order to know ourselves, there is required in addition to the act of thought, which brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, a determinate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given; it therefore follows that although my existence* is not indeed appearance (still less mere illusion), the determination of my existence can take place only in conformity with the form of inner sense, according to the special mode in which the manifold, which I combine, is given in inner intuition." (B157) Also, a note is given to the "my existence" in the quote above: "The 'I think' expresses the act of determining my existence." -- I would suggest that "this representation is a thought, not an intuition" should be read as "this representation is a thought, not an empirical intuition" meaning that the transcendental apperception does not give an additional empirical intuition, i.e., appearance, to any instance of consciousness, which is quite in conformity with the "logical condition" reading, or Santaraksita's reading.

9. Arnold repeats Strawson's interpretation of the logical condition, or the intentionality side to give operational conceptual tools for reconstructing Santaraksita's svasamvitti theory: what is necessary to all our possible experience is that there be a distinction of what is aware of and what is aware, and that's all. That is, the necessity has its basis at the structure of intentionality, which can be featured as "self-referential." -- Any particular state or experience must be "owned" by a subject for a state or experience is individuated with reference to its subject.

III. Svasamvitti in Dignaga

1. Dignaga's position: Twofold appearing of cognition-- (Arnold, 87; Hattori's trans.) "Cognition arises as appearing twofold: [having the appearance of itself [as subject], and the appearance of an object. In terms of these two appearances, the one that is apperception is the one that is the result."

"In this regard, it is not the case, as for proponents of external objects, that a pramana is something other than its result; rather, there arises a cognition, existing as the result, containing the representation of an object; and this very [cognition] is understood as comprising the action [of a putatively 推定的 ! 'instrumental' pramana. Hence, the action is figuratively designated as being the pramana, though [the latter is in fact] devoid of activity. "

"Thus, [it should be understood that the roles of the means of cognition (pramana) and the object to be cognized (prameya), corresponding to differences of [aspect of] the cognition (grahakakara), are [only] figuratively 象徵地、比喻地 ! attributed to the respective distinctive factor in each case. "

"That which appears is the object known (prameya), while the pramana and its result are, [respectively,] the subjective aspect of [the cognition] (grahakakara) and the cognition [itself]; hence, these three are not separated."

✕ The above statement is correspondent with the meaning of Kant's "transcendental"!

2. "Perception 現量" in Dignaga is not necessarily "sensory," but "whatever cognition immediately, free of conceptual elaboration. (Arnold 87).

3. In so far as Dignaga could be regarded as a representationalist epistemologist as such!

Richard Hyes: the only thing which we are immediately acquainted is the contents of our own mental states, and this cannot be mistaken! – can provide with, Arnold implies, the insight of svasamvitti, since svasamvitti is the only really occurrent sort of cognition.

But, what if Dignaga should be regarded as a strong idealist? – The difference is only the following: either to be an ontological claim that mental events are all that exist, or an epistemological claim that mental events are all that we can directly know. Make no difference to the problem:

If subject-object is a two-aspect relation, as Dignaga himself has characterized as “twofold” relation, how the subjective aspect can seem phenomenologically to mean something objective?

4. Arnold concludes that the materials so far in Dignaga could be read like Ficht's reading of Kant: the twofold relation is one between a cognition and an always-accompanying self-awareness, and then will fall into the issue of infinite regress.

✕ But I think Dignaga's own material is enough to refute the Cartesian or Madhyamika 中觀 reading. If we take Dignaga's view already as transcendental, i.e., the logical relation is a substratum-substance relation, not a previous cause-subsequent effect, the result itself and the cause are not separable, and then there's no question who accompanies whom!

Candrakirti's critique

1. Candrakirti thinks “svalaksana 自相” in the conventional meaning is “defining characteristic,” but Dignaga takes it for something as “uniquely particular objects of perception.” If it is the latter, then one lacks the referents of words – only the defining characteristic is or has properties at all. If svalaksana is not or does not have sole properties which can define itself, but is an object, it requires then another properties to define itself, and that would be svalaksana—again. Candrakirti thinks Dignaga's theory of apperception is only to serve as the “another” svalaksana which defines the known svalaksana— infinite regress.

