Re: Purposiveness (purposefulness) and Kant's "as-if" metaphor (Re: 試問怎麼讀《判斷力批判》?)

I think, when the categories of causality in understanding is employed, the purposive causality is something objective while the object of such purposive/causal relation is in space & time. Yet, the purposiveness in the as-if regularity of something no rule of understanding can be employed at all, is something a priori. If we are talking about natural causality, yes! it is true that the formal conformity between the awareness and the object of that awareness has nothing to do with causality. Based on this ground, Kant would have such as phrase that the "relation" in a judgment of taste is "purposiveness without a purpose" for a purpose is exactly the "concept" of understanding which is to be employed and contribute natural causality.

As for the case of morality, free will is the cause of a phenomenal act, and it is at this point Kant needs another kind of causality, because will, metaphorically speaking, links something pure/intelligent with something phenomenal. Such a causal relation itself must thus not be empirical.

However, Kant thinks that the content of a free will must be conceptual so that universal practical laws could be possible and so that the pure intelligent can be thinkable without any need of sensible expression, which we can also agree, and then, it is not obscure to mention about "causality" in the practical employment of reason.

As for the subjective purposiveness (the one without a concept/purpose), it refers to the relation between faculties. A typical case is the free play between understanding and imagination. Since the free play is the a priori ground for the pure pleasure, the play itself is something not in space and time; if the faculties have to have "effect" upon each other -- actually, this is a question to all faculties in all employment of reason, then how should we put such a causality. Doesn't "purposiveness without a purpose" means "causality without a concept"? How far can "such causality without a concept" and the causality of freedom different -- namely, what is the symbolic structure between beauty and morality? These are the questions we have to continue, I believe.

We can agree with Kant in the Critique of Practical Reason that there is no deduction for practical reason because morality does not appear -- only recognized intelligibly, but that the universal communicability of practical laws can be taken as the proof for the practical employment of pure reason ("preface").




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    Very clear explanation. So I learned, thanks for your professionalism. This tells apart academia from amateur.

    On the notion of "what is the symbolic structure between beauty and morality?" I am interested to know your view (and/or current status) regarding the connection between Kant's aesthetics and teleology deduction? An onging research topic I believe.

    -- A close look at the term causality is needed when it is used . We, as well as Kant use causal relationship so readily. The possible "recursion" constitutes Kant's concern and hardship - to explain judgment by using judgment.
    #1 boris (網址) 於 2011-05-12 13:45 (回覆)
    Thanks for the discussion!
    I look forward to further discussion with you.
    #1.1 gustav (網址) 於 2011-05-12 14:47 (回覆)


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