2. In Madhyamaka's view, there's no existence of apperception. (✕ Echoed with Kant's position that apperception is a thought, not an empirical intuition.) “I think” does not exist, and there's no operation of a characteristic without a locus.

Santaraksita's innovation: Svasamvitti as a defining characteristic, not an action

1. Dharmottara 法上's revision of Dharmakirti 法稱's interpretation. Focus shift from pramana as instrument to pramana as the completion, pramanaphala 量果; from causal relation (produced and producer) to intentional relation (intended and the intentional). He refutes the position to take svasamvitti as an invariable concomitance with the causally efficacious object that produced the cognition, for the causation does not guarantee intentionality, e.g. sprouts are not intentional though the production of themselves are necessarily in concomitance with seeds. On the contrary, the result which must be a completion of the whole process including the function of intentionality, has to be intentional. – phenomena are better, as long as we admit that phenomena are necessarily intentional, than the putative assumption.

2. Moksakaragupta's explanation of Dharmottara: the relation of object-agent has been replaced by the relation of intended-intentional

3. Santaraksita understands svasamvitti as defining feature of cognition, which indicates being distinguished from the dead objects. And the core of that feature is intentionality.

4. Santaraksita thinks it's not good to interpret Dignaga's apperception theory in an agent-instrument-object analysis, for intentionality is not guaranteed; rather, it's better to treat apperception as the constitutively subjective aspect that defines any cognition as a cognition.

That is, svasamvitti does not exemplify intentionality, it itself is the intentionality.

Moreover, in so far as cognition is distinct from putatively material objects, it makes more sense for the direct objects of cognition to be of the same nature, to be of the nature of intellect, ✕ so that they can be connected with each other as an intellectual web.

5. And since svasamvitti is not any instance of intentionality but the intentionality itself, i.e., since the relation between the object of cognition and the cognition is characterized as intentional rather than causal (agent-instrument-object), there's no problem with infinite regress, as Candrakirti criticizes.

[心得]

首先，我認為Dan Arnold這篇文章不論就論點或闡述，完全沒有涉及到是否自證是先驗與否，雖然他所謂陳那之後的兩種對陳那自證說的詮解之間的爭辯的確與康德之後兩派對康德先驗統覺說的詮解之間的爭辯在系統意義上有雷同，但我認為要說明寂護之說能為陳那辯護且駁斥中觀月稱的批評，最多只需要引進「意向性」這個概念即可，完全不需要提及康德及後康德的德國哲學發展，就算不用引進「意向性」這一個概念，在陳那、月稱以及寂護三者的材料內便能達到。所以，我打算先在這三者所有的材料內部來重新摘要Dan Arnold的論述梗概即可，然後在該梗概上約略介紹一下後康德德國哲學發展上與此雷同之處。爾後，我會聚焦在陳那的自證說，並嘗試就其材料內部的系統意義以及康德的先驗理論進行初步的比較工作。

根據Dan Arnold引Hatorri的譯文，陳那認為認知升起時便具有兩個面向，一方面具有對認知者自身的自我意識這樣的表象，另一方面具有對象的表象。而因這樣的雙重面向性，所謂統覺者即是結果。不像實在論者那樣把持著量異於其結果的立場，陳那認為當認知運作時，其結果就包含了對象，而整個認知譬喻地包含著一個（被推定的）量的運作，但量就陳那自身的說法並不具動作性。陳那強調，作為認知手段的量以及被認知的對象，只是在每一個認知的例子當中截然不同的面向而已。而在一個認知當中，被意識到的是對象、而這個認知屬於主體的面向者是量，認知完整的自身是量的結果，這三者是無法被分離的。

這樣的自證說，根據Dan Arnold，在中觀派月稱的理解中，把自證當作一個必然伴隨著一切認知的一種直接的覺察，即當我認識到一棵樹，這樣的認識必須伴隨著一個關於自我的認識。月稱批評，自相素樸的語用中，意指「定義自身的特性」，而這樣的特性是語言的所指對象（intension），是認識對象的本質（extension），一旦被陳那扭曲為「一種特殊的現量」，語言便失去指涉對象，而且當自相不再是定義自身的特性，而需要另外一個東西來定義它，那個東西還是會需要另外一個東西來定義它，而月稱認為陳那的自證理論，就是作為另外一個特殊的現量去定義一個認知經驗當中的現量，而這並不能自圓其說反而會陷入一種無窮後退。此外，就中觀立場，「我」並不存在，而任何的運作都需要一個存在著的發生位置，假若沒這個位置，其實也不需要自證這樣的「推定」。

根據Dan Arnold，寂護順著（雖然寂護老於法上，但Dan Arnold認為以法上為背景更容易感受到寂護的價值）法救將對量的關注焦點從量作為手段轉移到量作為結果，以及將量、果與對象的關係也從量為因、果為果而人為執行者這樣的因果、執行關係，轉換成一種在結果上的被關注者與關注者的關係，從而提出自證是一種規約認知之為認知的特性，而因此特性區分出有智性生命者與無智性生命者的差異。認知是有智性生命的，而其特性是在「結果」上關注對象與關注者之間有一種循環因果的關係：我關注的對象造成我對我關注對象的關注，而我對我關注對象的關注造成我關注到我關注的對象。這一來，修改了簡單因果關係解釋之不足：因為一個結果因為某個原因而被造成，並不保證這個結果是關注於那個原因的，如種子為芽的因，但芽並不關注著種子，這樣的發展並不是智性生命者的發展；另一來，也以接受這種特性的循環以及消除自證知作為一個特殊的現量這樣的可能性，而僅是一個限制、定義認知之為認知的發展圖界的特性，駁斥了中觀的無限後推攻訐。

Dan Arnold指出，這樣的歷程也發生在康德即後康德德國哲學當中，此說當然正確。康德提出先驗統覺理論以解釋一切經驗的條件裡，便先驗地以統一的形式限制了、並始經驗成為可能，因而經驗總是統一在一個主體的。Fichte便發展出一個絕對主體，這個絕對主體一直伴隨著任何的認知，所以所有的認知都在經驗主體的伴隨之下被統一成一個連貫的發展。這樣的解讀，同樣因其無限後退為人所詬病，因為對主體的認識—自我，也是一種認識，也需要一個絕對主體去統一進來這個認識。有另一派人如Strawson則把康德的先驗統覺理解成一種邏輯條件，而因著這個邏輯條件而生成的認知，具有意向性。這也比較接近康德的原意，康德自己也講「當我思這樣的一種（伴隨在任何一個心智的內在確定性，且在所有的意識片段當中都是同一的）心智的內在確定性被生成時，自我意識本身無法再被任何其他的內在確定性伴隨」（CPR B 131-132）。他還說「在綜合原初的統覺統一當中，我對我自己的意識並不是一種我的表象，也不是我在我內部存在的意識，而純粹是我存在。而這樣的一種內在確定性是一個想法，不是一種直觀」（B157）。

Dan Arnold在此發覺，康德把先驗統覺當作一種想法，而不是直觀，且因這種先驗統覺總關涉到客體的判斷，而該類判斷以概念為決定性的基礎，於是認為與陳那的自證知有出入，因為陳那的自證是一種現量。不過我在這裡反對Dan Arnold的意見。我認為這裡有幽微的系統性差異以至於我們若未釐清，不能隨便類比陳那的現量與比量於康德的直觀與概念。一個初步的說明是，康德看待先驗統覺的統一是從把它當作一種邏輯的原因這樣的方向來看，而陳那是把自證當作一種發生的結果這樣的方向來看，而這樣的差異進一步指名的話，應該是康德以他的「先驗」觀念為核心架構，而陳那沒有。康德在Dan Arnold引的第二版（B 157）那段話後面，他還接著說：「為了要認識我們自己，還另外需要一個思考的動作，這個動作將每個可能的直觀的雜多統一在一個統覺中，那是一種確定式的直觀，透過此直觀被給予給主體。於是，雖然我的存在*斷非[經驗]表象（更不是幻象），而我自身的存在的確定性只能按照內感官的形式來發生，按照我所組構的並給予給內感官的雜多的特別模式」，而針對這個引言中的「我的存在」有個註腳：「這個「我思」所表達的，是確定我的存在動作。」我依此會建議這麼讀這個句子「這樣的一種內在確定性是一個想法，不

是一個直觀」：這樣的一種內在確定性是一個（先驗的）想法，不是一個經驗的直觀，意思是，先驗的統覺並不給予任何一個意識的片段一種特殊的「我、或我思」的經驗直觀（表象），而這已經展現出與所謂的邏輯條件式的解讀、或者寂護的解讀一致的方向了。

最後，按照Dan Arnold的題目「自證是否先驗？」，我會建議直接把康德的「先驗」的想法拿來比較是否「自證說」，或「自證」是先驗的，倘若答案肯定，則馬上我們能帶進先驗的特殊「因果關係」去幫陳那反駁中觀的無窮推論的批評，而寂護的說明只需拿來作為補充，而更不需要西方現代的意向性理論。凡先驗者，是藉由在現有、有限的經驗中進行的批判工作，而推定出的一切可能經驗的條件，而這樣的工作之所以可能，正因為這些一切可能經驗的條件以一種特殊關係先驗地「必然造成」這個現有經驗，所以在現在的有限經驗中，我們有理據去推定這樣的條件～這迴圈關係實際上是一切意向性自我指涉模型的根源，且是一種因果同時的同時因果。陳那首先認為認知有兩重性，在認知升起時同時意識到對象以及自身，另外他認為在一個認知當中，被意識到的是對象、而這個認知屬於主體的面向者是量，認知完整的自身是量的結果，這三者是無法被分離的，這樣的想法，隱含著的模型是量作為一種因而完整的認知是量的果，在果中包含著對象，也包含著我，倘若進一步，或者說借用先驗性，如同寂護所說自證不過就是一種制約認知發展歷程以及結果的具定義性性質，來解讀量與量果的關係：量是一切認識於是也是一切經驗的條件，而這條件中隱含一種以自我形式統一一切可能的認知與經驗於一個一貫性中，果必然都被意識成為量的樣態，如有概念性（比量）有直接性（現量），且都伴隨著一個自我意識（自證）。而以此再重新描述才剛提出的模型：量作為一個因，而任何一個完整的認知、經驗（或意識）的片段是為果，而在量當中以包含一種前在的統一條件將一切量的可能運作先於後在的實際運作給出能串連在一起成為一貫的條件，且又因著量的特性、有概念性有直接性，以至於我們能在運作中（即意識中）直接地（因現量）掌握對象的獨立性（因比量），又可一致地（因自證）將同一對象又按它的其他特性（因比量有一獨立「其他」特性，因現量又直接可掌握其其他「特性」）直接關聯於其自身（因自證可直接把兩種特性、兩個前後剎那的直接對象，直接一貫於一個統一的對象；因現量，於自證的統一性也有了依據可以把兩種特性歸給同一對象）。而由上面的模型的描述，若我們現觀我們的實際意識活動與該描述一致，那或許自證應該是直接的現量，否則我們的經驗不會是如同我們經驗的那樣。回過頭來，這又不與康德說的先驗統覺是為一種想法，而非經驗直觀相違，因為作為一個先驗的因，永遠是著於經驗但不是經驗，而這點，我想陳那或許也會同意，因為他也說自證雖看似活動但不具活動性，至少得這麼來反駁中觀的挑戰，而且還能保全自性空、我空等等基本立場。

Arnold, Dan. "Is Svasamvitti Transcendental? A Tentative Reconstruciton Following Santaraksita." Asian Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 77-111.

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